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Abstract 
 In this study Mormon theology has been brought to interact with the socio-
scientific study of emotion.  The expressed purpose of this dialogue has been to 
construct an introductory Latter-day Saint (or LDS) theology of emotion which is both 
canonically based and scientifically informed.  Specifically, this examination has 
highlighted three widely accepted general outcomes which emerge from the socio-
scientific study of emotion, namely the necessity of cognition for their emergence, the 
personal responsibility attached to their manifestation, and their instrumentality in 
facilitating various processes of human development and experience.  In turn, both the 
basic theological structure of Mormonism and its unique canonical texts have been 
examined to determine the extent to which LDS theology is compatible with such a 
three-fold definition of emotion.  As a result it was established that at this basic level of 
explanation science and Mormon theology undoubtedly share a common perspective. 
 In reaching this conclusion unique LDS texts have been examined with specific 
reference to their description of six common emotions: hope, fear, joy, sorrow, love, 
and hate.  For each of these emotional phenomena, which have further been classified 
into three separate groups of emotion types, the extensive report of textual evidence has 
consistently confirmed an implied presence of the outlined three-fold model of 
emotion.  Furthermore, specific attention to the Mormon theology of Atonement and to 
its significant role for the LDS framing and regulating of emotions has enlarged this 
theological examination to include a wider exploration of such areas as epistemology, 
cosmology, soteriology, and anthropology of Mormonism.  In this light, the theological 
and socio-scientific study of emotions in the LDS social/theological context may 
benefit from further academic research which could extend in the many possible 
directions of focus that have been suggested in the conclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Setting the Stage for an LDS Theology of Emotion 
 
 
Purposes and Objective 
 This work is an introductory examination on the nature of emotions within the 
theology of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  Since surprisingly little 
has been previously attempted or accomplished in this particular area of analysis I have 
favoured an approach which is preliminary rather than conclusive.  Indeed, the 
exploration of the role and significance of ‘emotion’ as a category of human 
phenomena can take numerous directions in the context of Mormon theology and 
virtually innumerable ones in the wider framework of Mormon practices, identity, and 
culture.  While in the latter realm of analysis the publication of various studies has 
initiated a discussion and interest, which is unlikely to disappear, the former level of 
discourse still lacks even the most cursory treatment.1  Thus, one of my purposes and 
hopes is to provide such a preliminary treatment and to make however small a 
contribution in a field of theological enquiry that I believe should receive greater 
attention. 
 In fact, emotional phenomena are at the core of the very definition of humanity, 
and the recent new-found interest in their study within a variety of humanistic and 
scientific disciplines adds support to what already appears as prima facie evidence for 
                                                 
1 Of particular relevance to the study of emotions in a Mormon context are various socio-psychological 
examinations on the relationship between LDS religiosity and mental health.  For an overview of studies 
of this kind in the twentieth century see Judd (1996), 112-24.  For even more recent studies see Overton 
(2005) . However, these analyses never deal with ‘emotion’ as a single category of experience.  Instead, 
it is discreet types of emotional phenomena (such as guilt, happiness, etc.) that function as a variable in 
some of these investigations.  Furthermore, since the main object of inquiry in several of these studies 
concerns the incidence of emotional disorders (depression, eating disorders, etc.) and the factors 
associated with their emergence the scope of their examination is limited to the realm of dysfunctional 
emotions. 
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this conclusion.2  At the same time, particularly in the context of a Western society, 
which is increasingly fragmented, both socially and academically, the 
interdisciplinarity that often emerges from this study functions as a powerful reminder 
of the utter complexity of the human being and of the inability of any single discipline 
to fully explain and to account for human dynamics and phenomena.  Then, it is only in 
the unity of philosophical, neurobiological, psychological, historical, anthropological, 
political, and other scientific approaches, methods, and languages that one may begin to 
grasp the true nature of emotion and begin to appreciate its complexity.   
However, for the person of faith, whose worldview is rooted in a theological 
anthropology as well as in a theistic cosmology and morality, scientific and humanistic 
understandings of emotion are often perceived as adversarial at worse and 
unsatisfactory at best.3  Hence, the need to bring natural and socio-scientific views of 
emotions in dialogue with theological perspectives, both to facilitate inclusiveness in 
the discussion as well as to enlarge the multidisciplinary input in the exploration.  In 
this context it is true that theology’s relationship with science has been and still is much 
more complicated than the relationship between two socio-scientific sub-disciplines 
like psychology and anthropology for example.  In fact, that science and religion may 
engage in fruitful dialogue is not a foregone conclusion.  I devote greater attention to 
this question in the section on methodology, but at this point I anticipate a general 
assumption that dialogue of some sort, to be later defined, is both possible and 
desirable.4  Therefore, a second purpose of this work is to provide an illustration of this 
form of dialogue in the micro reality of Latter-day Saint (or LDS, when used as an 
adjective) theology. 
 Finally, although my examination aims to lay a foundation for a generalized 
Mormon theology of emotion this theoretical groundwork would fail in both 
persuasiveness and coherence without direct engagement with at least a few specific 
paradigmatic ‘types’ of emotions.  In fact, since an already articulated Mormon 
                                                 
2 An indication of this popularity in academia is evidenced by the recent publication of several important 
handbooks that provide large amounts of information on various specific areas in the study of emotion.  
For example, in the years 2007 and 2008 the following significant contributions have come in print: 
Lewis, et al. (2008), Corrigan (2008), Coan and Allen (2007), Stets and Turner (2007), Gross (2007).  
Furthermore, several scientific journals now focus exclusively on the subject of ‘emotions’ and many 
articles and monographs regularly do the same. 
3 Freud (2005), 49.  Freud is perhaps the most well-known representative of this inimical view to a 
religiously-informed understanding of emotions.  See Strachey (1978). 
4 In this view I largely follow the opinion articulated by Dr. Fraser Watts, my Cambridge supervisor, in 
Watts (1997), 125-38. 
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theology of emotion does not presently exist the most significant evidence I was able to 
employ to begin to infer such a theology involved an analysis of individual usages of 
emotion-related terms within the LDS theological tradition.  Hence, it is a specific 
concern and objective of this analysis to identify and explain the usage of ‘emotion 
language’ in the theological discourse of Mormonism.  Specifically, I focus my 
attention on canonical texts unique to the tradition, a choice, which I later motivate by 
exploring the unique difficulties associated with the term ‘theology’ and the adjective 
‘authoritative’ in the Mormon context.  The specific emotions I have chosen for this 
theological examination include hope, fear, joy, sorrow, love, and hatred.  I provide 
greater details on the distinctive way in which I have classified these emotions in the 
next chapter where I also justify my attribution of a paradigmatic status to them. 
Unfortunately, space limitations have only allowed an engagement with these 
emotions, which is far from exhaustive.  Still, in my examination I aim to be 
sufficiently extensive to lend support for my conclusions by providing an appropriate 
illustration of these emotions in light of the theoretical concepts explicated throughout 
the text.  For this objective, and at least to limit the apparent risk of circularity, I have 
employed evidence from sources which are both external and internal to the Mormon 
tradition, namely socio-scientific understandings of emotion in the former case and 
canonical usages in the latter.  Thus, my construction of a preliminary LDS theology of 
emotion aims both at respecting the internal theological structure and authority of the 
tradition as well as at attempting to inform and possibly to enlarge it through some 
socio-scientific theories and conclusions, which emerge from sources that are external 
to it.  By so doing the boundaries between the internal and the external become more 
diffused yet the LDS theological perspective remains faithful to its nature since it does 
not simply tolerate such borrowings from other complementary sources of truth but 
actually advocates them on theological grounds.5 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 John Taylor, third President of the LDS Church, explain that Mormonism “embraces every principle of 
truth and intelligence pertaining to us as moral, intellectual, mortal and immortal being, pertaining to this 
world and the world that is to come.  We are open to truth of every kind, no matter whence it comes, 
where it originates, or who believes it.”  [Taylor (1941), 93].  Brigham Young similarly stated that 
Mormonism “embraces all truth and every fact of existence...and the sciences are facts as far as men 
have proved them...The Lord is one of the most scientific men who ever lived; you have no idea of the 
knowledge he has with regard to the sciences.”  [Journal of Discourses, 14:115-17] 
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General Methodology 
  At least three different adjectives may broadly be used to describe the 
methodological applications within this particular work, namely comparative, 
explorative, and integrative.  These distinctions highlight not only the various aspects 
of the method employed in the overall analysis as a unit, but they also pinpoint 
successive methodological stages in the development of my specific arguments and 
conclusions.  In fact, the first two chapters can be viewed as loosely comparative in 
nature, the next three as largely analytically explorative, and the last one as ultimately 
integrative of the previous comparative and explorative approaches.  Yet, while these 
terms may in general provide an illustrative picture at a superficial summative level to 
be truly meaningful they now require more precise descriptions, definitions, and 
clarifications. 
 Issues of method are particularly significant in those contexts where two or 
more distinct modes of discourse and explanation are brought to intersect and to 
interact.  Nowhere is this reality more evident than in the historically uncomfortable 
relationship between science and religion.  This centuries-old debate has focused both 
on the identification and limitation of mutual points of contact as well as on the 
affirmations and rebuttals of the supposed superiority of one epistemological field over 
the other.  The evidence in the literature suggests that the discussion is complex and not 
likely to reach a wide consensus at any time in the near future.6  In fact, the field on 
which debates centre seems to have enlarged in the last century or so.  While 
discussions on cosmology, cosmogony, and the origin of life still emerge, the debate 
between religion and the social sciences in particular is a relatively new area of 
potential conflict, which is at times actualized even in the political arena.  This 
particular make-up in the current debate may be traced to a variety of factors including 
the fairly recent academic ‘birth’ of several of the social sciences, their overall concern 
with many of the human and social factors on which religion is also focused, and their 
only quasi-scientific status in comparison to the ‘exact sciences’, which are generally 
held to possess greater empirical authority.  Therefore, to some extent at least, conflicts 
between religion and the social sciences emerge because the two are in some degree 
                                                 
6 A good introduction on the history of this relationship is found in Brooke (1991).  Ian Barbour, widely 
considered the father of the modern ‘science and religion’ field of study, has schematized the possible 
directions of this relationship in a famous four-fold typology (conflict, independence, dialogue, and 
integration) which appeared in several of his writings.  See Barbour (2002), 345-59.  Each of these ways 
of relating the two disciplines has in turn its own followers and proponents. 
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similar.  At the same time, there is no denying that they also differ in methods, 
language, and nature of basic assumptions.7 
 Some have suggested that conflicts could be avoided by emphasizing several of 
the differences between religion and the social sciences.  They have often done so by 
bracketing out either a separate dimension of reality, a separate kind of question, or a 
separate epistemological method at the foundation of each ‘discipline’ (if religion can 
be identified as such).8  As a result when the different modes of explanation are kept 
separate they are unlikely to come into conflict with each other and each is left 
undisturbed in its own pursuits and in their own levels of reality.  While this 
‘peacemaking’ approach has its truth and its positive function it is distorting of reality 
if taken to an extreme.  Conflict should be recognized and dealt with appropriately 
when social sciences and religion naturally seem to intersect either in their questions, 
suggestions, conclusions, or otherwise.  Of course there is no easy answer to the 
question of how conflict should be engaged ‘appropriately’ and given its complexity 
and only secondary relevance to my analysis I cannot directly address this question in 
this context.  However, in stating that religion and science should be allowed to 
dialogue, independent of the conclusions of such dialogue and at the ‘cost’ of engaging 
potential conflict I present my own normative methodological assumption that is 
present throughout my whole exploration. 
 Clearly, the specific manner in which I bring LDS theology and natural and 
socio-scientific theories of emotion into conversation could be rejected even when this 
same methodological assumption of dialogue is shared.  In fact, further disagreements 
may exist on the manner in which dialogical dynamics between science and religion 
should be carried out and on the ideal final result to be achieved.  Some may think that 
a form of assimilation is desirable, others may want a kind of integration, and still 
others ideally envisage some degree of interdependence.9  Whatever the differences in 
these objectives the form of dialogue which I bring to surface in this analysis should be 
evaluated in its specific and limited context and focus.  In fact, through this analysis it 
is not my intention to propose a universal model of psycho-religious interaction since 
the way in which I bring LDS theology to relate with scientific evidence on emotion 
                                                 
7 For a compelling philosophical critique of the social sciences from a Christian theological perspective 
see Milbank (2006), 51-144. 
8 A prominent example of this approach is the NOMA (non-overlapping magisterial) proposed in Gould 
(2001). 
9 An illustration of these various forms of interaction in the context of the relationship between 
psychology and Christianity is found in Collins, et al. (2000). 
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cannot necessarily be generalized to a variety of theological traditions and to 
numberless other socio-psychological phenomena evincing their own distinct 
complexities. Still, within its limited scope my analysis aims to provide a specific 
illustration of how some general standards of multi-disciplinary interaction can be 
conceptualized and applied in a particular theological context. 
 There are at least two such standards that I suggest to be important factors for 
the facilitator of such dialogue, namely transparency of approach, and respect for 
disciplinary independence.  By ‘transparency of approach’ I mean to highlight the 
significance of determining whether a particular study is to be conducted as a primarily 
theological or as a primarily socio-scientific examination.  Since we are dealing with 
contexts of interaction it is clear that both theological and socio-scientific perspectives 
will somewhat contribute to the dialogue.  However, locating oneself in a ‘neutral’ 
middle where theology and science are claimed to contribute equally to the discourse is 
wishful thinking at best.  In fact, theology and science generally make use of starkly 
different languages, they often build their own arguments on quite divergent 
assumptions, and they explore each other for different purposes and in different 
manners.  Therefore, the analyst is unavoidably led to make some choices in terms of 
language, methods, and assumptions that are usually closer to one discipline than the 
other.  It follows that, for example, it is one thing to conduct a study in the psychology 
of belief in the supernatural and quite another to write a biblical exegesis on what a 
specific pericope teaches about the nature of doubt.  In the former case the study is 
likely to appear as socio-scientific in method and language whereas in the latter case its 
main character will be theological.  The objects of both studies, at least partially, 
pertain to the realms of both psychology and religion, but the first study will be an 
exercise in the ‘psychology of religion’ whereas the second will be dealing with a kind 
of ‘theological psychology.’  The present study is undoubtedly primarily theological 
and is closer to a theological psychology than it is to a psychology of religion. 
 The second standard follows to some degree from this initial recognition.  To 
continue on the same line of example I personally find both a psychology of religion 
and a theological psychology valuable in their own right, but the degree to which, if at 
all, ‘psychology of religion’ should influence or change a particular theology or the 
degree to which, if at all, a theological psychology should find space and be integrated 
within mainstream secular psychology is unclear and debatable.  However, without 
going into the specific complexities of this cross-disciplinary potential, I find that 
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‘respect for disciplinary independence’ may at least function at the general level as the 
background through which these complex issues may be dealt.  Thus, for example, 
independence is maintained and respected if both psychology and theology are allowed 
to ‘receive’ such changes and cross-disciplinary influences in the degree to which their 
own disciplines find relevant, persuasive, and acceptable.  Of course, in using these 
agentive terms I do not wish to anthropomorphize theology and psychology as such, 
but to point to all those rules, limits, dynamics, and factors that give these disciplines a 
particular identity in specific contexts and times.  Thus, in writing what is primarily an 
LDS theology of emotions in light of socio-psychological studies and discussions on 
emotions I bring these latter conclusions to bear inasmuch as Mormon theology is open 
to such additions and contributions.  Thus, they are included with the purpose of 
informing the theology within its own constitutive boundaries rather than with the 
purpose to fully shape it or reshape it beyond its fundamental identifying markers.  
Fortunately for my endeavour I find that in its core affirmations and claims LDS 
theology is largely open to this kind of scientific contribution, although with some 
obvious limitations.  As these limitations emerge throughout my analysis I explicitly 
recognize them and discuss some of their implications. 
 More specifically, the particular methodological structure and trajectory with 
which I have chosen to carry out my examination is meant to be grounded in and to 
illustrate this principle of ‘respect for disciplinary independence.’  Thus, the 
comparative, explorative, and integrative approaches mentioned at the beginning of this 
section function in their unison and in their particular sequential arrangement as an 
attempt to structure my analysis in boundary sensitive terms and presuppositions.  In 
fact, in the comparative section I begin by maintaining a separation between the socio-
scientific study of emotions and those aspects of LDS theology that largely relate to the 
topic of ‘emotion.’  I do so by devoting one chapter to each ‘discipline,’ the first to the 
social sciences and the second to LDS theology.  In this manner I allow them to ‘speak’ 
in their own terms, and I only identify general parallels between basic axioms of their 
respective perspectives.  By so doing I merely suggest that a potential for fruitful 
interaction is present, which makes the first two chapters ‘comparative’ only in a more 
implicit and indirect sense.  Parenthetically, although my distinctive selection of the 
theological aspects of Mormonism to examine has its potential limitations, especially in 
lacking comprehensiveness, the clear preference for LDS tenets about human nature is 
far from arbitrary.  In fact, given the universal significance of emotional phenomena in 
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the context of human experience, make-up, and aspirations I have found the theological 
anthropology of Mormonism (as I understand it) to represent fertile ground from which 
to gather these emotion-related theological foundations.   
With the third chapter I move from parallelisms to direct intersections as I 
explore the Mormon canonical texts’ treatment of prototypical emotions in light of a 
simplified schematic conceptualization, which emerges from the review of the socio-
scientific evidence on emotions in the first chapter.  Therefore, I explore LDS 
authoritative texts and begin to construe a Mormon theology of emotion through the 
tools and the evidence provided by a wider multidisciplinary study of emotional 
phenomena.  In the context of ‘respect for disciplinary independence’ this step is not 
problematic for a variety of reasons.  First, from the perspective of the social sciences 
the approach is characterized by a single directionality of the outward kind as the 
social-scientific theoretical framework on emotions is left intact and unaffected by this 
intersecting exploration.  Second, from the perspective of LDS theology I have already 
indicated that a generalized openness to influence from scientific conclusions is 
constitutive of its own identity.  Furthermore, the highlighted parallelisms of the first 
two chapters function to suggest a more specific degree of openness in the particular 
context of the study of emotion.  In other words, a priori obstacles to the engagement 
with and even selective absorption of knowledge from socio-scientific studies of 
emotion do not seem to exist within the LDS theological worldview.  Still, conflicts 
could emerge in more specific areas of focus, but it is not the purpose of this work to 
directly engage such potential difficulties.   
Following this explorative section, which functions as the bulk of my analysis, I 
proceed to propose some general foundations for a Mormon theology of emotion that 
integrate and summarize all the evidence previously discussed.  Therefore, the 
concluding chapter is primarily integrative in the sense that it attempts to incorporate 
various kinds of information both intra-disciplinarily and inter-disciplinarily.  Thus, in 
the former case textual canonical evidence on individual kinds of emotions is joined 
together to form a rudimentary summative coherent schema of theological explanation 
that could be applied to all or to most emotional phenomena within a distinctive LDS 
worldview.  On the other hand, as already indicated, such evidence is in itself the 
product of a process of intersection where socio-scientific information has come to bear 
to some degree in this very explorative endeavour.  It is further likely that the effort to 
draw a summative theological explanatory schema is also implicitly informed by 
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similar scientific informational input.  Then, I further underline the potential for such 
interdisciplinarity as I suggest possible directions of analysis in the context of 
‘emotions in Mormonism.’  In this fashion I conclude what I have largely defined as a 
comparative, explorative, and integrative theological examination. 
More detailed methodological information on such processes as my canonical 
exploration or on my classification and selection of prototypical emotions is provided 
in the introductory sections of those later chapters that specifically focus on these 
endeavours.  At this point, to conclude this introductory section on method I supply 
some needed information on the perspective from which I approach this endeavour, 
which will influence, albeit subtly, my own exploration and conclusions. 
 
The Insider/Outsider Approach 
 In addition to and in association with methodology another important issue to 
explicitly engage when introducing a theological analysis like the present one involves 
the author’s commitments relative to the object of study.  In other words, and 
particularly in light of postmodern attacks on the very ideal of ‘objectivity’, it is useful 
and, I would add, ethically desirable to locate oneself in relation to the theological 
tradition under examination.  However, a simple dichotomy of either insider or outsider 
to the tradition does very little to describe the more complex intellectual and spiritual 
reality, which characterizes the experience of many individuals.  In fact, authors are in 
the first place common human beings, whose cultural backgrounds and reference 
groups are often multiply defined, giving rise to commitments of various and at times 
conflicting type.  Furthermore, commitment is only one factor that may be used in 
classifying an analyst in the insider/outsider typology.  Access to significant 
knowledge, use of relevant and appropriate terminology, and understanding of overall 
frameworks of meaning may all contribute in locating an individual inside or outside a 
particular tradition.  Thus, a spectrum with insider and outsider at opposite poles or a 
multilayered schema allowing coexisting elements of both insider and outsider identity 
are more likely to account for the common complexities of individual authors.  
A separate though related question pertains to the normative rather than to the 
descriptive side of this issue or to the degree to which it is more scientifically desirable 
to conduct ethnographies either as a ‘native’ or as an ‘outsider.’  In the study of religion 
this issue has given rise to a ongoing debate among anthropologists with positions 
which range from one extreme, where a status of insider unavoidably vitiates the 
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reliability of any conclusion, to the opposite position where it is an outsider who 
invariably lacks and will continue to lack the appropriate means to accurately describe 
a reality that is not fully his.10  Yet, the extreme ends of this spectrum are not typical 
and many anthropologists have acquired such a nuanced understanding of the meaning 
of insider or of outsider that they now recognize the importance and desirability of their 
co-existence.  In other words, commitment to a particular theological tradition or lack 
of commitment toward the same are not generally seen as an a priori obstacle to the 
usefulness or accuracy of an ethnographic, theological, or other kind of study focused 
on a specific religious group or on its theological framework.  Other factors, such as the 
ability to entertain a variety of perspectives as well as the depth of one’s knowledge on 
the socio-cultural and theological contexts are also significant.  Therefore, discussions 
now focus on the meaning of being an insider in one sense and an outsider in another as 
well as on the issue of self-awareness in relation to one’s prejudices, biases, 
assumptions, and relative position vis-à-vis the subject of study, which is needed to 
facilitate the achievement of superior scholarship in a properly ethical context.11 
 I do subscribe to the view that a dual status as insider and outsider not only is 
compatible with rigorous academic analysis but also that it adds to and it facilitates 
both the explorative and the explanatory processes of academic inquiry.  This is 
particularly relevant and true in the specific context of my present analysis where I 
bring elements of psychology and of the social sciences to interact with a particular 
theological tradition, which is still relatively unknown.  In fact, effective understanding 
of ideas variously manifested in separate areas of knowledge as well as their expression 
to readers from a variety of theological or cultural backgrounds constantly require an 
author to attempt to function as both insider and outsider.  In other words, one must be 
able to see from the inside and explain to the outside of a particular conceptual schema, 
whether theological or discipline-specific scientific, which is only possible when one 
understands what the outsider perceives about the inside.  Then, a challenge is often 
found in explaining the inside to the outside while both respecting the inside’s self-
                                                 
10 The literature on this subject is voluminous.  Some good general discussions on the significant 
elements in the debate are found in Stringer (2002), 1-20.  Also see Wiebe (1999), 260-73.  Of relevance 
to the debate is also the unique terminology applied by Kenneth Pike in describing these different 
standpoints where, among other things, etic has reference to an outside and emic to an inside viewpoint 
in approaching and explaining behaviour.  See Pike (1999), 28-36. 
11 Articulate reflections on the unique dynamics involved in approaching a study as a ‘default’ insider or  
outsider are found respectively in Jacobs-Huey (2002), 791-804 and in Barker (1987), 127-52.  A good 
article which explores ethical issues of commitment in ethnography is Peshkin (1984), 254-64.  
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definition as well as making it accessible to outsiders who use different language and 
often distinct assumptions.  To be sure, the exact nature of these explanations is subject 
to vigorous debate, as witnessed by the literature focusing on the role of reductionism 
in the study of religion.12 In any case, maintaining the tension and balance of the 
insider/outsider status is no simple task and it usually involves deep effort in the work 
of the academic. 
Perhaps the usefulness of this duality in status is more clearly recognized in the 
secondary context of communication than it is in the prior realm of individual study, 
discovery, and understanding.  However, if one thinks of an analyst through the 
analogy of a ‘translator’ it becomes apparent that prior understanding is just as 
significant as subsequent expression of the data in more widely understandable terms.  
The translator first needs to comprehend accurately what he is subsequently to express 
in a different language so that he can translate insider’s knowledge into outsider’s terms 
without altering its very nature and meaning.13  Thus, on the one hand, as an ‘insider’ 
he is facilitated in the acquisition of detailed knowledge about the object of analysis in 
itself with all of its complexities and minutiae.  In other words, ‘insider’ status allows 
the author to explore at close range what cannot be seen or understood from a distance.  
On the other hand as an ‘outsider’ the author is facilitated in the acquisition of 
comparative knowledge about the object of analysis with all of its connections and 
interactions.  In other words, ‘outsider’ status allows the author to explore from some 
distance what cannot be seen or understood at close range.  Each of these approaches is 
problematic in isolation but when joined to the other it is greatly instrumental in both 
processes of understanding and communication.  Thus, through alternating efforts of 
close-range and distant observations the analyst is more likely to first understand and 
then to communicate his ‘translated’ understanding accurately and correctly. 
Therefore, ideally, scholars will develop their knowledge in a multidisciplinary 
and multicultural fashion in order to become better ‘translators.’  However, the 
limitations and practicalities of the human condition often allow individuals to make 
these attempts in a limited degree.  In other words, although the ideal remains and 
through its presence may even motivate the acquisition of further knowledge it is 
realistic and honest to recognize that in relation to many objects of study most analysts 
                                                 
12 Two different positions on the subject of ‘reductionism’ in the study of religion are found in Gardaz 
(2008), 338-45 and Segal (1983), 97-124.  
13 Throughout this work I use the masculine pronoun ‘he’ in reference to the generic third person singular 
as common in most articulations of  Mormon theology. 
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are still identifiable or should identify themselves as ‘primarily’ or more naturally as 
insider or outsider.  In fact, notwithstanding all efforts to maintain separate coexisting 
and interacting perspectives, to grow in familiarity of different ‘languages,’ and to 
recognize similar functionalities of diverse worldview in meeting human needs, 
individuals’ identities are often interlinked with the subject of their studies in a 
complex manner.  Therefore, they continue to stand in relation to them as ‘default’ 
insiders or outsiders while consciously endeavouring to avoid or to counterbalance any 
myopic or presbyopic effect respectively.  Mine is one such attempt as I come to this 
analysis of LDS theology first as insider and secondly as outsider.   
 In affirming that I approach this study where the status of ‘insider’ has a relative 
prevalence over ‘outsider’ I mean especially two things.  First, I am a ‘native’ to 
Mormonism, to its theology and to its socio-cultural context because of my life-long 
participation in the faith.  Also, I am an ‘insider’ because I am committed to the faith’s 
basic theological tenets, which I have internalized as the organizing framework of my 
moral and spiritual identities.  At the same time I possess academic and other life 
experiential tools that have given me understanding and familiarity of outsiders’ 
perspectives on LDS theology and practices.  Thus, although mainly an insider to 
Mormonism I am sufficiently an outsider to make a fruitful dialogue on the subject 
possible.  On the other hand, trying to identify a ‘default’ position in relation to the 
multidisciplinary interaction I aim to conduct, namely between Theology and the Social 
Sciences in particular, is somewhat more difficult.  My academic background includes 
both Psychology and Religious Studies/Theology, but I have received more extensive 
training in the latter.  Hence, it is likely that my approach to the interaction between 
psychology and religion fits more naturally into a default insider to theology than into 
an insider to psychology.  In this light it is easier to comprehend why the present 
analysis is structured to be focused on a theological examination of Mormonism, in 
relation to which I am primarily an ‘insider’, both socio-culturally and academically.  
On the other hand, this same examination is informed by socio-psychological sciences 
and to some smaller degree by mainstream Christian theologies in relation to which, in 
the latter case more than in the former, I am by default an ‘outsider.’ 
Self-awareness of these intra-personal dynamics provide perhaps the most 
significant means in meeting their inherent challenges, which, parenthetically, are 
likely to be different than the ones encountered by the analyst, who approaches a 
similar study as a ‘natural’ outsider with some insider status.  Specifically, I trust that 
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my insider knowledge and experience will assist me in my explorative and integrative 
efforts thus endowing this analysis with richness and depth.  One important way to 
facilitate such a depth involves a close look at the distinct meaning of the term 
‘theology’ in the context of Mormonism.  Given its significance and recurrence within 
the examination that follows the term requires some clarifications. 
 
Defining LDS Theology 
Theology is commonly defined as the reasoned study and discourse of those 
matters which focus on God and on His relationship to the world.  The main sources for 
such reflective explorations have been found primarily in historical tradition, sacred 
texts, social experience, philosophical rules of reason, and liturgy.14  Some religious 
traditions, Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism in particular, have emphasized the 
importance of worship as the framework within which theology is to develop, thus 
placing liturgy at the theological forefront through an appeal to the principle of lex 
orandi lex credendi.15  Other schools of theological thought place greater weight on 
different authoritative sources.  Still, as a whole, both ancient and contemporary 
Christian theologies generally retain both the same wide objective as well as 
dependence on the same foundational sources.  Clearly, variations in approach, loci of 
focus, and pre-eminence of source have contributed to the creation of a Christian 
theological picture, which is characterized by sub-disciplines, multiple movements, and 
fragmentations of different kinds.16   
Such a proliferation of perspectives in theological discourse is likely to be one 
of the reasons why the term ‘theology’ usually lacks favour among Latter-day Saints 
(or ‘the Saints).  In fact, for a movement so concerned with institutional unity and 
doctrinal uniformity theological diversity is perceived more as a threat than as a source 
of epistemological richness.  To be sure, there are many factors which shape the 
complex relationship of Mormonism with the philosophical discipline of theology.  The 
issue is far too large for the present setting where all I may be able to express is a 
                                                 
14 Musser (2007), 2-9. 
15 The Catechism of the Catholic Church states: "The Church's faith precedes the faith of the believer 
who is invited to adhere to it. When the Church celebrates the sacraments, she confesses the faith 
received from the apostles - whence the ancient saying: lex orandi, lex credendi (or: legem credendi lex 
statuat supplicandi, according to Prosper of Aquitaine [5th cent.]). The law of prayer is the law of faith: 
the Church believes as she prays. Liturgy is a constitutive element of the holy and living Tradition." 
[Catholic Church (1999), par. 1124, 258] 
16 A good introduction on twentieth-century Christian theologies with accurate descriptions of their 
differences and complexities is found in Ford (2005). 
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general clarification of the topic as well as to provide an introduction to my own 
specific endeavour in the current analysis.  Historically, part of the complexity emerges 
from the fact that Mormon rhetoric on the subject of theology has not been consistent 
throughout the decades.  In fact, in the nineteenth century notable LDS authorities like 
Parley P. Pratt spoke highly of theology and defined it “the science of all other sciences 
and useful arts”.17  Even at the beginning of the twentieth century Mormon authorities 
made use of the term in neutral if not positive contexts and published various works of 
theology, although mostly of the dogmatic kind.18  There were indeed early critical 
statements on the subject of theology but their focus was usually specific to the 
theological content of Christian creeds and systems of doctrine.  Then, it was 
‘sectarian’ theology that represented the problem, not theology per se.19 
In the middle of the twentieth century the word ‘theology’ disappeared from 
Mormon sermons and writings to only reappear a few decades later in the words of 
LDS intellectuals, who began to engage main-stream Christian theologians and 
philosophers on the topic.  At the beginning of the twenty-first century it appears that 
questions about the nature and place of theology within Mormonism has attracted the 
attention and interest of several LDS thinkers, so much that academic organizations and 
publications have been devoted to the topic.20  Still, Mormons scholars have gone as far 
as claiming Mormonism to be atheological or have affirmed that theological pursuits 
are generally dangerous to the Mormon enterprise.21   Yet, when seen in context, and in 
light of some key Mormon tenets I am about to outline, the LDS rejection of theology 
appears less categorical and universal.  In fact, as stressed by David Paulsen, when 
                                                 
17 Pratt (1978), 1-2. 
18 See Widtsoe (1997) and Talmage (1899), 2-5. 
19 For example, John Taylor stated: “I consider that if I ever lost any time in my life, it was while 
studying the Christian theology.  Sectarian theology is the greatest tomfoolery in the world.” Journal of 
Discourses, 5:240. 
20 In 2003 the Society for Mormon Philosophy and Theology was organized and in 2005 it began to 
publish its own journal, Element.  Also see the edited volume McLachlan and Ericson (2007).  
21 The context of such statements usually clarify that a restricted meaning of theology is intended, 
particularly in the form of systematic theology.  For example, James Faulconer states that “Latter-day 
Saints are atheological.  In other words, they are without an official or even semi-official philosophy that 
explains and gives rational support to their beliefs and teachings... As I use the word theology here, it 
begins with belief and uses the methods of rational philosophy to give support to that belief: dogmatic, 
systematic, or rational theology... [S]ome Latter-day Saint leaders and thinkers have devoted 
considerable energy to formulating theologies of various kinds. Nevertheless, none of those efforts have 
come to fruition (none has been accepted as official...), and I think none will." [Faulconer (2006), 21-22].  
Louis Midgley, a noted LDS apologist, expressed more starkly his negative view on theology by stating 
that “Whenever we attempt to do theology, or fashion a system of doctrines, we end up in contention and 
disputation, for the entire enterprise is an exercise in arrogance and pride, against which the Book of 
Mormon warns.” [Midgley (1989), 104].  
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theology is understood as “thinking and talking about God,” the Saints obviously do 
theology and are involved in theological discourse.  However, Mormons “want to 
avoid…the problems of doing theology badly or improperly, and thus many of them 
would add that theology is a dangerous enterprise that must be handled with great 
caution.”22  At the foundation of these concerns lie several motivations two of which I 
find to be preeminent, namely the LDS concepts of ‘revelation’ and ‘authority’. 
Most Christian theologians emphasize reason and study, both of current realities 
as well as of pre-existent biblical ‘revelation,’ as the epistemological instruments of 
their theological discourses.  Mormons, on the other hand, have historically associated 
‘doctrinal’ knowledge with continuous, direct, and freshly scriptural divine ‘revelation’.  
From the very First Vision of the Prophet Joseph Smith to his subsequent theological 
statements emphasis has regularly been placed on the immediacy of the revelatory 
nature of these communications.23  If God could speak and show Himself to His 
prophet directly then any other source of divine knowledge was secondary at best or 
suspicious and potentially misguided at worse, particularly when based on fallen 
human philosophical reasoning.  In other words, epiphanies in the form of visions and 
other divine manifestations and not theology set the Mormon wheel in motion.  Thus, 
the beginnings of Mormonism and the more charismatic phase of its history were 
characterized by a starker juxtaposition between the theophanies on which its very 
raison d’être was founded and the ‘humanly constructed’ theologies of the other 
Christian denominations, which had lost the ‘fullness of truth.’  
The degree to which contemporary Mormonism has maintained or redefined 
this juxtaposition is a very interesting and rather complex issue in itself.  In the twenty-
first century the founding theophanies of the Mormon ‘restoration’ are certainly being 
emphasized in ways, which make them as theologically significant now for 
Mormonism’s own claims to truth as they were in the nineteenth century (if not more).  
However, on-going and continuous institutional revelation through God’s prophet, 
while remaining a central claim of Mormonism, has somewhat been redefined in the 
manner of its manifestations, at least in official sermons.  Mormon authorities rarely if 
ever speak of theophanies, angelic visions, or other outstanding experiences of this 
kind; on the other hand, they emphasize ‘revelation’ by the ‘power of the Holy Ghost.’ 
                                                 
22 Paulsen (2007), 12. 
23 Mormons underline the unique role of Joseph Smith as the prophet of the restoration by referring to 
him as ‘the Prophet’ with a capital P. 
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As will be examined in greater detail later this kind of revelatory process finds greater 
affinity with the theological enterprise because it involves, among other things, 
personal reflection and reason associated with a search for divine will and guidance.  In 
other words, theology acquires epistemic significance in a Mormon context only when 
occurring as divinely ‘inspired’ because ‘directed’ by the ‘power of the Holy Ghost.’ 
Of course, certain discerning criteria are necessary in order to determine 
whether particular ‘information’ is divinely inspired.  In the current setting I cannot 
attempt the difficult task of defining in detail the LDS understanding of how the power 
of the Holy Spirit is manifested.  It is in itself a basic element of Mormonism and of the 
typical LDS explanation for all religious experience, which tends to resist strict 
conceptual boundaries.  What is important in this context is the fact that such a 
‘revelatory’ enterprise is recognized within Mormonism as more ‘filtered’ and thus 
more complex than the ‘pure’ theophanies of its nineteenth century beginnings.  Thus, 
whatever divine communication emerges in such instances of mental/spiritual forms of 
‘revelation’ can become cluttered and potentially distorted by its intersections with the 
psychological, social and physiological dynamics of the individual.  Clearly, one of the 
greatest challenges for the faithful Saint is to discern between divine revelation and 
personal desires within one’s own mind.  It follows that there are dangers and risks 
inherent in the theological enterprise, which are perceived to originate more from 
inadequate levels of worthiness and of spiritual experience in receiving revelation than 
they are from lack of proper theological or intellectual training. 
Although many Saints recognize that the risk to encounter self-deception is both 
unavoidable and necessary to facilitate spiritual progression they believe that they 
should limit its danger by appropriately adapting existing and well-established 
revelation to the realm of personal life choices.24  Thus, as the faithful study canonical 
texts (and many spend considerable time in doing so) they generally focus their mental 
energy in the area of personal application of existing theology and shy away from any 
attempts to develop innovative theologies to fill existing vacuums.  These enterprises 
are left to the prophet and to the apostle, who, in the public Mormon perception, does 
not run the risks of misguidance, which characterize the common member.  
Furthermore, since their position or ‘calling’ is specifically one that involves being a 
                                                 
24 Mormons seek such guidance and revelation in all relevant aspects of their lives, and in matters that 
are not exclusively ‘religious’ according to the common understanding of the word.  They are taught to 
seek and watch for ‘revelation’ in the things they say, do and plan.   
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mouthpiece for God’s will and in light of their recognized spiritual worthiness and 
experience within the Church it is evident that ‘authority’ plays a significant role in the 
context of Mormon theology.  Therefore, in the case of those members who may be 
philosophically trained or otherwise theologically inclined the question of authority or 
degree of agreement with already existing authoritative statements usually remains at 
the forefront and is likely to overshadow any factors relating to the author’s intellectual 
preparation in the minds of many Church members.  Hence, the LDS theologian is 
faced with some unique dynamics given the wide perception that conflates the role of 
the prophet with the role of the scholar.25 
On the other hand, this is not a canonically normative connection within 
Mormonism because it is largely based on an unnecessary conflation of ‘theology’ and 
‘doctrine’, which was precipitated by the disappearance of the term ‘theology’ in LDS 
parlance.  In fact, as I understand the terms, ‘doctrine’ pertains to dogma, which is 
binding for the whole institution and its members, whereas theology does not require 
such an authoritative status.  It may be expressed as a personal interpretation, which 
implicitly claims its own authority, but it does not necessarily involve a challenge to 
dogmatic authority.  Thus, the virtual elimination of a classification category for non-
binding religious thought, namely ‘theology’, has often dichotomized pronouncements 
on religious matters as either ‘doctrinal’ or ‘non-doctrinal’.  It follows that Mormons 
may be uncertain about the proper classification of the ‘dogmatic theology’ (in the 
venue of theological reflection upon a dogmatic core) which originates in educators or 
other individuals who are not General Authorities.   On the one hand its derivation from 
individuals viewed as ‘orthodox’ and its emergence from what is perceived as 
‘doctrine’ constitute its prima facie authoritative justification. 26  On the other hand, 
particularly when theology aims to fill a doctrinal vacuum or when it appears to 
contradict existing statements perceived to be ‘doctrinal’ by some, it falls under a 
perception of suspicion which may even prevent its very emergence.   
                                                 
25 This is no universal conflation in Mormon circles but the issue of relationship of any intellectual 
pursuit to institutional authority and statements is a subject of recurrent discussion.  See Sperry (1967), 
74-85.  A more recent discussion on the dynamics of LDS scholarship in relation to perceived orthodoxy 
is found in Duffy (2008), 1-33. 
26 As illustrations of this kind of works one may think of the widely popular ‘parable of the bicycle’ 
employed by BYU professor Robinson to explain grace.  See Robinson (1992).  Other more 
philosophically based works by LDS educators have achieved some recognition throughout the Church 
in the U.S.A., The writings of Truman Madsen fit in this category.  See Madsen (2001). 
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 Still, an extreme a priori resistance to theology, as could be manifested in some 
perspectives among the Saints, is neither supported by the Mormon canon nor is it in 
agreement with prophetically revealed tenets of Mormonism about the universal 
imperative to acquire greater knowledge through reflection and faith.27  Furthermore, 
while the desire to maintain ‘doctrine’ uncorrupted from potentially misguided 
theological speculations is entirely justifiable, the extension and limits of such an 
official ‘doctrine’ is a subject, which, as already stated, is not beyond debate.28  
Perspectives range from a dogma, which is extensive and encompassing of most if not 
of all statements ever uttered by an LDS General Authority to the opposite extreme 
where Mormon doctrine is reducible to very few general tenets largely malleable to 
shifting historical and cultural applications.  The former group will usually allow very 
little room for original theological developments from non-prophetic sources, whereas 
the latter group will find room for the acceptance of all kinds of theological 
innovations, whatever their source.29  This debate encapsulates much that is central to 
the definition of Mormon identity at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In fact, 
at the root of this ‘theological question’ intersect at least two of the basic paradoxes, 
which characterize Mormon culture, as highlighted by Terryl Givens in his very 
informative historical analysis of Mormon cultural expressions.30 
In relation to my own perspective on the question of ‘doctrine’ I do not locate 
myself at either extreme of the spectrum previously referred to although I am closer to 
a view of Mormon ‘doctrine’ as limited to relatively few general tenets or ‘principles’, 
which are subject to wide applicability as directed by divine inspiration.  Furthermore, I 
do not suppose every statement by single General Authorities to be of necessity 
doctrinally authoritative although I do accept the premise that these individuals may 
and do declare authoritative ‘doctrine,’ particularly when speaking in unity on specific 
                                                 
27 “Seek learning, even by study and also by faith.” (D&C 88:118; 109:7, 14).  LDS authority J. Golden 
Kimball once expressed the principle in these terms: “There are not enough Apostles in the Church to 
prevent us from thinking, and they are not disposed to do so; but some people fancy that because we 
have the Presidency and Apostles of the Church that they will do the thinking for us.  There are men and 
women so mentally lazy that they hardly think for themselves.  To think calls for effort, which makes 
some men tired and wearies their souls.  No man or woman can remain in this Church on borrowed 
light.” [Kimball (1904), 97].  
28 For an LDS General Authority position on this issue see Clark (1979), 68-81.  A more recent 
theological discussion on the subject is found in Millet (2007), 265-81. 
29 Richard Poll proposed an analogical distinction between Mormons who emphasize the certainty of 
doctrine and authority over those who emphasize freedom and personal application.  They are identified 
respectively as “Iron Rod” and “Liahona” Mormons (the iron rod and the Liahona are objects found 
within the narrative of 1 Nephi in the Book of Mormon).  See Poll (Winter 1967), 107-17. 
30 The two paradoxes are authority vs. radical freedom and searching vs. certainty.  See Givens (2007), 3-
35. 
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subjects.  Therefore, I proceed to present an analysis, which is indeed a ‘creative’ 
theological examination of Mormonism, but which aims to remain within its acceptable 
‘doctrinal’ boundaries (as I understand them).  It is then both dogmatic, in the sense of 
being rooted in dogma, and constructive, as it attempts to organize its subject in a 
unique, coherent, and novel manner.  At the same time it does not claim to be 
doctrinally authoritative in the LDS context where such authority is not acquired 
through persuasive reasoning, but through ecclesiastical ordination to a particular 
Priesthood office, namely Apostle. 
 In conclusion, given these unique characteristics of the Mormon context when 
using the term ‘theology’ it is important to clarify both the nature of the endeavour as 
well as its relationship with the perceived official dogma to which it is associated.  In 
fact, it can be argued that a truly Mormon enterprise in academic theology is still in its 
infancy and consequently it still encounters pressures both for justification and for 
definition.  At the present time reflection, revelation, and authority are often interlinked 
in a complex manner in the LDS theological world so much that some awareness of 
their interactions represent a necessary step to the development of a Mormon 
theological discourse, which is both widely accessible outside the tradition as well as 
faithful to the theological identity from which it emerges.   
Before directly engaging LDS theology I have chosen to briefly address the 
current status of the scientific study of emotion with particular attention to the socio-
scientific realm.  Therefore, the first step in my analysis involves a survey of 
psychological, sociological, philosophical, and, to a lesser extent, physiological 
approaches to the subject as well as a summary of the present broad areas of focus and 
agreement which shape the investigation of emotion.  Since emotion research is a fast-
paced developing field of inquiry I have attempted to make use of the most updated 
findings and publications available, but given the vastness of literature being produced 
the presence of lacunae is unavoidable.  Still, my objective is not a comprehensive 
summation of the state of the research; instead, I aim to provide an outline of the 
general direction of analysis in the field as I single out three very broad conclusions 
that some may even find to be common-sensical.  However, as I show, these 
propositions are the fruit of relatively recent work on the subject that have followed 
centuries and even millennia of debates and disagreements. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
Emotion: Three Defining Characteristics 
 
 
 As in most cases it is appropriate to begin the present analysis with a definition 
of the subject to be examined.  The definition of emotion I have chosen to employ 
certainly owes much to the studies and discoveries of various scholars, as will emerge 
clearly throughout much of this chapter, but in its specific composition it is my own 
conclusion.  An emotion is a human phenomenon that engages the totality of the 
individual as he/she regularly responds to circumstances of change which occur within 
contexts of perceived relevance.  In other words, emotions are human responses, to be 
later classified in greater detail, which pervade the personal experience of each 
individual in his/her interaction with his/her contextual world.  Thus, life is an 
emotional experience with emotion-filled relationships, emotional meanings, and 
emotion caused or causing commitments.  Emotions are so embedded in our way of 
thinking and understanding the world that even the imagination struggles to construe an 
alternative image of emotionless existence.  In the popular science fiction Star Trek the 
logic driven and extremely rational Mr. Spock is still subject to occasional emotional 
‘infiltrations,’ which emerge from a genetic structure where his mother’s humanity 
coexists with his father’s perfect Vulcan rationality.1  In other words, humans never 
have and never could fully transcend their emotions if they are to maintain the essential 
characteristics of their species. 
However, to say that humans constantly and universally experience and observe 
emotions is different from claiming that they fully understand them.  In fact, some of 
the greatest minds in the history of mankind have focused their energies on defining, 
classifying, and analyzing emotions without being able to reach a recognizable 
consensus in any single one of these areas.  In more recent times empirical studies from 
                                                 
1 Berenson (1991), 33-34. 
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a variety of scientific disciplines have come to the aid of philosophers by providing 
observable data and theoretical models through which greater precision and reliable 
conclusions could ideally be reached.  Still, this optimism has only been partially 
justified since further questions and problems have accompanied the greater complexity 
and the empirical methods associated with a burgeoning multidisciplinary interest.  At 
the same time one cannot fail to recognize the extensive progress, which has 
characterized the study of emotions, and which is likely to continue its advance given 
the massive resources that many academic disciplines are investing into it.  While 
expressing awareness of these unsettled questions and debates this chapter is primarily 
an attempt to summarize the general consensus on those main areas of agreement, 
which pertain to the nature of emotions. 
 
Emotion through the ages: philosophical debates 
 When attempting to circumscribe a subject of great human significance it is 
sensible to begin with a brief look at what relevant knowledge on the topic comes to us 
from the past.  It is certainly no different with emotions, whose study predates the 
empirical and scientific era in which we now live by millennia.  Philosophers, from the 
ancient Greeks to their modern counterparts, have frequently debated the nature and 
significance of emotions.  At the same time, even when advocating opposing views, 
they have shared basic assumptions on the subject, which in light of recent empirical 
studies appear problematic at best.  Thus, as Robert Solomon highlights, philosophical 
discourse on emotion has been characterized at the core by a distinction between reason 
and emotion, “as if we were dealing with two natural kinds,” that is still lingering in 
present times.  As will be seen in a later section, this view is too simplistic and 
fundamentally erroneous.  Similarly, a related perspective has focused on the supposed 
inferiority of emotion in relation to reason, where emotion is seen as “more primitive, 
less intelligent, more bestial, less dependable, and more dangerous than reason.”2  This 
view is exaggerated at best but, although widely adhered to, dissonant voices have 
occasionally emerged in its opposition. 
 In antiquity the focus of the ‘emotion’ debate centred on the role that emotions 
played in morality.  Responses were often polarized, as evidenced for example by a 
comparison of the Aristotelian and of the Stoic perspectives.  Where Aristotle 
                                                 
2 Solomon (2008), 3. 
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understood emotions to be necessary for the ‘good life,’ the Stoics not only saw them 
as unnecessary but also as the true cause of much human misery.  Then, although both 
Aristotle and the Stoic Chrysippus presented theories and analyses on the nature of 
emotions they did so with quite different motivations, the former to discern and 
cultivate them (at least some), the latter to extirpate them.  Still, their perspectives on 
the nature of the emotions, described through their various physiological, cognitive, 
social, and behavioral components, were equally precocious.  For example, the Stoic 
attribution of emotions to irrational judgments needing correction foreshadowed the 
basic premise of modern cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy in the treatment of 
dysfunctional emotional phenomena.  But the Stoics went further than modern 
therapies in aiming to eradicate most individual desires, since these were perceived to 
lie at the root of all emotion-causing judgments and expectations.  Less radically, some 
of the Stoics’ contemporaries, the Epicureans, aimed simply to divert attention from the 
illusory and unnecessary to the material and necessary thus coming closer to the present 
form of intervention advocated by most cognitive therapies.3 
 The concern with ethics continued to be prevalent throughout the Middle Ages, 
particularly in relation to the identification of Christian sin, which was usually 
associated with particular emotions such as anger, envy, lust, etc.  Then, given the 
negative reputation enjoyed by emotions it is not surprising that Thomas Aquinas 
would equate the greatest virtues of love and hope with reason and not with emotions.4  
It was not until the early modern period that the emotions began to be rehabilitated, at 
least in some degree.  In fact, it was the very ‘father’ of modern philosophy, René 
Descartes, who suggested that although our physiologies are ‘moved’ by disturbing 
emotions, the emotions can also be affected by the soul, namely by reason.  In his 
Passions of the Soul he attempted to map a rudimentary neuro-scientific explanation of 
emotions, which included a ‘meeting’ of the body and of the mind in a small gland at 
the base of the brain.  Although renowned for his problematic dualism of body and 
mind, Descartes nevertheless attempted to explain the evident ‘interaction’ of the two 
in the phenomenon of emotion and he did so in quite sophisticated terms for his time.5 
                                                 
3 A thorough analysis of the Aristotelian view of emotions is found in Fortenbaugh (2002).  For a 
description of Chrysippus’ view see Sorabji (2000), 29-54.  For the Epicurean perspective see Annas 
(1989), 145-64.  
4 Aquinas (1967), 1a.2ae.24.2. 
5 Descartes (1989). 
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 In a radical shift from Cartesian dualism Baruch Spinoza proposed a complex 
theory of metaphysics, which was rooted in a monistic view of mind and body.  In fact, 
in the most relevant metaphysical premise to his theory of emotion, Spinoza believed 
that mind and body are only ‘aspects’ of a larger universal reality centred in and 
controlled by God, however defined.  The most significant implication of this 
perspective is that Spinoza claimed that we are not really in control of our lives 
although we often think and act as if we were.  In fact, emotions emerge from the many 
failed expectations and desires that underlie a belief in our personal agency and 
freedom, which cause frustration and misery.  Thus, echoing many aspects of the Stoic 
philosophy of emotions Spinoza warned against the negative effects of emotional 
experiences although he also made room for more positive ‘active emotions,’ which 
emerge from our ‘true’ nature and from a correct understanding of our place in the 
universe.6 
 A thinker who did not share Spinoza’s suspicion of the emotions, and who 
instead radically celebrated them over and above reason was David Hume.  Given his 
work and reputation as a central figure of the Enlightenment it is perhaps surprising that 
he would take a stand in their defence.  However, unlike Kant, who continued in his 
unswerving support of reason, Hume had come to question it even to the point of 
reacting against reason.  In particular, he had come to doubt the significance of reason 
as a means to pursue moral behaviour.  In fact, through his large volume A Treatise of 
Human Nature, he aimed to give emotions their rightful place at the very centre of 
philosophy and of ethics.7  In Germany various ‘Romantic’ philosophers seemed to go 
even further than Hume in their scepticism and in their celebration of the more 
instinctual and less rational side of humanity.  In this context Friederich Nietzsche is 
worthy of particular mention since, as Solomon pinpoints, in his enthusiastic defence of 
the emotions he suggested that “rationality itself may be nothing more than a certain 
product or confluence of emotion.”8 
 Before beginning to address the more empirical era in the study of emotions and 
in conclusion of this brief and necessarily highly simplified summary of philosophical 
thought on the subject a clarification is in order.  Although I have consistently 
                                                 
6 See Parkinson (2000). 
7 Whether intended or not the order of topics Hume addresses in his masterpiece underlines the centrality 
of emotions.  In fact, the first book of the treatise is devoted to ‘the understanding’, the second to ‘the 
passions’ and the third to ‘morals’.  See Norton and Norton (2000). 
8 Solomon (2003), 64. 
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described the views of some renowned thinkers in terms of an ‘emotion’ theory or 
perspective, most did not use the term ‘emotion’ as such.  In fact, as Thomas Dixon 
highlights, the historical study of the philosophical discourse on emotion is complicated 
by the fact that the term is relatively recent in its use.  It is thought to be dating to 
Descartes’ 1649 Passions of the Soul, but its wide and more consistent usage in 
reference to a single psychological category of experience did not emerge at least until 
the 19th century.  Prior to that time emotions were conceptualized primarily as two 
separate categories characterized by opposite valence, namely ‘affections’ and 
‘passions.’9  The former were useful, appropriate, and God approved phenomena, 
whereas the latter were morally condemnable and needed to be shunned.  The Christian 
Lactantius well captured this commonly held bi-directional view in the religious 
discourse, which characterized the context of emotions for millennia.  He claimed that 
the emotions “are planted in us by nature and have a purpose…if for good then they are 
virtues, if for bad, vices.”10  His was a common perspective among thinkers, who often 
held similarly divergent or even more complex views which discriminated among 
different kinds of emotional phenomena. 
 Hence, the introduction of a single term to facilitate a scientific form of 
discourse on the subject presents the usual problem which is typically encountered in 
any attempt to reach generalized conclusions, namely excessive simplification.  As will 
be seen shortly, this problem characterizes many of the debates on ‘emotions’ where 
one field typically protests against what is perceived to be an excessive generalization 
by presenting contrary evidence  which is manifested in particular circumstances.  
Notwithstanding this fact, it is likely that people and scholars will continue to want to 
address ‘emotions’ as a whole and to search for a single unitary explanatory theory for 
these phenomena, which in some form are clearly universal.  As the search continues so 
will the debates beginning with the defining issue of what exactly constitutes an 
emotion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Dixon (2003), 1-25.  Dixon explicitly takes issue with Solomon’s claim that emotions have been 
commonly viewed as negative and irrational throughout most of our history.  Although I have quoted 
Solomon at length I am also sympathetic to Dixon’s argument.  I find Dixon’s revisionist history and 
linguistic analysis to function as a needed corrective to Solomon’s claims, which at times involve 
excessive generalizations. 
10 As quoted in Konstan (2001), 121. 
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Emotion today: socio-scientific descriptions 
 “Emotion, first of all, serves as a shorthand for, or pointer to, intrapersonal 
causal processes and mechanisms.  It thereby also points to a human and animal system 
architecture that enables such mechanisms.”11  This statement captures both the 
elusiveness and complexity of the concept of emotion.  It further suggests that a most 
fruitful method of emotion research should involve interdisciplinarity where 
neurophysiology, psychology, and the social sciences necessarily play a central role in 
its scientific analysis.  In fact, most theories of emotion recognize that core foci of these 
disciplines, namely sensation/feeling (physiology), cognition, and behaviour, function 
as the three main constitutive elements of emotional phenomena, although relative 
significance and patterns of interrelationship are still hotly debated.  Therefore, 
comprehensive descriptions of any emotion should include both micro and macro 
analyses with focus on both the single elements of its manifestation, as well as on the 
particular combination of its feeling/sensory, cognitive, and behavioural components. 
 Indeed, we have made considerable progress toward detailed multicomponential 
‘mappings’ of various emotions although from the phenomenological perspective 
emotions are inherently resistant to conceptual capturing, particularly when more than 
self-reporting evidence is being sought.  It is then not surprising that much of the 
progress has taken place in the neurophysiological ‘mapping’ of emotions, where 
measurements are more exact and where variables are more easily controllable.  
Furthermore, if description is also meant to provide or at least to aid in the process of 
explanation questions of causality must be added and integrated to complicate the 
overall picture.  It is to these causative issues that I now turn my attention as well as to 
two other factors which are significant for any definition of emotion, namely duration 
and valence.  These are perhaps peripheral and somewhat less controversial elements of 
emotion when juxtaposed to the more central and hotly debated fundamentals of its 
components.  Still, a description of these three dimensions may well introduce and 
facilitate a subsequent focus on emotions’ constitutive elements and on their dynamics. 
 The general cause of emotions was well conceptualized by Aaron Ben-Ze’ev in 
terms, which are as much common-sensical as they are scientifically valid.  He said that 
“emotions typically occur when we perceive positive or negative significant changes in 
our personal situation – or in that of those related to us.  A positive or negative 
                                                 
11 Frijda (2008), 69. 
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significant change is that which significantly interrupts or improves a smoothly flowing 
situation relevant to our concerns.”12  Consequently, emotions emerge as responses to 
such perceived changes, which are characterized by a more or less diffused volition to 
either welcome the changes or to reject them.  An emphasis on the significance of these 
evaluative processes in the elicitation of emotions constitutes the distinguishing feature 
of appraisal theories of all kinds, which I examine in greater detail in the next pages.  
For now, the point is more general as I simply aim to list the number and types of 
factors that come together in the emergence of emotions, and which involve various 
possible combinations and results.  Thus, the whole process begins with an individual 
that has distinct drives, appetites, desires, and objectives, who perceives facilitations or 
resistances to these drives and desires in his interactions with the environment, and who 
consequently reacts in a potential variety of ‘emotional’ manners given the particular 
input at stake. 
   Yet, the challenge within this process involves actually defining the 
boundaries of the emotion in terms of locating the exact points where an emotion 
properly begins and where it ends.  The issue is indeed more complex than it appears.  
It would seem that the moment of perception of change should represent the starting 
point and the completion of the emotional response its ending counterpart.  However, 
human psychology and physiology are rarely neatly or linearly organized.  In fact, 
drives and desires do not only emerge as evaluative standards against which 
‘perceptions’ are measured but they also precede and shape those very perceptual 
experiences of change.  Similarly, through subsequent ruminations and memories the 
duration of an emotion may extend beyond its most immediate emerging 
circumstances.  Then, as Frijda reminds us, the nature of psychological causation is 
both ‘circular’ and ‘chaotic,’ including ‘feedback loops’ at all levels.  For this reason 
Lewis suggests that we should employ non-linear and dynamic models of explanations 
which take such ‘processes of vertical causality’ into account.13   
Still, even in light of this complexity we can make a few basic duration-based 
distinctions of emotional phenomena in order to facilitate both social communication 
and psychological analysis.  To begin, an emotion episode involves “a sequence of 
behavior and feeling modes that all center around dealing with a particular event.”14  It 
                                                 
12 Ben-Ze'ev (2000), 13. 
13 Lewis (2005), 105-31. 
14 Frijda (2008), 74. 
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is possible for such episodes to include more than one emotion, consisting for example 
of a sequential experience of sadness followed by anger or involving the coexistence of 
two emotions like joy and love contemporaneously.  Secondly, emotional attitudes or 
sentiments refer to a latent or dispositional propensity rather than to an occurrent 
(actual) emotional manifestation.  Therefore, although one may have a deep phobia for 
snakes he will not experience the ‘fear’ associated with this phobia unless in the actual 
presence of a snake.  Similarly, a person may possess an enduring love toward her 
spouse without a constant experience of a recognizable emotion of ‘love.’  Then, 
depending on the context the same emotion term, for example jealousy, may refer 
either to a sentiment, to an emotion, or to both. 
 Moods and affective traits are also distinguishable emotional phenomena.  Ben-
Ze’ev identifies moods and affective traits as characterized by general intentionality 
(the attribute of being ‘about’ something) vis-à-vis emotions’ and sentiments’ more 
specific intentionality.  In other words, “the intentionality of moods is not as complex 
and specific as that of emotions.  It is a more primitive type in which the intentional 
object is diffuse and difficult to specify.”  Still, although less specific and less intense 
than emotions moods involve an occurrent state of emotional arousal, which makes 
them function as “general background frameworks of the feeling dimension.”15  On the 
other hand, affective traits pertain to the general description of an individual’s 
emotional make-up and thus belong to the realm of personality.  In fact, affective traits 
are obviously included in the common depictions of each of the five classic divisions of 
personality, namely extroversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
openness to experience.  In turn, in those cases where one or more traits significantly 
impair functioning, we normally make use of a further classification, namely affective 
disorders. 
 Therefore, to return to the previously highlighted issue of causality, the problem 
of circularity is clearly evident in the context that emerges from the above given 
distinction.  Indeed, sentiments, moods, affective traits and affective disorders, as 
longer lasting or as more diffused phenomena, may and usually do shape emergent 
emotions of all kinds.  Clearly, the arrow also points in the opposite direction since 
various emotions combine to facilitate the emergence of sentiments and moods, as well 
as to intensify or diminish the intensity of particular affective traits.  Then, interactions 
                                                 
15 Ben-Ze'ev (2000), 87. 
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between moods and emotions further separate ‘cold’ rational experiences of 
deliberative judgments from the often ‘hot’ evaluative experiences identified as 
emotions.  These interactions also underlie the fact that emotional phenomena are 
characterized by a sensation, which is physiologically experienced as a form of arousal 
in various potential intensities and feelings of a positive or negative kind.   
It is in this context of affective variance that emotions are denoted as 
‘valenced’, a term widely used to indicate their hedonic tone corresponding to 
relatively straightforward physiological reactions experienced as pleasant or 
unpleasant. Thus, for example, the increased heart-rate and sweating associated with 
fear feel disturbing or unpleasant whereas the full organism’s relaxation constitutive of 
serenity is clearly experienced to be enjoyable.  Consequently and without hesitation, 
we identify emotions like joy, love, and hope as positive and others like sorrow, anger, 
and fear as negative.  This basic distinction is probably one of the oldest in the history 
of how humanity has been discussing emotions and is certainly still useful in many 
relevant contexts.  However, at deeper levels of scientific analyses such classifications 
are simplistic and potentially misleading because they ultimately distort the much more 
complex nature of emotions.  In fact, the affective valence of an emotion is intricately 
enmeshed with its cognitive defining aspects, which include phenomena like goal-
directedness, evaluations, and moral standards.  In turn, these cognitive dimensions 
shape the internal emotional experience, thus restricting or enlarging its valence well 
beyond its raw hedonic dimension.  In this context, Charland’s distinction between a 
narrower affect valence and a larger emotion valence seems to be appropriate and 
beneficial.16 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether emotion valence should be conceptualized 
in purely dichotomous terms which measure mutually exclusive positive or negative 
dimensions.  Some emotions are so complex and mixed that it may be difficult to 
identify their overall valence.  Thus, for example, lower-level wishes and drives may 
come into conflict with higher-level goals and ideals in their emotion-forming 
interactions, a phenomenon resembling the Freudian tension between the id and the 
superego.17  Moreover, even in the context of the narrower concept of affect valence an 
individual may recognize internal conflicts between different physiological sensations 
he is experiencing.  For example, the approach disposition, which is characteristic of 
                                                 
16 Charland (2005), 231-54. 
17 Minsky (2006), 81-93, 148.  
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anger, may feel positive to some degree even while the accompanying increased heart-
rate and sweating are experienced as negative.  Indeed, emotions are so interesting 
partly because their nature includes these very self-conflicting, unpredictable and 
difficult to manage elements.  Hence, when applied to emotions, the concept of valence 
should reflect such intricacies to the highest possible degree.  Instead, confusion and 
conflation in the usage of the term have been common, thus leading some to advocate  
a much needed refinement of the term and of the concept of valence.18 
At the same time, if ‘internal’ valence calls for an expansion of vocabulary 
‘external’ valence presents different kinds of issues (I use these locating adjectives to 
juxtapose the internal evaluations of individuals to the external evaluations of society at 
large).  These distinct forms of valences do not necessarily coincide as evidenced by 
the fact that the individual who experiences and the one who observes a particular 
emotion do not always evaluate it in similar fashion.  What is clear is that people are 
more or less constrained by the socially prescribed emotional values of their immediate 
environments, which are variously internalized.  Thus, in order to better focus on this 
specific object of analysis, historians have devised the term emotionology to refer to the 
‘emotion rules’ that exist in a particular society at a particular time.  Furthermore, to 
add social-scientific precision to the discussion William Reddy introduced the term 
emotives to describe those forms of societal action and speech that bring into being the 
very emotional values that they are pointing to.19  Therefore, rather than functioning 
merely as descriptive tools emotives are social shaping instruments of individuals’ 
emotions.  Clearly, and along with the emotionology phenomenon, emotives remind us 
that people’s experiential and interpretative realms of emotion are necessarily 
constrained by their social environment. 
In conclusion of this brief introductory overview I can then re-emphasize that 
emotions’ complexities are at least tri-dimensional, including physiological, 
psychological, and sociological inner and inter-dynamics.  Emotion has been defined in 
general terms as a human process with a cognitive-physiological makeup, which is 
elicited as a response to relevant changes in the context of a social interpersonal 
environment.  Its various components are intimately connected through flexible 
linkages, which combine according to specific patterns of synchronization.20  
                                                 
18 Colombetti (2005), 103-26.  
19 Reddy (2001). 
20 Scherer (2007), 101-26. 
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Furthermore, emotion is generally recognized as possessing affective and moral 
valence.  It is also a phenomenon that can usually be located in time within the porous 
boundaries of what are commonly termed emotion episodes.  With these preliminary 
signposts in place it is now time to delve into a more thorough examination of 
emotion’s nature, power, and moral significance. 
 
The nature of emotion: features, morality, and function 
 Any report on the results of the socio-scientific examination of emotions is 
bound to be selective.  Indeed, given the space constraints and the vastness of the 
available literature on the subject my current examination is no exception.  In so doing 
it may be argued that those aspects I have allowed to emerge from the literature as 
especially significant are biased towards the purpose in hand, a criticism which I need 
to address by lending support to my specific selection.  The best way to do so is by 
outlining my trajectory of focalization, which began with a reflection on the definition 
of emotion and on the history of its examination.  It continued with the highlighting of 
key terms in my definition of emotion which in turn I have associated to three of the 
core questions, and in some degree to their respective answers, that have characterized 
the study of emotion in both past and present times.  The first term is totality, through 
which I address the question about the nature and characterization of emotion in 
relation to the never ending debates about its cognitive and feeling/sensory features.  
The second expression is response, which brings both questions of capacity and norm 
into focus, specifically in terms of what we are able to do and should do about 
emotions.  Finally, the words change and relevance seem to be most closely related to 
the functional view of emotion and may guide us in addressing questions pertaining to 
their use and instrumentality for the happy life. 
 Having thus identified three important questions with the assistance of key 
defining terms (which in the case of totality also include an initial if very general 
answer) I next needed to identify those areas of focus that could function as appropriate 
and scientifically supported responses to these important queries.  To assist me in this 
task I found it helpful to draw a parallel and a contrast between a ‘pre-empirical’ 
historical period in the study of emotion and the present scientific time.  Of course, and 
as already outlined, the ‘pre-empirical’ period was not monolithic in its perspective on 
emotion, just as the present era also presents its areas of debate and disagreement.  Yet, 
there remains a general trend of emphasis which distinguishes the present from the past 
 31 
 
and which may be conceptualized as the distinction between cognitive and non-
cognitive theories of emotions.  In other words, although non-cognitive theories, more 
sophisticated and updated than ever, survive in the present day, cognitive approaches to 
emotions function as the dominant model for most respected studies of emotional 
phenomena.  This was not generally the case in the ‘pre-empirical’ stage of study 
previously examined and in this shift I found the root of my specific selective criteria. 
 Therefore, the responses I provide to the questions just outlined place particular 
focus on cognitive elements of interpretation and mirror current socio-scientific 
directions in addressing the nature, ethics, and functions of emotion.  In fact, science 
has demonstrated that emotions are not, as previously believed, purely irrational, 
‘beastly,’ and uncontrollable movements of mainly physiological, i.e. non-mental, 
origin.  Instead, and this is my answer to the first question, emotions are essentially 
cognitive/feeling-sensory phenomena which require cognitive input.  It then follows, to 
continue in the juxtaposition and to address the second question, that people may exert 
control and maintain personal responsibility in regulating them because they are not 
passive victims of externally produced and fully unpredictable phenomena.  At the 
same time, to address my third and final response, emotions are not necessarily 
irrational and untrustworthy.  To the contrary, they can teach us much about ourselves 
and our environment; hence, they have a significant function in the process of our 
personal development. 
  
Cognitive necessity 
 Emotions and deliberative thought processes are clearly different kinds of 
phenomena.  Most people could easily distinguish between the two.  In fact, they would 
describe emotions as mostly intuitive, quick, and affectively ‘charged’ impulsive 
manifestations whereas thought would be associated with ‘cold’ careful and often 
elaborate cognitive processes grounded in rationality.  If viewed as a stark dichotomy, 
however, this picture is more fictional than real since no human being reasons only 
through logic and in a purely emotionally-detached fashion.  Furthermore, emotions are 
not uncontrollable urges, which are wholly severed from the mind’s influence and 
direction.  Both thoughts and emotions are ‘embodied’ and although each is 
characterized by a different internal structure in relation to feeling and cognition the 
difference is one of degree rather than of mutual exclusivity. 
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 In stressing the ‘embodied’ nature of emotions scholars underlie, among other 
things, the centrality of the brain in their emergence.  In fact, Damasio has highlighted 
the significant emotional impairment suffered by people with brain damage.21  Further 
studies have succeeded in developing a proper psychophysiology of emotion through 
which emotional activity in both peripheral and central nervous systems has been 
identified and accurately measured.22  Indeed, numerous studies have been especially 
concerned with emotional processes within the brain.  As a result it is now widely 
recognized that the main seats of emotional activity are both the amygdala and the 
larger limbic system, located in the sub-cortical region of the brain.  At the same time, 
while it is well established that deliberative ‘thought’ is primarily a function of the 
higher cortex, science has shown that higher and lower areas of the brain are not 
insulated from each other.  In fact, they are intricately connected as they interact to 
some extent in most processes of human affect and cognition.  For example, sensory 
processing in the cortex is projected to the amygdala, which in turn “allows it to detect 
the presence of danger, while the amygdala’s projections to the cortex…allow the 
amygdala to influence cortical processing very early in an emotional episode.”23  This 
is then only one of several physiological indications that both sensation and cognition 
are constitutive of emotion. 
 On the other hand, it may be rightly argued that sensory processes are quite 
distinct from evaluative reflection.  To avoid confusion it is then important to specify 
what the term cognition is meant to signify.  By cognition I make reference to any 
aspect of human ‘information processing,’ whether conscious or unconscious, 
including memory, concept formation, and language as well as attention, perception, 
and mental imagery.  Ulric Neisser, who originally coined the term cognitive 
psychology, described cognition as “all processes by which the sensory input is 
transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with 
these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in 
images and hallucinations...”24  Therefore, arguing that emotions are necessarily and 
centrally cognitive does not imply that the cognitive processes at stake must be 
identified within the realm of awareness.  Indeed, such processes may be and often are 
too quick for singling out, and in many instances are automatically generated.  Failure 
                                                 
21 Damasio (1995), 1-79. 
22 Larsen, et al. (2008), 182. 
23 LeDeux and Phelps (2008), 166. 
24 Neisser (1967), 4. 
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to understand this distinction has often lengthened and confused debates on the primacy 
of cognition or of sensation in relation to the nature of emotions.  Thus, it is in this 
sense that I argue, as others now do, that emotions are necessarily and centrally 
cognitive. 
 Such a view may be contrasted to those perspectives that understand cognition 
not only as secondary to feeling in the experience of emotion, but also as ultimately 
unnecessary because intervening as a separate dimension which is not inherently 
affective.  Silvan Tomkins describes this view in these terms, 
Affect are sets of muscles, vascular, and glandular responses located in the face and also widely 
distributed through the body, which generate sensory feedback which is inherently ‘acceptable’ 
or ‘unacceptable’.  These organized responses are triggered at subcortical centers where specific 
‘programs’ for each distinct affect are stored.  If we are happy when we smile and sad when we 
cry why are we reluctant to agree that smiling or crying is primarily what it means to be happy 
or sad?25 
 
Matthew Elliot, in a book which provided great insights for the present examination 
and which will be later described in greater detail, labels theories of emotion of this 
kind as non-cognitive.  Yet, the term should not be understood as referring to a 
necessary absence of cognition in the occurrence of emotional phenomena; rather, it 
indicates that emotions may take place independently of cognition.  In other words, 
“There is no argument as to whether cognition is a sufficient cause of emotion; the 
question is whether it is a necessary cause.”26 
Tomkins and Izard are two of the remaining scholars who have followed in the 
footsteps of William James, the great philosopher and father of modern psychology, 
who had been one of the first to attempt an empirical explanation of emotion in the new 
scientific era of psychology.  Thus, another label for this family of theories is James-
Lange theories or also affective theories of emotion given the primacy of physiological 
sensation which they advocate over cognition.27  James viewed emotion as a function 
of motor and sensory areas of the neocortex, and as results of the body’s physiological 
changes we associate with emotions.  He said: “My theory ... is that the bodily changes 
follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur is the emotion… we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
                                                 
25 Tomkins (1970), 105-06. 
26 Izard, et al. (1984), 5. 
27 In this text, whenever used in juxtaposition to or in association with the adjective ‘cognitive’, 
‘affective’ is meant to underline the physiological (feeling/sensory) dimension of emotion vis-à-vis its 
cognitive one.  Instead, when used in any other context ‘affect’ simply functions as a synonym of 
emotion. 
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strike, afraid because we tremble.”28  A significant implication of this theory was the 
association of each emotion with a unique physiological manifestation, which 
functioned as the primary element of each emotion.  Thus, in James’ view, which was 
dominant in the first half of the 20th century, feeling and sensation came to define affect 
more closely and more directly than cognition ever could. 
 Contrary to this view, cognitive theories of emotion emphasize a reversed order 
of primacy where cognition precedes arousal.  These views started to emerge in the 
sixties, particularly through Magda Arnold and Richard Lazarus, but it was only in the 
eighties that they began to take root and to seriously challenge the previous dominance 
of non-cognitive theories of emotions.29  Lazarus summarized his views in these terms, 
“I offer the following manifesto for cognitive theorists that sums up the issue: emotion 
and cognition are inseparable...cognition is thus the key to emotion and to integrated 
human functioning.”30  To be sure, while cognitive theories took the ascendency over 
their non-cognitive counterparts the latter did not completely disappear.  In fact, the 
often heated debate between Lazarus and Zajonc in the eighties significantly polarized 
the field and some respected scholars, like the previously mentioned Tomkins and 
Izard, defended Zajonc’s non-cognitive position.31  Almost three decades after that 
famous and prolonged discussion a few non-cognitive perspectives are still existent and 
to some degree have been revived as they have encountered renewed commendation.32  
Still, cognitive theories of emotion are undeniably dominant as they keep being refined 
in light of those non-cognitive dynamics that invariably constitute the wider picture of 
emotional phenomena.33 
Specifically, cognitive theories of emotion place appraisal at the centre of the 
emotion phenomenon.  Appraisal, a term first used in the emotion context by Magda 
Arnold, refers to those conscious or unconscious dynamics of evaluation and judgment, 
which give an emotion its particular identity and ‘tone.’34  As such, appraisal involves 
recognition of value in a particular object, particularly as it relates to personal goals and 
to their achievement.  At the same time it also involves evaluation of the perceived 
                                                 
28 James (1884), 189-90. 
29 Most cognitivists would recognize these publications as the foundations of modern appraisal theories: 
Arnold (1960) and Lazarus (1966). 
30 Lazarus (1990), 9. 
31 See Lazarus (1984), 124-29; Zajonc (1984), 117-23; Tomkins (1984), 163-96; and Izard (1984), 17-37. 
32 Prinz (2005), 363-83. 
33 Clore and Ortony (2008), 628-41. 
34 For Arnold’s earliest usage of the term see Arnold (1960), 171. 
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change that the individual is in the process of experiencing vis-à-vis these very same 
goals and desires.  As Keith Oatley puts it, “emotions occur at the junctures of our 
inner concerns with the outer world; they are evaluations of events in terms of their 
importance for our concerns.  This importance derives jointly from genes, individual 
experience, and society.”35  Thus, we experience a negative emotion upon perceiving 
that our goals or concerns are being obstructed or otherwise threatened.  On the other 
hand, progression and facilitation towards goals give rise to positive emotions. 
 It is then through appraisals that emotions acquire their unique intentional 
character.  Furthermore, appraisals emerge in a context of desires, drives, beliefs, and 
values that combine to form the large background of dispositional motives against 
which an object or event will acquire emotional meaning.  In this sense emotions may 
be viewed as pre-occurrent dispositional states that protract a particular perspective in 
perceiving and interpreting the world.  In another sense emotions are occurrent 
manifestations, which involve or cause motivation in action or belief, whether as 
general ‘activation states’ or as specific ‘action tendencies.’  Thus, in relation to 
motivation, emotions can be “defined as event-instigated or object-instigated states of 
action readiness with control precedence.”36  Therefore, they are in a sense voluntary, 
although their volition emerges automatically and impulsively rather than through 
deliberative foresight.  We then return full circle to one of the core questions that each 
appraisal theory needs to address, namely whether it is appropriate to speak of 
appraisals in a motivational context characterized by unconscious impulses rather than 
by conscious planning.  Responses vary but generally fit within one category of at least 
three possible suggested approaches to this question. 
 In the first place, as already stated, since cognitive processes can be automatic 
and unconscious they may occur at extreme speeds.37  In other words, they “can 
precede almost any directed action pattern” without emerging into awareness.  As some 
have argued it would need to be so because “to withdraw from a painful stimulus 
requires the retrieval of a plan of action for withdrawal…similarly, approaching 
something requires an evaluation of the object being approached, as well as a plan of 
action.”38  These processes may very well be ‘mindless’; still, they often originate in 
previous patterns of learned associations.  In fact, through practice and experience, the 
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cognitive appraisals that are constitutive of emotion can become increasingly rapid and 
automatic.39  At the same time, it is true that reflexes and affective reactions of various 
kinds are based on ‘low-level’ imprinted processes.  For example, studies have shown 
that people naturally seem to respond more favourably to smooth over sharp-edged 
objects.40  Similarly, a clear preference for familiar over novel stimuli has been 
repeatedly demonstrated by studies of minimal conflict social situations where 
prevalent in-group bias confirms this general tendency.41  Such ‘low-level’ processes 
are undeniable, yet they do not necessarily create a problem for appraisal theories.  
Indeed, these early reactions involve undifferentiated affect, and as such are not yet to 
be considered full-blown emotions.42 
 In addition to redefining automaticity as a cognitive process, a second approach 
to the issue aims at integrating cognition with affect as parallel and interacting elements 
of the phenomenon.  These theories are usually based on a ‘dual-process’ model that 
distinguishes between purely affective and other elements in emotion, which are more 
directly cognitive.  The resulting improved cognitive theories have come to be 
expressed in a variety of forms and details.  For example, some theorists now 
distinguish between “rule-based processing” and “associative processing,” or between 
systematic and heuristic kinds of thinking.  This latter view claims that particular 
emotions can be elicited simply by affective association with a previous experience 
where the same emotion had emerged. 43 Other models draw sharper distinctions by 
distinguishing between emotion proper and unconscious affect, where the former is 
defined as a conscious, memorable state that is only instrumental in providing 
information and the latter is identified as the actual drive, which triggers behaviour.  
The point of contact between the two is found in the “affective residue” that emerges 
from emotion to constitute in turn the unconscious affective drive that motivates 
action.44  Still others emphasize the role of ‘low-level’ reactions as a component of the 
wider response system that constitutes the impetus for emotion.45 
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 Some theories maintain a distinction between ‘low-level’ and ‘high-level’ 
processes, but attempt their integration in a single-network model.  For example, as 
already suggested, emotions have been defined as transformed undifferentiated affect 
through appraisal, where both feeling and perceptual framing can occur automatically.46    
Another approach understands levels of processing to be ‘iterative,’ namely to involve 
a sequence of successive processes that give rise to ‘the evaluative cycle.’  In this 
context the first few iterations may involve only automatic evaluations whereas 
appraisals become more reflective as iterations increase in number.47  In physiological 
terms this means that information processes function “as a series of recursive feedback 
loops that involve additional regions of the cortex as the process continues.  With 
continual interaction of limbic and cortical areas, evaluations that start out as automatic 
become situated and progressively refined.”48  According to this and other theories here 
outlined, emotions emerge only when ‘high-level’ processes, conscious or unconscious, 
become involved in the network. 
 Finally, a third way to address the issue of automaticity involves the removal of 
the phenomenological distinction between affect and cognition.  According to this 
holistic view of emotion the intricacies of the phenomenon are such that any bracketing 
out of its components will invariably display a skewed picture on the nature of the 
subject being examined.  In other words, new concepts are needed rather than simplistic 
distinctions between affect and cognition in order to describe such multi-componential 
bodily processes.  One concept, which has been devised to describe emotional 
experiences more accurately, is “embodied cognition”.49  “Enactive appraisal” is a 
different term used to address a similar concept.  What unites these approaches is the 
objective to make appraisal more corporeal than mental by placing greater focus on the 
body as the instrument of appraisals.  Specifically, it has been argued that through 
enactive appraisal perception and action are deeply integrated so that “our capacity to 
perceive presupposes the ability to orient in the environment i.e. an ability strictly 
dependent on having a body.”50  Others have also recognized the importance of motor 
representations particularly as they underline emotion recognition as well as action 
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representation and foresight in social contexts.51  Thus, one of the main challenges for 
these theoretical approaches of embodiment involves devising descriptive models of 
emotion, which fully integrate all its constitutive elements not only physiologically, but 
also socially. 
 In fact, enactive appraisal approaches function as effective reminders of the 
necessary social-embeddedness of emotions, of which it may be easy to lose sight if the 
debate remains focused exclusively on issues of affective and cognitive morphology.  I 
return to this topic in greater detail in a later section, but for now I simply want to 
underline that this is a significant implication of the ‘enactive appraisal’ approach.  In 
short, not only are the appraisals inherent to emotions nuanced by the larger affective 
reality of the individual but also all constitutive elements of emotions are socially 
nuanced in their emergence and manifestation since the experiencing body is regularly 
situated in a temporal-spatial and interpersonal context, which makes up its very 
existence.  This is certainly a further complicating factor in emotion analysis, but at 
least it contributes to ground the ongoing discussion on the relative roles of affect and 
cognition phenomenologically.52  In this manner it clarifies the subject entity of 
emotion by removing the mistaken implied idea of a cognitive homunculus or of a 
bundle of neural activity, and replaces it with a feeling, sensorimotor, and self-
conscious individual, who possesses a social identity. 
 Then, although several recent theories have supplied many new questions and 
more complexities, it is encouraging to begin to witness a departure from the polarized 
debates that have characterized the 20th century study of the affective-cognitive 
dynamics of emotion.  This is clearly an indication of the progress in the field, which 
has mostly moved away from chicken and egg kinds of arguments to more 
sophisticated examinations of the intricate dynamics of emotions.  It follows that it is 
now rare to find scholars who deny the necessity of appraisals, however defined, in the 
emergence of emotions.  Similarly, it is not as easy to classify particular theories of 
emotions as either ‘cognitive’ or ‘non-cognitive’ given the wider and co-existing 
recognition now attributed to affective factors, which has contributed to make the 
picture more complex.  In other words, we can conclude that the attention has now 
moved from the ‘what is necessary’ to the ‘how is it necessary’ in the emergence of 
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emotional phenomena.  It is also for this reason that I identify cognitive necessity rather 
than cognitive primacy as a key defining characteristic of emotion. 
 In summary, modern socio-scientific studies on emotion have broken down the 
ancient separation which associated emotion with ‘reasonless’ body and reason with 
‘emotionless’ mind.  It is now recognized that emotions are inherently cognitive since 
they require perceptions and especially appraisals in order to fully emerge.  To be sure, 
these appraisals mostly take shape at the subconscious level of awareness and they 
frequently do so with rapid automaticity, but such unreflective dynamics do not 
necessarily invalidate those theories that place ‘appraisals’ at the centre of the 
experience.  In fact, these potential problems are usually resolved by appealing to the 
speed of cognition, to dual-process models of emotion, or to ‘embodied cognition’ 
respectively.  Thus, emotions are as much about what we ‘subconsciously’ think and 
value as they are about what we explicitly feel.  It is my next objective to explore how 
this conclusion affects our personal responsibility in relation to the emotions that we 
experience. 
 
Personal responsibility 
 Non-cognitive theories of emotions have been criticized not only for their 
physiological conclusions but also for their philosophical implications.  One such 
implication, as it has been argued, involves the removal of individual accountability for 
the emotions experienced by the individual.  In fact, “in a non-cognitive approach, 
emotion cannot be evaluated; one emotion cannot be said to be more appropriate than 
another…Pain or bodily feelings are morally neutral and cannot be classified as 
justifiable or unjustifiable.”53  In other words, physiological reactions of an 
uncontrollable nature, as emotions are held to be by some non-cognitivists, are amoral, 
at least in their emergent state.  Therefore, not only is it impossible to evaluate 
emotions in their pre-expressive condition but it is also erroneous to apply moral 
responsibility on individuals for erratic stimulus-response physiological manifestations 
which in a sense are comparable to nervous ticks.  At most, moral responsibility may be 
applied to the potentially controllable behaviour triggered by emotional phenomena; 
yet, even in these cases, accountability is necessarily dependent on the intensity of the 
emotion being experienced.  Indeed, if the physiological reaction is especially strong it 
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will unavoidably force itself to find expression in the context of whatever 
circumstances are present at the time of actualization. 
 To be sure, this characterization of a non-cognitivist perspective is somewhat 
simplistic.  Both philosophers and psychologists of this persuasion have recognized that 
emotions have moral valence and that individuals should engage their emotions 
according to the moral standards which they have internalized.  However, in this 
context moral interventions are mostly to occur as late or post-emotion attempts to 
allow, suppress, or redirect those emotional manifestations or behaviours, which seem 
to emerge by necessity.  Thus, they apply personal responsibility to emotional 
expression proper rather than to the preceding realm of emotional causation.  In other 
words, emotions are still viewed as ‘forces’ that come upon an individual, and which 
need to be controlled a posteriori rather than prevented a priori in the very initial stages 
of the process.  Emotions or ‘passions’ differ from ‘actions’ in that “the individual feels 
the actions or inclinations for them passively coming over him or her, rather than 
flowing from their initiative.”54  With few exceptions, Aristotle being a notable one, 
most past philosophers and modern non-cognitivists seem to subscribe to this 
perspective. 
 Instead and as already suggested, appraisal theories of emotion advocate a 
degree of personal responsibility which extends from the causative to the expressive 
factors of emotional phenomena.  Therefore, in the recurring context of a nature versus 
nurture debate, cognitive theories aim to strike a more balanced conclusion vis-à-vis the 
arguments of their non-cognitive counterparts, which are generally skewed on the side 
of nature.  Indeed, while they recognize the biological basis of emotion and the 
unconditioned nature of some emotion-causing stimuli appraisal theorists add a 
significant ingredient, namely concern relevance.  This factor “points at emergent 
properties that reside not in the positive or negative stimuli as such, but in a more 
involved interaction.”55  At the core of these interactions lie not only drives but also 
beliefs, values, desires, and commitments for whose internal presence one holds at least 
a measure of responsibility.  Indeed, one can only speak of a degree of responsibility 
because cognitive freedom is evidently constrained by a variety of physiological and 
social factors limiting the alternatives to which one is exposed to in the development of 
various beliefs and commitments.  Thus, if one judges voluntariness to be a prerequisite 
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for moral responsibility the extent to which an individual’s existing cognitive 
evaluative structure is voluntary, as manifested in beliefs, values, and desires, is at least 
debatable.   
 Yet, and without delving into the age-long debate about the voluntariness of 
belief, or between determinism and free will, we can only conclude that “the fact that 
few, if any, beliefs are the object of choice does not threaten the claim that many beliefs 
are sufficiently voluntary to be subject to evaluation in the sense of moral evaluation.”56  
In other words, to follow the reasoning of Descartes, William James, and many 
prominent Catholic thinkers, if our thoughts, values, and beliefs embody our will, then 
our emotions, when triggered by these same beliefs and values, function as 
manifestations of our will, and as such may be evaluated.57  Furthermore, several 
modern philosophers underline the connection between responsibility and cognitive 
mediation in emotions by broadening the discussion beyond pre-existing beliefs.  Thus, 
Solomon for example, states that “the key to overcoming the passivity view of 
emotions is to appreciate the power and pervasiveness of reflection in our emotional 
life.  If we continue to feel passive with regard to our emotions, then that is something 
that we choose to do.”58  Others, like Oakley and Schlossberger, stress the need to 
morally own our emotions by extending our understanding of ‘responsibility’ beyond 
the issue of immediate control over their emergence.59  What they all stress is the 
centrality of cognition in emotions and the existentialist tenet “that man is responsible 
for his passion.”60   
But to return to psychology, and to put it in computer related terms, emotions 
are as much about software and data as they are about hardware.  In fact, emotions 
involve “the structure (properties, capacities, propensities) of the individual; incoming 
and stored information; and online dynamic interaction with the environment.”61  In 
this context, even if structural components are assumed to be fixed individual choices 
significantly shape a variety of other factors such as the kind of information the person 
is exposed to, the nature of the information that will be stored, and various 
accompanying patterns of individual interaction with the environment.  In fact, even a 
relatively fixed structural component of personality associated with emotional 
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propensities, i.e. temperament, or “a set of hypothetical constructs describing individual 
differences in reactivity and self-regulation,” does not rigidly predetermine emotional 
behaviour.  Indeed, when studying the association of temperament with social 
adjustment (which involves emotional ‘appropriateness’) we learn that “the predictive 
links…are of a moderate size.”62  In other words, there are other factors beyond 
biological predisposition, which significantly affect the make-up of one’s emotional 
life. 
 Specifically, cognitive perspectives emphasize unconscious appraisals as the 
paramount factor in this equation.  Emerging from recurrent patterns of evaluation, 
which in the long run become automatic, unconscious appraisals ultimately form both 
our dispositional and occurrent motives for emotions.  It follows, perhaps in too simple 
terms since the process is often long and difficult, that in order to change emotions an 
individual needs to change the evaluations and beliefs that lie at their root.  Since 
beliefs and desires to a large extent are learned it should also be possible for them to be 
unlearned or at least modified.  Various forms of psychotherapy focus exactly on this 
objective in order to facilitate emotional health and to dispel negative patterns of 
affective coping.  As Mathew Elliott explains it, when we are aware of an emotion, “we 
must acknowledge what it tells us about our belief.  If it is a belief that we dislike or 
hold as morally objectionable we can begin to work to change this belief.”63  What is 
entailed by this affirmation is that whatever we believe about the developmental origin 
of our emotions we are at least responsible for intervening over them when we 
recognize that they are morally unacceptable. 
Clearly, our power over our emotions should not be overstated because 
involuntary life events, particular aspects of upbringing, and genetic factors may all 
exert significant impairing influence over emotional experiences and over our capacity 
to manipulate them. Obviously, the situation is particularly difficult in cases of 
emotional pathology where the horizons of change appear especially limited.  
Notwithstanding this fact, and particularly in the realm of normal populations, “we are 
our emotions” in the words of Robert Solomon, 
as much as we are our thoughts and actions.  They are sometimes...strategies for getting along 
in the world.  They are a means of motivating, guiding, influencing, and sometimes 
manipulating our own actions and attitudes...Accordingly, we are to a significant extent 
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responsible for our emotions, something that we often deny for the most self-serving of reasons, 
to make excuses for ourselves.64   
 
Therefore, particularly in light of the potentially destructive consequences of some 
emotions, many scholars of emotions are increasingly turning their attention to emotion 
regulation. 
 Emotion regulation usually refers to the process of control of one’s emotions, 
although it is indeed possible to think of a parallel process of extrinsic regulation of 
others’ emotions.  Furthermore, it is important to remember that ‘emotion regulation’ 
should not be mistaken to imply an independent process, which is separate and 
subsequent to the ‘pure’ experience of emotion.  In fact, some have convincingly 
argued that emotion and emotion regulation are concurrent processes, which are not 
separable in functional terms.65  In other words, given the fact that cortical inhibitions 
are structurally in place prior to our experience of emotional phenomena, regulation is 
bound to shape emotion in all stages of its manifestation, namely in the occurrent, and 
pre or post-occurrent phases.  Notwithstanding this complexity, which makes emotion 
regulation harder to pin down, the concept is theoretically useful in the context of 
description of emotional dynamics.  In fact, scholarly discussion on the topic has 
blossomed and emotion regulation is currently being addressed with unprecedented 
levels of detail and sophistication. 
 One of the key figures in the field is James Gross, the editor of the Handbook of 
Emotion Regulation.  His ‘modal model’ of emotion directly addresses the many kinds 
of regulating processes that can take place in connection with emotional experience and 
conveniently situates them in a coherent yet not simplistic order.66  Gross begins by 
heuristically distinguishing between sequential core features of emotions before 
locating various forms of regulation at different points of focus throughout the 
trajectory of the emotion process.  Indeed, regulations may variously be distributed 
throughout the emotional phenomenon since they can take place at a single phase only, 
in particular combinations at various phases, or at all four phases of the emotional 
experience.  Specifically, Gross identifies the four phases of emotional phenomena as 
situation, attention, appraisal, and response.  In this context he further identifies five 
families of emotion regulation strategies, which are individually associated with these 
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four stages of emotion as well as with a ‘pre-emotion’ preparatory phase, namely 
situation selection. The initial regulation mode of the situation level is situation 
modification whereas for the attention phase attentional deployment functions as the 
main regulatory intervention.  Finally, cognitive change and response modulation 
function as the regulation strategies for the appraisal and response dimensions 
respectively.67 
 In the first place, through situation selection, an individual attempts to direct an 
emotional trajectory which is yet to originate by seeking or by avoiding situations that 
are believed to trigger specific desirable or undesirable emotions.  Of course, the 
person’s ability to make such choices will vary according to the particular setting being 
examined.  For example, the selection of a movie to watch on television and the 
avoidance of one’s boss at work are not situations at equal levels on a hypothetical 
scale of freedom to select one’s situation.  Still, within variously constrained social 
contexts emotional prediction based on personal experience is at least one factor that 
affects the innumerable choices of situation exposure encountered in daily life.  To be 
sure, the degree of emotional predictive accuracy involved in these decisions need not 
be significant in order for them to occur; in fact, studies have shown that people often 
perceive a potential emotional trajectory through skewing biases of various kinds.68 
Yet, as Gross points out, “even if we had perfect information regarding past and future 
emotional responses to situations, there would remain the thorny issue of how to 
appropriately weight short-term benefits of emotion regulation versus longer-term 
costs.”69  Indeed, one could argue that these are the sort of choices that make life both 
challenging and rewarding. 
 On the other hand, through situation modification, the focus shifts from 
complete avoidance or exposure to circumstances to various attempts for their 
amelioration.  These endeavours may take different forms, but their general purpose 
involves the manipulation of a particular situation’s emotional impact.  For example, if 
an individual fears encountering a usually grumpy superior at work he may attempt to 
influence the nature of the situation by straightening out papers on the desk prior to his 
boss’ visit.  Alternatively, or in addition to it, by paying close attention to the superior’s 
words the employee may demonstrate that he holds his opinion in particularly high 
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regard.  Similarly, the person may enquire about the recent victorious game of the boss’ 
favourite football team and show enthusiasm in discussing the topic.  Modifications of 
this kind involve an effort to prevent or decrease the predicted anger of the employer, 
which, if successful, tend to diminish the fear experienced by the employee.  In other 
words, these actions aim to influence external circumstances in relation to potential 
emotional processes, thus leading to modifications of the characteristics of an emotion 
triggering situation.  To be sure, in some cases the changes involve such degrees of 
situational modification that in all practicality a whole new situation is brought into 
being.  For this reason it may not always be easy to distinguish between situation 
selection and situation modification, although in most circumstances the difference 
between the two will be apparent. 
   With attentional deployment the focus of regulation shifts from the external 
environment to internal mental processes.  Gross explains that attentional deployment 
is “an internal version of situation selection, in that attention is used to select which of 
many possible ‘internal situations’ are active for an individual at any point in time.”70 
Thus, to return to our example of the angry boss, an employee may choose to focus his 
attention on whatever positive messages are being expressed by his superior, albeit far 
and few.  This kind of positive focus is emotionally efficacious if it helps to reduce the 
fear that the individual is experiencing upon encountering his boss.  Since the positive 
nature of the boss’ message is objectively lacking or minor this form of attentional 
intervention can be identified as a kind of distraction from emotionally charged stimuli, 
one of the most common strategies of attentional deployment that even infants 
regularly use.  In fact, and in support of its regulating efficacy, it has been shown that 
infants’ ability to shift attention from emotionally frustrating stimuli to positive areas of 
focus is correlated with later qualities of social adaptation.71  On the other hand, 
rumination over emotionally-charged stimuli generally tends to correlate with the 
negative symptoms associated with depression.72  In fact, rumination extends and thus 
intensifies a particular emotional impact, but since its occurrence is often characterized 
by inflexibility over the powers of volition rumination is usually associated with 
emotional pathology rather than with constructive emotion regulation. 
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 If the gist of attentional deployment is change in focus, the essence of cognitive 
change is change in meaning.  Specifically, since individuals attribute meaning to 
emotionally relevant stimuli through appraisals cognitive change intervenes “by 
changing how one thinks either about the situation itself or about one’s capacity to 
manage the demands it poses.”73  In our example, the fearful employee may choose to 
explain the boss’ unpleasant behaviour as a manifestation of stress caused by his 
difficult family circumstances or by serious health problems rather than as a direct and 
personal attack expressing displeasure and anger over the employee’s job performance.  
Whether realistic or not, reappraisals of this kind have been shown to generally lead to 
a decrease of negative emotion experience.74  Furthermore, preliminary studies suggest 
that reappraisals do not significantly impair other concurrently functioning cognitive 
processes like memory.75  Indeed, reappraisal may function as one of the most 
effective strategies in emotion regulation although it makes sense to suppose that its 
impact will be indirectly related to one’s level of certainty in assessing the nature of 
any apparent reality.  In other words, since reappraisals usually involve the application 
of readings to available perceptual evidence which appear ‘less obvious’ in the context 
of normal patterns of evaluation, its emotional impact will likely be larger where 
greater flexibility exists to accept a reality that justifies different directions of empirical 
interpretation. 
 Finally, the strategy of response modulation takes place at the latest stage of the 
emotion process or whenever an individual attempts to directly influence his already 
initiated physiological or behavioural response tendencies.  The employee who makes 
an effort to look at his boss in the eyes while the latter is speaking is attempting to 
modulate the fear response by hiding it behind a behaviour that is associated with 
assertiveness and self-security rather than fear.  Therefore, response modulations often 
take the shape of expressive suppression of those emotional manifestations that are 
considered inappropriate for whatever reason.  Interestingly, contrary to the highlighted 
evidence on reappraisals, expressive suppression is associated with both social and 
cognitive costs in the course of concurrent activities.  For example, partners in social 
psychological experiments expressed greater discomfort when interacting with 
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suppressors than when engaging with non-suppressors.76  Similarly, various studies 
have shown that recall of material presented during a time of emotional suppression 
was significantly worse than in circumstances unregulated by suppression.77  Then, if at 
all possible it would seem that it is preferable to intervene on emotions at the earlier 
stages of appraisal and attention rather than in the later stage of response.  At the same 
time some preliminary evidence indicates that patterns of emotion regulation may 
include both effortful as well as automatic unconscious interventions, thus making the 
modulating of regulations partially elusive to conscious awareness and guidance.78 
 In summary, emotion regulation is a process characterized by potential multiple 
stages and multiple modalities of intervention, which are used to modulate our 
emotional life, both in its experience and in its expression.  Its wide extension on the 
trajectory of emotion, from its pre-emotional to its post-emotional ends, captures the 
essence of appraisal theories in their relation to personal responsibility about emotions.  
Since emotions only emerge in the specific cognitive contexts, which characterize 
individuals, humans are indeed responsible, whether fully or partially, for the emotions 
that they experience.  Thus, people produce their emotions first through background 
beliefs, values, and desires on which subsequent conscious or unconscious appraisals 
are dependent.  Secondly, they uniquely shape them through patterns of attention, of 
situation selection, situation modification or response modulation.  At the same time it 
must be remembered that these phenomena take place in the context of broader or 
narrower constraints of a physiological or environmental nature.   
To be sure, this whole regulatory process is built on the premise that emotions 
play a significant enough role in our existence to warrant the use of our resources and 
energy in attempting to control them.  In fact, as we are engaged in the managing of our 
emotions we learn to discern between those emotional manifestations which are 
destructive and dysfunctional and those which are constructive and developmentally 
instrumental.  Furthermore, we realize that such instrumentality often centres in the 
epistemic value of emotions from which we extract ‘teachings’ about our reality, 
whether subjective or objective, and whether internal or external.  In other words, 
through emotions we come to know ourselves as well as our environments.  It is indeed 
this topic, the epistemic instrumentality of emotions, which represents the next area of 
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focus in my analysis.  Then, in the upcoming section, I highlight the last of the three 
selected points of departure between modern science and past philosophy in relation to 
the understanding of emotions. 
 
Developmental instrumentality 
 In the context of the master-slave metaphor that characterized the reason-
emotion dichotomy of ages past it is hardly surprising that the pedagogical function of 
emotions was judged to be minor or null.  In fact, when viewed as non-cognitive 
irrational bodily movements that are schematically located at the opposite end of 
reflective reason emotion emerged primarily as an obstacle rather than as a catalyst to 
the pursuit of truth.  Then, within this particular conceptual framework it was the 
exercise of the purer and higher capacities of the mind, soul, or reason, which led to the 
acquisition of truth.  Emotions were not to teach; they were rather to be taught.  The 
conceptual extension of this view involved an association of emotions with irrationality 
and moral suspicion, a perspective which exerted a high degree of influence on much 
post-enlightenment ‘positivist’ thinking although hotly opposed by such thinkers as 
Hume and Pascal.  Hence, modern scholars of emotions have often encountered 
resistance in their attempts to recast emotions under a more positive light, perhaps 
finding further obstacles as a consequence of the publicity received by the prevalence 
and symptoms of various debilitative emotional disorders.  Still, the breadth, depth, and 
academic relevance of current literature on such topics as ‘emotions and ethics’ and 
‘emotional intelligence’ highlight the fact that we have largely overcome our anti-
emotion prejudices of the past as we study emotions with greater accuracy and with 
finer discernment. 
 At the same time, while much has been done to shed light on the positive 
function of emotions there is yet more that remains to be examined.  Given the breadth 
and complexity of the subject, which necessarily involves multiple areas of inquiry and 
conceptualization, this is only to be expected.  Therefore, the issue of instrumentality 
may be approached from a variety of perspectives and emphases.  For example, the 
subject may be examined with particular reference to the role of rationality, physiology, 
ethics, identity, perception, culture, or some other factor.  Thus, in this brief overview I 
can only scratch the surface of those questions that address the where, when, and how 
of the human value of emotions.  For this purpose it is useful to begin with a general 
organizing schema, such as Ben Ze’ev classification of emotions into three main 
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functional areas, which include the indicative, the mobilizing, and the communicative. 
Yet, as Ben Ze’ev recognizes, the foundations for this distinction are not original to his 
thought; instead, they were laid out by Charles Darwin in one of the earliest scientific 
studies on the evolutionary function of emotion: The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals.79 
 In this work and through extensive observations Darwin concluded that 
emotions had evolutionary advantages because they motivated adaptive behaviours like 
flight and procreation.  For example, fear energized potentially life-saving escapes from 
predators and lust allowed sexual reproduction of the species to continue.  In this sense 
emotions mobilized needed resources.  Furthermore, he saw emotions as modes of 
signalling and communication, which conferred survival advantages to both individual 
organisms and to groups.  In this second sense they indicated circumstances of danger 
or highlighted other relevant stimuli to the individual while communicating a similar 
need for attention to other individuals and groups, who were present on the ‘emotional’ 
scene.  More recent studies have both supported Darwin’s conclusions and extended his 
paradigm of evolutionary functionality to emotions like joy and embarrassment.80  At 
the same time, other scholars have warned that although “functional advantages of 
emotions can readily be thought of; that does not make these advantages actually occur, 
nor do they actually explain the emotions’ origin.”81 
 Parenthetically, I should underline that although Darwin’s evidence for the 
evolutionary function of emotion was later utilized in support of several non-cognitive 
theories of causation the scope and implications of the ‘indicative’ function are 
currently understood to be much larger than and not necessarily bound to the limited 
issue of affective or cognitive primacy.  In fact, since it has been abundantly shown that 
emotions involve unconscious appraisal processes, the presence of an emotional 
phenomenon is indicative not only of the specific activating perception but also of 
various elements of background information included in its constitutive appraisals.  
Indeed, as evaluations are shaped by internal beliefs and values, which to some extent 
lie beneath the realm of consciousness, emotions provide potentially relevant input for 
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For a theory about the evolutionary function of the ‘positive emotions’ see Fredrickson and Branigan 
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the identification of both nature and relative hierarchy of the said values and beliefs.  
Emotional explorations and analyses of this kind have undoubtedly been at the 
forefront of clinical interventions for emotional disorders where they have generally 
been effective in facilitating treatment.82  To be sure, ‘emotional processing’ is both 
post-emotional and reflective thus differing somewhat from processes inherent in the 
absorption of automatic and unreflective information concurrent to the experience of 
emotion.  Still, whether obtained through unreflective or reflective processes, and 
whether available immediately or only subsequently, the identifiable information which 
accompanies emotions usually possesses some measure of epistemic value.  
 Similarly, current conceptualizations of the mobilizing and communicative 
functions of emotions have broadened in scope since Darwin’s stage-setting analysis.  
In fact, our whole understanding of the instrumentality of emotions has increased in 
accuracy and complexity as emotional functions have come to intersect in intricate 
patterns of mutual relationship and even of dependency.  In this more advanced yet 
more conceptually entangled era the self has emerged as the core conceptual pivot 
around which all emotional experiences rotate.  Indeed, in many current theories it is 
the preservation and enhancement of the self in its unity, as a biologically-centred 
cognitive and social construct, which drives both emergence and expression of all 
emotional experiences.  The self then lies at the root of the mobilizing function of 
emotion as a ‘first cause’, hence ultimately making all emotions self-referential.83  
Furthermore, the information that emotion provides, either indicatively to the 
experiencer or communicatively to its observers, are received by each individual self-
referentially, namely in terms relevant to self preservation or to self enhancement.  In 
fact, the whole process of identity formation, which involves the acquisition of a self-
conception that includes both stable and dynamic characteristic, is itself rooted in 
emotional processes.84   
To be sure, placing the self at the centre of emotion does not mean isolating it 
from its social environment; in fact, the very concept of self is vacuous when removed 
from the social context that contributes to its definition.  Indeed, it suffices to remember 
that both self-awareness and self-conception (two inter-related but distinct processes) 
emerge from the individual’s continuous social interactions which are characterized by 
                                                 
82 See Greenberg (2008), 88-101.  For the potential information-feedback that may emerge from moods 
see Schwarz and Clore (2003), 298-301.  
83 Kaplan (2007), 224-53. 
84 For a good survey on emotion-based self theories see Boyns (2007), 254-75. 
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exchanges in both linguistic and emotional ‘currency.’  Thus, emotions give significant 
shape to most if not all interpersonal communicative dynamics, certainly a core reason 
for the increasing attention that the sociology of emotions is presently receiving.  
Indeed, sociological theories of emotion have mushroomed in all directions including at 
least five theoretical research traditions which distinguish between five separate areas 
of focus in relation to the emergence and the shaping of emotions.  One of the most 
prominent of these sociological traditions is the symbolic interactionist approach just 
highlighted, which emphasizes identity and self, both as situational and trans-situational 
entities.  The remaining traditions, namely the dramaturgical, the structural, the ritual, 
and the exchange one, instead place their focus on culture, social structure, ritual 
practices, and cost/reward dynamics respectively.85 
Similarly, to underline the self-relevant function of emotions does not imply a 
necessary association with selfish motivations and behaviours.  The degree to which 
individuals manifest ‘selfish’ emotions is dependent on a variety of factors, including 
the particular content of various areas of their personal identities, which incorporate 
cultural, religious, gender, professional, and other areas.  Among these factors is also 
found a collective dimension, which involves identification of the self with particular 
groups.  If this sense of group belonging is experienced as particularly significant the 
collective dimension may overshadow other areas of personal identity thus driving the 
individual to make significant sacrifices for the primary benefit of the collective entity.  
A further factor that may contribute to influence emotional responses in altruistic 
directions is empathy.  In fact, as a state which triggers emotional sensitivity to the 
particular conditions of others empathy lies at the foundation of what we often identify 
as ‘moral behaviour.’  Indeed, experimental evidence shows that it is common for most 
people to experience empathic distress and to generally desire to be helpful.86 
  The potential or actual presence of empathy in emotional responses reaffirms 
the need for a broad symbolic-interactionist conception of the self, which includes an 
ethical dimension of identity.  In fact, the influence that internalized moral norms exert 
in profiling the nature of emotional experiences can hardly be overemphasized.  
Hoffman makes this point convincingly when he highlights the significance of empathy 
in shaping the decisions which defined some of the major political and legal milestones 
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in the recent history of the United States.87  At the same time, one needs not look at the 
macro level to recognize the ever-present yet subtle normative dimension, which 
characterizes all emotional phenomena.  In fact, ethical considerations affect all stages 
of emotional experience, beginning with background beliefs and values that shape 
evaluations, through regulations of emotional expressions, to post-emotional reflections 
in assessing the impact of affective experiences.  In this context, it is important to use 
care when making generalizations since ethical norms vary in emphasis from individual 
to individual and especially from one culture to the next.  Still, it is possible to cluster 
distinctive normative structures in various cultures around one of three core ethical 
paradigms, which centre respectively on moral objectives of autonomy, community, 
and divinity.88  Then, in an ethical context where the individual, the group, or God 
acquire supreme significance emotions become truly teleological.  In fact, as 
constrained by ethical norms surrounding their kind, time, place, focus, and intensity 
emotions ultimately “reveal the goals or ends toward which human beings are meant to 
strive.”89 
Of course, whether individuals succeed or fail in achieving such moral goals is a 
different question, which hinges on a variety of both external and internal dynamics and 
constraints.  In fact, it is apparent that goal failure or frustration is a regular occurrence 
in most people’s daily experiences, at least in relation to their short-term objectives.   In 
these instances it is common for individuals to resort to coping mechanisms in response 
to the encounter with their failed expectations.  In this context and as previously 
indicated emotions essentially act as the first and most automatic coping responses to 
goal interruptions and obstructions; moreover, they accompany the various positive 
circumstances of goal achievement.  Then, when goals are frustrated, emotions provide 
a signal that in relation to the present circumstances some portions of currently held 
beliefs are false and in need of revision.  In turn, “the inertial persistence of the 
emotional arousal, and its slow decay, leads to continued recycling or rehearsal of those 
encoded events viewed as causally belonging to the emotional reaction.”90   
What emerges from these considerations is the significant role emotions may 
play in learning processes of various kinds.  In fact, as the first form of coping response 
to novel stimuli emotions should unavoidably be located at the core of humans’ life-
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90 Bower (1994), 304. 
 53 
 
long direction learning experiences, which generally involve the processing of fresh 
information.  In fact, studies have shown that in both children and adults a three-stage 
‘learning’ sequence typically follows emotional responses to goal failure.  As a form of 
reflective processing which immediately follows or is even co-occurring with the 
experience the first stage entails updating those beliefs that have emerged to be 
inadequate, which, if left unmodified, may further debilitate emotional functioning in 
future circumstances.  Secondly, individuals identify the nature of the consequences 
and damages, which followed the failure in their expectations, both internally and 
externally.  Finally, they evaluate the probability of generating a successful plan of 
action for future possibilities of goal achievement and subsequently determine whether 
to maintain, modify or discard the original goal.91 
 To be sure, much of the direction learning that emerges from personal goals is 
firmly rooted in the social realm of interpersonal relationships.  Hence, the self 
develops by necessity through interactions with other individuals towards whom 
various attitude stances may be manifested.  Then, emotions are socially instrumental 
inasmuch as they constitute a primary mode by which people strengthen or loosen their 
interpersonal relationships either through social engagement or disengagement.  
Specifically, emotions’ social function centres on three possible areas of universal goals 
or motivations: affiliation, attachment, and assertion.  Through affiliation we commit 
ourselves to a relatively large number of individuals with whom we desire to establish 
friendly cooperation.  On the other hand, attachment involves the search for intimate 
relationships with a restricted number of people where mutual protection is ensured 
through the exchange of trust and dependency.  Assertion further differs from both 
affiliation and attachment in that our objective centres in the desire to establish our 
status or power as we experience conflict within the social environment.  Therefore, 
although circumstances do not always permit absolute categorizations, sympathy may 
be classified as the main affiliation emotion, love as the core emotion of attachment, 
and anger as the ultimate assertion indicator.92 
 In addition to being applied to individual relationships socially engaging or 
disengaging emotions also function in the context of group relationships.  Indeed, 
people undergo a form of ‘depersonalization’ when they identify so much with a group 
that their social identity becomes more salient than their individual one.  In these 
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settings, which usually emerge when social comparisons or conflicts among groups are 
particularly significant, individuals see themselves as relatively interchangeable 
members of the group to which they belong.  Hence, they experience group-based 
rather than individually-based emotions since the context mainly involves intergroup 
rather than interpersonal relationships.  At the same time, group emotions often include 
two distinct dimensions, which relate concurrently to intergroup and to intra-group 
social motivations.  In fact, while an individual relates to outsider groups in a mostly 
depersonalized state he also experiences within his own group group-focused 
interpersonal relationships, which in turn may strengthen or loosen the intra-group 
affiliation bond.  Interestingly, some emotions can simultaneously play opposite social 
functions in the respective contexts of intergroup and intra-group relationships.  For 
example, shared hatred serves an assertive distancing function in intergroup 
relationships while at the same time potentially strengthening intra-group affiliation.93 
 A larger exploration of the function or instrumentality of emotion would 
involve many other dimensions of human behaviour and cognition.  If the focus is on 
behaviour examples include an examination of emotional influences over patterns of 
economic activities and an analysis of individuals’ emotional responses to 
physiological symptoms that relate to personal health.94  Indeed, an increasing number 
of experiments and studies are focusing on the many aspects that characterize the 
emotion-health relationship.95  In the realm of cognition examples are so numerous to 
include entire volumes dedicated to the exploration of the effects of emotion over 
specific cognitive processes.96  Given the current level of interest it is likely that more 
studies of such focused nature will continue to emerge in both behavioural and 
cognitive areas of exploration.  In this process of discovery we will also continue to 
apply our moral views to those affective genetic traits in our emotions that we find to 
be dysfunctional or even harmful.  After all, since most would agree that humans are 
not genetic robots, we should not merely consent to our genes’ programming, 
especially when our goals and values differ from our puzzling genetic predispositions.97  
In this very context one cannot help but notice the increase in popularity of 
emotional intelligence, a unitary concept, which variously frames human capacities for 
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emotional control and direction.  Although still in its infancy ‘emotional intelligence’ 
has already captured the enthusiasm of popular writers and observers, whose 
exaggerated claims and confused conceptualizations are being criticized by the very 
originators of the concept.  In fact, while recognizing the utility of a unitary framework 
that gathers all individual emotional competencies under one conceptual umbrella Peter 
Salovey and his colleagues have emphasized both the multifaceted nature of emotional 
intelligence and the need for clarity in analyzing its various components.  For this 
purpose the same authors distinguish four main branches of emotional intelligence, 
each of which is characterized by specific emotion-related abilities.  The first branch 
involves the realms of perception, appraisal, and expression of emotions while the 
second concerns the use of emotions to facilitate thinking.  Then, the third branch 
measures the ability to understand and analyze emotional information whereas the final 
dimension is specifically concerned with the management of emotions, namely with 
emotional regulation.98  To be sure, since social situations and problems are inherently 
filled with affective information ‘social intelligence’ is bound to overlap with 
emotional intelligence.  Thus, as is true for every other human dimension, emotional 
intelligence as a distinct aspect of emotional instrumentality can only be defined in the 
social contexts, which characterize human existence. 
In summary, emotions inform, mobilize, and communicate, whether 
functionally or not.  In fact, their instrumentality is contingent on factors that include 
the adequacy of appraisals as well as other dynamics, such as the manner of their 
expression.99  Still, as a means to achieve ‘learning-centred’ personal development 
emotions are both necessary and prominent since they motivate and are constitutive of 
most processes of self-preservation, self-enhancement, and both interpersonal and 
intergroup relationships.  Furthermore, emotions possess potential epistemic value in 
relation to both internal and external sources of knowledge and they often act as louder-
than-words communicators of the very beliefs and values which lie at the root of 
individuals’ personal identity.  In this light it would seem appropriate that common 
conceptualizations of individual intelligence should include a specific dimension of 
emotional competency in addition to measuring other capacities of an intellectual and 
social nature.  Indeed, since emotions are at the core of what is involved in being and 
becoming a functional human being emotional intelligence is highly instrumental in all 
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major processes of individual development and progression.  Then, while these 
conclusions do not imply naive denying of the distorting or dysfunctional nature of 
some emotional expressions we now stand in stark departure from stoic and other 
related perspectives, which categorically opposed emotions to reason or invariably 
associated emotions with a form of bondage. 
The developmental instrumentality of emotions is the final of the three general 
points of socio-scientific achievement in the study of emotions that I have selected for 
my brief review.  In this process of exploration it has become apparent that the attribute 
of instrumentality follows logically from the two previously highlighted aspects, 
namely the cognitive necessity as well as the personal responsibility inherent in 
emotions.  In turn, this tripartite philosophical and scientific foundation for 
understanding emotional phenomena frames the great majority of current directions in 
the socio-scientific exploration of emotions.  Then, one final issue remains open for 
brief examination at the conclusion of this chapter: the problem of emotional 
classification.  Given my own later attempt to classify emotions within the context of 
Mormon canonical texts I certainly need to provide both a general introduction to the 
issue and a description of my own criteria of classification. 
 
Distinguishing different emotions: three major approaches 
 At present no universal agreement exists on a single mode of emotion 
classification or on the exact boundaries of meaning in the linguistic labels that have 
been attached to particular emotional phenomena.  This is the current reality 
notwithstanding the fact that for centuries scholars have been developing a range of 
possible emotion taxonomies in order to reduce complexity and to facilitate discourse 
and understanding.  In turn, these taxonomies have varied in relation to the manner in 
which they describe the interaction and organization of particular emotional 
components since some have placed greater emphasis on one specific element or on a 
defining emotional dynamic over another.  Yet, when we limit our focus to modern 
socio-scientific theories of classification it is possible to identify three main families of 
such hypotheses which distinctively describe and thus classify emotional 
manifestations.  The three approaches involve respectively basic-emotion, multi-
componential, and hierarchical theories, each of which boasts its own followers and 
supporters.  My current objective is to briefly highlight each perspective before 
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concluding the section with a reference to a less comprehensive yet useful manner of 
classification, which involves the employment of ‘prototypical emotions’. 
 As Frijda succinctly explains, within the basic-emotions hypothesis “the various 
components form solidly coherent packets, each based on a common neural and 
neurohumoral disposition.  Activation of the dispositions by events jointly activates the 
various components.” 100  Building on Darwin’s work, scholars in this vigorous 
tradition have placed great emphasis on the claimed universality of certain facial 
expressions like smiling, frowning, or sneering and on the existence of dedicated brain 
circuits for various emotional experiences.101  Although heavily neurobiological in 
focus, this perspective leaves ample room for cultural and individual differences 
because each basic emotion can also be viewed to represent a functionally defined class 
of experience.  Furthermore, to use Frijda’s words once more, “within each class, the 
precise antecedents, nature of the objects, full gamut of appraisal components, precise 
type of action goal or action...all may vary.”102  Hence, complex emotions differ from 
their basic counterparts in that the former involve the addition of culturally refined or 
idiosyncratic developments with a basic core, which is innate and universal.103  Still, 
lack of consensus on the criteria for the identification of a basic emotion, with the 
accompanying problem of no clarity in distinguishing basic emotions from their 
complex counterparts make this perspective somewhat problematic.  Even Paul Ekman, 
seems to imply that such classifications are elusive since he recently added nine 
categories of basic emotions to the original six (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
and surprise) which he first proposed.104 
 Instead, multi-componential views of emotion are not concerned with clearly 
demarcated classifications.  According to this perspective emotions are “more or less 
unordered collections of components, jointly activated by how an emotional event is 
appraised and by individual component propensities.”105  In this light, as emotion labels 
are somewhat arbitrary identifications that mainly reflect cultural concerns they only 
‘fuzzily’ have reference to the actual sub-regional structures and dynamics of emotional 
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experiences.  A major proponent of this perspective, Klaus Scherer, used the term 
‘synchronization’ to highlight the necessary condition for the emergence of emotion, 
which potentially involves innumerable combinations of relevant cognitive and 
physiological components in interaction with external conditions.106  Therefore, multi-
componential views seem to be well equipped to account for the cultural variations that 
characterize much of the existing emotion language and classification.  Yet, improved 
validity may have been achieved at the cost of diminished ability to communicate about 
emotion given the inherent difficulty to conceptually ‘freeze’ emotional phenomena for 
analytical purposes within a multi-componential framework. 
 Perhaps, this problem is partially reduced by the third hierarchical approach, 
which attempts to organize emotions both horizontally and vertically and to consider 
both their individual characteristics and their overall nature.  One prominent illustration 
of a theory rooted in this kind of perspective was proposed by the late Robert Plutchik.  
whose ‘circumplex model’ involves both a ‘vertical’ classification of emotional 
intensity and a horizontal (as well as circular) ordering of the emotions according to 
their mutual similarity.  Therefore, since the model identifies eight primary emotions in 
a hierarchical structure of componential significance Plutchik appears to propose a 
middle ground between the basic-emotion and the multi-componential views previously 
highlighted.107  Other scholars have also employed similar hierarchical models although 
the locus of their focus has often differed from Plutchik’s.  For example, Ben-Ze’ev has 
suggested a comprehensive hierarchical classification of emotions along two separate 
dimensions, i.e. their affective valence on the one hand and the object of their focus on 
the other.108  As a whole it appears that hierarchical perspectives are similar to multi-
componential approaches in their shift of emphasis from categorical to process 
conceptualizations.  At the same time, in comparison to most multi-componential 
approaches hierarchical perspectives preserve a more systematic form of structural 
organization, which I believe to have its own attractiveness for both analytic and 
communication purposes.  
 Finally, in addition to the three classification approaches I have just outlined it 
is possible to identify other forms of emotion classification, which are not devised with 
the purpose of presenting a detailed picture of comprehensive organization.  In fact, 
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there are instances where scholars are so concerned with exploring the characteristics 
and dynamics of single and widely recognized types of emotions that the issue of their 
organization in an overarching structure of emotion classification appears to be 
secondary.  In these cases the use of prototypical categories of description is 
particularly common.  Through this specific focus various emotions are given 
membership in a particular category if they are judged to possess a high degree of 
similarity to the best existing exemplar which defines that very category.  For example, 
gladness, anticipation, or excitement are all clustered into a prototypical category of 
‘happiness’ and are examined as such.  Furthermore, within this descriptive framework 
all identified emotional phenomena are treated as if they were unrelated to any 
particular context since the main focus of the analysis involves what is typical rather 
than what is valid in each instance.109   
Clearly, the use of prototypical categories is an attempt to simplify a complex 
picture in order to facilitate work with existing data.  Therefore, as an organizing 
principle it has its utility and place although disagreements are likely to emerge in 
relation to both the particular selection of prototypical emotional categories as well as 
to the judgments that determine inclusion of a specific emotion into one category over 
another.  Still, the concept is helpful particularly when classification functions as a 
means to facilitate analysis rather than as the ultimate focus of one’s examination.  
Therefore, I make use of it in my own classification since it fits well within the larger 
context of the present analysis. 
 
Emotion classification in the present analysis of LDS texts 
 The upcoming theological examination of the emotional content of 
Mormonism’s sacred texts is built on a rather narrow pragmatic focus. In fact, my aim 
is only to analyse specific textual emotion-related terms and instances rather than 
attempting to develop a full-blown systematization of all LDS scriptural emotional 
phenomena.  Indeed, while I do explore basic overarching standards of emotion 
conceptualization in the Mormon theological milieu these conclusions cannot be 
properly developed in detailed articulation within the limited space of the present 
endeavour.  Thus, a full-blown LDS theology of emotion must await a later project in 
which it can be unfolded with greater coherence and completeness.  At present, a few 
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specific emotions are my main object of focus and it is in relation to their selection and 
classification that I now need to present my own organizing criteria.  In this context my 
method generally involves a syncretism of elements from both hierarchical and 
prototypological perspectives since I aim to strike a balance between clarity of focus 
and faithfulness to complexity. 
 In the first place I have selected only three main classes of emotions for my 
present study.  Each category or ‘kind’ is thought to exist in a multiplicity of 
manifesting forms, which in turn are identified through a variety of linguistic 
expressions.  The dependent variable that determines distinctions within the same 
emotional category is affective valence, or the degree to which a particular emotional 
experience generally feels pleasant or unpleasant.  Therefore, a specific ‘kind’ of 
emotion appears as a spectrum of experience where location is determined by relative 
valence, either on a positive side or on a negative one.110  Yet, while suggesting this 
general form of background organization I am not concerned with the creation of a 
detailed internal hierarchy of emotional intensity.  In other words, I am not interested in 
associating individual emotion terms with specific degrees of valence nor do I intend to 
identify the exact emotion, which is located at each extreme end of the experiential 
spectrum.  Instead, I choose one prototypical positive manifestation, for example joy, 
and one prototypical negative one, sorrow in the same example, to represent the two 
specific loci of focus for the examination of that single class of emotion.  Hence, my 
classification is prototypical at least at two different levels of description: first, in the 
selection of three prototypical ‘classes’ of emotions, and second, in the internal 
selection of a positive and a negative prototypical manifestation of that same category. 
 At the same time, this method is hierarchical, at least in rudimentary fashion, 
because it lays out a basic valence-dependent dichotomy within each emotional 
category.  Furthermore, the selection of the three core emotion classes to be explored 
ensues from organizing criteria that include a hierarchical dimension.  In fact, mine is 
an attempt to distinguish between a few core emotional forms of experience by 
highlighting the most prominent of their distinctive emotional components.  In other 
words, each category is identifiable primarily in relation to one or two characteristics 
that are present in all emotions, but which emerge with unique visibility or intensity in 
one kind of emotional phenomenon.  Therefore, the paramount components function as 
                                                 
110 This method of classification has some affinity with the one outlined in Rolls (2005), 14. 
 61 
 
the mark, which distinguishes that particular emotion class from other emotion 
categories.  To return to the previous example of joy and sorrow, the class of emotion 
they represent seems to display the common emotional characteristics of evaluation and 
goal directedness with particular prominence and visibility.  For this reason I have 
named this particular class of emotional experience the assessing category.  Therefore, 
it may be observed that within the classification I am presently employing prototypical 
categories of emotions and their positive or negative manifestations intersect with a 
basic hierarchy, which in turn is founded on a multi-componential view of emotional 
phenomena. 
 To be sure, no single aspect of this form of classification is beyond dispute.  
One could certainly focus on more emotional categories than these three and both 
identifying components and labels for each selected class are not self-evident.  Still, for 
my present purposes these distinctions are sufficiently workable while also remaining 
illustrative of the core emotional phenomena in the human experience.  In any case, and 
to set out my classification in some order, I have labelled the three highlighted classes 
of classification as the predicting, the assessing, and the relating categories of emotion.  
The prominent components in the predicting class are change and uncertainty whereas 
the selected forms of manifestation with opposing valence centre in hope and fear.  
Then, as already indicated, the assessing category emerges from the visibility of 
evaluation and goal directedness and with opposing manifestations of joy and sorrow.  
Finally, desires and interpersonal connections prominently characterize the relating 
class in which love and hatred function as the two prototypical directions of expression. 
 The contours and significance of each of these categories of emotion within the 
bounds of the LDS canon will be analysed in detail in subsequent chapters, particularly 
in relation to the three defining characteristics of emotion described in this chapter, 
namely cognitive necessity, personal responsibility, and developmental instrumentality.  
However, before commencing the extensive examination, which constitutes the bulk of 
the present endeavour, I find it necessary to draw a bridge between what has emerged 
as a socio-scientific survey on the existing emotion research and what will later 
materialize as a theological analysis of emotion in a very specific religious context.  At 
the core of this bridge is also found a survey, although in this instance its nature is 
theological rather than scientific.  Therefore, in the following chapter I set out to 
highlight some of the central theological foundations of the Mormon worldview with 
the purpose of sketching the contextual ideological background against which LDS 
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emotional interpretation may be understood and described.  Furthermore, and in this 
light, I hope to draw preliminary attention to the affinity between the previously 
highlighted characteristics of emotion and some of the core tenets, which theologically 
define Mormonism.   
Hence, in introducing the detailed textual analysis that will later follow I 
assemble the theological scaffolding against which the concept of emotion appears to 
fit quite naturally, not as a scientific concept, but as a theological one.  In fact, only by 
understanding the LDS theological framework can one begin to construct a proper LDS 
theology of emotion, which will include both theological assumptions and linguistic 
expressions unique to Mormonism as well as connections with a different yet related 
mode of explanation, i.e. the socio-scientific one. 
 
 63 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Mormon Theological Foundations of Existence 
 
 
 At the root of Thomas Dixon’s historical examination From Passions to 
Emotions lays a distinction between the usually dyadic religious language employed in 
reference to emotional phenomena and the post-enlightenment conflation of terms like 
passions and affections under one single semantic umbrella, ‘emotion.’  Hence, Dixon’s 
subtitle: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category.1  From this volume’s 
detailed analysis and from its author’s reasoned conclusions I extract at least two quite 
evident implications, which are of relevance for my current purposes.  First, 
theologians and religious devotees have always spoken and written about emotions.  In 
fact, given the centrality, intensity, and frequency of emotions in humanity’s daily 
experience emotions have regularly appeared at the forefront of sacred writings, of 
sermons, and of spiritual exercises of all kinds.  Indeed, they have been the object of 
significant theological work by major thinkers like Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, to 
name only two.2  Nevertheless, and this is a second conclusion of Dixon’s work, there 
is no necessary equivalence between socio-scientific and theological discourses on 
emotion.  At times both disciplines are concerned with addressing similar questions, 
but in other instances their focus and assumptions differ significantly.  Hence, one 
needs to avoid the assumption of semantic correspondence and in so doing pay 
particular attention to distinctive contexts of explanation.3 
                                                 
1 Dixon (2003), 1-5. 
2 See Dyson (1998), 359-89, 581-633; Aquinas (1967).  Also, for both Augustine’s and Aquinas’ views 
on emotion see Dixon (2003), 26-61. 
3 The most prominent author who is exploring with academic depth the realm of interaction between 
religion and emotion is John Corrigan.  Within this context he has provided both acute theoretical 
analyses of the study of religion and emotion and informative historiographical surveys on the current 
state of the research.  See, Corrigan (2004), 3-32; Corrigan (2002), 269-80; and Corrigan (2000), 1-19.  
Also see his most recent edited work, Corrigan (2008). 
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 In the present age the need for contextual attention is especially relevant given 
the fact that much of the secular psychological terminology about emotion has been 
adopted in both popular religious circles and in academic theological settings.  
Therefore, if commonality of terms is perceived to justify the absence of any degree of 
‘translation’ the fact that science and religion do not always speak about the exact same 
phenomenon is likely to be obscured.  At the same time, it is true that a large degree of 
semantic correspondence has been reached especially in those instances where 
theological borrowings from scientific perspectives, as well as inflow in the opposite 
direction, have extended from mere terminology to include values and objectives.  
Intricate relationships of this kind are perhaps best exemplified by such sub-disciplines 
as transpersonal psychology or as counselling-focused pastoral theology.4  However, it 
is clear that incorporations of this nature can only occur in a theological context which 
is already open, on its own terms, to such additions.  Therefore, it is through awareness 
of a tradition’s fundamental tenets or assumptions that one can facilitate the process of 
multidisciplinary communication, respect, and exchange, thus allowing theologies to 
provide their unique contributions to the study of emotion.  
 All these considerations are certainly applicable to the theology of Mormonism.  
As many others do Mormons regularly speak, teach, and reflect about emotions.  
Furthermore, although some of their terminology is unique, much of the emotion 
language in LDS sermons and lessons matches common psychological or popular 
terminology.  Yet, the theological context and the underlining assumptions that 
permeate the use of emotion language within Mormonism considerably shape its 
meaning and significance.  Moreover, Mormon theology is obviously selective in its 
absorption from secular socio-scientific sources of emotion-related knowledge, 
particularly in the realms of theological anthropology and ethics.  At the same time, 
because the fundamental structure of Mormon theology is not incompatible with the 
current major scientific conclusions on the subject of emotion, LDS theology may 
‘converse’ with and ‘appropriate’ much from the empirical study of emotion.5  
                                                 
4 On transpersonal psychology see Kasprow and Scotton (1999), 12-23.  Of course, there may be several 
theological approaches to pastoral counseling.  One specific and well-articulated example may be found 
in Louw (1999). 
5 The noted LDS psychologist Allen Bergin repeatedly uses both psychological and Mormon theological 
insights when addressing emotional phenomena in Bergin (2002).  At the same time, another Mormon 
psychologist and philosopher, Richard N. Williams has emphasized the need to construct an LDS 
psychology that is built on proper theoretical ‘Gospel’ foundations in Williams (1998), 1-30.  A volume, 
which is wholly devoted to the theoretical exploration of the intersection between psychology and the 
LDS theological framework is Jackson, et al. (2005).   
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Similarly, non-Mormon social scientists may find that examining both distinctive and 
common approaches to the conceptualization and regulation of emotions in an LDS 
religious setting may provide some useful insights.   
My current analysis hopes to provide a contribution to this realm of exchange.  
In this chapter I am particularly concerned with drawing attention to what Mormons 
consider some basic and authoritative principles of the LDS theological worldview 
which owe their existence to the nineteenth-century theological revelations of their 
founder and prophet Joseph Smith.6  As I turn to three of these foundational 
‘principles,’ which I have purposely selected for association with the three defining 
characteristics of emotion outlined in the previous chapter, the resonance between the 
socio-psychological characteristics of emotion and Mormon cosmological explanations 
of existence will clearly stand out.  In this manner, my preliminary suggestion that 
emotion processes are central to the LDS theological worldview will receive some 
initial support.  Then, prior to engaging in the textual analysis, which constitutes the 
bulk of the present examination, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the 
Mormon understanding of ‘Atonement’ as the paradigmatic instrument that facilitates 
the theological framing of emotional understanding, regulation, and intelligence in an 
LDS context.  Yet, to properly introduce this very context and before examining the 
three theological principles of present concern I begin by turning my attention to the 
nature of ‘authoritative’ LDS theology and to the significance of the term ‘principle’ in 
the Mormon conceptual framework. 
 
Mormon theological certainties: the Gospel as principles in mutual tension  
 In the introduction I briefly outlined the LDS preference for the term ‘doctrine’ 
over ‘theology’ where I also recognized some of the difficulties involved in what often 
appears as a fuzzy distinction of terms.  I have further highlighted the similarity if not 
equivalence of the LDS term ‘doctrine’ with what most Christians identify as ‘dogma’ 
given Mormonism’s necessary connection between doctrine and the institutional 
authority invested in the First Presidency and in the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles.  
Thus, in order to avoid confusion it should be understood that when I use the term 
‘theology’ in the LDS context I am referring to the ‘authoritative theology’ or 
                                                 
6 The most comprehensive Joseph Smith biography in existence is Bushman and Woodworth (2007). 
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‘doctrine’ which is existent in the Church at the beginning of the twenty-first century.7  
Yet, given the problem that ‘doctrine’ is not explicitly detailed by any document that 
could be considered a ‘creed’ such exposition is bound to be dependent on my own 
understanding of the subject, particularly of those areas which allow for a variety of 
possible interpretations.  In fact, as previously stated, theological boundaries are 
somewhat larger or narrower as contingent on individual LDS members’ perspectives 
on a variety of issues including the exact nature of revelation, prophetic infallibility, 
openness to theological change, etc. 
 At the same time, Mormonism is not as malleable as it may appear.  In fact, it 
possesses a theological core, which although changeable in theory, is unlikely to ever 
be significantly altered by any Mormon authority of present or future times.  Such a 
core is largely retraceable to numerous theological revelations received by the Prophet 
Joseph, as the Saints like to refer to him, which has usually been canonized in one of 
the Scriptural texts that Mormons use in addition to the Bible.  These doctrinal tenets 
give Mormonism its theological identity and constitute an integral part of what 
Mormons see as the theological illumination that emerged through the Restoration, a 
term used in reference to the historical and theological ‘return’ of God’s appointed 
church to the earth.8  Still, it would be simplistic to imply that the exact boundaries of 
such a theological core were clearly delineated by Joseph Smith himself.  Furthermore, 
the transmission of this doctrinal nucleus to the present day has not been carried out in 
the absence of any alterations.  This is an issue, which is both historically and 
theologically nuanced, but whose detailed examination lies beyond the scope of the 
present endeavour.9  
 Indeed, in the present discussion the affirmation of the existence of a practically 
unchangeable doctrinal core is more relevant than its exact description.  Thus, the 
Saints regularly use terminology, which points in this very direction of core theological 
                                                 
7 James Faulconer writes of this use of ‘theology’ as “a set of beliefs” in the LDS context.  See Tracy, et 
al. (2007), 468-78. 
8 With this doctrinal core Ben Huff proposes that Mormons should work towards a tentative systematic 
theology while still allowing for future corrections and additions in light of continuing revelation.  See 
Ibid., 478-87. 
9 To name only a few complicating factors in relation to the founder’s central role in this picture, not all 
of Joseph Smith’s purported revelations have acquired canonized status.  Other revelations, while 
remaining in canonized print, are rarely if ever spoken of, and some, which have never been officially 
canonized, seem to retain importance at some level of Mormon discourse (the King Follett sermon).  
Furthermore, while few in number, statements from Joseph’s successors as Church presidents have been 
canonized in the LDS Standard Works (D&C 136, 138).  Some statements have applied a single official 
interpretation to some of Smith’s revelations (‘interest’ interpreted as ‘income’ in the context of D&C 
119, the tithing revelation). 
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stability, as exemplified by the expression ‘the Gospel’.  Although inclusive of its 
common Christological meaning as used by most Christian denominations, within 
Mormonism the meaning of ‘the Gospel’ extends well beyond these commonly 
recognized boundaries.  The extent of its semantic reach is once more dependent on 
various interpretative factors, which make it to a large degree synonymous with the 
term ‘doctrine’.  Thus, for many ‘the Gospel’ is broadly defined as ‘the truth’ or more 
specifically the whole body of truths, which the Church teaches through its doctrines.  
Yet, Jesus Himself defines ‘the Gospel’ in a Book of Mormon (BoM) passage where 
the definition is more restrictive since it largely points to the common Christian 
understanding of the term.  Here ‘the Gospel’ is the good news of Jesus’ earthly 
mission as Son of God which culminates in His sacrifice.  Thus, the Gospel’s core 
components centre around the human response to Christ’s salvific mission on our 
behalf as manifested by faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour, repentance, baptism by water, 
and reception of the gift of the Holy Spirit.10 
 Significantly, these four expressions of acceptance are the primary 
representatives of the two soteriological concepts, which organize the whole of the 
LDS theological discourse, namely principles and ordinances.  In fact, in the Church’s 
fourth Articles of Faith, it is affirmed that faith and repentance are the first ‘principles’ 
of the Gospel, whereas ‘baptism’ and ‘the gift of the Holy Ghost’ are the first 
‘ordinances’.11  Therefore, whether the ordinal qualification is indicative of precedence 
in temporal sequence or of pre-eminence in theological significance the associated 
implication is equally evident: ‘the Gospel’ centres in these principles and ordinances, 
but it includes more.  In the first place, Mormons have clearly identified which sacred 
ceremonies are necessary for salvation and the list is mostly limited to a handful of 
ordinances performed in LDS holy temples.12  On the other hand, it is not as 
straightforward to identify all individual Gospel ‘principles’ and the task is subject to 
the qualifications and problems previously mentioned in relation to the issue of 
definition of doctrine.  Furthermore, while Mormons distinguish between necessary and 
useful ordinances, which are not required for eternal salvation (like the blessing of the 
sick), this classification is problematic if not impossible in relation to ‘principles’. 
                                                 
10 3 Ne. 27:13-19. 
11 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (1981a), 60. 
12 A ‘sociological’ overview of Mormon temple worship may be found in Mauss (1987), 77-83.  
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 In fact, as Douglas Davies observes, ‘principle’ is closely associated to the 
concept of ‘law’ in Mormon theological rhetoric.  Thus, “principle and ‘law’ comprise 
a category of LDS thought: they are ideas necessary for thinking about everything else 
and are themselves non-reducible to other ideas.”13  It is further significant that 
Mormons commonly prefix the noun ‘principle’ with the adjective ‘eternal’, thus 
suggesting that eternal principles are both temporally unchangeable and philosophically 
‘basic’.  Davies continues: “Principles have a certain impersonality: they resemble 
scientific laws more than the outcome of any one divine intention.  The gods 
themselves, including Heavenly Father, have had to learn these principles, so that 
divine wisdom consists in precisely such an ever-growing knowledge.”14  In other 
words, ‘principles’ are to be learned through a process of assimilation, which involves 
cognitive understanding, emotional internalization, and practical embodied praxis.  In 
this sense ‘principles’ are more than just laws; they are virtues that define identity.  
Therefore, in the context of the Mormon doctrine of Deity, their significance centres in 
the claim that they are perfectly embodied in the person of God rather than in the 
radical assertion that they precede and transcend God.  Thus, although Gospel 
‘principles’ challenge the cosmological view of a divine first cause, they do not replace 
it with a different subject; they eliminate the question altogether by appearing as 
constitutive of a universe where both God and eternal principles are needed and co-
existent.15 
 More will soon follow on Mormon cosmology but now I need to explore a final 
element of significance in the context of this introductory framing of LDS doctrine.  
While the recognition and description of basic ‘eternal principles’ is central to any 
attempt to understand Mormon theology a deeper and more accurate theological picture 
only emerges where these same principles are examined in their mutual relationship.  In 
other words, if isolated from its ‘relations’ each highlighted principle may appear 
distorted within the theological schema in which it is meant to function since its nature 
is only correctly comprehensible in the context of a ‘principles’ and ‘relations’ root 
equation.16  To further clarify, as core complementary ideas principles describe an ideal 
                                                 
13 Davies (2003), 23. 
14 Ibid., 24. 
15 There are some similarities between the LDS view of ‘principles’ and the ‘metaphysical principles’ of 
process thought.  See Griffin and McLachlan (2007), 181-82. 
16 Douglas Davies first acutely highlighted this foundational pairing in Davies (2003), 27.  Yet, I mean to 
enlarge Davies’ paradigm by placing greater focus on relations among principles whereas Davies 
understood relations mainly as interpersonal phenomena. 
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existence within which perfection exists not only in their presence but also through 
their ideal relative balance in mutual relationship.  I will soon provide some examples 
of these relationships as I describe the three principles I selected for my analysis, but 
now I simply want to highlight this general concept of necessary ‘relation’ with its 
implications of an accompanying ‘tension’ which generally exists among foundational 
principles. 
 As previously mentioned, Terryl Givens has provided a well-written analysis of 
some of the tensions that have characterized Mormon cultural expressions throughout 
the Church’s history.  In his account Givens identifies four tensions or paradoxes which 
are at the core of the Mormon experience in both its theological as well as in its artistic 
materializations.  These paradoxes are expressed as concepts or ‘principles’ which pull 
in opposite directions from each other and he organizes them as four distinct 
dichotomies, namely authority and radical freedom, searching and certainty, the sacred 
and the banal, exile and integration.17  These tensions have not been ultimately 
resolved, and indeed, in both Givens’ and in my own opinion, much of Mormonism’s 
vitality and strength is manifested through their presence.  At the same time, tension is 
not humanity’s natural or preferred condition; thus, pressures to reduce tension in either 
one direction or in the other continue to characterize Mormons as they do all 
homeostasis-seeking humans.  Hence, to say that these strains are a theological reality 
of Mormonism is neither to say that most Mormons regularly achieve this ideal balance 
of opposing principles, nor that most Mormons regularly engage in this uncomfortable 
search.  Indeed, I suspect that many individual members fail to perceive any existing 
theological tension either because they have highlighted one theological principle to the 
neglect of other tension-provoking ones, or because they fail to see the necessary 
relationships between various opposing principles. 
 Several difficulties associated with the issue of LDS doctrinal definition are 
traceable to the presence of these very tensions, especially to the ‘authority vs. radical 
freedom’ and ‘searching vs. certainty’ dichotomies.  Perhaps, the question of boundary 
setting in the Mormon theological realm is only a single but particularly good example 
of one larger issue and problem, which is at the root of all realms of human experience 
and of all individuals’ and groups’ dynamics.  It may be that one of the great paradoxes 
in the human experience involves the coexisting drives to achieve both stability and 
                                                 
17 Givens (2007), xi-xvi. 
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innovation, to find comfort and security in the unchangeable while also leaving room 
for the adaptable and the new; it is to keep searching when certainty has been reached.  
This makes the question of the possible systemization and delimitation of LDS 
theology one of ultimate struggle between the needs for security and the drives for 
learning and progression, where a perfect balance is difficult enough to envision that 
alternating prioritization of each may appear as a more conceivable ideal target.  
However, at the individual level, and given people’s differing capacities, desires, and 
propensities, it is natural that not only actual behaviours but also normative objectives 
will greatly diverge, depending primarily on how individuals choose to situate 
themselves in relation to this paradox. 
 On the other hand, I suppose that the LDS Church does not intend to fully 
resolve this tension as it aims to continue to provide both theological security in an 
increasingly unstable world and pragmatic adaptability to these very same changes.18  
In fact, it may be argued that the presence of this tension has facilitated the Church’s 
international growth.  This conclusion may also be inferred from an official statement 
entitled “Approaching Mormon Doctrine” which was released in 2007 on the Church’s 
Newsroom website.19  Addressed primarily to news media personnel the statement 
begins with the recognition that “much misunderstanding about The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints revolves around its doctrine.”  Then, it continues with some 
clarifications on the nature of authoritative Mormon theology and with clear references 
to the relationship between theological stability and change: 
The doctrinal tenets of any religion are best understood within a broad context… Not every 
statement made by a Church leader, past or present, necessarily constitutes doctrine… With 
divine inspiration, the First Presidency…and the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles… counsel 
together to establish doctrine that is consistently proclaimed in official Church publications. 
This doctrine resides in the four “standard works” of scripture (the Holy Bible, the Book of 
Mormon, the Doctrine and Covenants and the Pearl of Great Price), official declarations and 
proclamations, and the Articles of Faith… Some doctrines are more important than others and 
might be considered core doctrines… the Church does not preclude future additions or changes 
to its teachings or practices. This living, dynamic aspect of the Church provides flexibility in 
meeting those challenges. 
 
                                                 
18 While some Latter-day Saints distinguish the unchangeable ‘doctrine’ from changeable ‘policies’ of 
the Church flexibility has been manifested in both theological and administrative realms.  However, neat 
compartmentalisations in specific instances are often made a posteriori in light of already existing 
patterns of change.  Thus, this distinction may be effective at the explanatory rather than at the predictive 
level, as was the case in relation to the revelation that extended the priesthood to males of African 
descents.  What for many was a ‘doctrine’ before the change became a ‘policy’ because of the change. 
19 Approaching Mormon Doctrine (2007). 
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In other words, the theological picture of Mormonism centres around a constructive 
tension between the static and the dynamic, being both stable at the core and innovative 
when required by circumstances and revelation. 
 It is, then, in this context of a fundamental core that I have chosen to highlight 
the three principles which are about to follow.  The first principle, which I have named 
materialistic monism, has significant affinity and overlap with Givens’ third paradox of 
‘the sacred and the banal’.  The second principle is moral agency and the final one is 
eternal progression, which is encapsulated primarily in three processes, i.e. revelation, 
repentance, and family relationships.  In carrying out this examination I should once 
more emphasize that these principles are neither meant to be comprehensive in 
describing Mormonism’s fundamental theology nor should they function as the 
paramount representatives of LDS principles.  Indeed, there are other principles which 
could be viewed as more central to Mormon theology; yet, in the context of the current 
examination of the LDS theology of emotion, the relevancy of the presently selected 
threesome is uniquely apparent.  
 
Materialistic monism 
 About one year prior to his death the Prophet Joseph Smith stated: “There is no 
such thing as immaterial matter.  All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can 
only be discerned by purer eyes; we cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we 
shall see that it is all matter.”20  Thus, by setting matter as the common denominator of 
all substance, whether spiritual or non-spiritual, Joseph Smith took one more step in his 
fundamental break from the views that characterized other theological anthropologies, 
cosmologies, and Christologies of his time.  For him there was no stark and 
impenetrable division between mind or spirit and body or matter, and he did not share 
in the common a priori condemnation of the material vis-à-vis the spiritual; to the 
contrary, he intricately intersected the two and reappraised the physical in a positive 
direction.  In this manner a dualistic cosmos was replaced by a monistic one, still 
divided into at least two major material forms but fully material nevertheless. 
  To be sure, it is debatable whether Joseph Smith wholly rejected Cartesian 
dualism given that he did not go as far as eliminating ‘spirit’ as a unique ontological 
category.  He did not ‘translate’ it, like modern monists often do, into specific bodily or 
                                                 
20 D&C 131:7-8. 
 72 
 
cerebral processes but he only transformed it into a kind of invisible material substance, 
a sort of ‘dark matter’ (to put it into astronomic terms), which interacts with visible and 
recognizable matter.  Still, his emphasis went much further than a linguistic 
rehabilitation of the term ‘material’; it was a much sharper turn in the direction of a 
new understanding of the relationship between the spiritually material and the 
physically material.  In fact, he redefined soul as the unity of ‘the spirit and the body’, 
where the intricate intersection of the two is not to be seen as a temporary burden, but 
as the eternal and welcomed destiny of all redeemed humanity.  Joseph explained it in 
these terms: “For man is spirit.  The elements are eternal and spirit and element, 
inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy.  And when separated, man cannot 
receive a fullness of joy.”21  Therefore, he did not only claim that our world and the 
larger universe are fully and inevitably material, but also that within this materiality the 
ideal condition of being involves a fully blended coexistence of the finer and the 
grosser, or of the spiritual and the physical. 
 In this context what Joseph Smith revealed about the defining characteristics of 
individual human spirits is also relevant.  On the one hand the Mormon perspective is 
not unique in affirming that each human body is enlivened by a spiritual being or 
person which, at the time of death, separates from its physical envelopment to continue 
in its existence.  On the other hand, other details are distinctive of Joseph Smith’s 
radical revelations.  For example, the Prophet taught that God did not create individual 
spirits ex nihilo but out of eternally pre-existing and indestructible ‘intelligence’.22  
Similarly, these same spirits, being material in the finer sense, were ‘organized’ (in this 
context an LDS synonym for ‘creation’) according to a particular form and shape, 
which mirrors the form acquired by the physical body that would envelop them on 
earth.  Thus, when the brother of Jared, a visionary BoM prophet, sees Christ’s spirit in 
human form prior to the days of His incarnation he is taught the uniquely Mormon 
concept of spirit body: “Behold, this body, which ye now behold, is the body of my 
spirit; and man have I created after the body of my spirit; and even as I appear unto thee 
to be in the spirit will I appear unto my people in the flesh.”23 
 Therefore, Joseph’s redefinition of the nature of spirit and of its relationship to 
matter distinctly shaped the Mormon theology of Deity.  Indeed, Joseph Smith’s 
                                                 
21 D&C 88:15; 93:33-34. 
22 D&C 93:29-30.  I provide greater details on the subject of ‘intelligence’ in the next section within this 
chapter. 
23 Ether 3:16. 
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teachings on the divine, as well as his first-hand claims in support of these teachings 
were both novel and controversial.  He stated, for example, that “the Father has a body 
of flesh and bones as tangible as man’s; the Son also; but the Holy Ghost has not a 
body of flesh and bones, but is a personage of Spirit.”24  Later on, in his non-canonical 
King Follett Sermon, he went even further with statements associating God’s distant 
past and humanity’s potential future that sounded blasphemous to the ears of many.25  
Whatever one makes of these later statements, affirming the corporeality of God and 
breaking from the classical Trinitarian orthodoxy that had come to define Christianity 
was sufficient to cause the kind of theological rift that has often characterized LDS and 
main-stream Christian relationships. 
 Specifically, the Mormon theology of deity became especially problematic for 
many given its implications for a unique theological anthropology.  Indeed, by 
interpreting God’s fatherhood of humanity in spiritually literal terms Joseph bridged 
some of the distance between God and man and thus redefined the relationship between 
humans and the divine.  In the first place, Mormons understood the imago Dei to 
include humans’ physical resemblance to their Creator, whose features are not 
temporarily (as in the case of the Incarnation) but eternally corporeal.  Furthermore, 
God and humanity share such general bodily structure at two levels of embodiment, i.e. 
in both ‘spirit body’ and ‘flesh body’.  True, LDS theology recognizes that God’s 
embodied person greatly surpasses humanity in glory, knowledge, character, and even 
some physical characteristics given the canonical tenet that God and all resurrected 
beings possess a bloodless body of ‘flesh and bones’ unlike mortal humans.26  Yet, 
these qualifications have not usually softened the perceived negative impact caused by 
the LDS removal of a ‘wholly other’ divine category of being. 
 In fact, Mormons underline human-divine similarities as they explain their 
corporeal resemblances in relation to a family centred mode of discourse, which is at 
least allusive to a phenotypic if not to a genotypic pattern of ‘spirit body’ trait 
transmission.  And while on the one hand it is easy to understand the common LDS 
                                                 
24 D&C 130:22.  For an LDS perspective on the  philosophical/historical belief in God’s corporeality see 
Paulsen (1996), 6-94. 
25 The substance of his message is encapsulated in a couplet coined by Lorenzo Snow (later to become 
the fifth president of the Church) prior to the King Follett Discourse in June 1840.  It states that “as man 
is God once was; as God is man may become.”  [Snow Smith (1884), 46].  Also See Larson (1978), 193-
208. 
26 D&C 129:1-2.  Immortal ‘flesh and bone’ is juxtaposed to mortal ‘flesh and blood’ to explain various 
passages like 1 Cor. 15:50, Matt. 16:17, and Luke 24:39. 
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manner to address the divine, ‘Heavenly Father’, as a metaphoric description of a 
loving relationship between creature and Creator Mormons are uncomfortable with any 
interpretation that fully strips this title of its literalness. 27  Indeed, if the official status 
of the human potential for development to Godhood is at least debatable, the God-like 
ability to ultimately acquire a spiritual progeny when humans are resurrected and 
‘exalted’ is firmly canonized.  Joseph Smith taught that only in the highest degree of 
the Celestial Kingdom, which is the greatest in Mormonism’s stratified heaven, worthy 
couples married by the authority of the Priesthood may obtain an ‘increase’, a term 
which has been consistently interpreted as ‘spiritual offspring’.28  Then, with this tenet 
in place, the heavy emphasis on eternal marriage, the common references to spiritual 
brotherhood and sisterhood, and the many family centred practices and sermons that 
characterize Mormonism it is not surprising that speculative pressures should arise in 
attempting to complete the theological family picture with missing pieces like a 
‘Heavenly Mother’, God’s own family history, or Jesus’ marital status. 
 With the former in mind it is then possible to return to my previous claim that a 
‘tension between principles’ is a core element of the Mormon theological structure and 
subsequently recognize an illustration of this very tension within the present subject of 
examination.  If ‘materialistic monism’ is the highlighted principle whose ramifications 
underline similarity or closeness to God at a variety of possible levels principles that 
counter these influences in the opposite direction would instead emphasize differences 
and distance between humans and the divine.  Several candidates exist for this 
counterbalancing role including ‘sin’, ever-present in the human experience, the 
attributes of God as described by the ‘omni’ adjectives, the need for processes of 
transfiguration in order for humans to withstand the presence of God, the recognition 
that revelation is limited to our capacity, that God ‘will yet reveal many great and 
important things pertaining to the Kingdom of God,’ and others.  While not all these 
theological tenets fit the proper definition of ‘principle’ they still may function as 
theological warnings that reduce the drive to associate the human to the divine to a 
point of distortion. 
 At the same time, ‘materialistic monism’ is so embedded in LDS consciousness 
that its ramifications are apparent at several levels of the Mormon experience.  Far from 
                                                 
27 In recent years Blake Ostler has provided the most comprehensive exposition of the LDS doctrine of 
Deity in juxtaposition to classical theism in his 3 volume treatise entitled ‘Exploring Mormon Thought.’  
See especially Ostler (2001), 1-25.  Also see Roberts (1998). 
28 D&C 131:4. 
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being merely an item of theological interest ‘the collapse of sacred distance’, as Givens 
puts it, came to ground the very identity of the Church, its members, and its founder.29  
In fact, Joseph Smith himself embodied such monistic tendencies as he claimed 
spiritual experiences of a tangible, direct, and vivid nature, whether involving day-light 
visions of angelic beings or translations of sacred texts from metallic plates.  It further 
characterized his teachings and counsels, which ranged from the most sublime to the 
most practical and economical, involving God-given mandates for cities, armies, 
universities, banks, stores, etc.  Certainly, as many contemporaries recognized it was 
infused in a personality that managed to reconcile prophetic revelation with wrestling, 
and dedicating temples with rambunctious playing with the boys.  Contemporary 
Mormonism is not far removed from this picture with a Gospel that expands to include 
all of life’s relevant aspects, meetinghouses built both for worship services and 
recreational activities, bishops that may conduct meetings in Church on Sunday and 
business consultations throughout the week in their regular employment, or knowledge 
that is pursued for both secular and spiritual purposes.30   
 Space does not allow me to list most relevant examples but to describe the 
depth and pervasiveness of this pattern it is sufficient to remember Armand Mauss’ 
general characterization of Mormonism, namely the nicely constructed metaphor of “an 
unending struggle between the angel and the beehive.”31  This tension is both constant 
and pervasive because it emerges within the context of a religion that embraces the 
totality of life and the totality of knowledge.  Therefore, Mormonism is largely at odds 
with the post-enlightenment separation between the secular and the spiritual, since 
these are not seen as incompatible and dualistic categories but as intricately intersected 
aspects of daily experience.  True, the Church has managed to absorb this distinction as 
it has accommodated to larger secular societies in the realms of government, politics, 
and economics; yet, history has not completely obliterated Mormon monistic 
perspectives in other areas of experience.32  For example, to underline the unity of the 
secular and the spiritual in the realm of knowledge acquisition there is no other 
                                                 
29 Givens (2007), 37-52. 
30 For an historical review of the institutional church’s involvement in ‘temporal’ endeavours see 
Arrington and Bitton (1979), 262-83. 
31 The angel is the symbol on top of most LDS temples, which Mauss associates with Mormonism’s 
focus on the spiritual and otherworldly.  On the other hand, the beehive is the symbol of the state of 
Utah, pointing to Mormonism’s practical, industrious and this-worldly orientation.  See Mauss (1994), 3-
17. 
32 For an accurate historical description of the process of institutional assimilation in early twentieth 
century America see Alexander (1986). 
 76 
 
statement that is used more often at Brigham Young University than Brigham Young’s 
commission to the institution’s founding father Karl Maeser that he “ought not teach 
the alphabet or the multiplication tables without the Spirit of God.”33  And while it 
would be going too far either to conclude that Mormonism is pantheistic or to assume 
that LDS theology admits no metaphysical realm, the principle of materialistic monism 
has shaped Mormon theology so distinctly to clearly set it apart from other Christian 
theologies and theological anthropologies. 
 Whether this reality is to be judged as salutary or detrimental to Mormonism is 
a question for a separate context.  Still, as with all LDS principles of its unchanging 
eternal Gospel, if materialistic monism is excessively highlighted to the neglect of other 
counterbalancing principles distortions are likely to emerge.  Thus, Terryl Givens 
pointedly inquires about this possibility: “If God is shorn of ineffability and 
transcendence, or is construed in human terms, how does one find the reverential awe 
that moves one to true worshipfulness?  If Jesus is our ‘big brother,’ how can he be our 
Lord and God?”34  Yet, Mormon theology is sufficiently large and flexible to provide 
its own internal response to these questions in the form of a balance between the 
distance of apophatic theology and the closeness and comfort of anthropomorphic 
divinity.  Furthermore, if the partial collapse of sacred distance can coexist with Otto’s 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans Mormon perspectives on human nature can 
similarly accommodate the co-presence of the divine with the human, of the immortal 
with the mortal, or of the good with the fallen.  In fact, as will increasingly become 
apparent, the complexities and difficulties inherent in this intra-human coexistence are 
at the core of both LDS and other Christian perspectives on emotions. 
 Specifically, as previously outlined, Mormonism emphasizes that internal unity 
and harmony between the individual grosser and finer elements, i.e. the body and the 
spirit, is central to the happy life.  In this context, it is generally understood that the 
spirit is to function as the main guide and leader of the body although LDS theology 
does not create a stark evaluative separation between a godly spirit and a devilish fallen 
body.  The difference in priority is rooted in functionality rather than in evaluations 
since the body is utterly non-functional or dead when separate from the spirit.  Yet, 
human limitations are experienced as a whole person and the structural fusion of body 
and spirit makes it difficult if not utterly impossible to distinguish between purely 
                                                 
33Maeser (1928), 79. 
34Givens (2007), 48. 
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spiritual or purely physical influences.  Thus, while in a mortal state, there is no need 
for spiritual promptings or other kinds of divine influences to bypass the physical brain 
and to necessarily appear as ‘supernatural’.  The Mormon soul is an intricate union of 
body and spirit; hence, a cognitive/affective concept of emotion has great affinity to a 
view of human nature where mind and body or spirit and physiology are essentially 
one. 
 At the same time, such internal fusion complicates matters in the actuality of 
daily life where the ideal of unity gives way to the reality of personal fragmentation as 
individuals feel pulled in different directions by conflicting desires, pressures, and 
drives.  LDS theology partially conceptualizes the issue as an internal tension between 
the fallen and the divine as taught by Benjamin, the embodiment of a righteous BoM 
king, who states that “the natural man is an enemy to God, and has been from the fall of 
Adam,” “according to the will of the flesh and the evil which is therein, which giveth 
the spirit of the devil power to captivate”as Lehi, the first BoM prophet, had previously 
concluded.35  On the other hand, a different LDS scripture states that “man was in the 
beginning with God...and every spirit of man was innocent in the beginning” and king 
Benjamin qualifies his previous statement on necessary enmity by adding “unless he 
yields to the enticings of the Holy Spirit, and putteth off the natural man and becometh 
a saint through the atonement of Christ.”36  Thus, the Saints are driven to resolve their 
inner emotional tensions by seeking spiritual divine influence from without rather than 
by following a particular spiritual element from within.  To be sure, the reception of 
divine communication is a process rooted in complexities, but this is a subject for a 
later focus. 
 In conclusion, Mormon materialistic monism has significant implications for an 
LDS theology of deity and for a theological anthropology relevant to the topic of 
emotions.  It underlines LDS views on ‘spirit’, the corporeality of God, human nature 
and eternal destiny, unity versus fragmentation of the self, and other related issues.  
Specifically, it seems incompatible with older theories of emotion that proposed 
fundamental distinctions between the cognitive and the affective with the purpose of 
protecting the former from the latter.  To the contrary, it appears to fit well within a 
view of emotion as an experience which is necessarily both cognitive and affective.  
Yet, materialistic monism is only one of the unchanging Mormon principles of the 
                                                 
35 Mosiah 3:19; 2 Ne. 2:29. 
36 D&C 93:29, 38; Mosiah 3:19. 
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eternal Gospel and as such it needs to be kept in tension with other principles of equal 
significance within the wider picture of a Mormon theological worldview.  One such 
principle is moral agency. 
 
Moral agency 
Agency is the personal ability to choose freely between alternative options.  
Therefore, agency requires both the minimal presence of two available choices as well 
as the absence of complete external coercion over one’s process of selection.37  The 
expression moral agency further qualifies both criteria and consequences that are 
inherent to common processes of choice; thus, within the ‘high-accountability’ 
theology of Mormonism moral agency is generally preferred to the popular term free 
agency.38  In fact, LDS authorities have expressed concerns about potential distortions 
that could emerge from a concept of agency which is exclusively defined in terms of 
freedom rather than of morality.39  Specifically, within the Mormon universe of eternal 
principles freedom of choice never admits the possibility of circumvention or of 
manipulation of the eternally fixed consequences attached to individual choices since 
this necessary association emerges from a principle of justice, which is constitutive of 
both God’s and of the universe’s very natures.  Thus, divine justice as embodied in 
eternal law functions as the common paradigm of explanation for both punishments and 
rewards which emerge in consequence of individual choices.40  In other words, 
although Mormonism contextualizes justice and merit through a counterbalancing 
principle of mercy (to be later explored) freedom never obscures accountability since 
freedom coexists with fixed moral boundaries. 
                                                 
37 While the concept of agency overlaps significantly with the common philosophical and theological 
notion of ‘free will’ the LDS theological context uniquely frames the Mormon definition of agency.  For 
a more detailed theological discussion on the LDS definition and significance of agency see Ostler 
(2001), 201-46.  Also Widtsoe (1997), 16-18, 32-37 provides a lengthier description than the present 
section allows. 
38 Yet, many Latter-day Saints commonly use the term free agency in church lessons and sermons, 
although the expression appears with less frequency in the discourses of the Church’s highest authorities. 
39 For example see Packer (1992), 66-68 and Uchtdorf (2006), 14-19. 
40 Such a deterministic link of choice and consequences is not limited to the Mormon ideas of 
eschatological judgment and eternal salvation.  The inter-link between action, thoughts, behaviours and 
related consequences applies to some extent to the micro reality of the daily human experiences, 
although in manifestations, which are not necessarily self-evident.  In fact, it is assumed that an 
immediately obvious link between actions and consequences could lead to ‘conditioned’ obedience 
rather than to choices based on principles of love for truth, God, and neighbour.  Were agency to 
regularly cause this state of affairs, it would fail in the very purpose for which it is so crucial, namely in 
facilitating genuine spiritual growth and progression through pondered experience of life’s choices and 
consequences.   
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There are yet other reasons which complicate any picture of automatic interlink 
between freedom and choice as amply demonstrated by the age-old philosophical 
debate on the subject.  In fact, especially in the realm of behaviour (as opposed to 
thought) the human experience of agency usually occurs in contexts characterized by 
several constraints of both biological and social nature.  LDS theology recognizes these 
difficulties and does not deny that choice options are often very limited or that the 
strength of enticing pressures in different directions is usually uneven.  Yet, 
Mormonism remains libertarian in relation to ‘the free-will problem’ since it proclaims 
that freedom ultimately characterizes the core spiritual identity of individuals at the 
level of desire.41  Indeed, although desires are influenced and constrained in all possible 
directions Mormon theology recognizes a deep core or self which is ultimately non-
reducible to other external factors as it involves an independent if only diffused desire 
in the general direction of good or of evil.  Neal A. Maxwell (1926-2004), one of the 
members of the LDS Quorum of the Twelve Apostles in recent decades, summarized it 
thus: “Of course our genes, circumstances, and environments matter very much, and 
they shape us significantly.  Yet there remains an inner zone in which we are sovereign, 
unless we abdicate.  In this zone lies the essence of our individuality and our personal 
accountability.”42  In order to understand the theological roots of such ‘inner zone’ it is 
then necessary to provide further details on the Mormon concepts of being, creation, 
and plan of salvation. 
As previously mentioned any concept of ‘beginning’ of existence must be 
understood in light of the Mormon rejection of creation ex nihilo.  Thus, since Joseph 
Smith taught that all matter is self-existent and indestructible (although modifiable in 
form and characteristics) the universe did not materialize through a First Cause and 
individual beings never ‘began’ to exist.43  With few others in the Judeo-Christian 
world LDS theology defines ‘divine creation’ as organization or transformation of 
matter, whether in relation to the ‘grosser’ matter of the natural world or to the ‘finer’ 
                                                 
41 The literature on our civilization’s perennial debate about ‘free will’ is obviously voluminous.  A good 
summary of its main problems and taxonomies is found in Kane (2005) or more succinctly in Kane 
(2002), 1-24. 
42 Maxwell (1996), 21. 
43 Joseph Smith logically associated forward infinity with backward infinity in these terms: “Is it logic to 
say that a spirit is immortal and yet has a beginning? Because if a spirit has a beginning, it will have an 
end. That is good logic. I want to reason further on the spirit of man, for I am dwelling on the spirit and 
body of man--on the subject of the dead. I take my ring from my finger and liken it unto the mind of 
man, the immortal spirit, because it has no beginning. Suppose I cut it in two; as the Lord lives, because 
it has a beginning, it would have an end.” [Larson (1978), 203]. 
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spiritual matter of individual beings.44  Such distinct view of creation that denies a pre-
existent nothingness has significant implications for the LDS perspective on agency.  In 
fact, the divine creation of spirit ‘beings’ is said to have involved the transformation of 
a disembodied and independent form of existence called intelligence.  As the Prophet 
explained, “all truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it, to act for 
itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no existence.”45  Such independence 
seems to imply a degree of agency, which is natural to the condition of intelligence.   
To be sure, this is an area of LDS theology fraught with speculations and with 
varieties of interpretations.  Whilst it is generally accepted that gross matter is only 
‘acted upon’, lacking the ability to respond independently to other agents, some 
uncertainty exists on whether agency characterizes spirit-matter in its primal 
unorganised stage of existence as intelligence.  B.H. Robert, an LDS authority and 
theologian living between the nineteenth and twentieth century and one of the greatest 
Mormon intellectuals, claimed that spirit-matter is matter that ‘acts’ at any stage of its 
own eternal development or progression.  He characterized spirit-matter as inherently 
endowed with individuality and personhood, as well as possessing the power to act in 
some capacity as an agent, prior to any divine intervention, which would further 
organise it into a more developed being capable of greater agentive functions.  
Significantly, this perspective is particularly attractive to LDS theology because its 
philosophical foundation provides Mormon thinkers with unique tools that have been 
used in presenting a unique rational response to the ever-present ‘problem of evil.’46  
On the other hand, Bruce R. McConkie, prominent Mormon apostle and 
theologian of the late twentieth century, claimed that spirit-matter necessitates God’s 
act of creation and organisation in order to acquire both individuality and the ability to 
exercise agency.  For McConkie spirit-matter in its pristine form exists as raw material 
for spiritual beings, superior to gross matter in quality and refinement, but similarly 
lacking individuality and ability to act.  Therefore, he distinguishes between the 
singular undifferentiated intelligence that precedes spirit creation and the plural 
individualized spirit intelligences or spirit beings that emerge in consequence to God’s 
creative act.   In this exegetical framework agency is not natural to uncreated 
                                                 
44 A Jewish theologian who has criticized creation ex nihilo as biblically unfounded is Levenson (1994), 
xxix, 121-27.  Some Christian process theologians have also rejected the concept.  See Griffin (2001), 
108-44. 
45 D&C 93:30. 
46 See Paulsen (2000), 53-65. 
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intelligence because it necessitates divine intervention in order to emerge as one of the 
core individual characteristics of spirit beings.47  My personal reading of D&C 93 is 
closer to Roberts’ interpretation, although McConkie rightly attempts to make use of 
other scriptural texts (especially Abr. 3) to elucidate this passage.48   
In any case, whether understood as a self-existent eternal reality or as a creating 
concession from a loving God the independence of personal will is at the foundation of 
the Mormon perspective on agency.  Indeed, within the highly ‘progressive’ LDS 
theological framework of eternal growth it is possible for these separate views to co-
exist comfortably since many Saints speak of agency both in terms of eternal principle 
and of divine gift.  The connecting link between these distinct designations centres 
around divine interventions or transformations, which bring about those conditions that 
allow agency to continue and to develop in such circumstances as were not previously 
experienced.  In other words, although God could potentially manipulate and limit His 
children’s individual agency through the superior knowledge and power that He enjoys 
He instead chooses to endow us with expanded opportunities to make use of and to 
increase in the exercise of this very freedom.  Mormon theology affirms this point 
strongly and repeatedly in its accounts of the pre-mortal realm of existence in which 
our early processes of development and transformation by means of God’s ‘creative’ 
interventions are briefly highlighted.49  
In the first place, as I began to explain, intelligences’ are transformed and 
embodied spiritually through a process of creation in which God acts as their Father.  
As a consequence of this first level of transformation and embodiment individuals find 
themselves in a higher stage of development with an increased capacity to act, to will, 
to know, and to feel, and with emerging attributes of unique personalities and identities.  
Yet, although descriptions of the characteristics of such spiritual beings are sketchy at 
best the Mormon saga of pre-mortality clearly depicts this first embodiment as a 
condition that is still characterized by significant limitations and obstacles, which are 
inherent to a spiritual form of existence.   Therefore, as earlier highlighted, a further 
                                                 
47 A scholarly theological review of various historical statements and questions associated with 
‘intelligence’, including Roberts’ and McConkie’s,  is found in Ostler (2001), 82-95, 99-100.  Also for 
the historical development of the LDS doctrine of pre-mortal existence see Ostler (1982), 59-78.   
48 In support of McConkie’s position it should be recognized that the five LDS canonical references 
which explicitly mention agency generally support the divine gift perspective.  See D&C 101:78, Moses 
4:3, and Moses 7:32.  Also see Cannon (2007), 233-48. 
49 In the wider context of Western philosophical, literary, and theological perspectives on the subject of 
pre-mortal existence the forthcoming exploration by Terryl Givens presents itself as a promising and 
needed publication in a largely neglected field of analysis.  See Givens (2009). 
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developing stage and a further embodiment were held to be necessary, thus leading to 
what Mormons call the second estate or the human mortal condition of life on this 
earth.50   
To be sure, the first estate, or the interval between the creation of individual 
spirit children and the beginning of physical embodiment on earth, is conceptualized as 
a period of learning and maturation in the presence of the Heavenly Father.  Yet, such 
progress is held to have been insufficient for the full potential development of God’s 
children.  Therefore, according to the Mormon narration of the pre-earthly existence, 
God devised a plan to overcome this obstacle and to enable His spirit children to pursue 
growth and progress in a different location and under different circumstances.  He then 
presented and taught this plan to the spirits in His presence, who thus learned that life 
on earth would involve the possession of a physical, mortal body of flesh and blood, 
that the gift of agency would continue to be central in the lives of each individual on 
earth, and that the spiritual first-born of the Heavenly Father would come to the world 
to sacrifice Himself, to die, and to resurrect as the incarnate Jesus Christ.  Indeed, His 
mission would provide the necessary redemption for a ‘fallen’ humanity following the 
transgression of Adam and Eve, which was bound to occur.  Such then was God’s plan 
of salvation, a term the Saints commonly use to identify the saga of humanity’s eternal 
progression that spans from the pre-mortal to the post-mortal realms of existence.   
 The Mormon account continues by emphasizing that the plan of salvation as 
just described was not fully welcomed by one of the eldest of the spirit children, who 
was also one of the most advanced in knowledge, Lucifer or Satan.  His opposition 
centred on some key aspects of the plan, particularly on the ability that God’s children 
would have to choose whether to obey or to disregard their Heavenly Father’s 
commandments.  Thus, Satan proposed himself as the enforcer of obedience in an 
alternative to the original plan.  Yet, God rejected his addendum and Lucifer responded 
in turn by rebelling against his Father and by attempting to persuade the heavenly 
spirits to follow him in opposition.  This act of persuasion, which involved arguments, 
counterarguments and other forms of rhetoric as implicitly suggested, constituted a war 
for the loyalty of individual spirits.  Since the focus of the debate involved the role that 
agency would acquire in the earthly experience this mythic event is often known as a 
                                                 
50 The main canonical references for the descriptions of pre-mortal existence that I am about to outline 
are found in the PoGP, specifically in Moses 4:1-4 and in Abr. 3:22-28.  Latter-day Saints also clearly 
use Rev. 12:7 and D&C 29: 36-38 when speaking of the War in Heaven.   
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War for Agency or War in Heaven and its casualties, the rebels, were numbered in the 
amount of ‘a third part’ of God’s children.  In fact, as a consequence of this rebellion, 
the story continues, Satan and his followers were cast out from the presence of God, 
were denied physical embodiment, and presently continue their revolt on earth against 
God’s plan and against Jesus’ atonement.51 
   In the context of this narrative there are some elements of significance which 
are relative to the principle of agency.  In the first place the focus on agency as the 
main issue of contention leading to the heavenly war functions to elevate its overall 
importance within the wider schema of LDS cosmology and soteriology.  In other 
words, agency becomes, as it were, the eternal principle par excellence upon which the 
whole plan of salvation is founded and sustained.  Furthermore, the War for Agency 
intensifies human accountability in the sense that the principle itself was chosen freely 
by each individual who has lived or is yet to live on earth.  In fact, in the face of a 
possible alternative existence without agency the majority of God’s spirit children 
chose to preserve this valued principle alongside its accompanying risks and lack of 
guarantees, which involved the possibility of sin, separation from God, and living in the 
presence of others who could choose to live lives in radically negative directions.  
Therefore, for the Mormon faithful, personal responsibility for one’s present condition 
reaches backwards into the realm of pre-mortal existence, at least at the general level of 
our assent to an agency-driven plan.  In short, we freely accepted a plan which involves 
necessary outcomes for our erroneous choices as well as negative consequences for the 
evil choices of some external agents, particularly of those with whom we share some 
kind of relationship. 
 Indeed, by explicitly interlinking loyalty to the Heavenly Father with agency the 
War in Heaven account underlines the inextricable connection between agency and 
personal relations.  In this manner, as Douglas Davies indicates, principles and relations 
come to function in unison as the core organizational structure of Mormon 
soteriology.52  Yet, in the highly pragmatic and present-oriented theology of 
                                                 
51 In this summary I have attempted to outline what I see as the most common understanding of the War 
in Heaven narrative among contemporary Latter-day Saints.  Historically, since canonical information on 
the subject is very limited, several LDS thinkers and authorities have suggested interpretations and 
additions aimed at completing this theological picture.  Most of these speculations have not encountered 
widespread acceptance or even awareness by the main body of contemporary Saints although in the 
twentieth century some exegetical expansions received considerable exposure and became popular 
among Church members.  Interpretations with racist overtones in particular have come to represent a 
source of embarrassment for present leaders.  See Bush (1973), 11-68. 
52 Davies (2003), 27. 
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Mormonism this eternal bond is mirrored in the daily realities of mortal life on earth, 
both at the motivational and at the consequential levels of experience.  In fact, 
interpersonal relations often constitute a significant factor in the evaluation of 
alternatives, which precede the implementation of particular choices.  Furthermore, the 
same relations often emerge affected, in either positive or negative directions, as a 
consequence of particular agentive decisions.  In other words, no human ever functions 
or chooses in total isolation and the War in Heaven narrative rooted in a spiritual family 
context underlines the LDS belief that social contextualization of even the most 
significant decisions is an eternal reality.  This is largely perceived as an unavoidable 
and even desirable state of affairs as long as relations are properly prioritized and 
organized according to principles of truth, such as love and obedience to God’s 
commandments.  In the context of an LDS theology of emotion this recognition is 
significant because it allows for and encourages a complex interconnection between 
emotional and rational elements in decision making.53 
The War in Heaven is further significant for its inferences about God’s 
relationship to His spirit children.  In fact, God’s love is highlighted by His decision to 
place agency at the centre of His plan since agency appears as the only principle of 
infinite development, which can ultimately bring His children to obtain “all things”.  To 
be sure, and as previously indicated, the story suggests that a being superior in 
knowledge and intelligence may potentially restrict an inferior being from exercising 
his agency, since Satan had proposed exactly this particular course of action.  Yet, 
although God similarly could override agency or constrict it in various manners He 
generally chooses to respect it even at the cost of spiritual casualties.  In this light, the 
love He has for His children is underlined by His desire to see them reach their highest 
                                                 
53 Such interconnection can also be extracted from the War in Heaven narrative through a particular 
exegetical reading.  In fact, the narrative possibly implies that Satan’s success in bringing one third of the 
heavenly spirits to follow him may have originated in his ability to appeal to emotions of fear and 
uncertainty associated with God’s plan of salvation.  On the other hand Satan’s proposal guaranteed a 
form of salvation which, although lower, did not appear to include the risks inherent in personal choice.  
Furthermore, God’s plan may have been presented as particularly risky inasmuch as it was based on trust 
in Jesus’ perfect life of obedience and in His act of Atonement, which had not yet taken place.  Had 
Christ failed in just one instance, the whole plan would have been frustrated and Satan may have played 
on this fear in order to gather followers.  Therefore, each individual’s decision in this regard may be seen 
as a complex interconnection of motivating factors including one’s relationship to Jesus, trust and loyalty 
to Him, one’s fears about personal abilities to deal with freedom, and the core tension between desires 
for security, freedom, and progression.. 
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possible potential as He allows agency to continue unhindered through a deliberate 
decision rooted in love rather than by a logical necessity that He is bound to abide to.54 
 Given such high divine regard for the principle of agency a particularly complex 
question for the faithful Saint involves the degree to which God is believed to intervene 
in the daily lives and problems of His spirit children.  In other words, although on the 
one hand Mormons are not deists on the other hand the LDS view of divine 
omnipotence needs some qualifications since human agency appears to be a major 
factor that affects God’s interaction with His children on earth.  In this respect the God 
of Mormonism resembles the being described by the relational theologies of both 
process and open theisms.55  In fact, in divine/human relationships not only do humans 
have the choice to either welcome God or to reject Him but they can also choose to 
affect God in some degree through their wishes, experiences, and desires.  Of course, 
God’s knowledge, power, and attributes, especially love, make the interaction quite 
unbalanced so that when viewed in relation to human knowledge and understanding 
divine power cannot be defined as anything less than perfect or complete.  Thus, 
through these claims Mormons do not renounce God’s omnipotence but contextualize it 
in tension with the personal responsibility which is inherent to individual moral 
agency.56 
 In conclusion, the heavy emphasis on agency which roots LDS cosmology, 
theodicy, soteriology, and all other areas of Mormon theology is likely to find no equal 
within the theological spectrum of Christian traditions.  This is probably both good and 
bad news for Mormons.  In fact, while on the one hand the non-reducible nature of 
                                                 
54 At the same time distinguishing between God’s will and God’s logical possibilities of behaviour is a 
theologically useless endeavour.  In the Mormon theology of Deity God’s actions conform to those laws 
that are associated with the condition of Godhood without which ‘God would cease to be God’ (Alma 42: 
13, 22, 25).  Clearly, LDS theology views God as a being who is perfectly willing and rejoices in 
following these laws so much that He embodies them in His character, will, and disposition.  Being a god 
and doing the things of a god are one and the same natural condition for the Father in Heaven.  Whether 
God has a logical possibility to go against the laws which He has chosen to submit to is a point of no 
relevance in light of the fact that His perfect will and character make it an impossibility in actuality. 
55 Good summarizing chapters that explore the similarities and differences between LDS and Christian 
relational theologies are Griffin and McLachlan (2007), 161-210 and Pinnock and Paulsen (2007), 489-
553.  Also see Ostler (2001), 43-65. 
56 Mormonism has not followed classical Christianity in its philosophical efforts to protect divine 
omnipotence from all possible external influences.  For many classical theologians a God moved by His 
creatures as well as by His own choices is not sufficiently independent or omnipotent.  Mormon 
theology, instead, has been more concerned with maintaining the focus on a perfect God with whom 
humanity could interact.  Thus, Mormons are willing to redefine God’s perfection if it understood to 
mean that the divine lies above and beyond any influence that His own creatures’ actions and feelings 
could exert.  To be sure, such emphasis on divine passibility is not unique to Mormonism since several 
modern Christian theologians, like Moltmann for example, have similarly embraced the theme of an 
empathic suffering God.  See McGrath (2006), 211-14. 
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eternal moral agency uniquely strengthens the Mormon response to the classical 
problem of evil on the other hand such pervasive prominence functions as a liability if 
this awesome sense of accountability is experienced by the Saints as an excessive 
discouraging burden.  Indeed, overemphasizing personal responsibility for salvation to 
the neglect of divine grace is bound to shift to the individual the weight of 
responsibility for all imperfections.  In turn, this condition may lead the faithful down a 
path which culminates in the spiritually and psychologically damaging effect of a 
compulsive perfectionism with either an accompanying hopelessness or a false sense of 
security.  The popularity and quantity of publications by LDS ‘neo-orthodox’ writers, 
which attempt to bring greater balance and hope through a renewed emphasis on grace, 
suggest that this distortion has indeed affected a number of Saints.57   
 However, as writers like Millet and Robinson repeatedly argue, such distortions 
are not intrinsic to Mormon theology.  As highlighted in the discussion about 
materialistic monism the LDS principle of agency needs to be kept in tension with 
those counterbalancing principles of its theology which contextualize the 
conceptualization of agency.  One such principle, which I explore in the final section of 
this chapter, is divine Atonement, whose consequences and significance are deep and 
all-encompassing.  In fact, the overarching supremacy of individual accountability is 
alleviated by the power of Atonement and by its allied principles of mercy and grace, 
which play a central sanctifying role in the spiritual progression of the individual.  Still, 
for now my main focus has been to highlight the centrality of moral agency and of its 
associated concepts of justice and merit in the framework of the Mormon theological 
tradition.58  In turn, this emphasis is resonant of the socio-scientific recognition 
attached to personal responsibility for emotional experiences, which was highlighted in 
the previous chapter and which centred on the attention placed over processes of 
emotional regulation.   
 
Eternal Progression 
 In order to draw a proper association between accountability and moral agency, 
and possibly to alleviate the burden of responsibility that comes with individual 
                                                 
57 One example of a’ neo-orthodox’ LDS publication is Millet (2003). 
58 LDS philosophers Richard Williams and Terry Warner have emphatically advocated ‘agentive theory’ 
as one foundational aspect of LDS approaches to pastoral counselling and self-help.  See Williams 
(2005), 116-42 and Warner (2001).  Also see Judd (2005), 98-115 for an LDS perspective on how 
agency should be conceptualized in relation to the free-will versus determinism debate. 
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freedom, Mormon theology does not only affirm agency but also contextualizes it 
within the full scope of its eternal existence.  One manner in which it does so is by 
emphasizing agency’s purpose as the primary instrument through which each 
individual’s desire for growth and progression may be achieved.  Indeed, moral agency 
may even be viewed as constitutive of this very desire given the LDS canonical 
suggestion that the drive and independence which characterize intelligence are agentive 
in themselves.  This further underlines the great dynamism of the Mormon universe of 
existence where individual beings are inherently driven to activity for the purpose of 
either personal or communal progression.  Thus, even the perfect God of Mormonism is 
not satisfied with eternal rest, but chooses to carry out a work for the advancement of 
His children, namely to “bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man.”59  In 
short, the Mormon journey of progression is truly eternal because it never culminates in 
a state of complete stasis.  Within the LDS perspective eternal bliss is hardly 
conceivable without some form of advancement. 
 This individual journey, as already indicated, is characterized by subsequent 
stages of development corresponding to distinctive forms of embodiment.  To be sure, 
the Mormon ‘wheel of existence’ is linear rather than circular since it is characterized 
by the continuation of one’s identity and core individual make-up.  What changes is the 
degree of knowledge and progression in relation to God’s ideal character as well as 
each stage’s unique form of material body, which is taken through progressively more 
mature degrees of development.  In fact, the path begins with intelligence, it continues 
through the stages of spirit, human, and post-mortal spirit, before culminating in 
resurrected being.  Therefore, the human physical body of the present mortal condition 
does not constitute a beginning of individuality or personality because the foundation 
of one’s own eternal history is laid in the pre-mortal saga of existence.  Still, a veil of 
forgetfulness prevents humans from having access to knowledge acquired in previous 
stages of existence although occasional ‘piercings’ of the veil are deemed to be 
possible, particularly in the form of a sense of familiarity experienced in relation to 
truth or to specific individuals.60 
 Then, this original core of eternal personality, as the main conceptualized 
structure of the theomorphic nature and potentiality of the human individual, becomes 
                                                 
59 Moses 1:39 
60 In a few words, déjà-vus of knowledge, mostly of spiritual matters, and déjà-vus of relationships, 
rather than of experiences, characterize a Mormon theology of “thinning of the veil”.  See Madsen 
(1998), 456-65.   
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an object of ‘discovery’ or more properly, to use Truman Madsen’s expression, 
‘recovery’.  In fact, notwithstanding the vagueness and uncertainty about its content 
Mormons find in it strong validation for their spiritual identity, specifically by 
interpreting it as the main repository of their God-given personal value and embryonic 
divinity.  Hence, the challenge for the LDS faithful is to facilitate the eternal 
development of this self-existent essence while in a condition of physical mortality, a 
condition which is attributed in unison with other Christian traditions to the Fall of 
Adam and Eve.  Yet, the LDS view presents some unique perspectives on the Fall, the 
most significant of which lies in its emphasis on Adam and Eve’s transgression as felix 
culpa.  This is explicitly captured in the following BoM passage: 
And now, behold, if Adam had not transgressed he would not have fallen, but he would have 
remained in the garden of Eden. And all things which were created must have remained in the 
same state in which they were after they were created; and they must have remained forever, 
and had no end.  And they would have had no children; wherefore they would have remained in 
a state of innocence, having no joy, for they knew no misery; doing no good, for they knew no 
sin.  But behold, all things have been done in the wisdom of him who knoweth all things.  
  Adam fell that men might be; and men are, that they might have joy.61  
 
Thus, although in the short-run the consequences of the Fall are to a large degree 
debilitating, in the long-run they are empowering when viewed from the wider 
perspective of the LDS saga of eternal progression.62 
 At the root of this distinction lies the LDS view on the need for ‘opposition’, 
whose function is at least two-fold.  On the one hand, opposition enables the logical 
attribution of meaning through the conceptualization of opposite pairs; on the other 
hand, it makes agency possible as it endows opposing directions of behaviour with the 
kind of attractiveness that generally prevent foregone or necessary choices.  The textual 
basis for this perspective is a BoM statement by Lehi, whose original context appears to 
be metaphysical rather than experiential; yet, as already hinted, LDS theology naturally 
tends to conflate the practical with the spiritual.  Thus, the scripture states,  
For it must needs be, that there is an opposition in all things. If not so... righteousness could not 
be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. 
Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it should be one body it 
must needs remain as dead... Wherefore, it must needs have been created for a thing of naught; 
wherefore there would have been no purpose in the end of its creation. Wherefore, this thing 
must needs destroy the wisdom of God and his eternal purposes... And to bring about his eternal 
purposes in the end of man, after he had created our first parents, and ...all things which are 
created, it must needs be that there was an opposition; even the forbidden fruit in opposition to 
the tree of life; the one being sweet and the other bitter.  Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto 
                                                 
61 2 Ne. 2:22-25.   
62 For a theological exposition of LDS perspectives on the Fall see Gaskill (2005).  Compare to McGrath 
(2006), 361-67. 
 89 
 
man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be 
that he was enticed by the one or the other.63  
 
Furthermore, as a consequence of the Fall ‘opposition’ was carried over into mortality 
in the form of biological limitations or of genetic tendencies in the realm of cognition, 
emotion or behaviour, which in turn constitute the “mortal overlay” that regularly 
restricts  the individual in his desires and actions.64  When added to the inherent 
environmental limitations that emerge from human social contexts and to our general 
inability to access pre-mortal knowledge it is clear that opposition is a defining element 
of the human experience. 
 Still, Mormonism approaches opposition with optimism since the individual’s 
struggle for goodness in the context of this resistance functions as a primary instrument 
which facilitates development of personal character.  Hence, the common metaphor that 
compares personal struggles to overcome opposition to the stress that muscles must 
undergo in order to grow in size and strength, particularly in a weight lifting setting.  
Therefore, notwithstanding the balancing forces in the direction of grace and mercy 
such a picture inherently interlinks growth and progression with personal effort, 
sacrifice, and work.  Within this dynamic picture of progression it is agency that makes 
movement possible and it is moral agency in a context of both internal and external 
opposition that characterizes and distinguishes the creature who acts from the thing that 
is acted upon.65  Then, as mutually dependent forces with an increased capability to 
function in the context of a physically embodied organism vis-à-vis a spiritual one, 
opposition and agency are at the core of the Mormon justification for the necessity of 
the human mortal experience. 
 On the other hand, agency and opposition do not guarantee progression: it is the 
particular mode of their employment which determines whether development, 
regression, or stasis will ensue.  Without a purposeful and informed direction of 
thought or action the ability to choose is not a necessary good that the Saints feel 
comfortable in glorifying a priori.  Fortunately, God has provided and continues to 
provide needed direction to facilitate a correct use of agency which enables individual 
progression in the face of recurrent opposition.  Furthermore, God has also intervened 
                                                 
63 2 Ne. 2: 11-12, 15-16. 
64 For a psycho/theological discussion of the ‘mortal overlay’ see Bergin (2002), 29-47. 
65 Distinctly, some have argued that LDS canonical texts seem to extend agency to the planet earth as 
such (D&C 77:1; 88:18,25; 130:9).   The largest and most well-known argument in support of animistic 
influences on Joseph Smith’s thinking is Brooke (1994). 
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through His Son’s Atonement to prevent humans’ inevitable misuse of agency from 
functioning as an insurmountable obstacle to their progression.  In this context, I aim to 
briefly describe some of the main forms of divine assistance as I now explore three 
specific areas which embody ‘developmental potentiality’ in Mormon theology, i.e. 
revelation, repentance, and family relations.  Then, I conclude the chapter with an 
analysis of what ultimately frames all forms of individual spiritual development, 
namely the LDS theology of Atonement.  
 
Revelation 
 In the Mormon perspective there is hardly any significant individual 
progression that may occur without an accompanying growth in the realm of 
knowledge.  Thus, the developing soul is first and foremost a learning soul, whose 
knowledge is being expanded and refined through various stages of eternal experience.  
Indeed, it is this heavy emphasis on knowledge acquisition which has led some to 
affirm that Mormonism represents “a purely American gnosis.”66  To be sure, the LDS 
rhetoric on the importance of knowledge and education is not limited to the 
metaphysical.  In fact, statistics showing the number of Mormons with University 
degrees confirm that the emphasis is at least as pragmatic as it is soteriological, 
although these kinds of demarcations are not necessarily compatible with an LDS 
theological framework which interprets truth as ‘one great whole’.67  Then, knowledge 
acquisition is at least as much about a general searching attitude of the developing 
individual as it is about the assimilation of specific soteriological information.  Such 
extensive scope was highlighted by Joseph Smith himself in his statement that “one of 
the grand fundamental principles of 'Mormonism’ is to receive truth, let it come from 
whence it may.”68 
 At the same time, not all truth possesses equal utility and not all knowledge is 
‘necessary for salvation’, as the Saints would express it.  In short, while a search for 
truth is an imperative characteristic of the developing individual, truthful content may 
variously be classified in relation to its soteriological functional importance.  Thus, 
Mormons seek for guidance not only in their daily processes of discernment between 
truth and error but also in the ever-present necessity to prioritize knowledge acquisition 
                                                 
66 Bloom (1992), 123. 
67 See statistics in Duke (1998), 83. 
68 Smith and Roberts (1970), 5:499. 
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within a human context of limited time and resources.  Furthermore, since the ‘mortal 
overlay’ deeply affects the brain by limiting its capacities for memory, perception, 
attention, and other processing abilities, Mormonism’s epistemology clearly extends its 
reach beyond human reason to the recognition and inclusion of divine revelation.  In 
this context Mormon theology is built on a similar foundation as wider Christianity 
although the LDS understanding of revelation is also unique in some of its core 
aspects.69 
 In the first place Mormon theology presents no explicit limitations to the 
contextual realms within which revelation may operate.  It extends from the most 
‘religious’ spheres of lesson preparations or other ecclesiastical activities to various 
items of personal importance that may involve employment, education, or interpersonal 
relationships.  To be sure, individual Saints differ in relation to what they hold to be 
appropriate for revelatory input and LDS leaders have occasionally counselled 
members not to trivialize revelation by praying for divine illumination in those contexts 
where personal preference is mostly non-consequential.  Still, the search for revelation, 
its interpretation, and its meaning-making potential constitute such pervasive elements 
of the LDS spiritual life to make them function as the very centre of the varieties of 
Mormon religious experiences.  On the other hand, limitations are present in the 
context of scope or jurisdiction of revelatory messages, which are highly structured 
according to the responsibilities and specific areas of authority within the LDS 
hierarchy.  Thus, it is possible to speak of ‘institutional’ revelation and of ‘personal’ 
revelation as coexisting dimensions of a single Mormon theology of revelation.  
Indeed, this is not a demarcation between two different ‘kinds’ of revelation since the 
distinction centres on extension of authoritativeness of revelatory statements rather than 
on modes of reception or on dynamics of ‘spiritual’ interactions.70   
In fact, Mormon theology affirms that all human beings may receive divine 
communication by means of spiritual manifestations, which are not an exclusive 
prerogative of a selected class of mystics.  Therefore, access to revelation is potentially 
universal, although differences in degrees of revelatory intensity, in specificity and in 
abilities to receive or to accurately interpret divine communication are openly 
                                                 
69 An exploration of the Mormon concept of revelation vis-à-vis other Christians perspectives can be 
found in Hansen (1985), 51-57. 
70 Of course, the relationship between ‘institutional’ and ‘personal’ revelation may potentially involve 
conflict.  See Compton (1991), 34-41 and Stannard (1991), 49-51. 
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recognized.71  One way in which such a wide accessibility is rhetorically strengthened 
is through an emphasis on the need for each member to make use of the two primary 
revelatory sources, which are broadly and consistently available: prayer and scripture.  
Therefore, Mormons seek for divine illumination mainly in the form of spiritual 
answers to their specific prayers, which petition for guidance and knowledge about a 
particular state of affairs.  Similarly, the Saints approach scripture as sacred texts, 
which are uniquely instrumental to God’s purposes in providing not only general 
guidance but also very personalized instructions.  This process, which leads to the 
extraction of individualized meaning, is facilitated by the canonical direction to “liken 
all scriptures unto us, that it might be for our profit and learning.”72 
To be sure, Mormonism leaves room for less ordinary revelatory experiences by 
highlighting the uniqueness and purpose of single mediated settings of divine 
communication (patriarchal blessings) or by emphasizing the sacrality of demarcated 
space, which facilitates the reception of individual illumination (LDS temples).73  At 
the same time, as Terryl Givens has noted, the BoM insists on depicting revelatory 
experiences as dialogic, even conversational encounters with a divine reality that 
literally speaks and responds like ordinary human beings.74  Such a radically literal 
understanding of divine communication was further strengthened by the descriptions of 
Joseph Smith’s own theophanies, including the First Vision and the visitations of the 
angel Moroni.  Therefore, Mormons encounter the same tension in relation to revelation 
as they do in relation to the wider issue of materialistic monism, namely the balancing 
of a sacred, spiritual, other-wordly experience with the ordinary, widely accessible, and 
physical characteristics which similarly contribute to its definition.  The force of this 
tension is particularly evident when one begins to explore the modalities of spiritual 
communication as they are conceptualized in the LDS theological framework of 
revelation. 75 
Space will not allow a thorough examination of all the pneumatological 
dimensions of the Mormon perspective on revelation although in the latter part of this 
chapter I endeavour to draw the main contours of ‘Spirit’ as it is understood in the LDS 
                                                 
71 For the significance of revelation as unifying universal principle of a multi-ethnic international church 
see Seshachari (1980), 38-46. 
72 1 Ne. 19:23. 
73 A study that outlines the general content of LDS patriarchal blessings is Bates (1993), 1-29. 
74 See Givens (2002), 209-39. 
75 For a relatively systematic description of the various facets and complexities of ‘revelation’ by one 
LDS Apostle see Oaks (1982), 20-26. 
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context.  At this point it is central to simply highlight the fact that contemporary 
Mormonism heavily stresses the cognitive/affective internal nature of spiritual 
communication while not fully excluding an a priori possibility of visions, revelatory 
dreams, or other outstanding forms of divine manifestations.  Thus, when claiming to 
have received inspiration or revelation Mormons usually make use of terms like 
‘prompting’, ‘feeling’, ‘impression’, ‘sense’, etc.  This is not vocabulary that generally 
implies communication of full propositions; instead, it has reference mostly to 
confirmatory or refuting intimations about particular courses of action, which usually 
follow the individual’s preliminary decision to move in a specific direction.  Although 
a phenomenology of LDS religious experiences would indicate that some members 
claim to receive propositional forms of divine communication (in the form of novel 
thoughts, for example) I suspect that the great majority of Mormons would commonly 
attribute revelatory quality to promptings or feelings, which are interpreted as either 
positive or negative responses to tentative individual deliberations.76 
Therefore, by emphasizing the need for the petitioning individual’s preliminary 
work Mormon theology brings moral agency to the forefront of this issue.  Indeed, 
although God’s answers cannot be constricted because they are to occur “in his own 
time, and in his own way, and according to his own will” the message of the LDS 
revelatory framework is one of relative significance of individual desires and of its 
accompanying efforts in the context of the communicative process.77  In this manner, 
revelation remains ‘dialogic’ and even conversational, although less immediately so 
than how it is depicted in the BoM.  Then, in this context of more ‘filtered’ 
communication tension-causing opposition emerges perhaps even more prominently 
from internal rather than external sources.  It includes intricate mixtures of motivations, 
thoughts, feelings, and confusing desires as well as pre-revelatory mental struggles, 
which are finalized to the evaluation of particularly problematic courses of action.  In 
other words, both in what he says and in what he hears back through long and difficult 
experience the petitioner must learn how to properly function in a context of revelatory 
communication. 
Yet, revelation does not only provide a locus for its own tension and opposition 
but it also supplies the means through which wider tension-causing oppositions and 
                                                 
76 See, for example, two perspectives on personal experiences of revelation in Maxwell (1996), 80 and 
Anderson (1992), 34-38. 
77 D&C 88:68. 
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uncertainties may be resolved.  Hence, one is to grow both in the principle of revelation 
as he is to grow from the employment of the very same principle in one’s life.  In so 
doing the individual is led on a course of increasing knowledge, which may transcend, 
to a degree, the capacities of the imperfect rational mind.  For the Mormon faithful 
these are not matters of little import since the knowledge acquired through revelation, 
while helpful and comforting in the here and now, ultimately sheds light on the very 
nature of God and on the deepest essence of the individual’s own character, two aspects 
which are intricately interrelated in the LDS theomorphic view of anthropology.78  To 
be sure, the process of growth, whether in revelation or in any other matter, is far from 
being linear and at times it even happens to reverse direction.  In the Mormon 
theological view humans make many mistakes inadvertently but at times we wilfully 
choose a path that sets us back on our trajectory of eternal development, i.e. the path of 
sin.  Thus, given such human instability lasting growth could only be achieved through 
a process that would facilitate deeper change in the very tendencies and desires of the 
individual.  Repentance is such a process and it is to its examination in the Mormon 
theological context that I now turn. 
 
Repentance 
 It is a firm tenet of LDS theology that the human experience lies at the core of 
the eternal progression of the individual.  At the same time, the mortal condition, which 
Adam and Eve introduced, is both a step forward and a step downward, at least 
temporarily, for God’s spirit family.  In fact, life on earth involves at least two 
impeding conditions that, if left unconquered, prevent individual souls from returning 
to live in the presence of their Heavenly Father.  BoM prophet Jacob calls these 
obstacles “that monster, death and hell, which I call the death of the body, and also the 
death of the spirit.”79  In other words both the death of the physical body and the human 
reality of sin, which Jacob calls hell, are potentially destructive.  It will be the focus of 
the last section in this chapter to explore more fully how the LDS conception of 
Atonement provides a solution to this problem.  The present concern is to examine the 
broad effects of the human response to personal sin on the trajectory of individual 
progression. 
                                                 
78 In his famous King Follett Discourse Joseph Smith claimed that “If men do not comprehend the 
character of God, they do not comprehend themselves."  [Larson (1978), 198]. 
79 2 Ne. 9:10 
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 Mormons emphasize sin in its actual quantifiable individual manifestations 
rather than focusing on a general or collective condition which is inherent to the human 
state.  For a tradition so concerned with personal accountability there is expectedly little 
stress on any theological content which may justify a feeling of helplessness in relation 
to sin.  In fact, the Saints underline knowledge as a presupposed condition for the 
existence of sin, thus excluding any possibility that young children may sin.  In short, 
the biblical definition of sin which is most attractive to Mormons is James’ statement: 
“to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.”80  Still, given the 
immanent presence of ‘the light of Christ’, which endows all human beings with a basic 
discerning power between good and evil (the core knowledge activated in human 
encounters with sin), most are faced with the responsibility and the capability of 
avoiding sin.  Therefore, the individual process of repentance is set in motion by an 
initial recognition of personal responsibility in light of the potential alternative of a 
non-sinful action, word, or thought.  In turn, this recognition causes a feeling of 
remorse that is triggered by the love one experiences toward God, truth, others, etc.  
When possible and appropriate, restitution must accompany this internal process, 
which should then culminate in a renewed desire to live in obedience to God’s 
commandments through a life of righteousness.81 
 Of course, as is common to the structure of the whole LDS spiritual life, these 
various expressions of penitence represent only the human side of the full equation, 
which necessarily includes divine intervention and interaction.  In fact, the Atonement 
plays an indispensable role in the progression and effectiveness of the whole experience 
of personal repentance.  At the root of this significance lies the Atonement’s most 
immediate and recurrent influence in the lives of individuals, namely the facilitating 
even enabling role that makes the presence of the Holy Spirit a living reality in the 
hearts of the faithful.  Without the Atonement’s effects such a spiritual presence would 
be utterly and permanently rejected at the first occurrence of sin.  Instead, through 
repentance, those obstacles, which are consequential to sin and not necessarily 
permanent to the human condition, may be removed.  Therefore, since it functions to 
repair a spiritual damage, which unavoidably halts any possibility of significant growth, 
                                                 
80 James 4:17 
81 In Mormon circles these progressive steps are sometimes called the four Rs of the repentance process.  
In the case of the most serious sins ‘confession’ to a Church bishop should also be included.  One recent 
sermon that explains repentance somewhat systematically is Nelson (2007), 102-05. but the most 
extensive popular work on the subject in LDS circles is probably Kimball (1969). 
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repentance plays a restoring role.  In fact, as Mormonism repeatedly emphasizes, when 
the individual is left to his own strength or abilities and devoid of the Spirit of God the 
path that follows will be one of regression rather than of progression. 
 Therefore, with the Spirit acting as the enabling presence that comforts, reveals, 
strengthens, and guides, repentance repairs the human soul not to a static pre-existing 
condition but to a dynamic progressing state that is central to the purpose of this earthly 
experience.  To be sure, Mormon leaders emphasize that sin is not needed in order for 
God’s Spirit to be manifested; righteousness is the real prerequisite, not sin followed by 
repentance.  However, since some degree of sin is unavoidably real repentance can 
limit the damage of the diversion, destruction, or enervation that accompanies the 
various manifestations of sin.  Then, since Spirit enables change as it aids the 
individual to follow on the illuminated path of personal growth, repentance is in a sense 
necessary for most positive change to occur.  Furthermore, repentance potentially 
facilitates growth not only through the positive consequences intrinsic to the Spirit’s 
‘reinstatement’ but also through the negative ones, which are inherent to the spiritual 
outcomes of sinning.  In other words, sensitivity to spiritual loss may provide greater 
motivation for later efforts aimed at the avoidance of sin. 
 Finally, notwithstanding the objective of a sinless life, Mormon theology 
counterbalances the realm of the ideal with the realistic recognition that repentance is a 
life-long daily endeavour, which no human being will ever be able to transcend.  Then, 
through the permanency of this dimension repentance is conceptualized both as a single 
repeatable process applicable to specific identifiable sins and as a general attitude of 
submission and humility before God’s grandeur and perfection, which ought to be 
permanently fixed in the human heart.  In both cases the indicator of a true or sufficient 
repentance will take the form of a renewed presence of the Holy Spirit, which will often 
endow the individual with an increased ability to abandon sin and to continue in the 
path of eternal growth with a reduced number of spiritual impediments.  One of the 
main contexts for such individual progression, which LDS theology amply emphasizes, 
is the family setting.  It is to this topic that I now turn as I aim to present a brief survey 
of its theological significance. 
 
 Family Relations 
 The family is one of the core defining characteristics of all Mormon theological 
orthodoxy and related orthopraxis.  Indeed, it is as central to LDS soteriology as it is to 
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Mormon conceptualizations of all ideal religious and secular behaviours.  Then, it is no 
surprise that family appears prominently and frequently in all forms of LDS rhetoric 
and expression culminating in the 1995 “The Family: a Proclamation to the World”, 
which was issued by the central governing body of the Church.82  This document is an 
ideal illustration of the bivalent and pragmatic nature of LDS theology as it highlights 
both the family’s theological significance within the Mormon saga of eternal 
progression and its pre-eminence in the context of all possible social organizational 
structures of mortality.83  Thus, family is central to both the immediacy of the human 
condition and to the more distant soteriological foundations of a pre-mortal and post-
mortal eternity.  The necessary interconnection between these two realms of existence 
is perhaps nowhere else as evident as in the Mormon focus on ‘proxy work’ for the 
salvation of the dead.  In fact, it is primarily the LDS emphasis on eternal family, which 
drives Mormons to spend considerable time engaged in genealogical research and in the 
subsequent temple work in behalf of the dead. 
 At the same time, much of the Mormon path to spiritual development is 
concerned with the individual.  In fact, the first two principles of the Gospel, faith and 
repentance, emerge in consequence of those personal endeavours, which lie at the core 
of individual conversion.  Moral agency, while functioning within the wider framework 
of family and community interactions, is certainly a principle reducible to individual 
accountability.  Indeed, most ordinances, such as baptism, confirmation, or ordination, 
are practices with salvific value focused on the individual.  Therefore, the centrality of 
the family in Mormonism is not incompatible with a concern with the individual 
because salvation begins with the individual and it extends to the unit of the family.  It 
follows that even for those members who are single or in otherwise very difficult and 
dysfunctional family situations the ultimate ideal of an eternal family of love and 
harmony is a theological and psychological necessity.  In the mortal meanwhile, and in 
addition to any efforts aimed at strengthening one’s biological family unit, it is the 
                                                 
82 The significance of this act is apparent when it is recognized that this proclamation on the family is 
only the fourth such world proclamation in the whole history of the LDS Church.  See text in Hinckley 
(1995), 102. 
83 Parenthetically, the LDS paradigmatic view of family affects both macro and micro levels of social 
organization.  In the first place, Mormons do not make reference to the ‘human family’ in purely 
metaphorical terms given the literal spiritual family relatedness that characterizes humanity’s eternal 
nature.  Similarly, the Saints commonly speak of their local congregations in terms of ‘ward family’ and 
address each other with the title of brother or sister.  At the same time Mormonism strongly supports the 
view that any community, nation, and society at large can only be as strong, happy, and stable as are its 
constitutive family units.  Thus, social structures are both a large family and a conglomeration of many 
families. 
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responsibility of each individual to be engaged in family-focused behaviour as the 
understanding of family is extended to include the congregational or communal 
meaning of the term.84 
 Therefore, in the LDS dynamic sequence of spiritual priorities, family stands at 
the very centre with the individual preceding it and the community following it.  In 
another sense, family is the culmination of spiritual priorities if the meaning of family 
is expanded to include local, national, or international human communities.  
Parenthetically, in this duality of meaning finds expression one of the core paradoxes of 
Mormon culture, namely the tension between home and larger society, or between the 
peculiar and the universal.  In short, conversion begins indeed with the individual but it 
culminates in family exaltation, as an LDS leader has recently stressed.  Although 
individuals may still partake of ‘salvation’ without their families such ‘saved’ condition 
must be understood in the context of the stratified soteriological picture of Mormonism 
where salvation is inferior to exaltation in glory, capacities, and sociality.  In fact, only 
‘exalted’ beings may eventually dwell in the presence of their entire family, both 
spiritual and physical, which includes Heavenly Parents, Jesus Christ, as well as earthly 
parents, spouses, and children. 85  
To be sure, in defining ‘eternal life’ as the condition of existence in God’s 
presence with maximum happiness the Mormon perspective is not unique.  Yet, in 
comparison to other Christian theological approaches Mormonism adds a specific 
emphasis on the presence of family as a core source of such happiness.  Furthermore 
and truly uniquely, Mormon theology makes the daring claim that eternal bliss is 
somewhat infinitely expandable in degrees which are proportional to the eternal 
expansion of the family unit.  In other words, one’s happiness or glory (the two terms 
can be used synonymously in this context) will continue to enlarge as a consequence of 
one’s attainment of eternal posterity, although the exact nature of this spiritual 
achievement is not exactly demarcated.  Thus, what characterizes the Mormon view of 
eternal life is not only its duration and joyous nature, but also its potential for ‘spiritual’ 
procreation of ‘eternal lives’.  This, in fact, represents the model of existence which is 
presently experienced by the Father in Heaven, and which is offered as the attainable 
                                                 
84 Several LDS authoritative statements clarify that the family is not to function as the sole focus of 
service and concern for an individual, but as the first and paramount one.  For example, Joseph Smith 
stated that “a man filled with the love of God is not content with blessing his family alone, but ranges 
through the whole world anxious to bless the whole human race.” [Smith and Smith (1977), 174]. 
85 See Nelson (2008), 7-10. 
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objective for all His children.  Then, the Mormon saga of eternity appears as an 
enlarging universe of family connection, population, and progression, with its 
significant associated increase of glorious exaltation.86 
To some extent the Mormon perception of family in the present tense mirrors 
this heavenly picture.  Indeed, while family circumstances in the mortal condition are 
often quite removed from the ideal state of future eternities the family is to function 
now as the main ‘laboratory’ for character-based growth and development.  In other 
words, the family should function as the primary school of virtue for mortality in both 
its supportive and challenging aspects.  This means that the individual mostly learns to 
love and to shape his emotions in the family, but it is also in the family that the person 
often encounters the opposition which is a necessary ingredient for the spiritual 
development process.  Alas, while in the human condition, some families may function 
more as a source of opposition than as a source of spiritual nourishment.  In these 
contexts individuals may find special meaning in an expanded conceptualization of 
family that includes Church and other supporting sources.  Still, even in functional 
families that provide needed love and support, one finds ample opportunities to grow in 
the emulation of Christ-like attributes like love, patience, and endurance.  This growth 
process is indeed eternal and perhaps frustratingly long but in the Mormon theological 
unity of the pragmatic present with both past and future of promise the journey is at 
least as important as the destination itself. 
In summary, within the present section I have highlighted three core dimensions 
of the Mormon principle of eternal progression, namely revelation, repentance, and 
family relations.  Furthermore, alongside materialistic monism and moral agency, I 
have selected eternal progression as the third principle of Mormon theology of unique 
significance to the topic of emotion.  In fact, I have aimed to highlight a relationship of 
affinity between two separate but related discourses on emotion, namely the theological 
and the previously outlined scientific one.  Specifically, the intricate fusion of cognitive 
and affective elements of emotion has its parallel in the LDS conflation of the physical 
and the spiritual as variously expressed through the overarching principle of 
materialistic monism.  Similarly, contextualized accountability for individual emotions 
resonates with the Mormon emphasis on moral agency and its accompanying inference 
of personal responsibility, whether limited or not, in relation to all forms of behaviours 
                                                 
86 See Davies (2000), 143-52. 
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and even thoughts.  Finally, emotions’ developmental instrumentality, which in turn is 
materialized in the areas of knowledge acquisition, change, and interpersonal 
relationships, finds similar expression in the LDS principle of eternal progression 
through its processes of revelation and repentance and in its primary context of family 
relations. 
Certainly, this kind of cross-disciplinary dialogue could be extended to include 
more precise and detailed discussions with more focused suggestions in relation to 
specific dynamics of interaction and convergence.  However, the present focused 
exploration mainly involves a textual analysis of the LDS canon to determine whether 
these texts’ treatment of emotion parallels current broad socio-scientific conclusions on 
the same topic.  Yet, before proceeding with this textual analysis, there is another area 
of parallelism which requires proper exploration.  Unlike materialistic monism, moral 
agency, and eternal progression this final topic is not a principle which relates to a 
specific aspect or characteristic of emotion.  Instead, it is a larger principle of Mormon 
theology, which shapes the whole LDS conceptual framework of emotional phenomena 
in multiple directions of significance: it is Christ’s Atonement.  No single scientific 
expression exists in the context of emotion research that parallels the principle of 
Atonement.  Yet, Atonement relates to and incorporates theologically at least three 
areas of secular concern about emotion, namely emotion regulation, emotional healing, 
and emotional epistemology. 
 
The Atonement 
 In LDS and in mainstream Christian theologies there is only one Atonement of 
universal efficacy and significance, i.e. the Atonement of the Son of God incarnate 
Jesus Christ.  For Mormons, Jesus Christ’s Atonement is first and foremost an event 
which took place in a specific place and at a particular time of the world’s history.  
Still, although temporally and spatially situated, its effects and consequences transcend 
all time and space.  Indeed, as the BoM controversially claims, the Atonement 
transcends time even retroactively by making its benefits felt in the earthly experiences 
of believers who lived prior to its actual occurrence.  In these instances, faith in the 
promise of the Atonement as an event of future actualization was sufficient to bring 
about blessings which were dependent upon the occurrence of the Atonement as 
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historical fact.87  Less uniquely, Mormon theology also affirms that, following its 
occurrence, Jesus’ Atonement ‘reaches out’ in efficacy to any point in time and to any 
location where a spirit child of God may be found to exercise faith in it.88 
 In order to properly understand Mormon scriptural texts on the Atonement, it is 
important to recall this distinction between the historical event proper and its 
transcending consequences.  In fact, some canonical references focus more directly on 
one rather than on the other.  In the present context my attention is centred more on the 
theological exploration of the Atonement’s effects over humanity, both short-term and 
long-term, than it is on the examination of the LDS perspective of the event’s historical 
details.  To be sure, it is the exact nature of the event which shapes the consequences at 
stake, but my primary focus involves its ‘blessings’ since this is the aspect of greatest 
relevance in relation to the topic of emotion.  Furthermore, Mormon and other Christian 
perspectives on the historical details of the event do not differ significantly except for a 
unique LDS emphasis on Gethsemane, which others have already examined.89  Thus, to 
the degree that is possible given the complexity of the theme, I aim to explore the 
benefits that Mormons associate with Christ’s sacrificial offer specifically as viewed in 
terms of presence and nature of the Spirit. 
 Within the context of efficacy and blessings it is possible to distinguish between 
unique and recurrent consequences of the Atonement.  The former are associated with 
single eschatological events of promise which include resurrection or eternal life.  The 
latter, on the other hand, represent more individualized, specific and recurrent 
blessings, which usually appear in the present or past tenses. Therefore, the 
eschatological blessings of the Atonement are well suited to appear in contexts which 
emphasize the historical event of Christ’s sacrifice whereas its recurrent present 
benefits are usually described in terms of the daily divine interventions which the 
Saints recognize as also consequential to the Atonement.  Thus, the Atonement appears 
as an ongoing tool to access divine grace as made available by its mediation.  
                                                 
87 In this and in later contexts my use of the term ‘blessing’ does not have reference to the ceremonial 
practice of laying on of hands by a member of the Priesthood.  Instead, I use blessing as a general term to 
be distinguished from ‘Patriarchal blessing’ or ‘blessing of the sick’.  Under this wide umbrella term fall 
all those benefits, of either spiritual or material nature, which occur in consequence of God’s direct or 
indirect intervention and benevolence in people’s lives. 
88 A further element of distinction in the LDS view of Atonement vis-à-vis other Christian perspectives is 
the occasional claim that the Atonement has efficacy not only over the inhabitants of this earthly planet 
but also over other beings of God’s family who reside in some other location within the Universe.  For an 
articulate exposition of LDS Christology in juxtaposition to Christian theology see Ostler (2001), 409-85 
89 Davies (2003), 102-06, 51-56. 
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Furthermore, as I shortly explain in greater detail, the nature of the divine-human 
interaction inherent in these occasions is directly shaped by the specific phenomenon 
that constituted the atoning sacrifice itself.  Hence, the Atonement is ‘living’ or 
ongoing in that it represents the necessary point of connection between the divine and 
the human realms of existence as it functions both to make the connection possible as 
well as to shape its very nature. 
 To explain this ever-presentness of the Atonement in light of the recurrence and 
immediacy of its benefits it is helpful to begin with a description of its eschatological 
promises.  In line with the pervasive LDS emphasis on agency the Atonement includes 
both a ‘conditional’ and an ‘unconditional’ blessing.  Specifically, within the LDS 
theological perspective it is the gift of resurrection from death, or immortality, which is 
truly universal and fully unconditional.  In fact, although in the short-term necessary to 
the functioning of the plan, if left unconquered death would represent a universal 
calamity as it would render permanent the human separation from God.  This would 
truly make the Fall of Adam and Eve catastrophic rather than fortunate.  However, 
Mormons believe that Christ overcame death through His own resurrection for the 
whole of humanity as explained in the biblical text: “For as in Adam all die, even so in 
Christ shall all be made alive.”90  For the Saints this means that Jesus’ resurrection 
from the tomb, which functions as the culmination of the Atonement itself, is both the 
first resurrection and the starting point of a universal, even inescapable and fully 
inclusive resurrection. 
 The theological explanation for the second ‘conditional’ gift of eternal life is 
highly contingent on the particular theory of Atonement which individuals embrace 
when interpreting its nature.  In the case of LDS theology both scriptures and 
commentaries imply for the most part, although not exclusively, a concept of 
Atonement as penal substitution.  According to this theory Jesus Christ stands in the 
place of humanity to receive the punishment which justice demands in consequence of 
our sins.  Parenthetically, a unique Mormon twist to this theory is provided by the 
identification of justice with an eternal principle which God cannot transcend and 
which is operative at the time of the final judgment.  Thus, thanks to His perfect life of 
obedience and to the sufferings He experienced in our behalf Jesus is able to intercede 
for His spiritual brothers and sisters as they are subject to the eternal judgment of their 
                                                 
90 1 Cor. 15:22 
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Heavenly Father.  LDS scripture even spells out the gist of Christ’s intercessory words 
for those individuals who would receive eternal life through His Atonement, 
Behold the sufferings and death of him who did no sin, in whom thou wast well pleased; behold 
the blood of thy Son which was shed, the blood of him whom thou gavest that thyself might be 
glorified; Wherefore, Father, spare these my brethren that believe on my name, that they may 
come unto me and have everlasting life.91  
 
Therefore, Jesus allows those individuals who choose to accept His sacrifice to submit 
to the “plan of mercy” because He has “appeased the demands of justice.”92  In turn, the 
‘plan of mercy’ first redefines sin in relation to one’s knowledge and desires rather than 
purely in terms of external legal requirements and secondly it allows for the possibility 
of repentance in those cases where sin has been committed.  Still, mercy and justice 
must coexist in balance because it is only through “faith unto repentance” (the 
conditional aspect of the ‘mercy’ blessing) that justice is appeased and that the 
Atonement can ultimately take effect.93 
 Then, in light of the prior discussion on the principle of repentance, it is evident 
that the blessing of eternal life provided by the Atonement ought to be understood more 
widely than in terms of a promise that only materializes at the moment of the final 
judgment.  In fact, LDS theology defines the potential continuous efficacy of the 
Atonement through two closely related terms, which are constitutive of most divine 
interventions that characterize human spiritual experiences, i.e. justification and 
sanctification.  These terms are clearly not original to Mormonism since they appear in 
the biblical record, but in the context of LDS theology they fit into a general framework 
of eternal progression where they describe two closely associated elements of the gift 
of eternal life in process of actualization.94  Therefore, both justification and 
sanctification are closely interlinked to the principle of repentance, whose restorative 
instrumentality and overall facilitative purposes were previously highlighted.  Yet, the 
efficacy of sanctification is not limited to the process of overcoming sin since its 
                                                 
91 D&C 45:4-5 
92 Alma 42:15.  The Book of Mormon further describes Jesus’ Atonement in relation to justice in these 
terms: “Having ascended into heaven, having the bowels of mercy; being filled with compassion towards 
the children of men; standing betwixt them and justice; having broken the bands of death, taken upon 
himself their iniquity and their transgressions, having redeemed them, and satisfied the demands of 
justice.” (Mosiah 15:9) 
93 In some BoM passages mercy may be seen to function as a synonym for the person of Jesus as the 
following verse indicates: “And thus mercy can satisfy the demands of justice, and encircles them in the 
arms of safety, while he that exercises no faith unto repentance is exposed to the whole law of the 
demands of justice; therefore only unto him that has faith unto repentance is brought about the great and 
eternal plan of redemption.” (Alma 34:16).  Also see Alma 42:24. 
94 In the Bible see Rom. 4:25; 5:16,18; 2 Thes. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:2.  In LDS texts see D&C 20:30-31; Hel. 
3:35. 
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boundaries of influence include virtually all human circumstances and conditions, 
which are of any consequence for the individual.  Thus, as one Mormon authority 
explained, “the Atonement is not just for sinners” because much more than sin falls 
under its sanctifying umbrella.95 
 To proceed with order, though, Mormon theology views justification as the 
process through which an individual is declared righteous through the imputed 
righteousness of Jesus Christ.  In other words, although the individual is not actually 
righteous in his persona he is held to be so in the context of receiving ‘judgment’ 
thanks to Jesus’ substitutionary Atonement, which pardons him from his guilt.  Thus, 
whether in the eschatological context or in the recurrent setting of daily repentance, 
sincere penitent individuals benefit from Jesus’ saving ‘transfer’ of His own 
righteousness.  On their part, they are responsible to come to Jesus in ‘faith unto 
repentance’ and to fulfil all the requirements of this process inasmuch as they are able.  
Therefore, in light of the ‘demands of justice’ against humanity this specific 
manifestation of Christ’s substitutionary Atonement is crucial to God’s children in their 
desire to reach eternal life.  Yet, justification by itself does not change the individual, as 
it only restores him to a condition of innocence.  In the LDS theological framework this 
is not sufficient to justify the whole plan of salvation because it merely returns 
humanity to its condition prior to ‘the Fall’ and is still eternally distant from the 
ultimate apotheosis that God desires for His children.  In short, justification fixes one 
major problem but in isolation it does not cause the eternal progression which 
consititutes the core purpose of this earthly existence. 
On the other hand, sanctification is the very source of this growth.  As inferred 
by the etymology of the term sanctification makes individuals holy as it provides the 
needed power, knowledge, and comfort, which are constitutive of eternal progression.  
True, to be operative sanctification requires individual effort and desire but it still 
remains classified as a gift because its benefits and blessings are judged as far superior 
to what a single person may be able to obtain in return through his own merit.  Like 
justification, sanctification is a blessing traceable to the efficacy of the Atonement, 
which pierces the barrier between the mortal and the divine thanks to Jesus’ 
unblemished mediation.  Therefore, it may occur in association with justification as a 
consequence of the process of repentance but it may also emerge in contexts where the 
                                                 
95 Hafen (1990), 7-14. 
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overcoming of sin is not the core focus of the situation.  Thus, it may be manifested in 
whatever circumstances of connection between the heavenly and the earthly that take 
place in an individual’s life, whether petitioned for or unrequested.  In short, 
sanctification describes the purifying and strengthening effects of the Holy Spirit in the 
lives of those individuals who enjoy His benefits.96 
Then, it is in the concept of sanctification that Mormon pneumatology and 
Christology share the most but also where their distinctions are harder to identify.  Part 
of the difficulty lies in the fact that LDS theology has not replaced the Trinitarian 
theology it has rejected with an articulate and detailed Mormon theology of the 
Godhead.  Thus, for example, in the context of an eternal family where each individual 
is primarily identified in his relation to the Heavenly Father or to his Saviour brother, 
the Holy Spirit does not enjoy an explicit identity in this family context.  In other 
words, it is neither known how the Holy Spirit is related to the other members of the 
Godhead nor how He (as commonly speculated) is related to the rest of the human 
family.  What Mormon theology does affirm unequivocally is that the Holy Ghost is the 
only being in the Godhead without a body of flesh and bones, who most likely has 
delayed the process of acquisition of a body to fulfil His unique function of dwelling in 
the human heart.97  By so doing the ‘Spirit’ comforts, guides, teaches, testifies, and 
strengthens individuals throughout their lives thanks to Jesus’ Atonement, which allows 
such spiritual presence among humans by bridging the separating gap between divinity 
and humanity.   
Yet, the Mormon canon implies that a much more direct intervention of the 
personage of Christ is also present in the sanctifying process of individuals.  In fact, 
Jesus’ sanctifying role is expressed in terms which underlie its dependency on the 
dynamics of the Atonement and on what the Atonement has made of Him.  
Specifically, as well captured by Alma, the rebel-turned-prophet in the BoM, it is the 
comprehensive empathy that Christ was able to acquire through His intercessory 
sufferings which empowers Him with a fuller ability to sanctify, 
And he shall go forth, suffering pains and afflictions and temptations of every kind; and this that 
the word might be fulfilled which saith he will take upon him the pains and sicknesses of his 
people...and he will take upon him their infirmities, that his bowels may be filled with mercy, 
according to the flesh, that he may know according to the flesh how to succor his people 
                                                 
96 A description of the LDS doctrine of justification and sanctification is found in Christofferson (2001), 
18-25.  Compare with McGrath (2006), 371-79. 
97 For a comparative examination of the LDS perspective on the trinity see Owen (2005), 59-84.  On the 
Holy Ghost in Mormonism see Davies (2003), 71-73.  
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according to their infirmities.  Now the Spirit knoweth all things; nevertheless the Son of God 
suffereth according to the flesh...98 
 
In light of this passage Christ’s all-encompassing sufferings for the struggles and pains 
of humanity, which reached well beyond the direct consequences of sin, allowed Him 
to more fully experience mercy in our behalf.  Therefore, it is Jesus who is moved to 
come to our succour and to pour out His spiritual “tender mercies” and not the 
personage of the Holy Spirit, who has not carried out this empathic Atonement in our 
behalf.  Yet, the process of receiving divine succour is repeatedly described in LDS 
scriptures as necessarily materialized in the enabling power of the Spirit, which 
conveys knowledge, comfort, or energy as needed.99 
 Therefore, while ‘Spirit’ remains one of the primary root-metaphors for LDS 
phenomenological explanations of transcendent experiences the Atonement, both as an 
event with consequences and as the person of the atoning ‘Christ’, stands in a position 
of even greater theological and psychological significance.  In fact, the Atonement 
precedes Spirit in sequential causative descriptions of our spiritual connections with the 
divine and it encompasses Spirit in the identifying accounts of those manifestations that 
constitute these very connections.  Furthermore, almost every other aspect of LDS 
theology seems ultimately to be retraceable to the event of the Atonement, which 
emerges as the centre of the Mormon Plan of Salvation with ramifications that are as 
extensive as they are significant.  Thus, to take as an example the three previously 
selected tools or aspects of eternal progression, the Atonement allows, explains and 
facilitates repentance, revelation, and family relations.  In fact, in addition to 
strengthening the individual in these contexts of experience the Atonement gives 
efficacy and value to the performed ordinances associated with these principles.  In 
fact, without the ‘bridging’ effects of the Atonement, both temple ordinances, which 
bind families eternally, and chapel ordinances, which signify repentance (baptism and 
sacrament), would be of ephemeral rather than of eternal validity. 
 Furthermore, even eternal principles like materialistic monism and agency, 
which are self-existent and not contingent on external factors for their actualization, 
may function, through the instrumentality of the Atonement, with potentially reduced 
                                                 
98 Alma 7:11-13. 
99 In describing his view of the Mormon theology of Atonement Blake Ostler emphasizes this 
‘compassionate’ aspect and criticizes the penal-substitutionary perspective.  See Ostler (2006), 203-81.  
A similar position is expressed in Potter (1999), 73-86.  A perspective which partially builds on Potter’s 
argument while also expanding it is Morgan (2006), 57-81.  This is a view I find particularly attractive. 
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impediments in the human context.  Thus, for example, although body and spirit are 
combined as an inextricable unity of substance without the Atonement’s sanctifying 
power the internal tension between the natural and the spiritual, as described by King 
Benjamin, would invariably culminate in a triumph of the former over the latter.  
Similarly, agency would only function as a means that leads to the condemnation of the 
individual if the Spirit were to cease providing an enticing influence in the direction of 
what is good and true.  Indeed, whether conceptualized as the more diffused and 
immanent ‘light of Christ’ or as the more personalized and intensive ‘Holy Ghost’, 
LDS theology leaves no equivocation about the fate of the individual who is left to his 
own strength and discernment: he would invariably become enslaved by the superior 
power and knowledge of Satan. 100 
 Consequently, as Mormon leaders repeatedly try to capture in statements like 
“the Atonement is the very heart of Christ’s gospel”, “it is the central act in all of 
human history”, “it is the most fundamental doctrine of our faith” and many other 
similar declarations, the Atonement is historically, theologically, and anthropologically 
essential to the whole structure of the LDS worldview.101  In this context it should be 
remembered that within the angel/beehive totality of the Mormon perspective of reality 
these affirmations are existentially and pragmatically normative at the most basic and 
practical level.  In short, not only do they define the eschatological soteriology of the 
theological tradition but also, and most immediately, they provide an organizing and 
motivating framework for the interpretation of the daily intersecting realms of the 
spiritual and psychological, which for the Saints materialize in both emotional and 
cognitive spheres.  In our present context this means that the spirit of the individual and 
the Holy Spirit meet in the emotions, a meeting which is made possible by the penal 
substitution of the Atonement and which by it is being shaped, as I later explain in 
more detail, particularly through the perfect empathic sorrow Christ embodies as a 
consequence of the event.  Thus, emotions function as a key repository for divine 
revelation and intervention while also embodying the individual’s possible rejections 
and disputations of these very intercessions. 
From a functionalist psychological perspective this centrality translates into the 
fact that the Atonement, as a more or less personalized image, enables the 
                                                 
100 For a ‘confessional’ description of the ‘light of Christ’ see Packer (2005), 8-14.  The topic has not 
often been addressed academically. 
101 See Maxwell (2001), 10-15, and Oaks (1994), 60-67.. 
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‘spiritualizing’ of emotional processes thus underlying the comforting immediacy of 
divine interventions in daily experiences.  In theological terms, the Atonement, or more 
properly Christ as defined by the experience of the Atonement, comes to the rescue of 
the ‘divine’ within by opening the connection to the Divine without.  In such a broad 
sense the Atonement is both the means and the end, the force and the source, the 
connection and the connected divine origin from where to receive light and direction.  
In more specific relation to the emotions this assistance, or more properly succour, 
takes place in such key dimensions as enlightenment in discernment, correct 
development and refinement of both emotional direction and intensity, as well as 
guidance/intensification of motivation and self-control.  Indeed, the Atonement 
provides the theological lenses through which the LDS faithful comes to process and 
interpret his emotions as well as to drive emotional regulation and coping.   
Yet, while theologically grounded in canonical texts that interlink ‘Spirit’ with 
emotion the connection between the Atonement and the emotions has never been 
judged as sufficient to fully explain the whole realm of emotional phenomena.  Indeed, 
since the line of demarcation between spiritually affected and purely naturalistic 
emotional experiences is expectedly fuzzy much that pertains to their discernment is 
left to the personal experience and capacity of the individual.  On the other hand, in 
communal settings in particular, public declarations which involve certain paradigms of 
emotional interpretation often tend to reinforce widely held perspectives on spiritual 
discernment that may not necessarily represent authoritative canon.102  The examination 
of these LDS dynamics would be sociologically and theologically fascinating, but I do 
not at present have the means, data, or space to engage this question directly.  On the 
other hand, my main concern has been to simply outline the way in which the 
Atonement constitutes a broad framework of emotional interpretation and regulation. 
 Within this same context the objective of the first chapters in this analysis has 
been twofold.  In the first place I have attempted to lay the foundations for a direct 
engagement between the socio-scientific study of emotion and a Mormon theology of 
emotion by showing the potential fruitfulness for dialogue through a preliminary 
comparative survey highlighting points of contact.  Furthermore, I have aimed at 
                                                 
102 One example could be the belief expressed in a variety of forms that truth cannot be associated with 
feelings of discomfort.  It follows that anything, which is novel and ‘surprising’ is often too quickly 
discerned as error because in contrast with the personal pride that already assumes the possession of 
truth.  This is not a Mormon tendency in itself but a wider human predisposition to constantly seek for 
confirmation of held beliefs.   
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beginning my own construction of an introductory LDS theology of emotion by 
borrowing some elements of current emotion research for broad integration with core 
theological principles of Mormonism.  Yet, so far I have limited my constructive 
interaction to mostly distant associations and broad areas of contact.  At this point my 
task is to engage the topic more directly and to explore in greater detail the content of 
an LDS theology of emotion vis-à-vis the socio-scientific axioms about emotions 
previously outlined.  To do this I have chosen as my text those unique canonical 
sources that distinguish Mormonism from its main-stream Christian theological 
counterparts and it is to them that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The ‘Predicting’ Emotions: Hope and Fear 
 
 
 In order to begin assessing the status of emotion within the Mormon theological 
framework it is essential to examine those authoritative texts which lie at the root of the 
LDS theological tradition.  Therefore, the main objective of this chapter, and indeed of 
the rest of this analysis, is to explore in some depth the content of these texts in relation 
to words and expressions which have reference to emotions.  Specifically, in light of 
the classification that I have chosen to employ, which I outlined at the conclusion of 
chapter one, I am presently concerned with the Mormon theological framing of those 
emotions I have termed predicting, and more particularly with hope and fear as their 
opposing prototypical manifestations.  Yet, prior to engaging the emotion content of 
sacred LDS texts I need to provide a brief introduction on the nature and significance of 
Mormon scripture since its characteristics certainly appear peculiar when viewed from 
the perspective of main-stream Christian traditions.  In this context my objective is not 
only to describe the origin and basic make-up of unique LDS scriptural volumes but it 
is also to situate these texts in the larger picture of a Mormon theological tradition 
which is grounded in a complex interaction of living and scriptural prophetic authority. 
 
The Mormon Canon 
 When compared to other Christian traditions Mormonism accepts a canon that 
is distinctively larger.  Yet the difference is not centred on questions of extension of the 
biblical text proper as displayed, for example, by Catholic and Protestant disagreements 
over the inclusion or exclusion of the Old Testament ‘apocrypha’ in their Bible.  
Instead, the uniqueness of the Mormon canonical position lies in the LDS acceptance of 
scriptural books which are separate from the Bible.  In this context the Mormon 
approval of the more conservative Protestant selection of biblical texts coexists with an 
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utter denial of the supreme status of the Bible as sola scriptura.  In fact, in addition to 
the Bible, the LDS canon includes three sacred books, namely the BoM, the Doctrine 
and Covenants (D&C), and the Pearl of Great Price (PoGP), which form, as a combined 
whole, the canonical works, the scriptures, or the standard works.   
 Mormons are encouraged to study these books of scriptures on a daily basis as 
individuals and as families.  Moreover, the weekly focus of the Church’s ‘Sunday 
School’ lessons is centred on selected passages from the standard works which are 
regularly repeated according to set calendars of study.  Yet, beginning with Church 
President Ezra T. Benson (1899-1994) prophetic statements of recent years have 
emphasized the need to give priority to the study of the BoM.  Indeed, at the turn of the 
twenty-first century Church President Gordon B. Hinckley (1910-2007) has renewed a 
call for the Saints to study this book with urgency and focus.1  To be sure, in the 
present setting I am not able to explore all the issues that pertain to the relationship 
among these books or to examine questions about their relative hierarchy or internal 
nature.  Still, what follows is a brief overview of each text that aims to function as a 
general background to the detailed analysis of the canonical emotional content which 
will characterize the rest of this examination. 
 
The Bible 
 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints uses the King James Version 
(KJV) of the Bible as its official biblical record; hence, all biblical references in the 
present text are extracted from the KJV.  Other versions of the Bible are virtually 
absent from Mormon houses and from their places of worship, although they are not 
explicitly condemned.2  Furthermore, Mormons make use of the Joseph Smith 
Translation (JST), a revision of the biblical text carried out by the Prophet Joseph 
Smith, which, for the most part, is found printed in the footnotes and endnotes of the 
LDS edition of the Bible.3  However, the status of the JST is somewhat ambiguous 
since, in the first place, it does not replace the KJV as the official authoritative biblical 
record of the Church.  Moreover, its significance and use is closely interlinked to the 
history of its transmission and to the Church’s relations with what is now called the 
                                                 
1 See Benson (1986), 4-7 and Hinckley (2005), 2-6. 
2 See Barlow (1989), 18-43.  
3 The theological foundation for this work of revision is rooted in the Saints’ belief that “the Bible is the 
word of God as far as it is translated correctly.” [Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (1981a), A 
of F 8, 60].  For the history and content of the JST see Jackson, et al. (2004). 
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Community of Christ.  In fact, this religious movement, which used to be known as the 
Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, has always been the 
proprietor of the copyright for the JST, which takes the name of Inspired Version 
within the Missouri-based Church.4 
 
The Book of Mormon 
 The BoM is a volume originally published in 1830 in Palmyra, New York, 
where Mormonism’s prophet and founder, Joseph Smith, first announced his 
theophanies.  One of his sacred visions involved an angelic commission to translate an 
ancient record, which he was able to obtain after some time.  As stated in the 
Introduction of the book,  
It is a record of God’s dealings with the ancient inhabitants of the Americas…The book was 
written by many ancient prophets by the spirit of prophecy and revelation. Their words, written 
on gold plates, were quoted and abridged by a prophet-historian named Mormon. The record 
gives an account of two great civilizations…The crowning event recorded in the Book of 
Mormon is the personal ministry of the Lord Jesus Christ among the Nephites soon after his 
resurrection.5 
 
Joseph Smith claimed to have translated this ancient record into English from the 
language, called ‘reformed Egyptian’, in which it had been originally engraved.  He 
further explained that the translation was only made possible “by the gift and power of 
God” and with the aid of instruments he had received for this sacred purpose.  The 
book is presently printed in more than 100 languages and is one of the most distinctive 
marks of Mormonism and of its missionary efforts.6 
 Since a good portion of this work will be concerned with the analysis of the 
emotion language within the BoM it is important to explicitly outline the linguistic 
assumptions which lie at the root of this examination.  In fact, the nature of the 
language of the BoM is a matter of dispute between believers and nonbelievers.  Those 
who do not accept Joseph Smith’s explanation mostly view the book as an individual 
creation from the imagination of its nineteenth-century ‘author’ rather than as a text 
with ancient linguistic or historical origin.  Believers, on the other hand, support the 
Prophet’s claim of an original ancient source.  Still, given the very limited details about 
the translation process provided both by Smith and by his scribes the nature of the 
                                                 
4 At the present time the LDS Church and the Community of Christ share much in their historical roots 
although they have become increasingly distant in the realm of theology.  On the Inspired Version see 
Edwards (1990).  
5 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (1981b), Introduction. 
6 Ibid.  The best academic study on the BoM is found in Givens (2002). 
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translation remains open to speculation even among LDS scholars.  Indeed some 
suggest a prevalence of a ‘loose’ translation/interpretation where others advocate a 
‘tight’ translation of the original source text.7   
In the context of the present analysis the issue is only relevant as it relates to the 
specific linguistic analysis which is being carried out.  Regardless of one’s acceptance 
or rejection of Joseph Smith’s explanation attempting to retrieve what may have been 
the original textual source the Prophet used in the ‘translation’ is undoubtedly a useless 
endeavour.  Indeed, the original ancient text is unavailable for examination and no 
known example of ‘Reformed Egyptian’ has yet been recognized in any other text.  
Therefore, I can only focus my analysis on the English text as it appears in the current 
edition of the book.  Moreover, since the language of the BoM is often very resonant of 
the KJV language of the Bible I may make occasional reference to biblical linguistic 
evidence without necessarily suggesting source dependency.  Still, semantic parallels 
ought to be assumed since they may occasionally contribute to facilitate this whole 
linguistic examination.   
 
The Doctrine and Covenants 
 The D&C is a volume mostly authored by Joseph Smith in the context of his 
exercise of prophetic and leadership capacity as God’s mouthpiece.  It contains 
primarily revelations, letters, items of instruction and organization, accounts of visions, 
and biblical commentaries as were dictated by the Prophet to his scribes.  In limited 
amount it also includes a few revelations recorded by Smith’s successors as well as two 
Official Declarations which announced the end of two highly controversial practices, 
i.e. plural marriage and the denial of Priesthood conferral to men of African descent.  
When juxtaposed to the BoM it may be seen that the D&C appears to be quite different 
in content, although its language similarly resembles the literary style of the KJV.  In 
fact, the D&C is not a coherent narrative and with the exception of a few revelations it 
does not purport to derive from texts of ancient origin. However, it is similarly dear to 
the Saints as it is understood to provide tangible evidence of the divine intervention 
which has contributed to validate the Church’s early history. 
 In addition to providing the organizational structure of the Church the D&C 
contains several significant theological statements, which lie at the foundation of the 
                                                 
7 See Ricks (1993), 201-06 and Skousen (1998), 22-31.  Also see Van Wagoner and Walker (1982), 49-
68. 
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Mormon dogma.  Furthermore, it should be noted that as the main collector of modern 
canonized revelations it has been subjected to several changes throughout its various 
editions.  In fact, should future additions be included in the Mormon canon, it is likely 
that the D&C will function as the repository of such changes.8 
 
The Pearl of Great Price 
 The PoGP is the smallest of the LDS standard works.  In fact, for the greatest 
part of its history, it has not been published individually but it has regularly been 
included in the same volume as the D&C.  At the same time, the textual nature of this 
collection is even more mixed than the D&C since the PoGP includes both texts that 
are explicit about their nineteenth century origin and others which purport ancient 
derivation.  The bulk of the book includes some revelations received by the Prophet 
while in the process of interpreting the Bible, specifically sections which include 
extensive additions to the biblical text.  Furthermore, the book contains Joseph’s 
account of his early religious history, which was written in 1838, as well as the Articles 
of Faith, or the closest document to what many would identify as a ‘Mormon Creed.’  
This list of 13 articles was written by Mormonism’s founder in response to a request of 
an editor from a Chicago newspaper who desired to publish a summary of the new 
religion’s tenets.  Finally, the book of Abraham emerged from what Joseph claimed to 
have been his translation of some ancient Egyptian papyri, which he had purchased 
while living in Kirtland, Ohio.9   
In comparison to the D&C the PoGP is almost exclusively theological, since it 
does not include organizational or structural information with the exception of a few 
general statements contained in the Articles of Faith.  Finally, prior observations which 
are relative to the linguistic analysis of the English text in the BoM are also relevant in 
relation to the Book of Abraham within the PoGP. 
 
 
 
Living Prophets and the ‘Open’ Canon 
                                                 
8 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (1981c). 
9 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (1981a).  The text of the Book of Abraham has been 
subject to extensive criticism and several articles have debated its nature and implications.  A history of 
the book may be found in Peterson (1995). 
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In addition to distinctiveness in scriptural sources Mormon theology also parts 
from main-stream Christian traditions in matters of canonical fixity.  In fact, in light of 
the LDS conceptualization of revelation as the eternal principle of ongoing divine 
communication, the fluidity of the Mormon canon vis-à-vis classical Christianity’s 
closure of its own biblical canon is hardly surprising.  Indeed, the LDS canon remains 
open in principle to subsequent additions and subtractions of both grammatical and 
theological nature although the implementation of such changes in practice, especially 
in the past century, has been quite infrequent.  Yet all LDS scriptures have been 
subjected to minor grammatical editing and the D&C and the PoGP in particular have 
appeared in their successive editions with some additions and deletions of considerable 
size.10  Further changes are likely to take place in the future in line with a theological 
view which stresses the continuity of revelation through the mouth of a living prophet 
who is uniquely inspired to respond to the challenges of his own time.  This theological 
expectation is in turn rooted in the canonized tenet that through His prophet God “will 
yet reveal many great and important things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.”11   
At the same time, as already pinpointed, the great majority of prophetic 
statements are never canonized in print.  In other words, no prophetic declaration is 
added to the existing edition of Mormon scriptures apart from seldom exceptional 
‘revelations’ which involve major modifications in Church practice or theology.  
Indeed, the two official declarations of the D&C underline significant changes of this 
nature in sanctioning the end of the historical era of plural marriage and the extension 
of Priesthood ordinations to blacks of African descent.  Thus, notwithstanding its 
fluidity in principle, Mormon scripture is in actuality highly fixed.  Consequently, in 
their search for cognitive and moral stability Mormons thrive on what they perceive as 
the firmness of a Gospel which is contained in scriptures that do not usually change.  
Indeed, as history has shown, additions usually precipitate some degree of crisis in 
some segment of the LDS population, particularly if the measure is understood to be 
canonically corrective rather than complementary.12   
                                                 
10 For analyses of the changes in subsequent editions of the D&C see Woodford (1974) and Best (1992), 
87-112. 
11 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (1981a), A of F 9, 60. 
12 The issuing of first and second Manifestos by prophetic authority, which officially discontinued the 
celebration of plural marriages within the Church, exemplified such a circumstance of internal struggle.  
Some members refused to accept the change and as a consequence decided to join various splinter 
groups, which still exist today as theologically and institutionally separate organizations that are not 
associated with the LDS Church.  See Driggs (1990), 367-89. 
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 That theological change should give rise to difficulties in the minds of some 
Saints is not surprising in light of the existing relationship between canon and prophetic 
authority.   This link is inherently difficult to demarcate but may better be summarized 
in terms of mutual justification within a coherent whole rather than as a hierarchically 
organized order of theological authority.  In other words, complementarity rather than 
innovation and change defines the common contemporary understanding of the 
relationship between scripture and ‘living’ prophetic revelation in the minds of most 
Mormons.  In fact, to approach the issue with a question on relative priority or 
hierarchy of authority is bound to leave the inquirer somewhat frustrated and confused 
since historical statements of different LDS prophets have emphasized the priority of 
the existing canon on the one hand or the superior authority of revelations by living 
prophets on the other.13  Still, the evidence from the LDS canonical context points in a 
direction of relative openness to theological change while, at the same time, it also 
highlights the exceptionality of such innovations which must explicitly appear to be 
far-reaching in their theological significance.  Hence, when focusing on the content of 
the Mormon canon the previously highlighted theological tension between stability and 
change is clearly skewed on the side of permanence. 
Yet, this core theological paradox is pushed back in the direction of a point of 
balance when the focus shifts to the realm of exegesis and application.  Indeed, if the 
official canon contains primarily the largely unchangeable theological foundation 
established by the Prophet Joseph Smith it is the manner in which his living successor 
interprets and applies that same text to present institutional circumstances which 
constitutes the dynamic realm of LDS canonical openness.  Furthermore, and perhaps 
even more significantly, it is the amount of attention and emphasis placed upon specific 
passages of canonical writings which shape the theological picture of Mormonism in its 
present tense as opposed to its past or potential future tenses.  In other words, through 
General Conferences and Sunday lessons the Saints are primarily exposed to the 
present theological emphasis of living prophets and apostles as it emerges from their 
sermons.   Moreover, when teachings of past prophets are examined in weekly lessons 
as required by the present curriculum of the Priesthood and Relief Society, such lessons 
                                                 
13 Compare these two statements from past Church presidents: 1. “You cannot accept the books written 
by the authorities of the Church as standards of doctrine, only in so far as they accord with the revealed 
word in the standard works...If Joseph Fielding Smith writes something which is out of harmony with the 
revelations, then every member of the Church is duty bound to reject it.” [Smith (1954), 3:203-04]  2. 
The living prophet is more vital to us than the standard works...the prophet does not need to say “Thus 
Saith the Lord” to give us scripture.” [Benson (1981), 1-8]. 
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are organized in print through the guidance of present authorities, who select the words 
of their predecessors which ought to be examined and discussed.  In this manner it is 
largely possible to avoid the explicit highlighting of theological change which may 
involve contradictions that could appear problematic.  In fact, where past prophetic 
authorities appear to stand theologically corrected rather than being ‘added upon’ there 
is an inherent risk that the potential doubt over the prophetic authority of past prophets 
may spill over to shake the legitimacy of their present counterpart. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that Mormonism attempts to negotiate the fine line 
that exists between the vitality and psychological disturbance which are inherent in the 
expression of change.  In the present setting I am unable to explore in detail the various 
ways in which the tradition engages these very difficulties but some of its signposts 
will emerge as I continue to explore the relationship between established canon and 
prophetic authority.  Then, to summarize, Mormon theology emphasizes unity and 
continuity between canon and living revelation, the latter functioning to develop and 
contextualize the former by reshaping its applicability in the present milieu.  At the 
same time, although scripture is the repository of core doctrinal foundations, it may be 
occasionally subjected, through divine guidance and in exceptional circumstances, to 
modifications and changes as directed by living prophetic authorities.  Furthermore, 
prophets and apostles establish patterns of doctrinal ‘relevancy’ by focusing sermons 
and lessons on particular Gospel subjects and areas of concern.  In turn, these particular 
patterns of emphasis, given the LDS theological context of dynamic fluidity, may 
occasionally raise questions about the status of that which is being left out, whether 
originating in scripture or in prophetic statements from the past.  Significantly, it is this 
realm of content, which remains presently unaddressed by authoritative sources, that 
gives rise to much of the fuzziness and uncertainty associated with Mormon theology. 
To further complicate things, when focusing on past prophetic statements, it 
was previously highlighted that declarations from individuals in authority may be 
accompanied by potential questions about the revelatory status of such statements.  In 
other words, prophets and apostles may also speak as regular mortals and thus express 
in some of their statements a personal opinion that does not necessarily represent an 
inviolable truth with a ‘revelatory’ stamp of approval.  Yet, the faithful is not regularly 
faced with this problem if he is unaware of or if he naturally overlooks all those 
statements from the past which are being neglected institutionally.  In fact, either by 
rehearsing or by choosing not to quote selected statements from their predecessors 
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present leaders appear to further or to diminish the theological life and authority of 
particular past exegetical discussions by implying what at best is their secondary if not 
inconsequential nature.   
On the other hand, given the regular Church-wide emphasis on personal, family, 
and congregational study of the standard works, the Saints are inevitably faced with 
scriptural passages whose content is not presently spoken of with any degree of 
significance, or which may even appear to contradict present theological directions.  
Clearly, Mormons approach these questions in a variety of ways, and those who find 
resolution usually appeal to contextualizing factors, allegorical interpretations, or, when 
dealing with the biblical text, problems of translation.  Yet, some may go further by 
applying a sort of evolutionary pattern of development to Mormon theology where they 
identify the main correctives or increasingly precise demarcations of previous 
theological content not in explicit textual modifications of the canon but implicitly in 
living prophetic patterns of emphasis and exegesis.14  Whatever avenues of explanation 
individual members choose it is evident that Mormons’ engagement with scripture is 
intricately and unavoidably linked with their understanding of the ‘uncanonized’ 
declarations of prophetic authorities on the passages or topics which lie within their 
analytical focus.   
Therefore, my choice to focus exclusively on canonical texts and to neglect 
prophetic statements in my current examination of the LDS theological framework of 
emotion requires an explanation.  To be sure, this limitation would have been 
significant and potentially disastrous if my objective had been to construct a 
comprehensive Mormon theology of emotion.  However, my objective is less far-
reaching since it is limited to an introduction to the topic for which I judge the 
canonical evidence to be sufficient.  Furthermore, in addition to the obvious problem of 
space limitations and within the specific analytical context with which I am presently 
concerned, I do not find most statements from Mormon authorities to add significant 
evidence to the one provided by the LDS canon.  In other words, LDS prophets have 
                                                 
14 Whether this particularly ‘loose’ approach to LDS canon is consonant with orthodox Mormon theology 
is debatable.  In any case, and in potential support of this view, it is at least apparent that removals of 
canonical materials as corrective measure to any of Joseph Smith’s canonized revelations are quite 
unlikely in the present institutional context.  Notwithstanding the fact there is no Mormon tenet on the 
infallibility of Joseph Smith or of any other prophet who succeeded him the institution has naturally felt 
the need to shore its members’ faith in its Prophet founder.  Thus, any removal of existing canonical 
revelations could cast a shadow of doubt over the prophetic veracity of Joseph Smith’s claims or over 
any of the claims of its successors.  This is where theological change appears as a double-edged sword, 
which can lead either to growth or to crisis. 
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largely taken the basic identification of emotions as developmentally instrumental 
cognitive/affective phenomena for which individuals are accountable as a core 
assumption of their more specific and focused statements about various 
emotional/spiritual dynamics.  In this setting I cannot provide the evidence to support 
this conclusion and must therefore leave it for a future endeavour along with any other 
focused engagement with LDS prophetic statements on emotion.  For now I turn to the 
Mormon canon and specifically to its distinctive scriptures after a few brief 
considerations about emotions in the biblical text. 
 
Exploring Emotions in the Bible 
 As previously stated, by including the KJV of the Bible in their standard work, 
Mormons share a canonical foundation with the rest of the Christian world.  Indeed, as 
Philip Barlow has highlighted, the earliest articulations of Mormon theological 
concerns and justifications were as replete with biblical references, themes, and 
biblically informed language as were the theologies of most Christian denominations in 
nineteenth century America.15  Yet, I have chosen not to include the biblical record 
within the scope of my present examination for reasons which are both structural and 
methodological.  To be sure, the exclusion should not be understood to infer that the 
LDS canonical framework attributes negligible theological significance to the biblical 
record.  On the contrary, Mormons make use of the Bible, and particularly of the New 
Testament, in the various theological settings where emotion is the focus of their 
scriptural study and discussion.  At the same time, Mormons interpret the Bible ‘in 
light of the Restoration’, i.e. their hermeneutical background is uniquely shaped by 
those nineteenth-century revelations, which gave rise to Mormonism, particularly as 
contained in the D&C and in the BoM.  Consequently, if limitations of space and the 
objective of maintaining a distinctive Mormon focus drive an author to an unavoidable 
selection of texts, primacy will necessarily be given to unique LDS scriptures rather 
than to the Bible.  
 Still, it is appropriate to ask, given the Mormon insistence on the fact that the 
Bible and the BoM ‘go hand in hand’, whether the relegation of the Bible to the 
background of the present structure could significantly alter the theological picture 
which is being examined.  Indeed, the answer may be positive were it not for the fact 
                                                 
15 Barlow (1991), 43-46.  Barlow’s work is the most comprehensive historical analysis on the 
relationship between Mormonism and the Bible. 
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that a thorough examination of the Bible’s emotion-related content, with specific 
reference to its cognitive foundation, is already in existence.  The study to which I am 
referring is Matthew Elliott’s solid analysis Faithful Feelings, a careful exploration of 
emotions as they are contained in the biblical text and especially in the New 
Testament.16   Certainly, this volume has played a significant role in the development 
of my present examination since it has provided both an impetus and a model for my 
own analysis of emotions in Mormonism.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the 
differences between our two studies, which I will shortly outline, I view Elliott’s 
conclusions as complementary and largely equivalent to my arguments.  Hence, 
Faithful Feelings may be used as a supporting textual source to my present analysis, 
which I then ‘borrow’ and for the most part ‘include’ in my own canonical LDS 
theology of emotion.  In short, what my study is lacking in relation to the Bible is 
largely supplied by Elliott’s outstanding examination. 
 To be sure, Elliott is an evangelical Christian and his biblical analysis is 
certainly not meant to lead to scriptural correlations, and much less to equivalencies 
with the Mormon tradition.  Yet, what primarily emerges from his work is a well-
focused exegesis of the biblical text, with which the Saints would find no significant 
theological reason to argue.  Still, in this context of wide agreement there are at least 
two main differences which distinguish our studies.  In the first place, although both 
works involve theological examinations with psychological foundations Elliott uses a 
method of linguistic and cultural-historical analysis (or criticism) to examine his texts, 
which is not present in my study.  Instead, as I later explain in greater detail, my 
approach to Mormon scriptures involves a formalist hermeneutical method which limits 
the analysis to the English text rather than to a wider linguistic background that 
includes both Hebrew and Greek etymologies of emotion-related words.  Indeed, given 
the particular historical and linguistic nature of the biblical text Elliott’s method is 
appropriate, well-established and even expected for an academic study of this nature.  
On the other hand, the academic study of unique LDS canonical texts has hardly begun, 
is based on mixed linguistic and historical evidence, and usually polarizes believers 
versus non-believers.  Therefore, the desire to maintain methodological consistency is 
another reason for the exclusion of biblical texts from the focus of the present study. 
                                                 
16 Elliott (2005).  See reviews in Johnson (2007), 166-67 and Mclarty (2008), 261-63. 
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A second difference between Faithful Feelings and the present work is found in 
the distinct ways in which they each emphasize the role of cognition in emotional 
phenomena.  In fact, one of Elliott’s main purposes is to demonstrate that the sacred 
text, and particularly the New Testament, supports an understanding of emotion where 
cognition holds primacy over sensation.  I, instead, depart somewhat from Elliott’s 
view and prefer to make a less remarkable argument in terms of the necessity of 
cognition in emotional processes where such necessity does not unavoidably precede or 
singly cause its accompanying affective manifestations.  What motivates the more 
limited nature of my perspective is the recognition that the current evidence from the 
social-scientific study of emotion is more complex than Elliott believes; thus, in my 
opinion, his strong conclusion about the cognitive primacy of emotions is slightly 
premature.  Still, Elliott generally moves in the right direction and my distinctive 
emphasis on personal responsibility and developmental instrumentality of emotions 
further aims to strengthen and to widen his and my argument on the centrality of 
cognition.    
Therefore, although other minor differences in purpose and focus of analysis 
contribute to make both Elliott’s and my contributions unique, it may be apparent why I 
consider our studies as mostly complementary, at least for my objectives.  Then, given 
its significance for my work and before proceeding with my own analysis of Mormon 
theology, a brief outline of Faithful Feelings’ structure is in order.  The volume begins 
with an introductory presentation of Elliott’s explicit aim to demonstrate through his 
study that the authors of the New Testament held a basic understanding of emotions 
which recognized, however implicitly, their inherent cognitive and in large part positive 
nature.  Consequently, he advocates greater attention to this fact for further theological 
developments in New Testament studies, which he sees as still excessively tied to non-
cognitivist and overall negative perspectives on emotions.  He then begins his analysis 
proper by presenting the debate between cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of 
emotions and firmly sides with the cognitivists while providing scientific and 
philosophical reasons for doing so.  Subsequently, his analysis takes a historical step 
backwards as he sets out to explore the ancient world of the Bible in specific reference 
to its perspectives on emotions 
 Elliott’s examination is first grounded in a close and focused analysis of Greco-
Roman and of Jewish thought about emotional phenomena.  He outlines the often 
conflicting perspectives on the topic which existed in these ancient cultural contexts but 
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argues that the Hebrew Bible stresses the integration of feeling and thinking.  By 
analysing several Hebrew words the Old Testament uses to identify emotions and by 
exploring their textual and theological contexts he lays a foundation that functions as a 
background for his subsequent New Testament examination.  For example, he places 
emphasis on the strongly anthropomorphic view of an emotional God in the Hebrew 
Bible and explores the meaning of such terms as ‘heart’, or the Hebrew lēb, which 
corresponds to the Greek ‘kardia.  Following his extensive textual and cultural review 
he concludes that the Old Testament “has a strong place for healthy emotion in its faith 
and in the lives of its characters,” particularly when compared to the views espoused by 
Jewish writers like Philo, Josephus, or the author of 4 Maccabees, who had been 
strongly influenced by Stoic conceptualizations of emotions.  Then, in his transition to 
the bulk of his analysis he observes that “it is clear that the New Testament takes its 
lead from the Old Testament.”17 
 Subsequently Elliott moves to a careful and extensive examination of the 
emotion-related content in the New Testament as he focuses on a variety of its emotion-
identifying words.  He begins by paying particular attention to the contexts and uses of 
those terms associated with positive emotions such as love, joy, and hope.  Then, he 
proceeds to examine the textual framework of those emotions which are normally 
judged to be negative, namely jealousy, fear, sorrow, and anger.  In the final chapter of 
his book he summarizes his findings in the following conclusions, 
It is clear that the New Testament authors generally write about emotion from a cognitive 
perspective.  This is not to say that there was a well informed theory of emotions behind the 
writings but it is to say that a cognitive view was assumed.  We see this cognitive framework in 
many areas: 1. Emotion is freely and frequently commanded in the text, 2. In some instances 
particular emotions for particular reasons are prohibited, 3. People are held responsible for how 
they feel and judgments are made about a particular emotion in a particular circumstance being 
right or wrong, 4. Emotions are seen as a genuine indicator of the righteousness of morality of 
those who profess belief (or if they really believe), 5. Emotions are regularly linked with 
thinking and beliefs, 6. Emotions in the text have objects, either stated or implied, 7. Emotions 
are morally neutral and they may be righteous or wicked depending on their object, 8. God has 
emotions that are felt for good reasons, 9. To change a person’s objectionable emotions the 
solution offered is often to change thinking, 10. Love is the predominate emotion and often 
motivates other feelings.  We can also see a cognitive emphasis in the unity of meaning between 
emotions in different contexts.18 
 
In short, it is only by understanding emotions in light of a cognitive framework that a 
proper biblical theology of emotions may be constructed. 
                                                 
17 Elliott (2005), 242. 
18 Ibid., 237. 
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As already suggested, an LDS exegetical perspective would largely concur with 
Elliott’s affirmations, although, to my knowledge, no similar emotion-focused 
examination of the biblical record has ever been conducted in the Mormon theological 
setting.   Still, I aim to provide at least indirect support for this stated conclusion of 
agreement through larger evidence from other LDS canonical texts and from the 
general framework of Mormon cosmology and soteriology.  In fact, and as I am about 
to outline, since Mormon theology and its distinct scriptures match the general portrait 
of emotion drawn by Elliott it is likely at worse and obvious at best that a Mormon 
understanding of the biblical record would similarly fit within this particular 
conceptualization of emotional phenomena.  Indeed, the objective of the rest of this 
endeavour is to underline the extent to which Mormon scriptures can be judged to 
warrant this perspective. 
 
Exploring Emotions in Unique Mormon Scriptures 
 In conducting my examination of the emotion-related content of the BoM, the 
D&C, and of the PoGP, I have chosen to structure my analysis in an order which is 
different from Elliott’s.  Where his examination sequentially orders positive emotions 
first and negative emotions then I have decided to make use of a classification which is 
somewhat more qualitative than evaluative.  Indeed, as explained at the conclusion of 
chapter two, I have distinguished between three ‘categories’ of emotions within which I 
have selected two prototypical and usually opposite forms of their manifestation.  Then, 
the predicting, the assessing, and the relating emotions, in this exact order, are the 
three emotional categories I am about to examine and the pairs of emotions within each 
of these categories on which I focus my attention are respectively hope/fear, 
joy/sorrow, and love/hatred.   
 To be sure, all these categories of emotion describe a particular ‘relation’ of the 
subject to the object, whether the latter is a human or an inanimate object.  
Furthermore, it is also of interest that each ‘kind’ of emotion is expressed in a usually 
fixed ‘relation’ to time which varies from one category to the next.  For example, the 
first unit of classification, the predicting emotions of hope and fear, highlights the 
individual’s condition relative to his expectations, i.e. his relation with or about the 
more or less imminent future.  It may also relate to the individual’s stand in relation to 
the unknown present as it occurs away from the person’s direct experience.  Instead, the 
assessing emotions of joy and sorrow infer a condition in which the individual looks 
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backwards rather than forwards.  This category of emotion expresses the potential 
manifestations of a relation with or about the past and with or about the present as 
perceived by the individual.  Therefore, although the third spectrum of relating 
emotions, as manifested in love and hatred, explicitly and visibly highlights the 
emotional possibilities in the relation toward objects, individuals, or groups, all 
emotions are in some degree ‘relational’.  Indeed, it is their relationality which makes 
them humanly significant. 19   
Moreover, it appears that my specific order of classification may also be viewed 
as a hierarchy in the degree of interpersonal relationality, real or perceived, which each 
‘kind’ of emotion is expressing.  Thus, the predicting emotions function as the least 
relational of the three selected categories since hope or fear may emerge within the 
individual in relation to his own expectations and regardless of personal interaction.  
Then, the assessing emotions follow with a higher degree of relationality whereas the 
apex of inter-relational emotions is certainly to be found in the relating emotions of 
love and hatred.  In this context, given the significance of relationality for both socio-
scientific understanding of emotions and LDS theology I found the focus and fluidity 
with which I could bring relationality to the forefront to be a significant advantage of 
this particular classifying model.  Furthermore, this manner of classification has the 
advantage of highlighting the role of cognition.  Thus, although love and hatred may 
‘feel’ utterly different, my schema underlines a core similarity in their nature since they 
both involve an intense response to a highly engaging interpersonal exchange.  Indeed, 
what primarily distinguishes the two opposite ends of this particular emotional 
spectrum is the distinctive content of their cognitive dynamics, which flavours the 
experienced emotional relation in either a positive or a negative direction.   
Finally, I need to highlight a few details in the context of my specific 
methodology for engaging non-Biblical LDS scriptural texts.  As previously indicated, 
my focus is limited to those terms which are explicitly signifying the six emotional 
manifestations selected for my examination.  In other words, a scriptural verse or 
pericope is incorporated in my analysis only if it contains one of the emotion terms 
included in my original classification, one of its obvious synonyms, or one of its 
                                                 
19 It should be understood that such emotional categorizations are not to be seen as tight 
phenomenological compartments.  In fact, as outlined in chapter two and as will become further evident 
throughout this work emotional phenomena intersect and interact in complex and unavoidable ways.  It 
follows, for example, that one’s degree of hope will be interconnected to one’s level of joy and 
happiness, as well as to one’s ability and willingness to extend and express love. 
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closely related words.  This task is facilitated by the existence of an online resource at 
scriptures.lds.org where, upon entering a specific word or sentence, the user is able to 
search each canonical work to identify all those verses which contain a particular term.  
This word-focused approach has the advantages of facilitating the order and precision 
with which the work can be carried out.  At the same time it is an undeniable fact that 
the emotional content of a text is not always clearly highlighted by emotional 
vocabulary.  Therefore, my analysis is lacking in those contexts where explicit emotion 
terms are not present within the text and where emotional content is only evinced 
implicitly.20  Yet, since my objective centres on the development of a representative 
survey rather than on the exhaustive outlining of all textual evidences of emotions this 
limitation is not ultimately incapacitating. 
In this context a question about the criteria which characterizes the necessary 
selectivity of my analysis is also likely to emerge.  Since it is impossible to explore 
with detail every single scriptural verse, which contains one of the emotion terms under 
examination, it is natural to enquire about what motivated my particular selection of the 
texts that appear in the following pages.  I can summarize my response in two terms, 
namely transparency and relevance.  In the first place I have attempted to highlight 
those scriptural passages which, in their reference to emotion, appear as more explicit 
than obscure.  Moreover, I have chosen to focus on narratives and pericopes which are 
most commonly quoted and made use of in LDS sermons, lessons, and theological 
discussions.  Of course, some degree of arbitrariness is unavoidable in this context but 
my examination of the whole canon leads me to conclude that the textual evidence in 
its totality is overwhelmingly clear.  In other words, a different composition of the texts 
highlighted in this survey could potentially only diminish the scope of the argument 
rather than succeeding in fully invalidating it.  Still, I recognize I am not able to prove 
to the reader that my scriptural selection is truly representative and not skewed in the 
direction of my argument; hence, my work invites this kind of evaluation and thus 
remains subject to the potential criticism of those who would have advocated a 
different selection. 
Finally, all textual and especially canonical analyses involve particular 
hermeneutical assumptions which need to be explicitly addressed.  As already 
indicated, and as much as it is possible, the present study attempts to bracket out all 
                                                 
20 Elliott uses the parable of the Good Samaritan as a primary example of an emotion-filled narrative 
which is not expressed in emotion-focused terms.  Elliott (2005), 125-127. 
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those divisive questions which pertain to the origin and nature of Mormon scriptures 
and which could represent a distraction for the analytical purposes at hand.  Thus, I am 
only concerned with the English text and more specifically with the latest English 
edition of the LDS scriptures, dating to 1979.  In other words, I want to examine the 
text as it appears today, and in so doing I take a formalist approach. By employing this 
hermeneutical method I want to highlight my concern with the text as a literary 
construct, and particularly with its embodiment of a particular attitude toward emotion, 
which is of theological significance for the LDS religious community.  It is this attitude 
that is central for my present purposes and which emerges from the text’s own claims, 
regardless of authorship’s attributions to a transcendent deity, a pre-Columbian 
prophet, or to a nineteenth century American.  Therefore, the text’s own assumptions 
are also my own and its ‘voice’ at face value is sufficient evidence for my examination 
and arguments. 
 
Hope: the Positive Predicting Experience 
  The word hope, the closely synonymous looking forward, and their various 
grammatical derivatives appear in at least 53 verses of the Mormon canon21.  Among 
the emotions selected for my examination hope is undoubtedly the most ‘cognitive’ of 
the group since it is commonly perceived, correctly I suppose, to be less intensely 
‘affective’ than other emotions like joy or love.  Yet, few if any would question the 
reality of its affective nature and consequently its classification as a proper emotion.  
As I analyse hope within LDS scriptural texts it will become apparent that I separate 
my selected examples of its usage into three groups, which correspond to the three 
defining characteristics of emotion previously highlighted.  In this context I need to 
underline that although I have judged each selected usage to fit primarily into one of 
these categories, most uses are good examples of all three.  In fact, cognitive necessity, 
personal responsibility, and developmental instrumentality are intersecting 
characteristics which should not be viewed as tight compartmental classifications.  Still, 
for the sake of organizational clarity, I have chosen to highlight one descriptive 
component over another in each scriptural selection that relates to the specific emotion 
I am examining. 
                                                 
21 When identifying the number of words in the ‘Mormon canon’ I should more properly make reference 
to the Mormon non-biblical canon because, as stated, the Bible has not been included in this search.  Yet 
to avoid the cumbersome expression ‘non-biblical Mormon canon’ I use canon in these contexts to refer 
more specifically to the unique Mormon canon, i.e. the BoM, the D&C, and the PoGP.  
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 A complicating factor in the canonical analysis of hope is found in its close 
theological and semantic relationship to faith, which makes any attempt to distinguish 
between the two inherently problematic.  In fact, hope and faith seem at times to be 
used synonymously whereas in other instances it is possible to identify finer 
distinctions between them, whether of a sequential or of a componential nature.  Thus, 
some passages emphasise the need of hope for the development of faith while many 
others stress the exact opposite relationship.  Furthermore, it is debatable whether hope 
ought to be considered a constitutive element of faith or whether faith should be 
understood to represent a particular kind of hope.  In any case, others have conducted 
careful theological examinations of the relationship between these closely related 
concepts, which I need not presently rehearse.22  Certainly, a fuller exploration of 
positive predicting emotions would necessarily include an analysis of all the textual 
appearances of faith.  However, given the present limitations, I must restrict my focus 
to the use of the term hope although faith unavoidably and regularly appears in some of 
the same contexts. 
 
Cognitive Necessity      
 Even when one accounts for the complicating similarities between faith and 
hope the evidence for the necessity of ‘cognition’ in the Mormon scriptural uses of 
hope is pervasive and straightforward.  In fact, both hope and faith inevitably appear in 
contexts which underline their cognitive foundation.  As a primary example we may 
look at what is perhaps the most explicit theological discussion of hope in LDS 
scriptures which Moroni, the last BoM prophet, presents when reporting on his father’s 
teachings about the relationship between hope, faith, and charity.  In one of the most 
‘Pauline’ passages within the BoM Mormon initially stresses the dual directionality 
between faith and hope by first asking rhetorically, “How is it that ye can attain unto 
faith, save ye shall have hope?” and then by stating that “without faith there cannot be 
any hope.”  Yet, he also approaches the subject with greater clarity as he distinguishes 
between them in terms of the unique focus or object, which hope and faith respectively 
involve.  Faith is to be focused on an individual, “in Christ”, whereas hope expresses 
itself for a future condition, namely “eternal life.” 23  Consequently, hope has a 
                                                 
22 See Bunyan (1968). 
23 Moro. 7:39-42. Eternal life is one of hope’s most commonly identified objects.  Moroni writes of 
eternal life as “a more excellent hope”, whereas in another passage he writes of a more general “hope in 
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constitutive propositional object, which must have been acquired and retained 
cognitively by the individual prior to the emergence of the emotion.  In other words, 
there could be no hope in a particular future condition or in any other propositional 
object had not the conceptualization of that possibility first formed itself within one’s 
cognition. 
Furthermore, in a separate section of the book, Moroni highlights faith’s 
primacy in its relationship with hope by emphasizing faith’s role in activating the 
‘rational ground’, which justifies one’s hope: 
 But because of the faith of men he has shown himself unto the world, and glorified the name of 
the Father, and prepared a way that thereby others might be partakers of the heavenly gift, that 
they might hope for those things which they have not seen.  Wherefore, ye may also have hope, 
and be partakers of the gift, if ye will but have faith.24  
 
In other words, it was the faith of past believers, which contributed to the actualization 
of the earthly mission of Jesus Christ.  In turn, His observable life and Atonement 
provides a rational ground for the salvific hope of both present and future conditions.  
Therefore, hope is grounded in evidence, which is sufficiently convincing, for the 
believer at least, to allow hope to emerge.  In the context of the BoM the convincing 
evidence is gathered to a large extent from the revelations of the prophets about the 
mission of Christ, which is yet to come.  Thus, Nephi, one of the central prophetic 
figures in the BoM, quotes Isaiah extensively with the expressed purpose of enabling 
his readers to “have hope” when hearing his Messianic witness.  Later, Nephi’s 
younger brother Jacob confirms the significance and effectiveness of all prophetic 
writings by stating that “having all these witnesses we obtain a hope.”25 
It is also significant that the contexts in which the BoM usually highlights hope 
are illustrative of conversion circumstances.  In these instances the acquisition of a new 
hope is usually interlinked with all the new perceptions, knowledge, and commitments, 
which ground its very causal foundations.  For example, the prophet Alma reminds the 
people of Zarahemla about the spiritual circumstances surrounding their ancestors’ 
conversion at a place called “the waters of Mormon”.  In this context he asks his 
audience a question which he himself will answer, “What grounds had they to hope for 
salvation?”  Then, in speaking about his father Alma, who had been the leader of that 
converted group, he asks rhetorically “did not my father Alma believe in the words 
                                                                                                                                              
a better world.” (Ether 12:32,4.  Also see Alma 13:29.)  In another example Jacob writes of “a good hope 
of glory.” (Jacob 4:11) 
24 Ether 12:8-9.  See also Ether 12:4,6. 
25 1 Ne. 19:24, Jacob 4:4-6. 
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which were delivered by the mouth of Abinadi?  And was he not a holy prophet?”  In 
fact, Alma continues, “according to his faith there was a mighty change wrought in his 
heart.”  Whether this change followed, culminated in or included the acquisition of a 
hope for salvation the ground for the Elder Alma’s and his followers’ newly obtained 
hope is clearly rooted in their new beliefs.26 
 On the other hand, some of the strongest evidences for the ‘cognitive necessity’ 
of hope within LDS scriptures are found in those passages, which are critical of those 
hopes that are based on supposedly distorted perceptions.  The debate between the non-
believer Korihor and the prophet Alma is illustrative in this regard.  Reportedly in the 
year 74 B.C.E. Korihor is preaching to those people who believe in Christ’s future 
coming in these terms, “O ye that are bound down under a foolish and a vain hope, why 
do ye yoke yourselves with such foolish things?  Why do ye look for a Christ?”  In the 
same context Korihor also describes the believers’ hope in the remission of their sins as 
“the effect of a frenzied mind.”27  In the debate between Korihor and Alma which 
ensues the prophet responds to these very questions by providing evidence for the 
people’s hope which is also his own.  Thus, he asks, 
 And now what evidence have ye that there is no God, or that Christ cometh not?  I say unto you 
 that ye have none, save it be your word only.  But, behold, I have all things as a testimony that 
 these things are true; and ye also have all things as a testimony unto you that they are true.28 
 
As is apparent, a proper justification for hope is intricately dependent on the nature of 
one’s beliefs.   
In turn, belief is just as intricately connected with one’s desires, as both Alma 
and Mormon highlight in separate contexts.  In underlining the necessity of charity 
Mormon affirms that a person “cannot have faith and hope, save he shall be meek, and 
lowly of heart.”29  Alma, on the other hand, makes a unique contribution in describing 
both the nature of faith and the dynamics of its growth in what appears as the most 
developed treatise on faith within the BoM.  In addressing a group of poor people who 
had been “cast out” of their places of worship because of their poverty Alma first 
defines faith by stating that “if ye have faith ye hope for things which are not seen, 
                                                 
26 Alma 5:10-12.  The change seems to have followed sequentially the acquisition of belief; yet, as many 
other texts imply, the ‘affective’ change also intervenes in the opposite direction to immediately 
strengthen that initial faith and transforms it into a heavenly hope.  Therefore, in a sense, cognition and 
feeling may be said to coexist in the experience of hope, just like they coexist in the experience of any 
emotion.  Parenthetically, the emphasis in this passage is on the constitutive role of faith for the 
development of soteriological hope. 
27 Alma 30:13,16. 
28 Alma 30:40-41. 
29 Moro. 7:43. 
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which are true.”  He also prefaces this definition by distinguishing faith from “perfect 
knowledge”, thus clearly suggesting that faith involves a kind of knowledge, although 
not a perfect one.  The logical conclusion is the following: if faith is both a kind of 
hope as well as a kind of knowledge, then ‘faithful’ hope, or the hope which involves 
faith, is itself a kind of knowledge.  For Alma then, there is no such thing as a 
knowledge-free hope.30 
Of course, in the LDS canon there are many other supporting examples of the 
necessary cognitive nature of hope, which explicitly identify both its grounds and its 
objects.31  In this context it is interesting to note that the word ‘hopeful’ never appears 
in the text, which underlines the fact that LDS scripture does not directly address the 
more generalized mood of hope.  I suppose that one reason for this lacuna centres in the 
recognition that the condition of ‘hopefulness’ is usually constitutive of a state of 
happiness.  Then, given its wider-ranging affective scope, happiness is bound to receive 
greater textual attention than one of its components, as chapter four will further 
demonstrate.  Still, in connection with my cognitive emphasis, it may be argued that 
even a mood of hopefulness requires a foundation of particular beliefs and an implied 
object through which it may be more easily recognized.   
 
Personal Responsibility 
 Within Mormon scripture personal responsibility is repeatedly associated with 
the presence or absence of hope.  In fact, hope is mentioned alongside faith and charity 
when God or his prophets specifically command the people to possess these very 
attributes.32  In any case, even when not specifically identified in those other canonical 
imperatives which focus exclusively on the need for faith, it is likely that hope should 
be included as an inherent part of the process of faith, given the significant conceptual 
affinity highlighted in the previous section.33  Still, there are a few passages that 
specifically focus on hope and on the personal responsibility inherent in trying to 
acquire it or to maintain it.  One of these passages appears in one of the most well-
                                                 
30 Alma 32:21.  In an earlier passage Alma further implies that hope is a weaker form of knowledge or 
that it is not equivalent to proper knowledge when, in speaking about the righteous who had died in 
battle: “While many thousands of others truly mourn...yet they rejoice and exult in the hope, and even 
know...that they are raised to dwell at the right hand of God.” (Alma 28:12) 
31 In other examples Moroni writes “…the hope of his glory and of eternal life rest in your mind forever.” 
(Moro. 9:25)  Several other passages focus on distinctive cognitive or perceptive contents of hope (D&C 
138:14; 2 Ne. 25:24,27). 
32 Alma 7:24, D&C 6:19. 
33 Hel 5:41, Moro. 7:34. 
 131 
 
known sections in the BoM which deals with the subject of endurance.  Specifically, it 
is included in the speech given by the prophet Nephi which begins with a focus on the 
soteriological necessity of baptism.  In answering the question of what must follow an 
individual’s submission to this ordinance, what he calls the “entrance at the gate”, 
Nephi states: “Wherefore, ye must press forward with a steadfastness in Christ, having 
a perfect brightness of hope…”34  Furthermore, other passages command people to 
“look forward”, usually to the coming of Christ, an act that may be understood in terms 
of a cognitive attitude, which is both causative and constitutive of its associated hope.35   
Several examples of misguided hope are also highlighted in the BoM, such as 
Sherem’s hope to shake Jacob’s faith in Christ, or Amalickiah’s evil desires and hopes 
to deceitfully dethrone the Lamanite king.36  In these instances of misguided hope the 
text is more or less explicit in the condemnation of these individuals, a point based on 
the implied understanding that such negative developments could have been avoided 
through mental and spiritual efforts exercised in the right direction.  In other words, the 
principle of agency appears with prominence in relation to the acquisition of hope, 
although the focus of responsibility ultimately seems to be rooted in the nature of one’s 
desires rather than in the correctness or incorrectness of one’s beliefs.  In fact, other 
BoM passages emphasize the issue of availability of truthful information and the 
associated justice of God when they highlight the reason for some of the Lamanites’ 
unbelief.  When the misguided hope or the absence of proper hope is due to the 
unavailability of correct teachings from both parents and community God issues no 
personal condemnation.37 
Still, in relation to the acquisition of hope the text indicates that individuals are 
generally responsible for the actions and mental attitudes which will activate it.  For 
example, while living as a missionary among the yet unconverted and mostly wicked 
Lamanite people Aaron teaches the Lamanite king the manner to obtain the hope of 
salvation that he desires.  He states, “If thou wilt bow down before the God, yea, if thou 
wilt repent of all thy sins, and will bow down before God, and call on his name in faith, 
believing that ye shall receive, then shalt thou receive the hope which thou desirest.”38  
Clearly, hope appears in this context as a divine gift to be “received”.  At the same 
                                                 
34 2 Ne 31:20. 
35 Jarom 1:11, Mosiah 18:21. 
36 Jacob 7:5, Alma 47:4. 
37 Alma 9:16-17. 
38 Alma 22:16. 
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time, in a pattern which repeatedly surfaces within Mormon scriptures, this gift requires 
the manifestation of a desire for its reception as materialized in proper actions and in 
correct mental attitudes.  In fact, LDS texts stress that hope must be correctly directed, 
namely that it must be focused on the right objects and propositions.  They also 
emphasize that different kinds of hope need to be properly ordered, a point clearly 
highlighted by Jacob when he asserts that, prior to the acquisition of riches, one should 
“have obtained a hope in Christ.”39   
 Before concluding this section I should briefly recognize that the association of 
hope/faith to virtue gives rise to some philosophical difficulties, as exemplified by the 
famous James/Clifford debate on the will/ethics of belief.  Placing pre-eminence on 
cognition and volition, as I have just attempted, does not circumvent the problem but 
rather highlights particular questions, such as the implied infinite regression between 
will, as a commitment to believe or to hope, and desires, or the positive/negative 
propensities which are experienced ‘spontaneously’ in relation to the object at hand.  In 
fact, if on the one hand will shapes desires and on the other hand, at least to some 
extent, will is an expression of desires, where does the circle begin?  Far from being 
able to provide an exhaustive response in this setting I would suggest at least one 
possible LDS theological response with two areas of emphases.  On the one hand in 
denying the significance of a first cause Mormonism can shift the ground of 
responsibility from the origin to the process as it emphasizes the dynamic reciprocal 
relationship between will and desires rather than the original causes of a fixed 
beginning.  On the other hand, and in line with the Roberts’ theory of intelligences, 
Mormonism may still be able to recognize the will as the primary feature of an 
independent eternal individuality which is fixed in substance but whose exact nature 
remains in-process through its constant interactions, whether of a mediating or of a 
surrendering kind, with malleable desires.  Yet, the degree to which these 
conceptualizations will be satisfactory in their details remains a question for a separate 
occasion. 
 
Developmental Instrumentality 
 Mormon scripture also addresses the way in which hope in salvation, 
resurrection, or forgiveness of sins may be preserved in the difficult context of life’s 
                                                 
39 Jacob 2:17. 
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daily challenges.  Although not explicitly stated, these texts imply that maintaining 
hope is so obviously desirable that the point has no need of convincing argumentation.  
In fact, it is certainly widely recognized that hope is functional for the healthy and the 
happy life, although both religious and popular cultures often do not specifically 
delineate the reasons that lie behind such an undoubtedly truthful conclusion.  Yet, the 
prophet Mormon underlines the presentness of hope’s functionality when he clarifies 
that “the rest of the Lord”, which can be obtained by those “that have obtained a 
sufficient hope”, precedes the time of “rest with him in heaven.”40  Therefore, the 
presence of hope is central to the acquisition of some form of serenity (rest), which is 
not to await the postponed reception of the gift of eternal life.  This close relationship 
between hope, motivation, and well-being is also supported by scientific experiments 
although the connection would probably be sufficiently self-evident even in their 
absence.41 
Yet, other aspects of hope’s developmental instrumentality are not as obvious.  
One such example of significance is found in hope’s epistemic utility as manifested in 
both processes of self-discovery and social discovery.  In fact, the presence or absence 
of a particular form of hope often elucidates those cognitive processes which otherwise 
would remain obscure because lying below the surface of our awareness.  Thus, 
according to the BoM, the recognition of a generalized lack of hope within ourselves 
teaches us that we need to repent.  In fact, Moroni claims that if there is no hope, “ye 
must needs be in despair; and despair cometh because of iniquity.”42  Clearly, the 
implication is that the presence or absence of hope has moral implications, namely that 
the righteous individual is obviously a hopeful person whereas sustained hopelessness 
is generally indicative of serious spiritual problems that need our attention.  Indeed, as 
will be seen shortly, Mormon texts do not significantly depart from the biblical 
message in their emphasis on the necessary association between hopefulness and the 
Holy Spirit with its accompanying manifestations of comfort and enlightenment which 
are reserved for the blessed. 
Furthermore, the LDS canon stresses that hopes rooted in wicked objectives 
will be ultimately disappointed, thus highlighting condemnation and need of repentance 
                                                 
40 Moro. 7:3. 
41 In ‘hope theory’ motivation appears as an essential component of hope.  See Snyder, et al. (2005), 101-
18.  For studies on the physiological and psychological benefits of hope see Cheavens, et al. (2005), 119-
32. 
42 Moro. 10:22. 
 134 
 
for the holder of the distorted hope.  Hence, God states in the D&C that the punishment 
for the enemies of the Prophet will involve the abrupt end of their misplaced hopes.  In 
fact, “their hope shall be blasted”, and consequently “they may be disappointed also, 
and their hopes may be cut off.”43  On the other hand, the presence of hope with the 
right object in focus is prima facie evidence that we possess the kinds of beliefs God 
wants us to possess.44  Moreover, a strong hope in God’s promises indicates that we are 
on a path of spiritual progression.  In the LDS canon the clearest example of this kind is 
found in the account of the converted Lamanites of Anti-Nephi-Lehi, who had 
developed such hope in the resurrection that “they never did look upon death with any 
degree of terror”. 45  The depth of their hope was confirmed by their decision to allow 
their enemies to kill them rather than risking their own salvation in the process of 
shedding human blood for self-defense.  In turn, this eschatological fear is 
contextualized in a pre-conversion experience characterized by their commission of 
many murders.  In this particular instance the evidence points to a unity of feeling, 
cognition, and behaviour, where each is acting in reinforcement and confirmation of the 
other.  Therefore, the manifestation of hope in behaviour, i.e. the willingness to 
sacrifice one’s life, points to a deeply embedded expectation of resurrection, which in 
its solidity represents the ideal depth of the salvific hope that emerges from LDS 
scripture. 
Indeed, in order to be truly functional in life hope must necessarily endure 
beyond occasional or irregular appearances.  It is only “firm hope” which will allow us 
to “have patience, and bear with…afflictions.”  Nephi uses different words but 
expresses the same concept when he invites us to “look forward with steadfastness,” a 
process which involves “having a perfect brightness of hope.” 46  In turn, only this kind 
of hope will lead the individual to the spiritual progression made possible by the 
process of justification of one’s sins which further activates personal sanctification.  In 
fact, in one description of righteousness within the BoM, true converts are described as 
“looking forward to that day (Christ’s coming), thus retaining a remission of their sins; 
being filled with great joy because of the resurrection of the dead.”  In other words, 
there is probably no greater obstacle to personal progression than sin, and the 
endurance of hope is a key factor, which allows the process of forgiveness to occur on a 
                                                 
43 D&C 121:11,14. 
44 Alma 7:6. 
45 Alma 27:28. 
46 Alma 34:41; 2 Ne. 26:8; 31:20. 
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regular basis.47 In this manner the individual is permitted to overcome, at least in some 
degree, the stifling effect of sin, which otherwise would impede personal progression or 
the experience of true spiritual development.  Yet, as I am about to explore, it is not just 
any form of hope that will make this process possible, but only that hope which is 
deeply focused on the Atonement and on its promises. 
 
Hope and the Atonement  
Mormon scripture describe the Atonement both as the object of one’s hope as 
well as the foundation for all hope.48  In fact, BoM prophet Jacob makes a brief but 
straightforward statement that captures the hypothetically tragic and universal 
consequences in the imaginary absence of the event: “if there should be no atonement 
made all mankind must be lost.”49  In other words, it is the reality of the Atonement that 
makes any hope a potential reality and without which any hope for happiness or 
immortality would necessarily dissipate as an illusionary dream.  Then, if all hopes are 
sustained and given purpose by the reality of the Atonement the specific promises of 
the Atonement should be found at the very centre of all our hopes.  In such a position of 
prominence a personal hope in those promises made possible by the Atonement, which 
focus on the possibility of forgiveness and on the reality of the final resurrection, give 
order to all other wishes and desires as manifested in various forms of hope.  
Furthermore, this ultimate hope contextualizes all other hopes into a larger eternal 
perspective of existence centred on Christ’s Atonement. 
Yet, the LDS canon possibly suggests that there is a more direct way in which 
the Atonement activates hope.  In other words, the Atonement does not only function as 
hope’s direct object for the internal hope-producing cognitions of the individual but it 
also acts as the external source which directly transmits the emotion ‘supernaturally’ to 
its beneficiaries as the instrument that ultimately makes all spiritual ‘gifts’ possible50.  
These are two separate yet related ways in which the Atonement is spoken of within the 
                                                 
47 Alma 4:14. 
48 The repeated description of faith as the necessary instrument that leads to hope is usually based on the 
assumption that such faith is focused in the person of Jesus Christ and in the promises of His Atonement.  
See Moro. 7:41; Alma 25:16. 
49 Jacob 7:12. 
50 As already suggested, given the heavy emphasis on personal responsibility, which characterizes 
Mormon theological perspectives, the term ‘gift’ should not to be understood in the context of complete 
absence of effort but rather in association with significant efforts which are yet inevitably 
incommensurate to the nature of the received ‘gift’.  For this reason the blessing remains a ‘gift’ because 
the inherent inadequacy of the effort excludes the possibility of using ‘earning’ terminology. 
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LDS theological context, and, as described in the previous chapter, its second function 
often appears as largely interchangeable with descriptions of the power of the Holy 
Spirit.  To be sure, no Mormon scripture specifically identifies a spiritual ‘gift of hope’, 
but undoubtedly the role of the Holy Spirit is in most instances implied if not explicitly 
recognized when hope is transmitted in forms of divine-human communication.  What 
remains unclear is the extent to which hope emerges in consequence of the spiritual 
experience or whether it is constitutive of the same. 
On the one hand the Mormon canon provides good evidence for the acquisition 
of hope in consequence of divine communication or intervention.  In relation to the 
attribute of cognitive necessity, which is being highlighted in this work, it is 
particularly relevant to underline those examples of heavenly manifestations, which 
involve the conveyance of ‘hope-filled’ information.  For example, in one particular 
instance Joseph Smith listed the heavenly beings with whom he had come into contact 
throughout his life, and in the same context he highlighted that they were “all declaring 
their dispensation, their rights, their keys, their honors, their majesty and glory, and the 
power of their priesthood; giving line upon line, precept upon precept…confirming our 
hope!”51  Then, it appears that the content of the divine message as heard and processed 
by both the Prophet and his followers was central to the strengthening of their hope.   
On the other hand the more common context of response to prayer in the 
absence of a heavenly vision is somewhat more ambiguous in relation to the exact 
timing and the manner of acquisition of hope.  Although within the present work the 
examination of the spiritual dynamics of this kind of interventions can only be sketched 
the existing evidence points to the possibility that the reception of hope as a spiritual 
gift may take place as a mainly external form of emotional transfer.  In psychological 
terms this translates to a pre-reflective experience of hope which is largely co-occurrent 
to the spiritual manifestation at stake.  The BoM war epistle sent from Helaman, a 
prominent Nephite commander, to captain Moroni, a fellow military leader (who 
should not be confused with the last BoM prophet), is indicative of these possible 
dynamics as the author describes the manner in which fears of defeat and destruction 
were changed into hope through his and his soldiers’ prayers of faith: 
Yea, and it came to pass that the Lord our God did visit us with assurances that he would deliver 
us; yea, insomuch that he did speak peace to our souls, and did grant unto us great faith, and did 
cause us that we should hope for our deliverance in him.52  
                                                 
51 D&C 128:21. 
52 Alma 58:11. 
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To be sure, the text is not concerned with analytical descriptions of the spiritual 
dynamics in the process of God’s succouring of His children.  Thus, it is entirely 
possible that the prayerful Helaman and his soldiers consciously interpreted a more 
general positive sensory response in the specific manner that was just described.  In any 
case, it is clear that the author desires to attribute to God the causation for this possible 
cognitive restructuring which led him to first experience fear and then hope.  From the 
phenomenological perspective Helaman simply felt an actual power that was 
transformative of emotion, whether primarily through a potent sensation experience to 
be subsequently interpreted or through a ready-made cognitive/affective infusion of a 
specific and contextualized form of hope.   
Clearly, a psychological description of spiritual experiences is not one of the 
main purposes of LDS scripture.  Therefore, other passages are similarly inconclusive 
and not specific in relation to such dynamics.  For example, it is sufficient for Moroni 
to describe the Holy Ghost as the Comforter, which “filleth with hope and perfect 
love.”53  Yet, although the manner of this replenishing act is not detailed in the text this 
brief exploration of hope has already demonstrated that the Atonement and its 
associated power of the Holy Ghost play a central role in the LDS theological 
framework of emotion, whether in terms of motivation, contextualization, production, 
or regulation.  This conclusion will be confirmed by all successive analyses of emotion 
as they appear in the current examination. 
 
Fear: the Negative Predicting Experience 
 If the desirability of hope is explicit, as is well captured in the thirteenth article 
of faith, LDS canonical references stressing both negative function and undesirable 
manifestations of fear are just as prevalent.54  To be sure, fear is not necessarily the 
exact opposite of hope; in fact, it could rightly be argued that courage represents the 
antonym of fear or that despair is to be located at the exact opposite of hope.  Still, as 
previously indicated, this is not a concern for the kind of conceptual structure I have 
chosen to employ within this textual analysis.  Furthermore, I am aware that fear, 
particularly in the context of godly fear, is in many cases commonly conceptualized as 
                                                 
53 Moro. 8:26. 
54 In a statement emphasizing Mormonism’s comprehensive aspirations to the good and to the true and in 
recognized resonance to Philip. 4:8 this article of faith claims that “we hope all things.”  Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints (1981b), A of F 13, 61. 
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reverence or worship, rather than as dread.  Yet, these contexts are still significant in 
relation to an analysis of this emotion since I assume that some level of fear is indeed 
present within an attitude of either reverence or worship, in line with Rudolf Ottos’ 
classic formula that defines the divine as mysterium tremendum et fascinans.  However, 
these instances of fear are not the main focus of my examination since it is common for 
divine fear to be overshadowed by other more prominent attributes and motivations, 
such as love, and awe. 
The word fear, its synonym dread, or one of their grammatical derivatives 
appears in 182 verses of the Mormon canon.  In many of these passages the authors do 
not associate any specific moral judgment to the occurrences of fear since their aim is 
mainly to outline matter-of-factly those attempted intentional predictions which are 
common to human life in its interpersonal or intergroup relationships.55 Still, many 
other usages of the term are replete with ethical implications, as was also highlighted in 
the prior analysis on the textual appearances of hope.  Furthermore, some passages are 
more descriptive than others in addressing the reasons, manifestations, and 
consequences of the various experiences of fear.  These more useful examples form the 
primary focus of my concern as I proceed to examine the cognitive necessity, personal 
responsibility, and developmental instrumentality in the fear content of LDS canonical 
texts.  
 
Cognitive Necessity 
In many instances of its scriptural usages fear appears to describe a condition of 
cognitive negative anticipation of future events.  For example, in relation to the 
disobedient or to the wicked, the Day of Judgment is repeatedly described in terms of 
the “great and dreadful day of the Lord.”56  In a more specific illustration within the 
PoGP, the portion of Enoch’s vision, which centres on the time that precedes the 
second coming of Christ, includes an image of “great tribulations among the 
wicked…and men’s hearts failing them, looking forth with fear for the judgments of 
the Almighty God.”57  In this and in other instances, the fearful anticipation of what 
may or will occur at a later date is clearly triggered by a cognitive perception of a 
                                                 
55 Many such uses are found in contexts of battle preparation and engagement in the many chapters 
dealing with wars within the BoM.  See Alma 58:15,29,36; 50:28,32; 44:15; 49:17; 51:11; 56:29; 52:29; 
Hel. 4:20; 11:32. 
56 JS-H 1:38, D&C 110:14,16, D&C 128:17, D&C 138:46 and many others. 
57 Moses 7:66.  Other examples include D&C 63:33; 88:91; 45:74; 2 Ne. 12:10,19,21; 2 Ne. 9:46; Jacob 
6:13; Alma 40:14. 
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future dreadful image, whose potential reality is mentally recognized.  Yet, the 
common description of the wicked often involves their failure to admit this very reality; 
hence, when unspecified, the fear of the Day of Judgment is perhaps better framed as a 
description of a future emotional condition at the time of the actual judgment.  Clearly, 
both dimensions easily coexist in those instances where the author expresses a hope 
that people in his audience will be motivated to reform their lives as they contemplate 
with fearful anticipation the dreadful picture of the future Day of Judgment in all its 
future manifestations. 
 In fact, various descriptions of transitions from a disbelieving to a converted 
condition often involve such a stage of dreadful contemplation.  For example, in the 
middle of their conversion process Alma the younger and the sons of Mosiah 
experienced “much anguish of soul because of their iniquities, suffering much and 
fearing that they should be cast off forever.”58  Similarly, the Lamanite king Lamoni, at 
the very early stages of his conversion, is described as fearing “exceedingly, with fear 
lest he had done wrong in slaying his servants” notwithstanding the belief that 
“whatsoever they [the Lamanites] did was right.”59  In these examples it is clear that the 
temporary experience of fear is indicative of a remorseful conscience which, in turn, 
either sets in motion or contributes to the process of conversion.  In the BoM Helaman 
sets out the common sequence of cognition in many of these circumstances by 
highlighting the fact that when unbelievers “saw, they believed, and fear came upon 
them.”60  Therefore, fear can fulfil a positive and important spiritual role which will be 
examined more closely when I highlight fear’s developmental instrumentality.   
 However, it is evident that not all forms of fear are facilitative of repentance.  In 
several instances within the Mormon canon the experience of divine fear is not 
indicative of a complete conversion process.  In these instances fear is rooted in a 
change of beliefs, which falls short, either in quality or in motivating power, of the 
necessary transition that leads to faith.  Nephi provides an example which illustrates the 
point that it is only the right kind of fear which is acceptable to God.  In quoting Isaiah 
Nephi states: “Forasmuch as this people draw near unto me with their mouth, and with 
their lips do honor me, but have removed their hearts far from me, and their fear 
                                                 
58 Mosiah 28:4.  Also see Alma 36:7,11. 
59 Alma 18:5.  Also see 3 Ne. 3:16,25 where it is the fear triggered by Lachoneus’ words which leads to 
repentance. 
60 Hel. 9:5. 
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towards me is taught by the precepts of men-.61  Another example is found in Jacob’s 
account of Sherem, a man who had rebelled against God and who was struck down by 
His power almost to the point of death.  In that moment of crisis Sherem laments: “I 
greatly fear lest my case shall be awful; but I confess unto God.”62  Yet the text implies 
that his confession was not sufficient in the eyes of God, thus possibly suggesting that 
it may have been rooted in superficiality, which was more forced by circumstances than 
by a real and deep desire to do God’s will.63   
In fact, for the purpose of qualifying the emotion as either spiritually desirable 
or undesirable the nature of the motivating volition is as central as the object of the 
fear.  For example, fear clearly does not function as an indicator of contrition when it is 
merely triggered by unwanted evidence which is contrary to one’s beliefs or when it is 
unaccompanied by a process of sincere repentance.  At times even fear which is both 
unforced by circumstances and focused on the right divine object is illustrated as 
emerging from unacceptable cognitive foundations because motivated by sinful desires.  
For example, in recounting a prophecy of the last days the BoM describes many who 
will preach in this manner, “Eat, drink, and be merry; nevertheless, fear God...God will 
beat us with a few stripes, and at last we shall be saved.”  In another context, the 
absence of the fear of death, which in other instances would be considered an indication 
of faith, is attributed instead to the “exceeding...anger” of individuals whom the text 
clearly condemns.  In other words, although physiological manifestations of fear may 
appear as morally indistinguishable, different values and beliefs can give rise to kinds 
of fear of quite opposite spiritual significance.64  Indeed, in manifesting coexisting 
beliefs and wishes fear may possibly emerge as self-conflicting.65 
In addition, the central role of cognition in the experience of fear is illustrated 
by those textual instances in which God invites humans not to be fearful.  In these 
contexts, God provides reasonable foundations, mostly centred in His divine 
omnipotent power, upon which individuals can construct their emotional regulations of 
                                                 
61 2 Ne. 27:25. 
62 Jacob 7:19. 
63 Interestingly accounts of the initial behavioural consequences which follow these unwelcomed turn of 
events, whether culminating in repentance or not, often involve such stark descriptions as “I fell to the 
earth and I did hear no more” or “they were immovable because of the fear.” (Alma 36:11; Hel. 5:34).  
Also see Alma 14:26. 
64 2 Ne. 28:8; Moro. 9:5.  This latter passage can be juxtaposed to a rather opposite description of 
absence of fear of death: “...they did not fear death; and they did think more upon the liberty of their 
fathers than they did upon their lives.” (Alma 56:47)  In yet another setting fear of death becomes an 
opportunity for the manifestation of divine power.  See Alma 17:29. 
65 For an example of conflicting fears see Alma 47:2. 
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distressing anxieties.  In fact, some of the most common motivations provided by the 
divine with the purpose of abating fear include statements or promises like “I the Lord 
am with you,” “God will deliver” or, with specific reference to one’s enemies, “they 
shall not have power,” “they are in mine hands,” and “they are as grass.”66  In many 
instances the assurance clearly does not imply a promise of immediate physical 
protection; instead, the focus is the acquisition of an eternal perspective, which in turn 
can allow the individual to find peace in the face of challenges.  For example, the Lord 
gave the following bitter-sweet message to the suffering Saints in Missouri, “fear not 
even unto death; for in this world your joy is not full, but in me your joy is full.”67  In 
the final analysis, given the evidence for the presence of coping mechanisms of 
cognitive restructuring, for the significance of volition in the emergence of emotion, 
and for the object-related moral evaluation of the experience of fear I conclude that 
cognitive necessity clearly underlies the treatment of fear in LDS canonical texts.  
 
Personal Responsibility 
 The Mormon canon presents extensive evidence that God commands and 
desires humanity to either fear or to fear not, which implies recognition of at least a 
partial degree of human control over emotional phenomena.  Divine commands to fear 
usually specify God Himself as the desired object of the emotion whereas commands 
not to fear centre in human pressures variously expressed in terms of power, strength, 
threats, etc.  To be sure, the extent to which godly fear should be understood as actual 
fear or more properly as worship and reverence has been a subject of discussion among 
theologians.68  The issue is not explicitly addressed in LDS scripture but the text makes 
it explicit that the command to fear God, whatever meaning is attributed to the term 
fear, is of universal applicability.  In fact, as the D&C reports, when God states “I, the 
Lord, am merciful and gracious unto those who fear me” it is clear that godly fear is not 
only for the rebellious to experience.69  The BoM echoes this conclusion by means of 
king Mosiah, who teaches that believers should do all things “in the fear of the Lord”, 
and through Amulek’s teachings, which stress that God’s children should “work out 
[your] salvation with fear before God.”70   
                                                 
66 D&C 68:6; 30:11; Alma 61:21; D&C 136:17,30; 124:7. 
67 D&C 101:36. 
68 A classic treatise on the topic is found in Bunyan (1967). 
69 D&C 76:5. 
70 Mosiah 29:30, Alma 34:37.  See also 3 Ne. 24:16; 25:2. 
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At the same time, when addressed to the rebellious or when expressed 
comparatively in relation to ‘worldly’ fears, the command to fear God is even more 
direct and pointed.  For example, in numerous instances God affirms the inevitability of 
His eschatological judgments for those who have chosen not to heed His counsel.  One 
of the many illustrations is the following D&C verse, whose emotional impact is 
strengthened by the added presence of the verb ‘tremble’, “Wherefore, fear and 
tremble, O ye people, for what I the Lord have decreed…shall be fulfilled.”71  
Furthermore, God commands fear in comparative terms in those texts which point to 
the need to fear Him rather than men or nations.  Isaiah makes this point explicitly in 
the BoM section which quotes him extensively, “A confederacy; neither fear ye their 
fear, nor be afraid.  Sanctify the Lord of Hosts himself, and let him be your fear, and let 
him be your dread.”72  Also captain Moroni, in his angry letter to the highest 
government official of his time, emphasizes a similar point when he describes his 
attitude toward what he perceived as a neglectful government that had abandoned him 
and his men in the middle of a war.  Thus, he writes to Pahoran, “I do not fear your 
power nor authority, but it is my God whom I fear.”73 
 Although divine commands to fear the Lord are numerous, divine commands 
not to fear are even greater in number.  In these later instances God’s commands to not 
fear are expressed in forms that range from the rebuke to the tender assurance, whether 
the object is specifically identified as individuals or nations or as human power in 
general.  For example, and on the one hand, God rebukes Isaiah’s people by asking 
through His prophet “who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of man, who shall 
die…and forgettest the Lord thy maker…and hast feared continually every day, 
because of the fury of the oppressor…And where is the fury of the oppressor?”74  On 
the other hand, God also reassures his followers as He addresses them with tender 
appellations while encouraging them to “fear not, little flock” or “fear not, little 
children.”75  The theological motivation for this softening of tone may either be 
indicative of the receptors’ standing as ‘forgiven’ before God, or it may point to 
divinely recognized limits of personal responsibility in some circumstances over others 
where the elimination of fear appears to be a highly unlikely human achievement.  
                                                 
71 D&C 1:7.  Also see D&C 133:38; 63:6; 88:104; 2 Ne. 21:2-3; 27:34; 3 Ne. 24:5; Moses 7:1,17; Morm. 
9:27; Mosiah 15:26. 
72 2 Ne. 18:12-13. 
73 Alma 60:28. 
74 2 Ne. 8:12-13.  See also 2 Ne. 17:4, 28. 
75 D&C 35:27; 6:34; 50:41. 
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Perhaps both factors are significant and the prevalence of words of comfort over 
imperatives is certainly observable in several canonical texts.  
 Indeed, many of the contexts in which God or a prophet encourages a people to 
not fear suggest that the audience has already been experiencing fear at the time of the 
assurance/command.  In other words, the directive could have been expressed 
synonymously as ‘cease to fear’ such as when God encourages the Saints in the 
immediate aftermath of the Missouri persecutions, “fear not, let your hearts be 
comforted…let not your hearts be troubled”.76  Clearly, this particular context does not 
imply any condemnation for the fear Church members were experiencing.  In contrast, 
other passages point explicitly to divine anger and condemnation as manifested in this 
divine rebuke, “But with some I am not well pleased, for they will not open their 
mouths, but they hide the talent which I have given unto them, because of the fear of 
man.  Wo unto such, for mine anger is kindled against them.”77 
Again, the difference in tone is significant and in the final analysis I would like 
to suggest one theological reason that may explain such contrast in terms that are 
relevant to this discussion of personal responsibility.78  God accepts as a natural 
response the almost instinctive human reaction of fear in the face of perceived threat.  
Such a reaction, in addition to being of necessary protective benefit in many instances, 
is hardly preventable through individual efforts and God’s perfect justice does not 
require accountability for the fight or flight response which is triggered automatically 
by sensory perceptions of threat.   Yet, these responses can be acted upon a posteriori 
and God seems concerned with whether the individual allows the perception of threat to 
remain unchallenged or whether the individual will provide his mind with 
counteracting information that soften or restructure the threatening stimulus.  In fact, in 
the case of God’s condemnation of those members who were afraid to “open their 
mouths” it appears that their failure to preach was a repeated response to their 
perceived threat of persecution.  In contrast, the Saints in Missouri, who had just 
experienced the difficulties connected with their expulsion from Jackson County, had 
not yet fully had the opportunity to ‘respond’ to their emotional condition in a ‘faithful’ 
manner.  Thus, although personal responsibility may be softened or briefly suspended 
                                                 
76 D&C 98:1,18. 
77 D&C 60:2. 
78 Admittedly the text is not very explicit in this regard; however, I use the overall picture of God’s 
justice and expectations that emerges from LDS scripture as the background on which to base my 
suggestion. 
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in the case of unpreventable threatening stimuli, long-range responsibility in relation to 
these stimuli is reaffirmed and is rooted in the interaction of one’s volition with one’s 
cognitive processing and restructuring. 
 
Developmental Instrumentality 
 The need for a proactive personal response to fear, which allows it to function 
as a potential tool for growth and development, underlies fear’s developmental 
instrumentality.  In fact, by providing opportunities for the emergence of faith, which is 
to be chosen as the ideal path of cognitive restructuring, fear acts both as the necessary 
opposition to faith and as its potential tester and motivator.  Needless to say, in 
numerous LDS canonical instances faith is described as the conqueror of fear.  For 
example, in the BoM the ‘people of Alma’ begin to fear when they see the approaching 
of the belligerent Lamanite army.  Consequently, their leader Alma comes to their aid 
in a way which is particularly significant in the context of the present discussion: 
Alma went forth and stood among them, and exhorted them that they should not be frightened, 
but that they should remember the Lord their God and he would deliver them.  Therefore, they 
hushed their fears, and began to cry unto the Lord that he would soften the hearts of the 
Lamanites, that they would spare them, and their wives, and their children.79  
 
Parenthetically, within the BoM itself the verb ‘to remember’ is used in over 100 
verses.  In most cases it functions as the proposed ultimate solution for problems 
related to the common anxieties of human experience as well as for the most recurrent 
problem highlighted in the BoM narrative, i.e. the sin of pride.80  The objects of 
‘remembering’ include God’s attributes, His previous actions in history, human 
dependency on the divine, one’s family and nation, or any other thought that may 
motivate an individual to overcome fear or other undesirable emotions.  Then, by 
providing an immediate moment of crisis that demands full attention fear is 
instrumental in potentially facilitating the development of those spiritual means which 
may conquer it, whether expressed as values, beliefs, or memories.  
Yet, the possible epistemic value of fear is just as instrumental as is its 
motivating function.  This is clearly evident within Mormon scripture in the specific 
                                                 
79 Mosiah 23:27-28.  An interesting question that emerges from this passage is whether the hushing of 
their fears should be understood as preceding the prayer or whether it occurred in consequence of the 
prayer.  The text suggests it occurred prior to the prayer and in fact it can be argued that ‘fear’ may have 
such a paralyzing effect to block some cognitive processes and verbal expression (if prayer is meant as 
an articulate expression of thoughts and desires).  In that case it would seem that ‘remembering’ God 
could have sufficiently calmed their anxieties to allow a prayer to Him to be articulated. 
80 Most major BoM prophets make repeated use of the word in their sermons.  See 2 Ne. 9; 29; Mosiah 4; 
Alma 36; Moro. 10; etc. 
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context of spiritual self-evaluation for the purposes of repentance and growth.  Thus, in 
light of the previous reference to God’s call to remember Him, it appears that those 
who repeatedly fail to overcome their fears of persecution are not remembering Him 
with sufficient frequency or intensity.  Therefore, their emotional state provides an 
indication of the weak condition of their faith, which conscientious believers will 
endeavour to strengthen through various forms of cognitive and behavioural 
intervention including divine petitions for greater faith.  To be sure, a failure to 
remember God is even more pronounced in those individuals who feel no fear towards 
God and His judgments, whether out of ignorance or out of rebellion.  Yet, while all 
these instances pinpoint individual weakness of various kinds they do not necessarily 
imply divine condemnation of God’s fearful children.  In fact, God’s response to those 
who fear, as already highlighted, varies in relation to a number of factors which include 
personal effort and nature of individual desires. 
At the same time, those who are portrayed as the heroes in the Mormon canon 
undoubtedly appear as people of great faith and courage, who revere or fear God while 
they disregard human threats and persecutions.  One of these spiritual models is 
certainly Nephi, whom the Lord commends for his faithfulness and courage in these 
terms, “Blessed art thou, Nephi, for…thou hast not feared them, and hast not sought 
thine own life, but hast sought my will, and to keep my commandments.”81  A further 
example, this time involving a group rather than an individual, centres on the figures of 
the heroic ‘young stripling warriors’ who fought courageously in battle notwithstanding 
their military inexperience.  Their commander Helaman praises them with words which 
explicitly associate their courage with their faith, “Now they never had fought, yet they 
did not fear death…yea, they had been taught by their mothers that if they did not 
doubt, God would deliver them”.82  
These descriptions are in stark contrast to those other accounts which focus on 
the disobedient and on the rebellious.  For example, prior to the BoM concluding battle, 
which brings the overwhelmingly superior Lamanite force to face the rebellious and 
faithless Nephites, Mormon describes his people in the following dreadful terms, 
“Behold the armies of the Lamanites marching towards them; and with that awful fear 
of death which fills the breasts of all the wicked, did they await to receive them.”83  
                                                 
81 Hel. 10:4. 
82 Alma 56:47. 
83 Morm. 6:7. 
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Yet, perhaps the clearest example of fear as evidence for the wickedness of its 
experiencer is found in the account of Nephi’s inspired prophecy of Seantum’s 
fratricide of Seezoram, the land’s chief-judge.  The prophet’s prediction outlines 
Seantum’s reaction when examiners are sent to examine his cloak.  As he is questioned 
about the blood stains found on his cloak Seantum “shall (he) tremble, and shall look 
pale, even as if death had come upon him.  And then shall ye say: “Because of this fear 
and this paleness which has come upon your face, behold, we know that thou art guilty.  
And then shall greater fear come upon him…84  Then, the physiological manifestations 
of fear function as a mirror into the true thoughts and desires of the individual, thus 
informing the public about an otherwise hidden truth. 
 Therefore, fear can unfold to us various aspects of reality in a variety of 
possible manners.  In the first place, it can strengthen our initial perception of a real 
threat or it can help us to identify the elusive nature of perceived threats as we examine 
the soundness of the values and beliefs that ground our experience of that particular 
kind of fear.  As emphasized within the LDS canon, fear may specifically give us 
indications about the state of our faith in God and about the hierarchy of our affections.  
Furthermore, it can increase our awareness of the basis of our own spiritual motivation 
as we discover whether fear functions as the necessary factor that moves us to action or 
whether fear happens to strengthen an already existing motivation to obedience.  Then, 
within the social realm, fear can aid us in the process of identifying the true values and 
desires of others through the exposure of their deepest selves which is facilitated by the 
expression of their fears.  Moreover, it can fulfil the communicative functions described 
in a previous chapter and highlighted in the BoM in the context of the Lamanite queen, 
who, when she “saw the fear of the servants... also began to fear exceedingly.”85 
In the final analysis, Mormon scripture emphasizes the fact that fear is neither 
necessarily functional nor dysfunctional; it all depends on its objects and motivations.  
On the one hand, fear may be based on distorted perceptions that remove us from the 
truth.  In fact, God commands us to fear Him and to cease fearing human power 
because the latter fear is based on an erroneous perception which does not take the full 
eternal picture into account.  On the other hand, divine fear, which is associated with 
faith in God’s power and perfection, may motivate an individual to obedience.  In 
addition to the conversion contexts previously outlined LDS texts suggest in several 
                                                 
84 Hel. 9:33-34. 
85 Alma 22:21. 
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instances that the one and only manner through which hardened and slothful 
individuals can be moved in a direction of righteousness is by means of godly fear.  
Support for this conclusion is clearly apparent in Enos’ BoM account where he 
describes the spiritual condition of his people in the following terms, 
And there was nothing save it was exceeding harshness, preaching and prophesying of wars, 
and contentions, and destructions, and continually reminding them of death, and the duration of 
eternity, and the judgments and the power of God, and all these things – stirring them up 
continually to keep them in the fear of the Lord.  I say there was nothing short of these things, 
and exceedingly great plainness of speech, that would keep them from going down speedily to  
destruction.86 
 
The text implies that a constant instillation of divine fear is not the ideal motivating 
condition to shift individuals in the direction of truth.  For example, a more desirable 
alternative is suggested in both biblical text and in the D&C through Christ’s renowned 
invitation, “if ye love me, keep my commandments.”87  Yet, Enos’ account and other 
scriptural texts seem to indicate that turning to God through fear is preferable over not 
turning to God at all. 
 
 Godly Fear, Satan, and the Obstacle of Fear  
Notwithstanding fear’s potential usefulness for God’s salvific purposes LDS 
canonical texts do not claim that God directly causes fear by conferring it onto His 
human creatures.  In other words, unlike hope fear is not a spiritual ‘gift’ whose 
reception is made possible by Christ’s Atonement.  Instead, the Atonement is 
commonly associated with the removal of fear, or to put it differently, with the 
acquisition of hope.  Still, several Mormon texts portray circumstances where humans 
experience intense fear when interacting with God.  On the positive side these instances 
include the visitations or visions of glorious heavenly beings, and on the negative one 
the divine communication of information which provoke serious anxiety and even 
terror, particularly in relation to the ‘Day of Judgement.’88  Therefore, while God does 
affect the cognitive perception of individuals in the direction of fear, either by 
conveying ‘fear-filled’ information or by manifesting His benevolent power, the Holy 
Spirit does not appear to directly ‘inject’ fear into individuals as instead is possibly 
suggested by some textual evidence relative to hope.  Thus, God cannot be said to 
                                                 
86 Enos 1:23.  Also see Moro. 9:3-5. 
87 D&C 124:87. 
88 References of the first kind include JS-H 1:14,32 and Ether 3:6,8.  Several examples have already been 
provided for the second kind of ‘fearful’ interaction. 
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directly ‘cause’ fear, but only to manipulate some perceptual factors which in most 
cases will lead to fear.89   
Various theological considerations may lie at the core of this conclusion.  In the 
first place, the motivating power of godly fear ideally functions only in preparation for 
the more desirable condition of ‘love’ towards one’s Father in Heaven.  Therefore, 
godly fear, when understood as dread of the divine, is neither advantageous nor 
necessary to the pursuit of personal salvation.  Secondly, fear never appears in any 
description of the divine attributes and certainly it is not included in the accounts which 
illustrate the emotional experiences of the Incarnate Jesus.  In fact, Jesus is repeatedly 
shown to manifest great respect, obedience, and adoration towards the Father, but not 
fear in the sense of our common usage.  Then, given the common Christian view which 
attributes to Jesus the role of perfect exemplar in both emotion and behaviour the 
account of His life supports the need to interpret God’s commands to fear Him in terms 
of worship, regard, and reverence.  In the final analysis, fear does not belong to the 
divine nature; therefore, any direct transfer of fear from the divine to the human would 
be self-contradictory.  Yet, textual evidence highlights the reality of a God who makes 
use of the common human experience of fear as an instrument that assists Him in His 
purposes with His children. 
In this context I should add that the fear references within the LDS canon are 
not limited to passages in which an object is explicitly defined, such as God or specific 
individuals or groups.  In a few instances the object remains unarticulated and the 
emphasis centres in the general experience of fear rather than in any specific 
contextualization of the phenomenon.  Unsurprisingly, in these illustrations fear is 
always described negatively since it appears as an obstacle that impedes spiritual 
communication.  Specifically, the term fear is used at times to describe the condition of 
a hindering inner doubt as it exists both within single individuals and larger groups.  
For example, by the mouth of Joseph Smith, and following his failed attempt to 
translate the original BoM plates, Oliver Cowdery received this divine message, “It is 
not expedient that you should translate now.  Behold, it was expedient when you 
commenced; but you feared, and the time is past, and it is not expedient now.”  It is not 
exactly clear what Oliver had feared or doubted although the negative consequences are 
                                                 
89 D&C 10:56 is perhaps an ambiguous exception since, in relation to the wicked, God says “It is they 
that I will disturb, and cause to tremble and shake to the center.”  Still, there is no indication that the verb 
‘cause’ should be understood in terms that are exceptionally unique in the wider context of this kind of 
godly interventions. 
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explicit.  In short, he was prevented from enjoying a significant spiritual experience.  
Similarly, fear functioned as an obstacle to other blessings for those Church elders who 
were told: “Ye endeavored to believe that ye should receive the blessing which was 
offered unto you; but…there were fears in your hearts, and verily this is the reason that 
ye did not receive.”90 
What further emphasizes the negative function of fear as an obstacle to 
human/divine interaction is the role LDS scripture attributes to Satan as provoker of 
fear.  In the relatively few references that associate Satan with the experience of fear 
the devil certainly functions as the indirect source of the emotion by nature of the 
cognitive perceptions which are interlinked with his presence.  For example, when 
explaining the reasons for James Covill’s defection from the Mormon cause God 
declares: “Straightway Satan tempted him; and the fear of persecution and the cares of 
the world caused him to reject the world.”91  Significantly, the object of fear is not 
Satan, but “the cares of the world”, although Lucifer is clearly framed as the instigator 
and facilitator of the process which involves in all likelihood an escalation of fear.  
Furthermore, where God is the appropriate object of fear, Satan or an individual by him 
inspired attempts to persuade people not to have godly fear.  Thus, BoM Nehor is 
reported to teach people that “they need not fear nor tremble, but that they might lift up 
their heads and rejoice; for...all men should have eternal life.”92 
At the same time the PoGP recounts an experience of Satan which is unique in 
its immediacy since it involves his actual visual presence.  Still, even in this particular 
incident the fear that Moses experiences appears to be a consequence of Moses’ 
perceptual and cognitive processes rather than being a result of a direct satanic 
intervention on Moses’ emotional sensations.  In this narrative Moses is visited by the 
spiritual personage of Satan, who repeatedly attempts to obtain Moses’ loyalty and 
obedience although without any success.  Following the prophet’s repeated refusals to 
worship him Satan reacts violently as he “cried with a loud voice, and ranted upon the 
earth, and commanded, saying: I am the Only Begotten, worship me.”  It is only at this 
point that the text highlights Moses’ experience of fear in these terms, “as he began to 
fear, he saw the bitterness of hell.  Nevertheless, calling upon God, he received 
                                                 
90 D&C 9:10-11; 67:3. 
91 D&C 40:2. 
92 Alma 1:4. 
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strength.”93  Therefore, Moses’ fear was caused by his perception of Satan’s violent 
reaction as threatening.  Furthermore, the text seems to imply an added sense of 
escalating intensity by associating the beginning of fear with related threatening mental 
images, such as “the bitterness of hell.”  In turn, the intensity of this fear led Moses to 
turn to God for assistance.  Perhaps, there is no other account in Mormon scripture 
which is as clear in highlighting the significance of cognitive processes throughout the 
experience of fear.   
Interestingly, another account, which also describes an encounter with the 
satanic presence, is somewhat more ambiguous in relation to the manifestation of fear.  
In other words, the text does not clearly exclude an interpretation which involves a 
direct emotional influence of Lucifer as dispenser of fear.  This particular narrative is 
found in the Joseph Smith History section of the PoGP which was written by the 
Prophet in 1838.  In one of Mormonism’s paradigmatic scenes, the First Vision, Joseph 
Smith described what followed the beginning of his petition in these words, 
I was seized upon by some power which entirely overcame me, and had such an astonishing 
influence over me as to bind my tongue so that I could not speak.  Thick darkness gathered 
around me, and it seemed to me for a time as if I were doomed to sudden destruction.  But, 
exerting all my powers to call upon God to deliver me out of the power of this enemy which had 
seized upon me, and at the very moment when I was ready to sink into despair and abandon 
myself to destruction – not to an imaginary ruin, but to the power of some actual being from the 
unseen world, who had such marvelous power as I had never before felt in any being – just at 
this moment of great alarm, I saw a pillar of light…94 
 
Although the Prophet never used the word fear within this account he wrote of “alarm” 
in a context that strongly implies the experience of fear.  Yet, his conceptualization of 
Satan’s effects on both body and mind are ambiguous enough to leave open the 
question as to whether fear was experienced as a consequence of the power that came 
upon him or as its component.   
Notwithstanding this latter possibility, the overall evidence from Mormon 
scriptural texts indicates that neither God nor Satan directly confer or transfer fear into 
individuals.  Instead, fear repeatedly appears as a natural human process which is 
rooted in cognitive perceptions of threat.  Furthermore, particularly when focused on 
human objects, fear creates mental/spiritual obstacles that impede divine 
communication.  For this reason, God frequently addresses His children about the need 
to prevent or to replace fear with other attributes.  Thus, in addition to the previously 
described focus on the acquisition of hope, BoM prophet Mormon echoes 1 John 4:18 
                                                 
93 Moses 1:12-22. 
94 JS-H 1:15-16.  Also see Davies (2009), 35-36. 
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in its core message that love ultimately conquers fear.  In fact, Mormon states: “I fear 
not what man can do; for perfect love casteth out all fear.”95  Similarly, God suggests in 
a D&C revelation that we may prevent at least some of our common fears from 
emerging through attentive preparation.  As a further support to the highly pragmatic 
nature of Mormonism this revelation states, “If ye are prepared ye shall not fear” is now 
one of the most quoted verses in LDS circles.96 
 In conclusion, in this chapter I have analysed a few relevant passages of the 
LDS canon, which focus on content that relates to the predicting emotions of hope and 
fear.  By highlighting the explicit and implicit textual evidence for the cognitive 
necessity, personal responsibility, and developmental instrumentality associated with 
these terms I have aimed to provide support for an implied ‘folk model’ of emotion, 
which brings these canonical authors to echo modern scholars and scientists in 
affirming these three basic characteristics that define emotions.97  Furthermore, I have 
examined various interlinks and contingencies that associate the Mormon 
understanding of Atonement with hope as well as underlining the connection between 
Satan and fear.  In this context I have highlighted the significance of these relationships 
within the wider framework of LDS theology.  Yet, the evidence so far has only 
focused on one category of emotion; hence, I now move to examine the second 
spectrum of emotional phenomena, or what I have called the assessing emotions.   
                                                 
95 Moro. 8:16. 
96 D&C 38:30. 
97 I use the term ‘folk model’ rather than ‘cultural model’ because it is applicable more widely to non-
western and non-industrialized settings.   “Cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of 
the world that are widely shared by the members of a society.”  Quinn and Holland (1987), 4. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
The ‘Assessing’ Emotions: Joy and Sorrow 
 
 
 This chapter focuses on those emotions, whose main object is centred in 
relevant aspects of the known present.  In other words, in comparison to the predicting 
emotions of the previous chapter the temporal context of the assessing emotions 
involves greater emphasis on the actual rather than on the potential.  In this context, 
since it is possible for an individual to vividly re-live the memory of past experiences 
the realm of actuality may also include events from the past, which are re-played 
cognitively in various possible degrees of awareness.  Furthermore, future events which 
are perceived as certain may also give rise to intense experiences of the two selected 
prototypical assessing emotions, namely joy and sorrow.  In fact, if the feared or hoped-
for event is played out in one’s mind as if it were already actualized its perceptual 
temporal immediacy may transform a predicting emotion towards it into an assessing 
one.  It is in this sense that in my forthcoming analysis I will also address instances of 
canonical anticipatory sorrow as well as what I have termed anticipatory joy in relation 
to future oriented events like the Judgment or Eternal life.1 
 My choice of assessment as the highlighted dimension of this category of 
emotion is driven by the visibility of ‘evaluation’ as the feature which best defines it.  
In fact, joy and sorrow ultimately emerge from personal judgments about the degree to 
which an experience is pleasing or painful.  At the same time, degrees of ‘certainty’ 
about the correctness of these evaluations shape the very nature and intensity of these 
emotions.  Thus, the greater the factors which cast doubt on the accuracy of the 
assessment, the more unlikely or at least more diffused the experiences of joy and 
                                                 
1 Psychological literature often addresses ‘anticipatory grief’, a concept originally employed by Eric 
Lindemann to describe the sorrow, which is based on a potential future event, usually a significant 
personal loss, experienced as real and as presently actualized.  See Reynolds and Botha (2006) 15-16. 
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sorrow will be.  Therefore, the more an individual is reasonably sure about the 
evaluation of present circumstances in relation to personal wishes and goals the more 
his assessments in the emotion-typical context of change will trigger the emotions of 
joy and of sorrow.  To be sure, as underlined in relation to hope and fear, the selected 
assessing emotions of joy and sorrow are not necessarily located at the opposite ends of 
this emotional spectrum where terms like ecstasy and agony might more properly 
express the most extreme opposite manifestations of this kind of emotion.  Yet, in 
addition to being commonly used in LDS canonical texts, joy and sorrow are 
sufficiently close to the opposite ends of this emotional spectrum that no alternative 
selection seems as viable for my current purposes. 
  
Joy: the Positive Assessing Experience 
The word joy is found in 161 verses of the Mormon canon.  When one considers 
that rejoice appears in 136 verses and happiness, delight, and enjoy combine for 
another two or three dozen appearances it is clear that the topic has a significant place 
within the LDS canonical texts.  In this context I consider terms like rejoice, delight, 
and enjoy as largely synonymous of joy, whereas the meaning of happiness is likely to 
be more nuanced, given our common understanding of the term.  In fact, happiness 
may be distinguished from joy both in relation to its duration and intensity since 
happiness could be identified correctly as a longer lasting mood of lesser intensity than 
the emotion of joy.  Yet, I have questioned whether the authors of the Mormon canon 
held this same view of semantic distinction, particularly in light of the fact that both joy 
and happiness appear in association to the adjective eternal in separate instances within 
the text.2  Therefore, in my present analysis I have decided to include scriptural 
examples of happiness, because this latter term is to be treated as a potential synonym 
for the emotion of joy. 
 
Cognitive Necessity 
 The cognitive necessity of joy is evidenced by the great number of its potential 
sources, which must be perceived and in some cases consciously recognized in order 
for the emotional manifestation of joy to emerge.  In fact, the joyful protagonists of 
Mormon scripture know the reason at the root of their experience of rejoicing.  For 
                                                 
2 Each appears only once in the ‘triple combination’ (a term that refers to the BoM, the D&C, and the 
PoGP as a single textual unit), ‘eternal happiness’ in Alma 3:26 and ‘eternal joy’ in D&C 109:76. 
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example, in describing the first prophetic dream of his father, Nephi states that his 
father’s “soul did rejoice, and his whole heart was filled, because of the things which he 
had seen.”3  Further instances of joy experienced by Lehi’s family are also described in 
terms presupposing cognitive perceptions.  These include, for example, the acquisition 
of safety for family members in danger or the attainment of food when in a state of near 
starvation.4  Significantly, in this latter instance, the family rejoices prior to the actual 
consumption of the food, thus indicating that the meaning of the food causally precedes 
its physiological enjoyment. 
Yet, what causes many “to rejoice with such exceedingly great joy” is 
knowledge of truth, whether acquired by means of prophetic preaching or sacred 
records.5  In this context what further underlies the significance of new knowledge is 
the meaning that it acquires in relation to loving interpersonal relationships.  In fact, 
whether within one’s family or within one’s community, it is the recognition of a 
change in the eternal status of a loved one who has accepted salvific knowledge which 
gives individuals great reason for rejoicing.  Usually, the starker the change and the 
conversion, the more intense will be the description of the subsequent joy.  Thus, on the 
one hand Alma affirms to his faithful son Shiblon, “I trust that I shall have great joy in 
you, because of your steadiness and your faithfulness unto God; for…I have had great 
joy in thee already.”6  On the other hands words turn to jubilation as Ammon is “carried 
away” in contemplating the change and conversion of  blood-thirsty Lamanites into 
peaceful Christ-believing ‘fruits’ of his missionary labours.  Ammon exults, “my joy is 
carried away, even unto boasting in my God” with great intensity and passion.7  I will 
return to this particular narrative repeatedly but at this point I simply want to highlight 
that one of the canonical illustrations of the greatest possible manifestations of joy 
emerges from a context of reflection over the degree of change experienced by those 
individuals, whom Ammon had come to love.  In other words, Ammon reflects on the 
negative ‘was’ and on the positive ‘is’ and rejoices in his direct witness and 
contribution to the actualization of that very change.   
 Still, it is also clear that joy emerges from those contexts that transcend the 
visible actuality of both past and present reality.  In fact, anticipatory joy in relation to 
                                                 
3 1 Ne. 1:15. 
4 1 Ne. 5:1,7;16:32. 
5 Mosiah 5:4; 28:18. 
6 Alma 38:2-3. 
7 Alma 26:35.  It is of interest that the verse begins with the rhetorical question “Now have we not reason 
to rejoice? 
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promises of resurrection or of eternal life lies at the very core of several of the 
scriptural passages under examination.  Nephi summarizes the main focus of the 
numerous illustrations of this kind when he declares, “we talk of Christ, we rejoice in 
Christ.”8  In some cases, the perceptual experience of the future joyful event is 
described in such ‘visionary’ terms that the temporal boundaries between the present 
and the future are clearly obliterated.  This is a typical occurrence in the life of many a 
prophet as the BoM indicates, “Yea, and behold, Abraham saw of his coming, and was 
filled with gladness and did rejoice…and almost all of our fathers, even down to this 
time; yea, they have testified of the coming of Christ, and have looked forward, and 
have rejoiced in his day which is to come.”9 
 Although in many other instances individuals have not reached such direct 
perception of future Messianic events, the cognitive actualization of future promises 
through faith is described as sufficient motivation for the emergence of present 
practices and commitments.  The process of repentance for the remission of sins is 
perhaps the most recurrent example of a practice of this kind.  As one among several 
pre-Incarnation BoM prophets, who interlinks the present need for repentance to the 
future coming of Christ king Benjamin states, 
And the Lord God hath sent his holy prophets among all the children of men, to declare these 
things to every kindred, nation, and tongue, that thereby whosoever should believe that Christ 
should come, the same might receive remission of their sins, and rejoice with exceedingly great 
joy, even as though he had already come among them.10  
 
Other examples include Jarom, who declares that prophets had persuaded the people 
“to look forward unto the Messiah, and believe in him to come as though he already 
was”, and the prophet Abinadi.  His words are particularly indicative of the firm 
association between prophecy and factual certainty: “And now if Christ had not come 
into the world, speaking of things to come as though they had already come, there 
could have been no redemption.”11   
These observations could introduce a larger and deeper discussion on issues 
pertaining to the development of faith and to the psychology of religious belief.  
However, my present concern is limited to the previously mentioned point that 
                                                 
8 2 Ne. 25:26 
9 Hel. 8:17,22 
10 Mosiah 3:13.  For prophetic warnings against the procrastination of repentance see Alma 13:27; 34:35; 
Hel. 13:38 
11 Jarom 1:11; Mosiah 16:6.  Many who believe Joseph Smith to be the sole creator of the BoM narrative 
would suggest that this use of terminology was necessary in the context of a Christ-oriented theology vis-
à-vis the book’s claims of a pre-Christian historical setting.  However, within my particular focus, 
historicity or temporal setting is not problematic in relation to the emergence of emotions. 
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consistent textual evidence suggests it is the cognitive actualization of the hoped-for 
event which triggers the immediacy and the intensity of the emotion of joy.  This 
pattern is apparent in relation to all those events, which involve both divine 
intervention and fulfilment of divine promises in relation to the ultimate triumph of 
truth and righteousness.  Therefore, promises about the redemption of Zion are to be 
included in this framework as well as all Christ-centred events such as the resurrection 
or the attainment of eternal life.12  Consequently, although the Mormon meaning of 
Gospel extends beyond the classical Christian euangelion, the LDS canon shares the 
biblical emphasis on “glad tidings of great joy” when describing the emotional intensity 
which is inherent to the acquisition of salvific knowledge.13 
 At the same time Mormon canonical texts recognize that it is possible and even 
common to obtain joy from false or incorrect knowledge.  Furthermore, LDS scripture 
provides evidence of individuals who, when driven by personal pride or evil desires, 
often experience joy in consequence of others’ difficulties and failures.  Yet, the text 
clearly distinguishes between ‘true’ joy and the joy which emerges from false or evil 
wishes.  As an emotional phenomenon which is neither as long-lasting nor as ‘special’ 
in quality as the ‘joy’ of the righteous ‘distorted joy’ is a mere imitation of the real 
emotion.  In present theological terminology we would probably describe the difference 
as a distinction between joy and pleasure, although the Mormon canon does not attach 
to pleasure a necessarily negative connotation.  The juxtaposition is evident when one 
first looks at the following example of ‘true’ joy, as promised in the D&C, “If thou 
shalt ask, thou shalt receive revelation upon revelation, knowledge upon knowledge, 
that thou mayest know the mysteries and peaceable things – that which bringeth joy, 
that which bringeth life eternal.”  On the other hand, when speaking in the BoM about 
those who are “not built upon my gospel”, Jesus admits that these individuals may 
indeed experience joy, or pleasure as it were, but adds that “they have joy in their 
works for a season, and by and by the end cometh.”14   
Indeed, those who oppose the ‘truth’ often do so through arguments which 
lament the deprivation of joy as a consequence of obedience to God’s commandments.  
Thus, Laman and Lemuel complain in these terms, “These many years we have 
                                                 
12 D&C 101:18; Moses 6:59; 2 Ne. 9:18; Morm. 9:14, and several others.  Parenthetically, the 
‘redemption of Zion’ was at the forefront of concern for Latter-day Saints in the nineteenth century much 
more than it is for the present generation of Mormons. 
13 Mosiah 3:3; Alma 13:22; Hel. 16:14; D&C 31:3; 79:1; 128:19. 
14 D&C 42:60; 3 Ne. 27:11. 
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suffered in the wilderness, which time we might have enjoyed our possessions and the 
land of our inheritance; yea, and we might have been happy.”15  Similarly, Nehor is 
pointing to this kind of joy when he teaches that “all mankind should be saved at the 
last day, and that they need not fear nor tremble, but (that) they might lift up their heads 
and rejoice.”  Yet, in Mormon’s judgment, this present-oriented form of rejoicing is 
rooted in selfish pleasures and in conscious disregard of God’s commandments.  For 
some prophets the difference between these two kinds of joys is so stark that they use 
quite opposite terms to describe the two experiences.  For example, Moroni speaks of 
the temporal and sinful joys of mortality as ‘misery’ when he pointedly asks “why do 
ye not think that greater is the value of an endless happiness than that misery which 
never dies – because of the praise of the world?”16  Of course, whether the emotion is 
experienced as joy or misery is contingent on individual perceptions, beliefs, and 
objectives or, in other words, on a variety of individual cognitive processes. 
 
Personal Responsibility  
In most instances where joy is misplaced, such as when it emerges from the 
consummation of evil, the individual’s accountability for the emotional experience is 
clearly apparent.  In fact, although God respects individual agency and thus allows this 
kind of ‘pleasures’ to subsist in the short term the long-term eternal repercussions for 
their manifestation are not at all pleasurable.  Thus, for all those who have knowingly 
chosen to rebel against truth the ‘rejoicing’ is only to be temporary.  This kind of 
emotional pattern is exemplified by Laman and Lemuel whose Schadenfreude is 
particularly explicit when their brother Nephi struggles in his attempts to build the ship 
which God had commanded him to construct.  Similarly, when the prophesied signs of 
Christ’s birth seem to be delayed the unbelievers confront the faithful and “began to 
rejoice over their brethren, saying: Behold the time is past, and the words of Samuel are 
not fulfilled; therefore, your joy and your faith concerning this thing hath been in 
vain.”17 Yet, as Mormon laments, those who have been instructed in the truth and still 
delight in “so much abomination” or delight “in everything except that which is good” 
can only expect an ultimate reversal of their present emotional condition through divine 
                                                 
15 1 Ne. 17:21. 
16 Alma 1:4; Morm 8:38. 
17 1 Ne. 17:19; 3 Ne. 1:6. 
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promises of “endless damnation” or “eternal misery.”18  Therefore, what now appears 
as joy to the rebellious is only misery in disguise if viewed in its proper eternal 
perspective.  
 Indeed, one of the Mormon eternal ‘principles’, which is as fixed and 
unalterable as any other principle, involves the necessary link between desires (with 
their accompanying behaviours) and emotional conditions.  To be sure, this relationship 
centres on long-lasting emotional states which are perhaps more correctly 
conceptualized as moods rather than as emotions.  Therefore, happiness rather than joy 
is repeatedly highlighted as the natural earthly and eternal consequence of righteous 
behaviour and of godly desires.  Yet, since LDS canonical contexts are not consistent in 
their use of ‘joy’ vis-à-vis ‘happiness’ it is possible that happiness should be 
understood to include single manifestations of joy or perhaps to function as an 
intensifier of these very joyous manifestations.  Whatever the case, and whether in the 
present tense of mortality or in the future tense of eternity, people’s volition as 
materialized in their actions is foundational to their ultimate emotional condition.  
Therefore, according to Mormon scripture, it is not possible to be happy in sin, but only 
to feel a temporary pleasure, which is experienced as such precisely because sin has 
caused that masking distortion which further distanced the individual from the real 
‘joy’ of the righteous. 
 Hence, the LDS emphasis on agency, as explicated in the parallel dimensions 
of freedom of choice and of fixity of consequences, is clearly at the root of many 
canonical passages on the acquisition of joy.  For example, Nephi uses action-oriented 
words in association with emotion-oriented terms when he states that his people “lived 
after the manner of happiness”.19  Alma the Younger similarly expresses this causal 
bond in even more unalterable terms by teaching his son Corianton that it is not 
possible to “be restored from sin to happiness.  Behold, I say unto you, wickedness 
never was happiness.”20  In fact, as Corianton attempts to excuse his sins in the doctrine 
of universal resurrection Alma clarifies that the resurrection will involve a diversified 
“restoration”,  
And if their works are evil they shall be restored unto them for evil…raised to endless happiness 
to inherit the kingdom of God, or to endless misery to inherit the kingdom of the devil, the one 
on one hand, the other on the other – the one raised to happiness according to his desires of 
                                                 
18 Moro. 9:13,19; Mosiah 16:11; Alma 3:26. 
19 2 Ne 5:27 
20 Alma 41:10 
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happiness, or good according to his desires of good; and the other to evil according to his 
desires of evil.21 
 
In other words, each individual will be held responsible for the personal wishes and 
desires in his life.  Moreover, Alma emphasizes that sins due to weaknesses and to 
limitations may not be excused except through the instrumentality of repentance, which 
is presently available to all people, even to those who may not be aware of it.22  Then, 
those individuals who follow their consciences and make use of this tool receive further 
divine assistance for the ongoing process of change and of sanctification of their 
desires. 
Therefore, at least in the eschatological context, what emerges is a degree of 
personal responsibility which removes any sense of surprise or of uncertainty from the 
Day of Judgment.  In other words, as Moroni expresses it, the judgment involves a 
fulfilment of one’s most prominent wishes and it represents a culmination of personal 
accountability in relation to one’s own destiny and to one’s own uncreated independent 
will.23  Therefore, it is only natural that ‘eternal life’ would be a torment for those who 
have truly and deeply desired to be unaffected by God’s presence having knowingly 
rejected a life patterned in obedience to His commandments.  As Moroni rhetorically 
asks: 
Do ye suppose that ye shall dwell with him under a consciousness of your guilt?  Do ye suppose 
that ye could be happy to dwell with that holy Being, when your souls are racked with a 
consciousness of guilt that ye have ever abused his laws?  Behold, I say unto you that ye would 
be more miserable to dwell with a holy and just God, under a consciousness of your filthiness 
before him, than ye would to dwell with the damned souls in hell.24 
 
There is, then, a continuity of sorts between one’s emotional status in this life and the 
status in the life which is to follow.  Moroni’s simple terms capture the extent of this 
inter-dimensional continuity when he states: “he that is happy shall be happy still; and 
he that is unhappy shall be unhappy still.”25 
                                                 
21 Alma 41:4-5 
22 As previously emphasized Mormonism teaches that every individual comes to earth endowed with a 
‘light of Christ’ or conscience, which facilitates the process of discernment between good or evil.  
Therefore, there is a sense in which unbelievers or non-Christians can repent and unknowingly make use 
of Christ’s Atonement, provided they have not previously and willingly rejected it. 
23 Clearly, emphasizing personal accountability does not imply support for a soteriological sufficiency of 
personal efforts.  Indeed, acceptance of the Atonement and use of its accompanying processes of 
repentance and sanctification are required prerequisites on earth to the extent that knowledge and other 
contextual limitations allow.  Yet, the Atonement may ultimately overcome all obstacles and sins only 
when decisively accepted. 
24 Morm. 9:3-4. 
25 Morm. 9:14.  This idea has clear affinity with the depiction of heaven and hell found in Lewis (2002). 
 160 
 
 However, in order to make sense of this continuity it is fundamental to 
recognize the writer’s perspective in relation to the distinctive kinds of ‘joy’ previously 
outlined.  Thus, Moroni calls unhappiness any emotional phenomenon which falls short 
of the happiness experienced within an obedient and loving relationship with God.  A 
person may at least begin to experience this latter kind of happiness, ‘the joy of the 
Saints’ as it is sometimes identified, while in this mortal condition.  Yet, for most 
faithful individuals the complete manifestation of its ‘fullness’ must await the 
unfolding of a later stage of existence.  In other words, the emotional continuity 
between mortal life and post-mortem life centres in the endurance of a general desire 
and direction rather than in the exact repetition of a particular kind of emotional 
experience with a specific level of intensity.  In support of this point God reminds His 
Saints that “in this world your joy is not full, but in me your joy is full.”26   
Still, there are a few instances in the Mormon canon where prophets experience 
a ‘fullness of joy’, or a taste, as it were, of the future intense joy of eternal life.  The 
BoM prophet/missionary Ammon is a primal example of such deep manifestations of 
joy, since he describes the emotion as enervating all his physical strength.  In relation to 
personal responsibility it would seem that the rarity of this kind of experience supports 
a contextual picture of divine bestowal of a ‘spiritual gift’, which is what makes the 
experience ultimately possible.  At the same time, Ammon’s commitment, 
determination, and love during his ministry among the Lamanites is at least partially 
attributable to his own desires to serve God and neighbour.  Thus, even while 
recognizing factors which lie beyond our personal control the Mormon canon 
highlights human responsibility in relation to thinking truth, desiring truth, and doing 
truth to the best of one’s abilities.  Inevitably, it is taught, ‘joy’ or the ‘joy of the Saints’ 
will follow these predetermined conditions which centre in personal obedience to 
divine commands.  Moreover, as was already outlined, this condition is enabled by the 
process of directing our cognitive focus to the right object, an action which is the core 
and the logical foundation of the command to “lift up your head and rejoice” as 
expressed by both God and by His prophets.27 
 
                                                 
26 D&C 101:36 
27 This imperative is found in Mosiah 7:19 and Alma 8:15.  It is also interesting to notice how the D&C 
commands focus on a lifting of the “heart” rather than head  as found in 2 Ne. 9:52;D&C 31:3; 42:69; 
25:13;and 27:15.  Several other commands to rejoice are expressed in a variety of terms in D&C 76:1; 
98:1; 100:12; 127:3; 128:22; 97:21; 19:39 
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Developmental Instrumentality 
 The examination thus far has built a firm foundation for my analysis of the 
developmental instrumentality of joy.  Then, if we begin with a closer look at the most 
intense and special kind of joy described in LDS scripture it is apparent that the ‘joy of 
the Saints’ functions first of all as a witness of God’s power for both experiencer and 
observer.  In this manner it is potentially a significant tool for the spiritual conversion 
of any present observer while it also provides great comfort and confidence to the 
individual who experiences the joy.  In fact, being able to feel the ‘joy of the Saints’ 
confirms one’s positive status in the sight of the divine as Mormon explains in his 
editorial comments on Ammon’s account of his intense joy:  “Now was not this 
exceeding joy?  Behold, this is joy which none receiveth save it be the truly penitent 
and humble seeker of happiness.”28  In other words true joy necessarily points 
backwards to the antecedent choices of the righteous individual and in this way it 
affirms a strong positive evaluation of that person’s spiritual stature.   
Furthermore, desires to experience such great joy can motivate individuals to 
follow the path of righteous choices, which is repeatedly described as a necessary 
though not sufficient condition for the emergence of this kind of emotional 
manifestation.  BoM King Benjamin specifically outlines the cognitive and behavioural 
trajectory which leads to enduring joy when he introduces his renowned teachings on 
the need to succour the poor.  In this context the necessary dependence of joy on the 
divine gift of ‘remission of sins’ is of particular significance, 
As ye have come to the knowledge of the glory of God, or if ye have known of his goodness and 
have tasted of his love, and have received a remission of your sins, which causeth such 
exceedingly great joy in your souls, even so I would that ye should remember, and always retain 
in remembrance, the greatness of God, and your own nothingness…and humble yourselves even 
in the depths of humility, calling on the name of the Lord daily, and standing steadfastly in the 
faith of that which is to come, which was spoken by the mouth of the angel.  And behold, I say 
unto you that if ye do this ye shall always rejoice, and be filled with the love of God, and always 
retain a remission of your sins.29 
 
In other words, joy’s causal cycle involves the acquisition of experiential knowledge of 
God and of His perfect attributes which must be accompanied by an attitude of humility 
towards Him.  In turn, this attitudinal disposition is a prerequisite for the reception of 
forgiveness of one’s sins which is the ultimate source of such an ‘exceeding joy.’ 
                                                 
28 Alma 27:18.  In this or in any other canonical text no suggestion is given that true joy and ‘pleasures’ 
may be confused by those individuals who are blessed with the company of the Holy Ghost.  The 
difference, although not articulated in detail, is assumed to be self-evident in the eyes of the person who 
has developed sufficient spiritual experience. 
29 Mosiah 4:11-12 
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Benjamin further suggests that when the individual receives forgiveness and 
then experiences the consequent joy he obtains additional empirical knowledge of the 
very source and attributes of this joyous forgiveness.  In fact, in the same verse he 
continues: “And ye shall grow in the knowledge of the glory of him that created you, or 
in the knowledge of that which is just and true.”   Therefore, coming back full circle to 
the beginning of the process, Benjamin stresses that the significance of this causal link 
is better expressed in regular repetitions rather than in occasional manifestations.  In 
fact, in order to retain joy as a defining characteristic of one’s emotional life it is 
necessary to experience a continuous remission of one’s sins which is only possible if a 
concept of stark inequality between personal attributes and the attributes of the Father 
in Heaven is maintained in vivid remembrance through one’s cognitive focus.  In this 
sense, then, repentance is more about a cognitive/affective attitude than it is about 
particular acts of contrition.  
 To grasp more fully the theological implications of this cycle of joy I need to 
highlight a logical connection in Benjamin’s words which other BoM writers articulate 
in greater detail.  If this kind of joy emerges as a consequence of forgiveness of sins 
then sin appears to function paradoxically as a necessity for the actualization of joy.  As 
previously discussed, this is exactly the point Lehi makes in his excursus on the 
necessity of comprehensive opposition, although he certainly does not mean to imply 
justification or encouragement of sin.30  In fact, in light of his larger focus within the 
same textual context his statement should also be read, perhaps even primarily, in terms 
of necessity of opposite potentialities.  Indeed, I previously underlined that it would be 
difficult to speak of agentive choices involving personal accountability in the absence 
of alternatives from which one may choose.  Yet, in order to provide agency with the 
opposition it needs it is not necessary for an alternative to ever be actualized since its 
existence within the realm of potentiality would be logically sufficient for the 
experience of choice. 
At the same time, in order to develop the capacity to experience a particular 
emotion, individuals need to encounter, at least at some point in time, the actualized 
opposite of that very same emotion.  In fact, Lehi pinpoints that joy is only identifiable 
and capable of being experienced in a context where sorrow (its opposite) has already 
become part of one’s emotional repertoire.  This argument is in line with socio-
                                                 
30 2 Ne 2:10-11,13. 
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scientific and philosophical perspectives which place ‘change’ at the defining core of 
emotional phenomena.  Thus, in these contexts, joy is understood to derive primarily 
from the interruption of sorrowful experiences rather than from neutral pre-existing 
conditions.  Lehi, then, makes use of this line of reasoning to explain the Fall of Adam 
and Eve as a felix culpa by implying that the Fall made joy a potential reality as it 
introduced sorrowful conditions on this earth.31  Therefore, since life ‘naturally’ 
provides sufficient experiences of suffering it is not needful to seek or to consciously 
choose sorrow in our daily reality in order to be able to experience joy.   
Yet, there is one kind of sorrow that needs to be consciously chosen when 
potentially it could be avoided; it is the sorrow that emerges from the recognition of 
one’s sinfulness.  When accepted, this is the universal experience of Paul’s ‘godly 
sorrow’, which is facilitative of humility, repentance and consequently of the ensuing 
experience of joy.32  In fact, notwithstanding human best efforts to the contrary, even 
those individuals who diligently seek to follow God in all their thoughts and deeds are 
likely to always experience a distance between their own desires or actions and His 
perfect will and character.  Therefore, if used to describe one’s failure to perfectly 
match God’s will despite sustained personal efforts, sin appears to be unavoidable.  On 
the other hand, if its definition implies an attitude of conscious and wilful rebellion 
against God’s commandments sin clearly falls within the realm of personal control and 
responsibility.  Yet, all are responsible for their chosen responses to the experience of 
sorrow, whether its source is the human tendency to sin or the unavoidable pains of life, 
such as death, disease, and disappointments.  Then, it is this response which plays the 
supreme role in relation to the individual’s potential to experience joy since reacting to 
life’s sorrows with anger and rebellion against God will create further distance from the 
divine (thus diminishing one’s joy) whereas responding with humility will have the 
exact opposite effect.   
 Thus, it is evident that both joy and sorrow are developmentally instrumental in 
humans’ earthly path of spiritual progression.  Yet, if joy’s dependency on sorrow is 
rooted in an eternal principle of necessary opposition one is left puzzled in relation to 
the meaning of ‘eternal joy’ in the Mormon context.  In fact, it logically follows that 
either the joy experienced in the eternities is not the same kind of emotional 
phenomenon as our present reality or ‘eternal life’ is not after all devoid of all sorts of 
                                                 
31 2 Ne. 2:23,25. 
32 2 Cor. 7:9-11. 
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sorrows and pains as usually supposed.  In possible support of the first possibility the 
LDS canon provides several illustrations of the uniqueness of ‘eternal life’, which will 
include sources of joy presently unavailable, such as ‘the communion and presence of 
God’ and a body characterized by ‘eternal glory’.  Whatever their exact significance it 
may be argued that these conditions will be so powerful that they will profoundly 
change the very dynamics of joy or of any other emotion.  Yet, within Mormonism’s 
overall framework, which stresses both embryonic human theomorphism as well as the 
essential continuity of being, stark structural changes in the nature of eternal emotions 
do not appear to be theologically likely.  In fact, ‘eternal life’ is normally described in 
terms of a ‘fullness of joy’, a distinction in degree rather than in kind, as highlighted by 
the  D&C in the context of the unique Mormon view that once resurrected “spirit and 
body” are “never again to be divided,” and as “inseparably connected, (they) receive a 
fullness of joy.”33 
 Therefore, explaining ‘eternal joy’ in relation to the coexisting actuality or 
potentiality of sorrow is in my opinion an alternative explanation of greater theological 
fruitfulness.  In the first place, given the various ‘joyful’ descriptions of eternal life, the 
actuality of sorrow may only endure in existence through the experiential memory of 
earthly sorrow.  In other words, having left behind all direct experience of sorrow 
through divinely mediated conquest resurrected humans may still retain the 
developmental experience of sorrow in the depth of their spiritual consciousness.  In 
turn, such memory could function as facilitative of the ongoing experience of joy.  Yet, 
sorrow may also continue to exist eternally as an ongoing possibility which is fully 
transmutable into actuality under specific circumstances.  I suggest that a potential 
realm for its emergence involves those dynamics of loving family relationships which 
characterize the Mormon view of the afterlife.  Specifically, if ‘eternal joy’ is 
inherently relational and if exalted individuals acquire a spiritual offspring which at 
some point is sent to experience a life of good and evil as humans presently do, then it 
is likely that these same agentive children would act in such ways as to cause both joy 
and sorrow in their eternal parents. 
In any case examining what specific canonical texts possibly imply about this 
issue is probably more useful than engaging in speculative theology.  In this context the 
best source of indirect evidence is probably found in those accounts of intense joy, 
                                                 
33 D&C 138:17; 93:33. 
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which approximate the eternal experience of ‘fullness of joy’.  In most of these 
instances the experience of joy emerges as highly relational since it is deeply embedded 
in emotions of love and affection towards other individuals.  A primary example of this 
pattern is Ammon’s previously mentioned expression of intense joy, which is not 
triggered primarily by his conquest of personal sin through repentance.  In fact, 
Ammon’s deep rejoicings emerge in the context of the sorrow and joy which he has 
experienced as a consequence of the loving relationships he has formed with the 
Lamanite people.  Therefore, the source of his joy centres in the recognition and 
participation in the conversion process of thousands of Lamanites as juxtaposed to the 
sorrow he had previously experienced when witnessing the same people’s attachment 
to sin and their slavery from it. 
 Yet, this is not the only example of Ammon’s experience of intense joy.  The 
fact that Ammon should undergo such remarkable experiences more often than other 
individuals is perhaps meant to convey not only his extraordinary righteousness but 
also his possession of a unique gift and spiritual sensitivity that enable these very 
manifestations.  For an example which suggests this possibility one may look at the 
instance involving the fall to the ground of both Lamanite king and queen who lose 
consciousness when they receive a conviction of the coming of Christ and of His role 
as Redeemer.  Having observed the scene Ammon reacts in this manner, 
Now Ammon seeing the Spirit of the Lord poured out according to his prayers upon the 
Lamanites, his brethren, who had been the cause of so much mourning among the Nephites, or 
among all the people of God because of their iniquities and their traditions, he fell upon his 
knees, and began to pour out his soul in prayer and thanksgiving to God for what he had done 
for his brethren; and he was also overpowered with joy; and thus they all three had sunk to the 
earth.34 
 
Thus, the intensity of Ammon’s joy derives both from his recognition of the Lamanites’ 
utter change in transforming a rebellious attitude into sincere discipleship and from his 
contemplation of God’s necessary role, which involved the conferral of His sanctifying 
spirit in this process of conversion.  What is not explicitly expressed in this quotation, 
although it is sufficiently implied by the larger context, is the significant role played by 
love in the emergence of such intense emotion.  It is Ammon’s great love for both God 
and Lamanites which intensifies and possibly activates his joy.   
Another textual example is perhaps more explicit in this regard, at least in 
relation to Ammon’s love for his Creator.  In this instance, fearing that Ammon’s 
                                                 
34 Alma 19:14 
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expression of joy constitutes prideful boasting, Ammon’s brother Aaron reproves him 
for his ‘excessive’ rejoicings.  Ammon’s response clarifies the object of his 
glorification through the following doxology, 
I do not boast in my own strength, nor in my own wisdom; but behold, my joy is full, yea, my 
heart is brim with joy, and I will rejoice in my God.  Yea, I know that I am nothing; as to my 
strength I am weak…but I will boast of my God…behold, many mighty miracles we have 
wrought in this land, for which we will praise his name forever…Therefore, let us glory, yea, 
we will glory in the Lord; yea, we will rejoice for our joy is full; yea, we will praise our God 
forever.  Behold, who can glory too much in the Lord?  Yea, who can say too much of his great 
power, and of his mercy, and of his long-suffering towards the children of men?35 
 
Ammon’s explanation clearly underlines the necessity of love for God in juxtaposition 
to what may appear, at least to his brother, as love for self.  Furthermore, after these 
words of divine glorification his joy seems to escalate as he continues to reflect upon 
the great love and faith of the newly converted Lamanites.  It is then this intricate bond 
of God, missionary, and new disciple, perceived both in terms of single purpose and 
unity of feelings, which leads Ammon to affirm “I cannot say the smallest part which I 
feel.”36   
To be sure, Ammon’s participation in God’s miracle of Lamanite conversion is 
a significant and probably necessary factor for his ability to rejoice in this manner.  
Thus, his perception of self as an active means who has led many Lamanites onto the 
path of conversion is certainly a catalyst to his experience of joy.  In fact, the 
significance of ‘personal involvement’ for the emergence of intense jubilation is 
implicit in the final example of Ammon’s remarkable joy.  In this instance Ammon 
encounters his old companion in both trouble and conversion, namely Alma the 
Younger.  Ammon’s joy in meeting Alma is such that it again results in physical 
exhaustion, which causes him to fall to the earth once more.  Interestingly, the account 
also indicates that “the joy of Alma in meeting his brethren was truly great, and also the 
joy of Aaron, of Omner, and Himni; but behold their joy was not that to exceed their 
strength.”37  In any case, Ammon’s joy and the joy of all those present at the time of the 
meeting are inherently interlinked to the shared history and friendship which 
characterized their relationship.  Furthermore, the joy is intensified by the recognized 
unity of purpose and feelings with God and towards God, which creates a triangle of 
unity and love similar to the one experienced in the previously mentioned instance of 
Lamanite conversion.  
                                                 
35 Alma 26:10-11,16. 
36 Alma 26:16. 
37 Alma 27:19. 
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 At the conclusion of this excursus on Ammon’s manifestations of joy it is 
natural to wonder whether such intense experiences appear to be normative within a 
Mormon theology of emotion.  Although I suppose that the majority of Saints would 
wish to have an intense joyous experience of this sort I do not find any canonical 
evidence in this direction.  In fact, in the context of the encounter just outlined Alma 
and Ammon’s difference of joyous intensity is not accompanied by an associated 
evaluation of separate levels of righteousness; on the contrary, textual evidence is 
repeatedly and consistently pointing toward their equality in righteousness, 
commitment, and devotion.  Therefore, within the wider context of the BoM text and in 
light of the cumulative evidence from Mormon theology these highly charged 
emotional experiences should be interpreted as individual manifestations of unique 
spiritual gifts which are mostly expressed in those individuals who are both sufficiently 
worthy  and especially predisposed to receive them.  At the same time these 
descriptions are meant to be illustrative of the potential joyousness of emotional 
manifestations when properly founded on faith, love, and interaction with the divine.  
Indeed, although only occasional throughout mortality, a ‘fullness of joy’ will embody 
the very existence of those who will receive the eternal blessing of the presence of 
God.38 
 In conclusion, both the presence and the absence of joy may be indicative of 
significant spiritual dynamics, pointing to patterns of forgiveness of sins, humility, and 
obedience, or to opposite patterns of disobedience and pride.  Yet, lack of joy or actual 
sorrow may simply emerge as a consequence of mortal testing.  Therefore, extracting 
self-evaluations from manifestations of joy is often inherently problematic.  Perhaps, 
then, joy is developmentally instrumental at its most when it functions as an achievable 
emotional goal which partially motivates faithful actions or when it emerges with the 
memory of experiential joyous moments of spiritual enlightenment.  Indeed, these 
memories are to be treasured and retrieved, particularly at those times when life’s 
experiences are darkest and most difficult, in which contexts they may act as sources of 
hope and as motivators for endurance.  
  
                                                 
38 See 3 Ne. 28:10.  Mormon scripture echoes Paul’s description of spiritual gifts (1 Cor. 12:1-11) and 
further develops the discussion in both BoM and D&C (see Moro 10 and D&C 46).  From a non-
Mormon perspective the accounts of Ammon’s joy are usually placed within the historical ‘revivalist’ 
context of Joseph Smith’s time and location.  For a thorough treatment on the topic of emotions within 
revivalist movements in the nineteenth century see Taves (1999). 
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Joy and the Spirit 
As previously highlighted the Atonement lies at the causative core of the Saints’ 
hope.  Similarly, it is also the ground of their joy since it enables the joyous process of 
forgiveness of sins, which ultimately leads to the gift of eternal life.  At the same time, 
within the LDS canon the Atonement repeatedly functions as the very object of 
anticipatory, visionary, and reflective joy.  In other words, the Atonement is both 
reason for and source of joy especially when individuals contemplate and wish to 
activate its far-reaching emotional consequences.  In fact, as the means by which 
believers renew the divine presence in their lives (as actualized in the personal 
influence of the Holy Ghost), the Atonement acts as provider of joy whenever it 
enables the Spirit’s influence to return to a repentant individual following the 
forgiveness of his sins.  Hence, it is no surprise that God should repeatedly associate 
joy with the positive effects of repentance, as when He affirms, in reference to Joseph 
Smith, that “his days of rejoicing are come unto the remission of his sins”.  Similarly, 
to the Saints who had completed the Kirtland temple He promised, “your sins are 
forgiven you; you are clean before me; therefore lift up your heads and rejoice.”39   
Furthermore, the great majority of canonical descriptions of divine-human 
interactions are characterized by emotional exchanges of thoughts, words, or images, 
which focus on the event and on the effects of the Atonement.    Many of these 
instances involve a distinct divine or angelic message that centres on Christ’s 
redeeming mission and power.  As a consequence of these communications individuals 
experience not only a ‘joyous’ anticipation of the possibility of forgiveness but also a 
jubilant awareness of a remission of sins already actualized.  Whether the messenger is 
a human prophet empowered by God’s ‘Spirit’ or whether a supernatural being is 
commissioned for this purpose the nucleus of the news generally involves ‘the great 
tidings of great joy’ of which some examples have already been given.  Visions also 
add to the perceptual foundation of this redemptive ‘joy’ as exemplified by Emer, who 
“saw the Son of Righteousness, and did rejoice and glory in his day” or by Enoch, who 
had a vision of “the day of the righteous, the hour of their redemption, and received a 
fullness of joy.”40  Then, it is clear that a belief in Christ’s mission and in the personal 
consequences of that same mission lies firmly at the centre of the Saints’ joy, as further 
                                                 
39 D&C 21:8; 110:5. 
40 Ether 9:22; Moses 7:67. 
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suggested by Giddonah’s question to Korihor, the anti-Christ, “Why do ye teach this 
people that there shall be no Christ to interrupt their rejoicings?”41  
   In this context of divine or divinely assisted manifestations and 
communications it is of interest to notice that light appears as a prominent motif within 
LDS canonical texts.  In fact, in addition to fulfilling its physical function of visibly 
manifesting divine glory, as exemplified by Joseph Smith’s First Vision, the word 
‘light’ is often used to describe the content and the ‘cognitive’ effects of various 
spiritual messages.  For example, in recounting Ammon’s reaction to the concerns of 
the Lamanite queen in behalf of her comatose husband Mormon writes, 
He knew that Lamoni was under the power of God; he knew that the dark veil of unbelief was 
being cast away from his mind, and the light which did light up his mind, which was the light of 
the glory of God, which was a marvelous light of his goodness – yea, this light had infused such 
joy into his soul, the cloud of darkness having been misspelled, and that the light of everlasting 
life was lit up in his soul, yea, he knew that this had overcome his natural frame, and he was 
carried away in God.42 
 
Among the various symbolic functions of the six distinct uses of ‘light’ within this 
single scriptural verse one meaning appears as especially visible: ‘light’ characterizes a 
new knowledge or perception.  In other words, the illuminating effects of spiritual light 
begin firmly in cognition and, as I infer from the text, only subsequently spread from 
the mind to the rest of one’s being. 
 To be sure, this should not be viewed as an exclusively rational process which 
centres on issues of logical or empirical validity.  Indeed, the conversion process is 
invariably described as an emotional experience of often poignant consequences in 
feelings.  Yet, the centrality of emotionally-significant information and beliefs in 
accounts of ‘enlightening’ conversions has great relevance in the context of the 
‘cognitive necessity’ of emotions.  Alma’s account of his own conversion further 
illustrates such a cognitive base, which is both causative and constitutive of the very 
‘light’ of spiritual conversion.  In describing the moment of ‘deliverance’ from the 
torment of sin Alma recalls: 
I remembered also to have heard my father prophesy unto the people concerning the coming of 
one Jesus Christ, a Son of God, to atone for the sins of the world.  Now, as my mind caught hold 
upon this thought, I cried within my heart: O Jesus, thou Son of God, have mercy on me, who 
am in the gall of bitterness, and am encircled about by the everlasting chains of death.  And 
now, behold, when I thought this, I could remember my pains no more; yea, I was harrowed up 
by the memory of my sins no more.  And oh, what joy, and what marvelous light I did behold; 
yea, my soul was filled with joy as exceeding as was my pain!43  
                                                 
41 Alma 30:22.  The highly emotional context in many of these instances is often expressed in outward 
physical manifestations involving ‘shouts’, ‘singing’, ‘weeping’, and ‘clasping of hands.’ 
42 Alma 19:6. 
43 Alma 36:17-20. 
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Then, it is evident in this context that remembering and thinking lie at the very 
foundation of the whole process of change as presently described. 
Yet, clearly it is not only the content of the information which is significant, but 
also the source and the mode of its communication.  In fact, by providing evidence for 
its truth the Spirit functions as the instrument which is needed to make the information 
efficacious.  Thus, Alma receives the ‘light’ that captures his conversion as a 
consequence of the forgiveness of his sins, which he receives following his sincere 
repentant petition.  In other words, while being forgiven Alma knows experientially as 
well as cognitively that the promises of the Atonement are real by the instrumentality of 
the cleansing spiritual manifestations of the Holy Ghost.  Therefore, it is ultimately the 
Spirit, which “giveth light”.  Indeed, it is a light which involves both cognitive and 
affective manifestations as exemplified in God’s promise to Hyrum Smith that “I will 
impart unto you of my Spirit, which shall enlighten your mind, which shall fill your 
soul with joy.”44   
Still, it is difficult to identify explicit textual support for a view of the Holy 
Spirit which is holistic in its effects, or both cognitive and affective.  Indeed, scriptures 
are generally more concerned with affirming such interventions than they are with 
detailing their specific dynamics.  Therefore, interpreting the acquisition of spiritual 
‘joy’ as described in the Mormon canon by clearly demarcating psycho-biological 
categories of experience would necessarily involve some unjustified extrapolations.  On 
the other hand, whether specific passages ground ‘spiritual’ joy primarily in cognitive 
enlightenment or in affective elation, what is significant in the present analysis is the 
spirit’s framing function in relation to the emergence, intensification, and regulation of 
emotional phenomena.  In short, there is no true joy in Mormonism, as opposed to mere 
pleasure, which is not necessarily and intricately associated with the presence of the 
Holy Spirit.  Within this pneumatological context proximate causes and forms of 
manifestation appear in a variety of settings and linguistic expressions, but the common 
denominator is invariably the influence of the Spirit. 
To look more closely at some of these instances one may note that joy often 
emerges from the Spirit’s direct conferral of positive information which otherwise 
would have remained unknown.  For example, when Alma speaks to the people of 
                                                 
44 D&C 11:13.  Also see 2 Ne. 31:3 and D&C 84:46. 
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Gideon he makes an allusion to a revelation about the people of Zarahemla, whom he 
had previously visited, 
I have come having great hopes…that I should find that ye were not in the awful dilemma that 
our brethren were in at Zarahemla.  But blessed be the name of God, that he hath given unto me 
the exceedingly great joy of knowing that they are established again in the way of his 
righteousness.45 
 
Furthermore, as Alma continues to deliver his message he indicates quite matter-of-
factly that he has just received a second spiritual revelation, which this time concerns 
his present audience: 
And now my beloved brethren, do you believe these things?...I know that ye believe them; and 
the way that I know that ye believe them is by the manifestation of the Spirit which is in me.  
And now because your faith is strong concerning that, yea, concerning the things which I have 
spoken, great is my joy.46 
 
In both instances, whether in propositional or more likely in intuitive form Alma 
receives knowledge from the Spirit, which knowledge functions in turn as a source of 
personal joy. 
 Other examples place greater emphasis on the sensation element of spiritual 
intervention.  In fact, many passages which underline the interconnection between ‘joy’ 
and ‘forgiveness of sins’ affirm that the negative affect previously associated with 
personal sins has now been transformed into a general positive emotion.  In other 
words, although the forgiven sins have not been extinguished from memory through 
faith in Christ’s redeeming mission the guilt associated with them has been replaced by 
joy.  Indeed, the change is so drastic and miraculous that Enos cannot refrain from 
asking God in bewilderment, “how is it done?”47  Similarly, in his inspiring speech 
King Benjamin highlights the fact that his audience has had such a powerful experience 
even in the midst of his sermon.  Thus, he reminds them, 
Even at this time, ye have been calling on his name, and begging for a remission of your sins.  
And has he suffered that ye have begged in vain?  Nay; he has poured out his Spirit upon you, 
and has caused that your hearts should be filled with joy, and has caused that your mouths 
should be stopped that ye could not find utterance, so exceedingly great was your joy.48 
 
Furthermore, when recounting his conversion Alma also underlines the change of 
affective quality in the memory of his sins by stressing that “he was harrowed up by the 
memory of his sins no more.”  Lamoni’s father, a Lamanite king, similarly understood 
                                                 
45 Alma 7:3-4. 
46 Alma 7:17. 
47 Enos 1:7. 
48 Mosiah 4:20. 
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the dramatic and miraculous emotional consequences inherent in the presence of this 
‘Spirit’ as evidenced by his question to Aaron, the missionary, 
What shall I do that I may be born of God, having this wicked spirit rooted out of my breast, 
and receive his Spirit, that I may be filled with joy, that I may not be cast off at the last day?  
Behold, said he, I will give up all that I possess, yea, I will forsake my kingdom, that I may 
receive this great joy.49   
 
Undoubtedly the sensory force of the godly joy experienced or desired has significantly 
impressed the individuals in these passages. 
At the same time many other LDS texts associated with divine spiritual 
interventions do not clearly articulate either cognitive or affective expressions of the 
resultant joy.  For example, while commenting on Alma’s mission among the 
Zoramites Mormon affirms: “The Lord…gave them strength, that they should suffer no 
manner of afflictions, save it were swallowed up in the joy of Christ.”50  In a later BoM 
section the brothers Nephi and Lehi are miraculously delivered from prison while 
standing “as if in the midst of a flaming fire, yet it did harm them not, neither did it take 
hold upon the walls of the prison; and they were filled with that joy which is 
unspeakable and full of glory.”51  Sacred ceremonies and ordinances are also occasions 
of joyous spiritual manifestations.  In fact, when Alma and Helam are baptized in the 
waters of Mormon “they arose and came forth out of the water rejoicing, being filled 
with the Spirit.”52  Yet, what is common to all these instances is a lack of specificity 
both in relation to the emergence and to the modalities of expression of such joy. 
Perhaps, the previously highlighted element of ‘love’ may be useful in inferring 
the wider spiritual context of at least some of these more ambiguous passages.  
Specifically, if love is included in the emotional picture being addressed, then joy often 
appears as a more clearly motivated phenomenon.  One example is found in the BoM 
account of Jesus’ post-resurrection visit among the surviving descendants of Lehi.  In 
one instance Jesus kneels to pray in behalf of those who are present but the words of 
His prayer are not reported because considered too ‘great and marvelous’ to be uttered 
and comprehended.  Yet, the description of what follows opens a window of 
understanding in this context of ineffability, 
No one can conceive of the joy which filled our souls at the time we heard him pray for us unto 
the Father…so great was the joy of the multitude that they were overcome.  And it came to pass 
                                                 
49 Alma 22:15. 
50 Alma 31:38.  Also see Alma 33:23. 
51 Hel. 5:44. 
52 Mosiah 18:14.  Also see the account of Joseph Smith and Oliver Cowdery’s baptisms in JS-H 1:73.  In 
the D&C see sec. 132:56 and 124:88. 
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that Jesus spake unto them, and bade them arise.  And they arose from the earth, and he said 
unto them: Blessed are ye because of your faith.  And now behold, my joy is full.  And when he 
had said these words, he wept, and the multitude bare record of it, and he took their little 
children, one by one, and blessed them, and prayer unto the Father for them.  And when he had 
done this he wept again.53 
 
In this context it appears that the mutual love between Jesus and those present at the 
scene is causally necessary as well as constitutive of their experience of ‘joy’.  
Significantly, the people’s joy is linked with their recognition of Jesus’ love for them, 
as expressed by His prayer in their behalf.  Similarly, Jesus’ affirmation that His “joy is 
full”, which twice culminates in weeping, follows His expression of love through 
blessings and prayers in behalf of both children and adults.   
  True, the specific context of Jesus’ presence is sufficiently extraordinary that 
one may not see the need to generalize this love-joy interaction to other contexts.  In 
fact, it is possible to infer from this passage that Jesus’ corporeal presence may 
uniquely have emanated the love that was absorbed and experienced by those in His 
presence.  Still, both Paul in the New Testament and King Benjamin in the BoM 
explicitly associate the Holy Spirit with the presence of both love and joy.54  Indeed, 
Mormon explains the popularity and success of King Benjamin among his people both 
in terms of his teaching of the truth and in terms of the love for his people, which he 
had expressed through his personal service.  Then, it was by embodying the content of 
his teachings that Benjamin “taught them to keep the commandments of God, that they 
might rejoice and be filled with love towards God and all men.”55  Furthermore, almost 
every LDS canonical text, which appears in a ‘missionary’ context, suggests an 
inseparable connection between ‘love’ and ‘joy’.  In fact, it is difficult to understand the 
common expression “joy in the fruit of your labors” independently of the ‘love’ that a 
missionary feels for that very fruit.56     
There is probably no better example than Alma’s doxology to provide a final 
illustration of this interaction.  In reflecting upon the ‘fruits’ of his spiritual labours and 
in describing his deepest wishes and desires to fulfil God’s purposes more fully Alma 
exults,  
This is my glory, that perhaps I may be an instrument in the hands of God to bring some soul to 
repentance; and this is my joy.  And behold, when I see many of my brethren truly penitent, and 
coming to the Lord their God, then is my soul filled with joy; then do I remember what the Lord 
has done for me, yea, even that he hath heard my prayer…and hath given me much success, in 
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the which my joy is full.  But I do not joy in my own success alone, but my joy is more full 
because of the success of my brethren, who have been up to the land of Nephi…Now, when I 
think of the success of these my brethren my soul is carried away, even to the separation of it 
from the body, as it were, so great is my joy.57 
 
It may be observed that Alma points at different causes for his joy, some are self-
referential and some are not.  In the first place he recognizes that his personal 
involvement as facilitator of conversions has contributed to bring to the surface life 
memories of great joy.  Indeed, witnessing the conversion process of repentant 
individuals has reminded him of his own conversion and of God’s ongoing mercy in his 
behalf.  Furthermore, he also indicates explicitly that both his own people’s repentance 
and the success of the sons of Mosiah in their mission among the Lamanites have given 
him significant reasons to rejoice.  Therefore, the firm bond of love and friendship 
between Alma and Mosiah’s sons is undoubtedly motivating and constitutive of the joy 
which Alma feels for his friends’ missionary successes.  Moreover, the joy he expresses 
for the fruits of his own labours, which have emerged throughout his ecclesiastical 
service among the people, seems to be similarly rooted in love as specifically 
manifested in his desires and in his actions for the people’s spiritual well-being which 
in turn had motivated his ministry among them.   
Other canonical settings also illustrate the unity of love and joy, sometimes also 
including faith as a third component of the experience.  Significantly, in all these 
instances the Spirit is the fundamental vehicle and intensifier of emotional phenomena, 
thus giving a uniquely ‘spiritual’ dimension to the expression of these emotions in the 
text.  Yet, it is not just the positive but also the negative assessing experiences which 
can function as vehicles of spiritual manifestations as I am about to explore. 
 
Sorrow: the Negative Assessing Experience 
The word sorrow appears in 83 verses of the Mormon canon whereas the terms 
pain, suffering, and their grammatical derivatives combine for another 172 verses.  Yet, 
in order to be more representative of the theme’s actual prominence this latter figure 
should be reduced to at least its half.  In fact, and in the first place, since pain and 
suffering often appear together as a sorrow-expressing literary couplet a considerable 
overlap between verses that quote pain and verses that quote suffering must be 
accounted for.  Furthermore, since LDS scriptures are mostly written in the language of 
the KJV Bible the verb to suffer is recurrently used as a synonym for the modern 
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English terms to allow or to permit, which is not a relevant meaning in the present 
analysis.  Finally, not all uses of the words pain and suffering have primary reference to 
experiences of sadness since in some instances their main focus involves descriptions 
of physical privations and diseases.  Yet, it is interesting that sadness never appears in 
Mormon canonical texts, although the adjective sad occasionally emerges in contexts 
where it only qualifies concepts or objects rather than individuals.58    
These preliminary considerations highlight the fact that it is more problematic 
to identify exact synonyms for sorrow than it is for joy.  In fact, the English language 
seems to distinguish finely between various kinds and degrees of sorrow much more 
than it does between different kinds of joy.  In this broad linguistic context my analysis 
is aimed primarily at outlining a representative sample of the term sorrow when used in 
a context of sadness or unhappiness.  Indeed, although the same qualifications 
mentioned in connection with happiness are relevant in this setting, unhappiness falls 
within the range of my present focus.  Therefore, given the canonical use of misery as 
an antonym to happiness I also include misery among the terms that need to be 
examined.  At the conclusion of this analysis it will emerge that sorrow and suffering 
are prominent LDS canonical themes which frequently appear in Christological, 
eschatological, and ethical contexts that are of key significance for Mormon theology. 
 
Cognitive Necessity 
Although LDS scriptures identify various reasons for the experience of sorrow 
some causative patterns emerge from the text as especially visible.  Certainly, the most 
frequent of these causal associations involves sin.  In fact, sin is usually identified as 
the ultimate source of sorrow in this mortal existence as well as being recognized as the 
cause of all potential suffering which will inevitably follow it in the eternities.  In some 
scriptural contexts the general condition of humanity is described as sinful whereas 
many other texts expressly identify sin as disobedience to a specific divine 
commandment.  An example of this latter case, which also highlights sin’s association 
with sorrow, is found in God’s reproof to James Covill, “thou hast seen great sorrow, 
for thou hast rejected me many times because of pride and the cares of the world.”59  
Indeed, as two of the human sins, which are most recurrent in the LDS canon, both 
‘pride’ and the ‘cares of the world’ illustrate the centrality of cognition in the present 
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Mormon understanding of sin.  Therefore, given the LDS ‘principle’ of the inextricable 
link between sin and sorrow, however the latter is to be defined, both sin and sorrow 
involve a necessary cognitive element in their manifestation. 
Specifically, ‘pride’ and ‘the cares of the world’ exemplify the problem of 
misdirected affections since they originate in a failure to heed the ‘two great 
commandments’ upon which all other commandments are based.60  In fact, in 1989 a 
Mormon prophet defined pride as “enmity toward God and enmity toward our 
fellowmen”.  Furthermore, the expression ‘the cares of the world’ has clear reference to 
misplaced cares or affections that are exerted over temporal concerns above and beyond 
the attention and care, which should be placed on divine commandments.  In this 
context, it is theologically significant that Mormonism has recently emphasized the 
centrality and prevalence of the ‘universal sin’ of pride in association with its renewed 
stress over the BoM, whose paramount theme centres in the ‘pride cycle’.61  Indeed, the 
necessary link between pride and its consequential sorrow in both mortal and post-
mortal conditions of life is one of the most explicit moral ‘principles’ highlighted by 
the BoM.  In other words, the causal bond between pride and sorrow is not only 
recurrent but is also foundational to the core message of the whole BoM narrative.   
Mormon scripture also provides ample confirming evidence to the fact that the 
difference between a joyful and a sorrowful emotional state often centres in the realm 
of a specific motivating knowledge.   For example, Mormon laments the condition of 
his people about to be exterminated while he contemplates the visual evidence, which 
indicates that “the day of grace was passed with them, both temporally and spiritually.”  
In this context it is not surprising that he would add, “my sorrow did return unto me 
again.”62  Others only experience sorrow tangentially and mainly while envisioning its 
potentiality or the sorrow they would have undergone had they not received the salvific 
knowledge contained in BoM Messianic prophecies.  Thus, King Benjamin reminds his 
sons that “were it not for these plates, which contain these records and these 
commandments, we must have suffered in ignorance, even at this present time, not 
knowing the mysteries of God.”63  In the opposite direction, Lehi’s parting words to his 
rebellious sons embody his wish for a transition from the sorrow he actually feels to a 
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potential joy, which could only be realized were he to witness a positive change in their 
obedience.  In this context he wishes “that my soul might have joy in you, and that my 
heart might leave this world with gladness because of you, that I might not be brought 
down with grief and sorrow to the grave.”64 
Significantly, Mormon texts also associate volition with emotional emergence, 
particularly while focusing on the relationship between desired and actual outcomes.  In 
other words, the failed expectation of specific positive events normally triggers the 
disappointment which is identified as sorrow.  Such a disappointment is often 
associated with a diminished motivation to pursue a particular course, i.e. with a feeling 
of giving up the desired objective.  There is perhaps no better place where this pattern 
is clearly outlined as in the account of Nephi’s return to Jerusalem to obtain the ‘brass 
plates’ from Laban.  As he and his brothers begin to face what appear to be 
insurmountable obstacles for the successful fulfilment of their mission Nephi states that 
“we began to be exceedingly sorrowful, and my brethren were about to return unto my 
father in the wilderness.”65  Nephi’s and his brothers’ divergent reactions to their 
sorrow is illustrative of this emotion’s coexisting potentiality for either progression or 
regression, as will be examined in the section on developmental instrumentality.  What 
is presently relevant is the fact that their experience of sorrow appears to be rooted in 
the failure of their expectations. 
Finally, one especially interesting context that highlights cognitive causal 
factors in the experience of sorrow is found in the recurrent passages which describe 
conflicting emotional reactions upon reflection over particular circumstances.  One 
such instance focuses on the emotional aftermath of a massive gathering of people 
during king Mosiah’s reign.  The purpose for the gathering is to listen to the reading of 
the written accounts which describe the adventures of Zeniff, Alma, and their 
respective peoples.   The self-conflicting nature of the gathered people’s reaction is 
evident in the following text, 
When Mosiah had made an end of reading the records, his people who tarried in the land were 
struck with wonder and amazement.  For they knew not what to think; for when they beheld 
those that had been delivered out of bondage they were filled with exceedingly great joy.  And 
again, when they thought of their brethren who had been slain by the Lamanites they were filled 
with sorrow, and even shed many tears of sorrow.  And again, when they thought of the 
immediate goodness of God, and his power in delivering Alma and his brethren out of the hands 
of the Lamanites and of bondage, they did raise their voices and give thanks to God.  And again, 
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when they thought upon the Lamanites, who were their brethren, of their sinful and polluted 
state, they were filled with pain and anguish for the welfare of their souls.66 
 
Clearly, the post-reflective emotions described in this passage alternate so much and so 
quickly between joy and sorrow because people’s conscious reflective content is 
rapidly shifting as the focus of attention changes from one situation to another.  
Therefore, in this as in the previous examples from LDS texts, the cognitive necessity 
of sorrow is plainly and convincingly demonstrated. 
 
Personal Responsibility 
The issue becomes more complex when addressing the personal responsibility 
associated with sorrow.  Thus, an initial clarification is needed in order to place the 
topic within its appropriate exegetical boundaries.  LDS canonical texts repeatedly 
suggest that sorrow is both avoidable and unavoidable.  In other words, the causal 
factors which lead to sorrow are in some circumstances deemed to lie within our 
personal capacity for control whereas in other cases its causal factors are recognized to 
lie outside our ability to prevent or to manipulate events.  Therefore, the discussion and 
emphasis in the context of one kind of sorrow, the preventable one, is quite different 
from the setting and language which usually characterizes the other kind, namely the 
inevitable one.  In this latter instance, as was previously seen, greater emphasis is 
placed on one’s response to sorrow rather than on the causes of its emergence.  It 
follows that the canonical picture of personal responsibility in relation to sorrow is 
multi-faceted and mostly confusing if this preliminary factor is not taken into proper 
account. 
 I have already introduced the causal link between sin and sorrow indicating that 
it is one of the key recurrent causal associations within Mormon scripture.  In this 
context sorrow is generally correlated to an eternal perspective of existence since the 
invariable consequences of disobedience are usually not fully experienced in this life.  
In fact, the most immediate consequences of sin in the present human condition are 
often perceived to be attractive, although they are never recognized as true joy by the 
believers who see in them only poor imitations as manifested by “pleasure”, “gain”, or 
“praises of men”.67  Furthermore, these kinds of enjoyments are held to be of short 
duration as underlined by their inability to establish an enduring mood of happiness.  In 
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fact, in the present-oriented words of Samuel the Lamanite, sin and happiness are 
necessarily incompatible.  To the rebellious Nephites he explains it in these terms: “ye 
have sought all the days of your lives for that which ye could not obtain; and ye have 
sought for happiness in doing iniquity, which thing is contrary to the nature of that 
righteousness which is in our great and Eternal Head.”68  Thus, Mormon texts stress 
that sorrow is a necessary accompaniment to sin both in the eschatological perspective 
and in the realm of present mortality where sin prevents the individual from 
experiencing ‘the joy of the Saints’.  Then, in comparison to this joy its poor 
pleasurable substitute is nothing but sorrow, notwithstanding the unbelievers’ claim to 
the contrary. 
 Undoubtedly, personal responsibility in avoiding sin to the best of one’s ability 
is a regular assumption if not an explicit affirmation of many a Mormon scripture.  
Consequently, the accompanying responsibility for the experience of sin-driven sorrow 
can hardly be escaped.  Yet, given that the post-fall “natural man is an enemy to God” 
the Mormon canon also assumes that the inherent attraction of sin leads all individuals 
to succumb in some degree.69  In these instances, even when sin is not avoided, 
personal responsibility endures in relation to the chosen reaction to the experience of 
sin, beginning with its recognition.  The key question then is whether the emerging 
sorrow will be avoided and obscured or whether it will be accepted and employed to 
develop the necessary humility which is central to the process of repentance.  
Therefore, it can be seen that in different forms personal responsibility extends from the 
causes and motivations of sorrow to the reactions and responses which follow it.  Even 
when sorrow emerges in circumstances primarily related to others’ choices the 
individual remains responsible to manage such sorrow in the manner which is deemed 
appropriate.  Then, my current task is to explore the way in which LDS texts express 
this very process of response. 
 To begin this discussion it is useful to remember the Pauline distinction 
between “godly sorrow” and “the sorrow of the world”.70  Although in slightly different 
terms Mormon texts echo this theme as they distinguish between the kind of sorrow 
which leads to repentance and the “sorrowing of the damned.”  For example, Mormon 
laments the condition of his people with these words,  
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Their sorrowing was not unto repentance, because of the goodness of God; but it was rather the 
sorrowing of the damned, because the Lord would not always suffer them to take happiness in 
sin.  And they did not come unto Jesus with broken hearts and contrite spirits, but they did curse 
God, and wish to die.  Nevertheless they would struggle with the sword for their lives.71 
 
What had deepened Mormon’s disappointment in this instance was his realization that 
sorrow had not been treated as an opportunity for repentance as he had hoped.  In fact, 
Mormon had started to “rejoice...knowing the mercies and the long-suffering of Lord, 
therefore, supposing that he would be merciful unto them that they would again become 
a righteous people.”72  Yet, the people’s choice to reject repentance strengthens rather 
than suspends the negative consequences of their sins, thus increasing the burden of 
their personal responsibility. 
On the other hand, LDS canonical texts provide evidences of individuals who 
use sorrow as their stepping stone to the metanoeo which leads to conversion.  In most 
instances such sorrow is manifested in the form of ‘guilt’ which emerges from the 
recognition that a sin has been committed where it could have been avoided.  The 
emotion is further intensified by the perception that being a disobedient child manifests 
ingratitude toward a loving Heavenly Father who sends blessings to His children to 
facilitate their progression and joy.  One clear example of this positive response is 
found in the BoM account of Zeezrom, whose “soul began to be harrowed up under a 
consciousness of his own guilt; yea, he began to be encircled about by the pains of 
hell.”  Significantly, the depth of his conversion and repentance is immediately 
manifested in his willingness to confess and in his endeavour to reverse all previously 
committed evil when he takes an unpopular stand in behalf of Alma and Amulek.  
Thus, “he began to cry unto the people, saying: Behold, I am guilty, and these men are 
spotless before God.  And he began to plead for them from that time forth.”73 
However, not all passages of scripture classify people’s reactions to sorrow in 
black and white terms.  In some instances the complexities of volition are such that 
godly and worldly sorrow appear more as two opposite tendencies extending on a 
spectrum of motivation than they do as mutually exclusive categories of emotional 
experience.  In fact, even very devout individuals occasionally fluctuate between more 
and less ‘godly’ occurrences of sorrow, as illustrated by Lehi, the patriarch of both 
Nephite and Lamanites civilizations.  Within the BoM record this prophet is shown to 
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experience one single moment of weakness when he murmurs “against the Lord” (to be 
understood in current terms as ‘complaining’) while finding himself almost at the point 
of starvation.  Since his sorrow is manifested “against” God it is clear that this 
experience lies closer to the ‘wordly’ than to the ‘godly’ side of the emotion.    In this 
context the apparent mitigating circumstance of impending starvation for his whole 
family is not offered as justification.   
Yet, through the example and inspiring words of his son Nephi, Lehi humbles 
himself and subsequently receives a revelatory voice through which “he was truly 
chastened because of his murmuring against the Lord, insomuch that he was brought 
down into the depths of sorrow.”74  It is important to remember that at the time of this 
chastening the physiological pain triggered by fatigue and lack of food has not subsided 
because the relevant circumstances have not yet changed.  Only later will Lehi’s family 
be able to find the necessary food which will allow them to obtain strength and to 
survive.  Still, this verse highlights a transition in Lehi’s attitude because his 
physiological sorrow, which first motivated complaining, does not function here as an 
obstacle to his interaction with God.  In fact, even while compounded by ‘guilt’ it 
possibly facilitates the humility that makes this very interaction possible.  Therefore, at 
the core of this change lies a shifting focus, a different choice, and a wider perspective 
that deeply affects the eventual emotional outcome in this prophet’s life. 
It is also significant to notice that Lehi’s original sorrow is not caused by an act 
of disobedience on his part; on the contrary, Lehi is suffering hunger in the desert 
because he obeyed God’s command to depart from Jerusalem.  Yet, Lehi retains 
responsibility for how he chooses to respond to these trying circumstances.  In fact, 
Mormon texts highlight that humans should react to ‘undeserved’ sorrow by focusing 
their attention and affections on God in prayer.  As stated in the D&C: “If thou art 
sorrowful, call on the Lord thy God with supplication, that your souls may be joyful.”75  
Still, the replacement of sorrow with joy will not always match God’s inscrutable will, 
or at least His timing.  This is particularly the case when the sorrow is caused by the 
unfortunate or evil choices of other individuals whose agency God will usually respect.  
Then, in these difficult circumstances, the faithful should humbly accept God’s 
decision not to remove the source of sorrow while continuing to search for His 
assistance by petitioning for strength, knowledge, or other empowering blessings.  As I 
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am about to explore, this is one of the most prominent aspects of sorrow’s 
developmental instrumentality.   
 
Developmental Instrumentality 
 The dynamic nature of sorrow is consistently evident within the developmental 
context of LDS canonical texts.  In other words, sorrow is the vehicle which inevitably 
pushes individuals, either forward or backward, in their path of spiritual progression.  
Thus, it can either motivate people to repent and to humble themselves before God or it 
can lead them to harden their hearts against Him and to abandon the path of 
discipleship.  In fact, some interpret sorrow as evidence of their own sinfulness and 
need for redemption whereas others understand it to be an indication of the absence of 
God and of the uselessness of His supposed commandments.  Therefore, whether the 
information is correct or incorrect, sorrow usually performs a communicative function 
subsequent to which individuals are motivated to act and to believe in certain manners.  
Clearly, according to LDS scriptures, not all human reactions to sorrow are 
developmentally instrumental although single inappropriate reactions do not necessarily 
cause permanent spiritual damage.  At the same time, Mormon texts highlight that 
inappropriate reactive ‘patterns’ to sorrow may represent a great danger for one’s 
spiritual well-being. 
  As already pinpointed, and in unison with all Christianity, Mormon theology 
affirms the inevitability of some of life’s sorrows; yet, a theology of ‘the Fall’ as felix 
culpa gives the LDS perspective unique patterns of emphasis in this context.  Indeed, in 
the first place the PoGP echoes Genesis in stating, “Unto the woman, I, the Lord God, 
said: I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception.  In sorrow thou shalt bring 
forth children…And unto Adam, I, the Lord God, said:…in sorrow shalt thou eat of it 
[the ground] all the days of thy life.”76  Therefore, Mormons accept sorrow as one of 
the consequences of ‘the Fall’ even speaking, as Alma does, of mortal experience as 
“this vale of sorrow.”77  However, when addressing post-Eden sorrow the Mormon 
emphasis is generally on ‘opportunity’ rather than on ‘punishment.’  Thus, while on the 
one hand sorrow is inherent in the process of biological decay and death, on the other it 
is a necessary ingredient for spiritual growth and progression.  The BoM highlights 
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these very aspects beginning with Nephi’s comments on sorrow’s physiological effects 
over his parents,  
My parents… they were brought down, yea, even upon their sickbeds.  Because of their grief 
and much sorrow, and the iniquity of my brethren, they were brought near even to be carried out 
of this time to meet their God; yea, their grey hairs were about to be brought down to lie low in 
the dust; yea, even they were near to be cast with sorrow into a watery grave.78    
 
Then, only a few pages removed, Lehi is reported to have taught that “Adam fell that 
men might be; and men are, that they might have joy.”  Indeed, in relation to the Fall he 
adds that “all things have been done in the wisdom of him who knoweth all things.”79   
Therefore, it is in God’s wisdom that experiential sorrow should polarize 
individuals who choose their response as either patient submissiveness or murmuring 
rebellion.  Yet, the two categories are not fixed and crossovers are possible since 
sorrow can humble the rebellious to the point of repentance.  One primary example of 
this pattern of lasting transformation is the conversion of Alma the Younger.80  Instead, 
on the negative side of the equation are Laman and Lemuel, whose occasional moments 
of humility do not facilitate a lasting spiritual conversion.  Eventually, having 
repeatedly rejected sorrowful privations and difficulties as a means to spiritual 
progression the BoM highlights their increasing rebellion, which culminates in their 
desire to murder both their father and their brother Nephi.81  Therefore, while Alma’s 
and Zeezrom’s humble response to their initial sorrowful guilt overshadows the evil 
nature of their earlier choices Laman and Lemuel do not share in the same victory as 
they progressively move in the direction of permanent rebellion. 
 To be sure, as seen in the case of Lehi, some degree of puzzlement over the 
evidence that bad things happen to good people will continue to affect firm believers as 
it will doubters.  Mormons have not been immune to this difficulty and the historical 
context of social conflict in which the movement emerged has probably exacerbated the 
issue.  The response LDS theology provides to the key question of ‘undeserved’ sorrow 
involves a tension between two different directions of explanation.  In the first place, 
and in unison with other Christian traditions, Mormon texts reduce the temporal 
extension of sorrow to this life while enlarging the perspective of existence to eternity.  
In this manner, suffering circumstances are framed as limited and temporal because the 
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individual casts his attention on the infinite and joyous after-life.  Thus, in a passage 
which is resonant of Johannine theology, God reassures His Saints by promising:  
And all they who suffer persecution for my name, and endure in faith, though they are called to 
lay down their lives for my sake yet shall they partake of all this glory.  Wherefore, fear not 
even unto death; for in this world your joy is not full, but in me your joy is full.82  
 
In other words, endurance is facilitated by the promise of a future lasting condition of 
happiness. 
The second direction of explanation recasts sorrow and suffering in terms that 
are not only opposite to joy, but also inherently necessary to the actualization of joy.  
This is a unique manner to respond to the drive for meaning, which characterizes the 
common experience of human beings.  Indeed, as Viktor Frankl argued, it is the 
identification of satisfactory meaning in the context of even the most excruciating 
suffering, which provides an effective path to psychological survival.83  In the Mormon 
context the meaning of sorrow emerges from its inclusion as a necessary factor for the 
achievement of joy, not only in the delayed milieu of the eternities but also in the very 
present condition of mortality.  Certainly, the philosophical foundations for the 
‘opposition in all things’ previously highlighted provide the most explicit evidence for 
this line of reasoning.  Additionally, several canonical instances make reference to the 
sorrow, which precedes and is juxtaposed to subsequent interrelated joy, thus 
potentially suggesting causative necessity of the former for the latter.  In one example 
Nephi states that “notwithstanding we had suffered many afflictions and much 
difficulty, yea, even so much that we cannot write them all, we were exceedingly 
rejoiced when we came to the seashore.”84  Similarly, in concluding the account of the 
sons of Mosiah’s mission among the Lamanites, Mormon writes of “their journeying in 
the land of Nephi, their sufferings in the land, their sorrows, and their afflictions, and 
their incomprehensible joy.”85  To these may be added the many conversion accounts 
which involve transitions from deep sorrow to profound joy. 
 Yet, notwithstanding its necessary association to joy and its potential facilitative 
role for the emergence of humility the negative implications of suffering can be 
spiritually ‘dangerous’.  In fact, if not transformed by faith sorrow may turn into 
despair as pinpointed by Moroni in the remark, “if ye have no hope ye must needs be in 
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despair; and despair cometh because of iniquity.”86  Thus, only faith can prevent the 
individual from abandoning himself to the sorrow, which leads to utter hopelessness.  
For example, in his 1838 description of his first theophany Joseph Smith focused on the 
timing of the occurrence which took place “at the very moment when I was ready to 
sink into despair and abandon myself to destruction.”87  Indeed, at the time of crisis he 
had continued to pray in faith for deliverance from the “enemy” and the “thick 
darkness” which were enveloping him.  In a separate context, when commenting on 
Alma’s emotional condition, Mormon suggests one reason for the great danger of 
mental capitulation to sorrow.  In his account Alma, “having seen the afflictions of the 
humble followers of God, and the persecutions which were heaped upon them by the 
remainder of his people, and seeing all their inequality, began to be very sorrowful; 
nevertheless the Spirit of the Lord did not fail him.”88   
Therefore, if the Spirit of the Lord is fully absent, and its comforting and 
strengthening influences do not assist the suffering individual, sorrow may escalate in a 
negative trajectory culminating in self-destruction.  Yet, this condition of utter spiritual 
abandonment is usually present only in those circumstances of unrelenting rebellion as 
typified in the spiritual condition of Mormon’s people at the time of preparation for 
their final battle.  Mormon describes the scene in these terms, 
The Spirit of the Lord hath already ceased to strive with their fathers; and they are without 
Christ and God in the world; and they are driven about as chaff before the wind…by 
Satan…And in this part of the land they are also seeking to put down all power and authority 
which cometh from God; and they are denying the Holy Ghost.89 
 
The text underlines the fact that the Spirit was not assisting this people because they 
had repeatedly and permanently rejected it; in other words, “the day of grace was 
passed”. 90  Still, since such circumstances of full rebellion are rare, as other LDS texts 
indicate, the assistance of the strengthening power of divinity is in some degree always 
present in all those individuals who have not fully extinguished the ‘light of Christ’ 
within them.  
Finally, to return to sorrow’s instrumentality in the process of spiritual 
progression I should highlight two of its specific functions, which emerge from several 
Mormon canonical accounts.  In the first place, sorrow can remind people of their 
                                                 
86 Moro. 10:22. 
87 JS-H 1:15-16.  
88 Alma 4:15. 
89 Morm 5:16, 18; Moro 8:28. 
90 Morm. 2:15. 
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identity in specific relation to their Father in Heaven.  For example, the BoM observes 
that “many of them, after having suffered much loss and so many afflictions, began to 
be stirred up in remembrance of the words which Aaron and his brethren had preached 
to them…therefore they began…to believe in the Lord.”91  Furthermore, sorrow may 
remind faithful individuals of the great suffering sacrifice of Jesus Christ, although the 
general tendency in the moment of pain is to centre one’s attention on the personal 
sorrow which is being experienced.  This was Joseph Smith’s experience in Liberty Jail 
when he poured out his feelings in prayer by crying to heaven: “O Lord, how long…?” 
and possibly also implying why? 92  Yet, God’s response, though comforting in tone, 
shifts the focus in comparative mode to Christ’s Atonement, “Know thou, my son, that 
all these things shall give thee experience, and shall be for thy good.  The Son of Man 
hath descended below them all.  Art thou greater than he?”93   
Secondly, sorrow may acquire a sanctifying function, particularly when 
associated with the direct effects of persecution, as commonly experienced by prophets 
like Nephi, Abinadi, Ammon, Alma, and Joseph Smith.94  True, in some instances the 
willingness to suffer persecution already indicates that the prophet has depth of faith 
and great love of truth.  Thus, in preparing for martyrdom Abinadi bravely affirms that 
“I will suffer even until death, and I will not recall my words” of testimony.  Similarly, 
the people of Ammon are killed while refusing to defend themselves in order to follow 
their commitment to bury “their weapons of war for peace.”95  Yet, in other passages 
suffering also appears as a further sanctifying tool which deepens and solidifies the 
existing faith and humility of individuals.  Therefore, it is not coincidental that those 
believers who are suffering persecution in the book of Helaman are described as 
increasing in faith, humility and purity,  
This was a great evil, which did cause the more humble part of the people to suffer great 
persecutions, and to wade through much affliction.  Nevertheless they did fast and pray oft, and 
did wax stronger and stronger in their humility, and firmer and firmer in the faith of Christ, unto 
the filling their souls with joy and consolation, yea, even to the purifying and the sanctification 
of their hearts, which sanctification cometh because of their yielding their hearts unto God.96 
 
These faithful individuals respond to suffering with patience and trust in God while 
probably understanding that ‘the shame of the world’ is a necessary feature of the path 
                                                 
91 Alma 25:6 
92 D&C 121:3; 109:31,49,76 
93 D&C 122:7-8 
94 See 2 Ne 1:24; Mosiah 7:16; 17:15; Alma 4:13; JS-H 1:23, 27. 
95 Mosiah 17:10; Alma 24:19 
96 Hel. 3:34-35 
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of discipleship.  In fact, Jacob conveys this sense of inevitability when wishing, “We 
would to God that…all men would believe in Christ, and view his death, and suffer his 
cross and bear the shame of the world.”97   
Indeed, God realizes that sorrow often functions as the only purifying 
instrument which leads stubborn individuals unto repentance as He affirms, “And my 
people must needs be chastened until they learn obedience, if it must needs be, by the 
things which they suffer.”98  Yet, some trials and afflictions fall upon whole 
populations without distinction between righteous or unrighteous.  In fact, Jacob 
describes the emotional condition of his people, including himself and all the other 
righteous, in these sombre words, 
The time passed away with us, and also our lives passed away like as it were unto us a dream, 
we being a lonesome and a solemn people, wanderers, cast out from Jerusalem, born in 
tribulation, in a wilderness, and hated of our brethren, which caused wars and contentions; 
wherefore, we did mourn out  our days.99  
 
Once again, the difference lies in patterns of response, whether involving humility and 
faith to further sanctification or pride and disbelief to hardened rebellion.  Then, 
sorrow’s developmental instrumentality hinges on this very distinction.  
 
Sorrow and the Atonement 
 Given the centrality of the Atonement for the process of understanding sorrow 
and for the development of its associated coping responses any LDS theological 
discussion of this emotion must include a careful exploration of sorrow’s connection 
with Christ’s sacrifice.  Yet, since sorrow’s interaction with the Atonement 
considerably overlaps with the interactive patterns of the relating emotions I will 
postpone some aspects of the present discussion to the next chapter.  For now, I may 
only outline the most prominent of the numerous ramifications of this relationship.  The 
following roles of the Atonement are especially relevant: remover of human sorrow, 
preventer of it, strength source for the human sufferer, and model of ideal human 
responses to some kinds of sorrow, thus facilitating a degree of its acceptance.  
Furthermore, human experiences of sorrow may aid the individual in understanding the 
Atonement, particularly through the experience of empathic sorrow, and consequently 
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to feel a deeper connection with Jesus while coming to understand and to experience a 
deeper form of Christ-like love. 
 In the first place, according to the penal-substitution view of the Atonement, 
Mormons stress that the atoning Jesus is the bearer of guilt for the sins of humankind.  
At the same time, since He “suffered temptations, but gave no heed unto them” Christ 
is able to impute to us the purity and innocence of His life, while taking upon Himself 
the sorrow of our guilt.100  Still, in line with the LDS emphasis on the eternal principle 
of agency Christ’s redeeming gift requires an uncoerced accepting response which is to 
be embodied in the personal offer of a repenting heart.  Indeed, since repentance itself 
is a gift made possible by the atoning sacrifice it is not surprising that Mormon texts 
often set Jesus’ sacrifice in direct relationship with repentance.  The D&C illustrates it 
in these terms, “The Lord your Redeemer suffered death in the flesh; wherefore he 
suffered the pain of all men, that all men might repent and come unto him.”101  In other 
words, the Atonement does not suspend individuals’ responsibility to avoid sin and to 
repent.  Instead, somewhat ironically, in order to avoid the ultimate sorrow, which is 
the enduring guilt of sin, humans are called to experience a different kind of sorrow, 
namely the deep sorrow of sincere repentance.  Yet, this sorrow is godly, sanctifying, 
instrumentally salvific, and only temporary. 
 Conversion and repentance stories in the Mormon canon perfectly illustrate this 
role of the Atonement.  For example, in speaking to his son Shiblon Alma highlights 
the deep emotional transformation which had emerged during his own conversion, “I 
was three days and three nights in the most bitter pain and anguish of soul; and never, 
until I did cry out unto the Lord Jesus Christ for mercy, did I receive a remission of my 
sins.  But behold, I did cry unto him and I did find peace to my soul.”102  Specifically, 
in this and in other accounts of his conversion, Alma highlights the role of ‘faith’ as the 
central factor that activates the Atonement’s power to heal spiritually.  Similarly, in his 
‘psalm’ within the fourth chapter of his second book, Nephi describes his own 
emotional transformation beginning with a reflection over the anger he feels against his 
brothers while lamenting “O wretched man that I am!” but culminating in joyful 
exultations and expressions of divine love.  The point of emotional transition centres on 
remembrance of personal experiences in which Nephi recognizes God’s power in the 
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form of love, protection, support, and powerful spiritual visitations.  The end-result of 
this recollection and refocusing is a changed emotional status, 
O then, if I have seen so great things, if the Lord in his condescension unto the children of men 
hath visited men in so much mercy, why should my heart weep and my soul linger in the valley 
of sorrow, and my flesh waste away, and my strength slacken, because of mine 
afflictions?...Awake my soul!  No longer droop in sin.  Rejoice, O my heart, and give place no 
more for the enemy of my soul.103 
 
Therefore, mere recollection of specific blessings made possible by the Atonement 
contributes to remove the present experience of sorrow in the recognition of personal 
weakness.104   
In addition to removing both present and eternal guilt by means of forgiveness 
of sins the Atonement removes or reduces the ‘guiltless’ sorrow which is associated 
with death, weakness, loss, disease, or with the hurtful consequences of others’ agency.   
In the first place, as common to other theistic religions, Mormonism highlights the fact 
that the suffering associated with the death of a loved one can be removed or at least 
softened by a recognition and celebration of the departed’s faithfulness and present 
state of blessedness.  Thus, in speaking of those Nephites who had lost their lives in 
battle against the Lamanites Helaman affirms: “Nevertheless, we may console 
ourselves in this point, that they have died in the cause of their country and of their 
God, yea, and they are happy.”105  Similarly, Mormon states in one of his editorials that 
“there were many who died with old age; and those who died in the faith of Christ are 
happy in him, as we must needs suppose.”106  Indeed, post-death or post-resurrection 
promises of removal of sorrow in association with the salvific promises of the 
Atonement are quite numerous in LDS texts.107 
Therefore, one of the primary means to reduce sorrow involves various forms of 
cognitive restructuring, including the forward-looking focus just mentioned, which is 
not only applicable to circumstances of death, but also to conditions of disease, loss, or 
other suffering.  Yet, even a faith in the eventual termination of all troubling 
experiences is not usually sufficient to abate significant levels of sorrow.  Other forms 
                                                 
103 2 Ne 4:26,28.  This text has some affinity to Romans 8. 
104 To be sure, the text does not clarify whether the transition is merely a result of Nephi’s change in 
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105 Alma 56:11. 
106 Alma 46:41. 
107 See Alma 40:12; 2 Ne. 24:3; D&C 101:29 to mention only a few. 
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of cognitive restructuring include comparative reappraisals of one’s suffering in 
relation to Jesus’ or other individuals’, recognition that losses and deprivations may 
only appear to be such when in reality they constitute blessings in disguise, or, as 
described earlier, an attitude that reshapes sorrow into a developmental tool which 
facilitates spiritual growth.  In some of these instances the Atonement appears 
explicitly within the new realm of focus (as in the Liberty Jail prayer) whereas in other 
cases it functions indirectly as the organizing principle that sustains ‘the great plan of 
happiness’, which in turn brings comfort because it enlarges one’s spiritual perspective. 
The truly distinctive Mormon element in the view of the Atonement as reducer 
of personal suffering centres in Christ’s experience of empathic sorrow.  Indeed, as 
previously outlined, Mormonism claims that Christ’s atoning experience was all 
inclusive of all forms of suffering and pain, whether related or unrelated to sin.  
Therefore, Mormons understand Jesus as the perfect empathizer who fully 
comprehends and knows from personal experience every single kind of painful 
manifestation associated with human life.  Consequently, when the Saints petition God 
for comfort and alleviation of pain they may sense that Jesus is able to share their 
burden and to participate in their sorrow.  This is indeed a form of cognitive 
intervention, although theologically it is more than an internal unassisted process.  In 
fact, Jesus’ empathy is intricately connected with the influence and blessings of the 
Holy Spirit, which provides comfort, knowledge, and perspective as an external 
intensifying source of ‘light’ and joy.  Then, as the ultimate cause of the Spirit’s 
sanctifying presence and as the moment in time which embodies divine compassion 
through empathic sorrow the Atonement reoccurs, as it were, by means of repeated acts 
of Jesus’ participation in human sorrow, which are ‘activated’ by prayers of faith. 
It is only in light of this theological background that one may begin to 
understand the Mormon usage of the term Atonement as a large coping umbrella under 
which appear to fall all negative aspects of the human experience.  Furthermore, the 
‘principle’ of materialistic monism previously describes strengthens such 
comprehensiveness inasmuch as it reframes pains, afflictions, sicknesses, and 
infirmities as human circumstances which affect the whole soul, both body and spirit.  
In other words, people are spiritually hindered by the effects of ‘the Fall’ as manifested 
by the sicknesses and infirmities of the body as well as by the struggles and pains 
associated with the daily dynamics of social interactions.  In turn, these hindrances are 
manifested in the greater resistance to the purifying influence of the Holy Spirit through 
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those psychological or physiological dynamics which represent inherent obstacles to 
spiritual manifestations.  Yet, in the individual who is able to exert faith in its power 
the effects of the Atonement are such that they may transcend, at least to some degree, 
these intrinsic obstacles.  In other words, wherever distance and separation from God is 
highlighted and enlarged by forces such as sin, faulty sociality, or decaying physiology 
the Atonement may act as a counter-force which reduces that distance by means of the 
sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit. 
Still, the Atonement will not always eliminate sorrow or even reduce it, but 
often it will ‘strengthen’ the individual so that he may face his challenges with greater 
hope and capacity.  Indeed, prophets recognize that trials and their associated sorrows 
often play a significant role as catalysts in the growth of Christ-like attributes.  
Therefore, within the eternal scheme of God’s plan of progression it is not always 
appropriate to petition for the removal of a source of suffering.  Alma manifests this 
perspective when he prays for strength during his mission among the Zoramites, 
Oh Lord, wilt thou give me strength, that I may bear with mine infirmities.  For I am infirm, and 
such wickedness among this people doth pain my soul.  O Lord, my heart is exceedingly 
sorrowful; wilt thou comfort my soul in Christ.  O Lord, wilt thou grant unto me that I may have 
strength, that I may suffer with patience these afflictions, which shall come upon me, because of 
the iniquity of this people.108 
 
In another context and at an earlier time God had responded to Alma’s specific 
petitions for freedom from Lamanite oppression by endowing him with strength rather 
than by causing his deliverance from bondage.  In that instance, “the burdens which 
were laid upon Alma and his brethren were made light; yea, the Lord did strengthen 
them that they could bear up their burdens with ease, and they did submit cheerfully 
and with patience to all the will of the Lord.”109  The source of sorrow was not 
removed, but an internal change was facilitated that diminished the impact of the 
sorrow-causing circumstances.   
 Clearly, all the sorrow suffered by the righteous because of their persecutors’ 
actions is preventable inasmuch as the persecutors choose to follow Christ’s teachings 
in avoiding sin.  Therefore, the Atonement is a preventer of sorrow in the degree to 
which it facilitates this very choice.  In fact, the power of the Spirit, whose presence is 
made possible by Jesus’ sacrifice, can strengthen individuals in their commitment and 
in their capacity to be obedient to divine teachings.  On the other hand, rejection of the 
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Atonement through unwillingness to obey or repent ultimately implies a rejection of 
both His ‘substitutory sorrow’ and of the presence of the Holy Spirit.  An ideal 
illustration of this pattern in the context of disobedience is provided by a passage of the 
D&C, which probably represents the most vivid and personal description of Jesus’ 
atoning sufferings within Mormon sacred literature.  Yet, this account does not only 
provide indications on the nature of the Atonement as an historical event but it also 
underlines the relationship that exists between human sorrow driven by disobedience 
and the Atonement as an ongoing process. 
This specific section of the D&C is addressed to one of the three witnesses of 
the BoM, i.e. Martin Harris, and it begins with a revelatory statement which denies the 
literal unlimited duration of the scriptural expression “eternal punishment”. Then, 
perhaps to ensure that this assertion does not function as a justification for sinning, the 
divine voice adds: 
Therefore I command you to repent – repent, lest I smite you by the rod of my mouth, and by 
my wrath, and by my anger, and your sufferings be sore – how sore you know not, how 
exquisite you know not, yea, how hard to bear you know not.  For behold, I, God, have suffered 
these things for all, that they might not suffer if they would repent; But if they would not repent 
they must suffer even as I; Which suffering caused myself, even God, the greatest of all, to 
tremble because of pain, and to bleed at every pore, and to suffer both body and spirit.110     
 
In this instance an emphasis on Atonement as ‘substitution’ is quite evident given that 
its function as preventer of ‘sorrow’ is enabled by the process of repentance which 
inherently signifies individual acceptance of Christ’s substitutory suffering.  At the 
same time, there is a paradox in the framing of Jesus (the revelator) as both dispenser of 
punishment and as the ultimate receiver of punishment in the event of the Atonement.   
As previously seen, Mormon theology approaches this paradox by 
understanding the “must” in this passage as a true ontological necessity.  In other 
words, within a universe of fixed and uncreated ‘principles’ there is no alternative for 
the individual who rejects Jesus’ empowering and liberating sacrifice: he must suffer.  
In this context God respects the agency of the rebellious and cannot allow “mercy to 
rob justice”, otherwise He “would cease to be God”.111  Whether this latter statement is 
understood as a merely logical or as a fully actual possibility the necessity for a total 
acceptance of the Atonement is explicitly stressed along with the dire consequences 
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intrinsic in the failure to repent.112  Yet, as the rest of this passage underlines, this is not 
a judgment or an experience of negative consequences which is relegated to the 
eschaton, “Wherefore, I command you again to repent, lest I humble you with my 
almighty power; and that you confess your sins, lest you suffer these punishments of 
which I have spoken, of which in the least degree you have tasted at the time I 
withdrew my Spirit.”113  In other words, God affirms that Martin has already begun to 
suffer the consequences of his rebellion.  Should he fail to repent the full force and 
extent of these consequences will be manifested at a later post-mortem stage, but a 
‘taste’ was already savoured when the Holy Spirit withdrew from his presence.   
Then, within this verse one finds at least three inferences, which are of 
theological significance within a Mormon context of sorrow and Atonement. In the first 
place, spiritual withdrawal causes sufferings, and secondly Christ Himself experienced 
such spiritual withdrawal during His Atonement.  Finally, by failing to accept the 
Atonement through repentance humans experience a “degree” of such spiritual 
loneliness, whereas those who accept it enjoy the Atonement’s substitutory function 
and thus need not suffer similar spiritual privations.  Therefore, rejecting the 
Atonement involves the associated forfeiting of its benefits and blessings, namely the 
guiding, strengthening, and comforting presence of the Holy Spirit.  Whether in the 
present of daily life or in the future of eternity it is isolation from God and from His 
Spirit that lies at the core of this self-inflicted punishment.114  At the same time, the 
passage neither claims that every instance of human estrangement from the Spirit is a 
consequence of sin nor that the issue of spiritual assistance can be easily settled in 
terms of dichotomous presence and absence.115  What is theologically and pastorally 
significant in this context is the association of loneliness with both Atonement and sin. 
Thus, on the one hand and by means of Jesus’ empathic sorrow as experienced in the 
loneliness of the Atonement Mormons can tap into a Christological resource to cope 
                                                 
112 Thus, God’s harsh rhetoric of infliction of punishment does not necessarily imply a desire but only a 
necessity.  The manner of harsh expression probably relates more to the audience than it does to the 
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with their spiritual loneliness.  On the other hand, Mormons realize that their 
loneliness, unlike Jesus’, is in many cases caused by sin, for which they will be 
motivated to seek forgiveness.116 
 Therefore, the Atonement is the ever-present resource for the proper 
contextualization of suffering which is just as significant to the process of acceptance 
of suffering as it is to the struggle in overcoming it.  In fact, there are sorrows and 
sufferings which the Atonement does not claim to be able to remove or to prevent, 
particularly in the context of the mortal realm but also in the future reality of our eternal 
existence, as I examine more closely in the next section on ‘love’.  Certainly, Jesus 
never promises the potential absence of all present sorrows and He does not perform 
deceiving illusionary transformations of reality like Satan, who imitates joy with 
sorrow and who confuses evil with good.  In so doing, as Lehi claims, since Satan “had 
fallen from heaven, and had become miserable forever, he sought also the misery of all 
mankind.”117  Therefore, the saying that ‘misery loves company’ is certainly applicable 
in the context of the Mormon devil, whose personal sorrow he desires to spread as 
widely as possible.  Then, in Satan’s case there is no sorrow associated with humility 
and love extending outward but only sorrow from pride and love directed inward as he 
“seeketh to destroy the souls of men.”118   
 In conclusion, in this chapter I have analysed a few relevant passages of the 
LDS canon, which focus on content relating to the assessing emotions as represented 
by joy and sorrow.  By highlighting the explicit and implicit textual evidence for the 
cognitive necessity, personal responsibility, and developmental instrumentality 
associated with these terms I have aimed to provide support for an implied ‘folk model’ 
of emotion, which brings these canonical authors to echo modern scholars and 
scientists in affirming the three basic characteristics that define emotions.  Furthermore, 
I have examined various links and contingencies that associate the Mormon 
understanding of Atonement with both joy and sorrow and have highlighted the 
significance of such interaction within the LDS theological framework.  In order to 
conclude my examination one more category of emotion remains to be analysed; hence, 
I now proceed to explore the third spectrum of emotional phenomena, or what I have 
identified as the relating emotions.   
                                                 
116 An LDS apostle recently spoke of Jesus’ loneliness with such pastoral perspective in mind.  See 
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117 2 Ne. 2:18. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
The ‘Relating’ Emotions: Love and Hate 
 
 
 To conclude my textual analysis of emotion terms within the LDS canon I have 
chosen to focus on a category of emotional phenomena which I have labelled relating.  
True, all emotions are relating in the sense that they are rooted to some degree in 
relationships with people or objects external to the individual experiencer.  Yet, some 
emotions do not require a grammatical direct object in order to be conceptualized 
whereas others appear to be almost meaningless in the absence of such an object.  For 
example, it is conceivable to speak of joy and of hope in terms which are exclusively 
focused on the individual subject as experiencer whereas any discussion of love is by 
necessity extended to at least imply some direct object, however diffused or 
generalized.  In fact, even when the object is equivalent to the subject love must be 
spoken of in reflexive rather than in objectless terms.  Therefore, I have decided to 
highlight relation as the preeminent characteristic of this kind of emotion with 
particular reference to human relationships as the main form of relation with which 
they are concerned. 
 The prototypical manifestation of this category of emotion centres 
unsurprisingly on the love-hate dichotomy.  In fact, love and hate represent perfect 
candidates for this selection given their common usage and their location on the very 
opposite ends of this particular emotional spectrum.  Furthermore, in comparison with 
verbs such as like or dislike, love and hate have usual reference to grammatical objects 
which interact; thus, human beings and their dynamic exchanges lie at the centre of 
these emotional experiences.  True, people often affirm their love or hate for a 
particular inanimate object but whether these expressions are understood as hyperboles, 
Freudian projections, or accurate descriptions, it is at least debatable that a healthy 
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human being may truly love or hate an inanimate object as such.  Indeed, the intensity 
of love or hate generally necessitates a responsive object which is capable of pleasing 
or hurting the individual.  Therefore, dual directionality functions prominently to 
emphasize relationship as the defining characteristic of the prototypical manifestations 
of this category of phenomena. 
 Finally, the temporal context of these emotions may extend to include both the 
actual and the potential.  In fact, as seen in relation to the assessing emotions, 
individual perceptions may form imagined or predicted relationships which in turn 
could activate feelings of love or hatred.  Yet, assuming that most people usually 
possess a general grasp over reality, love and hate are more likely to emerge in 
temporal contexts rooted in the present or in the past, whether correctly or incorrectly 
perceived.  Then, as my textual analysis indicates, if individuals contemplate a future 
experience of love or hatred they usually do so as they temporally extend their present 
emotional condition to the future rather than by ‘creating’ a cognitive image of a novel 
relationship which uniquely triggers their love or hatred.  To be sure, this is no simple 
area of exploration given the particular role played by temporal endurance in the 
definition of many a human relationship, which to some degree highlights the realm of 
the potential in the emergence or either love or hate.  However, this is not an issue with 
which I am presently concerned. 
 
Love: the Positive Relating Experience 
 The word love is found in 106 verses of the Mormon canon.  Affection appears 
in one instance and delight in 23 other verses thus combining for a total of 130 
inclusions within what Mormons call the ‘triple combination’.  I have decided to 
incorporate affection and delight in this analysis because the contexts in which they 
appear suggest a meaning that is synonymous with love.  While other terms, like 
worship, treasure, respect, and reverence, are at times closely associated with at least 
some aspect of love they generally lack the comprehensive array of attitudes and 
feelings which love is understood to include.  Furthermore, and uniquely among the 
‘positive’ emotions, scriptural instances of love are not limited to human subjects since 
canonical texts often describe divine love and highlight God’s affirmation of love 
towards humanity.  Instead, divine hope and divine joy are rarely, if at all, mentioned in 
LDS scriptural writings.  Significantly, as the textual examination will underline, 
Mormon texts do not suggest that divine love represents a different ‘kind’ of emotion to 
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be distinguished in kind from human love.  Instead, divine love embodies the apex of 
purity, intensity, and expansion of what humans experience in a yet smaller and 
imperfect form.  As such, divine love functions both as the ideal and as the source for 
the love that humanity is able to enjoy. 
 
Cognitive Necessity 
  Love is characterized both by specific objects and by its motivating reasons.  In 
other words, people generally know whom they love and why they love them, although 
identifying and articulating the exact motivations for one’s love may appear 
particularly difficult in some cases.  Specifically, instances of romantic attraction where 
love is expressed primarily as eros are likely to be subject to complicating and 
confusing obfuscations of motivations.  In these contexts, as many artistic expressions 
aim to remind us, the irrational, the unpredictable, and the inexplicable attached to 
these phenomena never cease to fascinate a world that is often obsessed with the 
mysterious and the dangerous.  Yet, the focus of both biblical and uniquely LDS 
scriptural texts is love as agape and not love in its erotic dimension.  Indeed, eros or 
any other passion, i.e. anger, may function as an obstacle to agape if not controlled and 
accompanied by selfless love.  This is probably what Alma the Younger means when 
he reminds his son Shiblon: “Bridle all your passions, that ye may be filled with love.”1  
In other words, eros is not necessarily to be extirpated, but the emotion to cultivate is 
the more rational and spiritually driven agape without which eros ceases to be love and 
begins to function as anti-love. 
  To be sure, Mormons generally do not distinguish between various kinds of 
love in ways explicitly based on Greek nomenclature.  However, they regularly and 
repeatedly use the KJV translation of agape as charity when speaking about the love 
which is worthy of aspiration and which is embodied in its fullness in the personages of 
the Godhead.  Thus, Moroni echoes Paul when he affirms that “charity is the pure love 
of Christ, and it endureth forever.”  Furthermore, in an earlier passage, he explains that 
the preposition ‘of’ should be understood both as a possessive referring to the love 
experienced by Christ and as a qualifier for the kind of love that all God’s children 
must ultimately possess in order “to inherit that place which” Christ has prepared for 
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them.2  Therefore, when studying the topic of love in canonical texts the Saints seek for 
understanding about the way in which such an ideal may be achieved while also 
looking for indications on how its obstructing imitations may be avoided.  In other 
words, as will be amply demonstrated, love in Mormon scriptures is all but an irrational 
and uncontrollable phenomenon. 
 In the first place, the cognitive necessity of love is evident in the varying 
possible objects of love which often underlie separate patterns of knowledge content 
and of desires.  In this context parental teaching and other forms of knowledge 
acquisition represent a key antecedent to the emergence and specific focalization of 
both emotions of love and hatred.  Thus, king Benjamin encourages his people to teach 
their children “to walk in the ways of truth and soberness; ye will teach them to love 
one another, and to serve one another.”  On the other hand, in reference to the 
Lamanites he was fighting in war, captain Moroni affirms that “it is the tradition of 
their fathers that has caused their hatred.”3  Therefore, one’s beliefs about ‘the other’ 
and about the latter’s responsibility in carrying out particular actions usually determine 
the response towards that same individual.  In this context, Zeniff roots the Lamanites’ 
hatred towards the Nephites in the belief of being repeatedly “wronged” by the 
Nephites.  Similarly, the desire of the converted sons of Mosiah to preach the Gospel to 
the blood-thirsty Lamanites is driven by a love which is kindled by their illuminated 
perspective on the nature of the eternities as “they could not bear that any human soul 
should perish; yea, even the very thoughts that any soul should endure endless torment 
did cause them to quake and tremble.”4 
 In other words, love has reasons, both when expressed by individual humans 
and by God Himself.  Mormon canonical texts provide numerous examples of 
motivated divine love of which only some may be highlighted here.  For example, 
Nephi states that God “loveth those who will have him to be their God” and God 
Himself is quoted stating that He shows mercy to “thousands of them who love me and 
keep my commandments.”5  The D&C is even more specific with its often 
individualized revelations as God says that He loves Hyrum Smith “because of the 
integrity of his heart, and because he loveth that which is right before me.”  The Lord 
also states in the same revelation that he loves George Miller “for the love he has to my 
                                                 
2 Moro. 7:47; Ether 12:33-34; 1 Cor. 13. 
3 Mosiah 4:14-15; Alma 60:32. 
4 Mosiah 10:12-13; Mosiah 28:2-3. 
5 1 Ne. 17:40; Mosiah 13:14. 
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testimony” and Isaac Galland “for the work he hath done.”6  Whether these statements 
should be considered sufficient evidence to justify a theological conclusion that God’s 
love is conditional appears to be a question that requires more space for a detailed 
examination than is presently available.  In this context, much clearly hinges on the 
specific interpretation that is attached to the adjectives used in scriptures to define 
divine love, namely “pure”, “perfect”, “redeeming”, “great”, and “wonderful”.7 
 What is sure is that LDS canonical texts do not describe God’s love as only a 
response to acceptable human actions.  Nephi, for example, stresses that the one thing 
he truly knows among the many of which he is ignorant is that God “loveth his 
children.”  In another BoM passage, which reports Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount during 
His ministry in the Americas, the well-known reference to “the fowls of the air” and 
“the lilies of the field” underlies God’s love for all His creatures, and especially for His 
children. 8  Such a lack of explicit condition for the actualization of divine love is 
particularly evident in the many passages which describe Christ’s motivations for His 
incarnation and atoning sacrifice.  Thus, the D&C echoes John 3:16 in affirming that 
Christ “loved the world that he gave his own life.”9  Similarly, a later section echoes 
Isaiah in its emphasis on Jesus’ “goodness” and “loving kindness”, which “saved them; 
and in his love, and in his pity, he redeemed them, and bore them, and carried them all 
the days of old.”10  In this context there is no explicit limitation to His love and to the 
extent of His redeeming goodness and kindness.   
Yet, God’s love is still grounded in reasons, which centre on the existence of a 
Creator/Father and creature/child relationship that kindles His love.  Then, in the 
context of this relationship, blessings are “held in reserve for them that love him” since 
God “delight(s) to honor those who serve” Him and His people He “delight(s) to bless 
with the greatest of blessings.”11  This added dimension of divine love is clearly 
contingent on human willingness to continue on earth the relationship with God 
characterized by love and obedience which existed in the pre-mortal sphere.  Therefore, 
God recognizes that a fullness of His love may only be experienced in the context of a 
reciprocal relationship where love is exchanged between the human and the divine.  To 
be sure, the exchange need not and cannot be equal in intensity since God’s love is 
                                                 
6 D&C 124:15,17,20,78. 
7 Moro. 7:47; 8:16,26; Alma 5:9,26; D&C 138:3. 
8 1 Ne. 11:17; 3 Ne. 13:26-32. 
9 D&C 34:3. 
10 D&C 133:52-53.  Also see 1 Ne. 19:9 and Ether 12:33-34. 
11 D&C 138:52; 76:5; and D&C 41:1. 
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bound to always surpass its human counterpart.  Still, LDS scriptures emphasize that 
divine love, just like imperfect human love, is limited in its expressions by the 
receiving objects of such love, who may respond either through openness or closure to 
its manifestations. 
It follows that reciprocity in willingness if not in expression is one of the most 
significant reasons that motivates the extension of love toward another individual.  The 
Mormon canon clearly outlines this pattern not only in relation to divine love but also 
in the context of love between individuals.  Specifically, it is of interest to note that in 
more than one instance the subject-ruler relationship in the monarchic political context 
of the BoM is described in terms of this exchange.  For example, Jacob explains that 
the people loved his brother Nephi “exceedingly, he having been a great protector for 
them, having wielded the sword of Laban in their defence, and having labored in all his 
days for their welfare“.  Similarly, king Mosiah’s subjects loved him because “he had 
not exacted riches of them, neither had he delighted in the shedding of blood; but he 
had established peace in the land, and he had granted unto his people that they should 
be delivered from all manner of bondage; therefore they did esteem him, yea, 
exceedingly, beyond measure.”12  In other words, since Nephi and Mosiah had 
demonstrated by their service their love for their people that same love was returned by 
their appreciative subjects without any hesitation. 
In summary, love involves cognition inasmuch as it requires specific objects 
and motivating reasons for its manifestations.  Generally speaking, both objects and 
reasons lie on the surface of one’s realm of awareness where the reciprocity embodied 
in established patterns of relationship functions as one of the most important motivating 
factors for the continuous existence of the emotion.  Moreover, various perceptions as 
affected by knowledge, experience, and desires significantly affect both direction and 
intensity of human loving manifestations.  On the other hand, God’s love is clearly not 
distorted by incorrect knowledge, limited experience or fallen desires.  Still, in order to 
achieve its full actualization, divine love necessitates a receiving agent who possesses 
at least a reciprocating attitude.  Otherwise, as I am about to explore, the accountable 
individual manifests by his actions his will to reject God’s love as well as its 
accompanying blessings. 
 
                                                 
12 Jacob 1:10, Mosiah 29:40. 
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Personal Responsibility 
 Human agents are indeed free to respond to God according to their own wishes 
and desires but, as in all instances of human obedience or disobedience, they will 
necessarily reap the positive or negative consequences of their decisions.  This eternal 
principle is also clearly applicable to the emotion of love.  In fact, with both God and 
one’s neighbour as its objects, love appears as the paramount commandment within the 
biblical record.  Unique LDS scriptures echo this same message in both dimensions.13  
In this context it is of interest to wonder about the reasons for God’s requirement that 
love should be manifested towards Him when, in light of our common understanding of 
a perfect character and personality, such request could appear as needlessly self-
centred.  Yet, it should be remembered that the verb command need not be understood 
as synonymous with demand in the context of a loving God who respects agency and 
desires the progression of His spirit children.  Then, as already highlighted, at least one 
reason for this commandment lies in the significant spiritual benefits which follow its 
observance.  In other words, although in the LDS theological framework God desires to 
be loved by His creatures, such love is never selfishly retained, but is returned ‘one 
hundred fold’ as a blessing to its human sender. 
 Mormon canonical texts repeatedly highlight that this very blessing centres in 
the personalized experience of God’s love.  In short, love functions, as it were, like the 
energy of an electric circuit, which is only able to flow if the willing individual allows 
it to continue in the direction of its ever-giving divine source.  Those who enjoy this 
experience in scriptural texts struggle to express it with words and most commonly use 
metaphors in attempting to convey an understanding of what it involves.  Thus, Jacob 
speaks of divine love as something to “feast upon” and King Benjamin maintains the 
imagery of a banquet as the verb he chooses to describe its experience is to “taste”.14  
Another prominent and reappearing imagery is the physical embrace which Lehi 
employs when he writes about being “encircled about eternally in the arms of his love”.  
In a later BoM passage he is echoed by Ammon, who describes the blessed state of the 
Lamanites he had helped to convert as “encircled about by the matchless bounty of his 
love”.15 
                                                 
13 See Matt 22:37-40; Mark 12:29-31; Luke 10:27; D&C 20:19; 59:5-6; 88:123; Alma 23:15; Moro. 
10:32. For a more specific family or community setting for such commandments see D&C 42:22, 45; 
25:14. 
14 Jacob 3:2; Mosiah 4:11. 
15 2 Ne. 1:15; Alma 26:15. 
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 Nephi also paints a metaphorical picture of this kind of experience when he 
highlights divine love as a favourite theme in much of his writings.  For example, he 
describes being filled with God’s love in terms which are intense and enervating, i.e. 
“even to the consuming of my flesh”.16  Furthermore, as he outlines the angelic 
exegetical commentary of his father’s dream, which Nephi reports to have received, he 
associates at least two of the dream’s symbolic images to divine love, namely the 
central image of the tree of life full of “most sweet” and luminous fruit as well as the 
“fountain of living waters”.17   Then, God’s love appears as the “most desirable above 
all things” and its acceptance or rejection prefigures the clear separation between the 
righteous and the wicked which characterizes the whole BoM narrative.18 In this 
context, the choice to partake or not to partake is to be accounted for personally, 
notwithstanding social pressures, persuasions in different directions, and all kinds of 
associated difficulties.  In fact, a common denominator in the various descriptions of 
the personal experiences of divine love centres in the preceding manifestations of 
humility, repentance, conversion, or faithful search for God’s will as exemplified by the 
spiritual lives of these individuals.19  
 Obviously, the other side of the equation, namely the failure to receive and to 
return love, is bound to involve negative and spiritually damaging consequences.  For 
example, the Lord warns the Saints of the need to obey Him (obedience is a common 
manifestation of love towards God) as He declares that “if you keep not my 
commandments, the love of the Father shall not continue with you, therefore you shall 
walk in darkness.”20  The BoM presents an even starker picture as the rebellious and 
unbelieving Nephites who face annihilation by the hand of a larger and stronger 
Lamanite army are described in the following terms, “They have lost their love, one 
towards another; and they thirst after blood and revenge continually.”  This is quite a 
contrasting image to the picture displayed in earlier pages of the BoM where “there was 
                                                 
16 2 Ne. 4:21. 
17 1 Ne. 8:11; 11:25. 
18 1 Ne. 11:22.  Also see 1 Ne. 8:17-18. 
19 In addition to the scriptural passages already outlined other sermons and accounts within the BoM 
emphasize God’s love.  Prominent examples include King Benjamin’s sermon (Mosiah 2-6), the 
conversion of Alma the Younger (Mosiah 27, Alma 37), the conversion of the people of Anti Nephi-
Lehis (Alma 23-24), and the visit of Christ among the surviving believers in America (3 Nephi 11, 17). 
20 D&C 95:12. 
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no contention in the land, because of the love of God which did dwell in the hearts of 
the people.”21 
Yet, in most cases, the problem God addresses in His revelations is not His 
children’s complete absence of love.  Instead, condemnation is uttered either in 
connection with the wickedness of some of His children, as manifested in the objects of 
their love, or with the misplaced priority of their affections.   Hence, in the first 
instance, Cain and some of his descendants are singled out for loving “Satan more than 
God.”  Jarom also speaks of the Lamanites’ love for “murder” and the D&C makes 
reference to individuals “who love to have others suffer” and to some who “love 
darkness rather than light.”22  However, in the second instance, objects of human love 
are not problematic for their inherent and absolute wickedness but only for their pre-
eminence over other more important spiritual pursuits.  For example, God condemns 
those who “loved the vain things of the world...riches and honor” or those whose “love 
of glory” leads them in directing their energies on the accumulation of 
“money…substance…and fine apparel”.23  The implication is that these pursuits leave 
no room for love of God and neighbour since all resources are engaged in self-centred 
objectives whose importance and ensuing satisfaction is only temporal. 
In this context of appropriate priority of affections it is interesting to recognize 
that in most of these instances divine condemnation falls short of being categorical and 
final.  In other words, although God holds people accountable for the objects on which 
they place their love, He also admits of changes, restructurings, and conversions.  There 
is no need to recount again the several descriptions of repentance in LDS scriptures that 
embody these very changes.  Perhaps, a significant indicator that a ‘repentance clause’ 
accompanies God’s condemnations is the use of the verb chasten in connection with 
divine reproving of His children.  In fact, in the D&C the Lord states the following, 
“Whom I love I also chasten that their sins may be forgiven, for with the chastisement I 
prepare a way for their deliverance in all things out of temptation, and I have loved 
you.”24  In short, God desires for His condemnations to be suspended and replaced by 
promised blessings in consequence of His children’s chosen acts of repentance. 
Furthermore, in issuing His judgments, God accounts for those factors which 
significantly impair the agency of individuals.  For example, an interesting passage 
                                                 
21 Moro 9:5. 4 Ne. 1:15. 
22 Moses 5:13,18,28; Jarom 1:6; D&C 121:13; 10:21; 29:45. 
23 Alma 1:16; 60:32; Morm. 8:37. 
24 D&C 95:1.  Also see Hel. 15:3. 
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quotes Jacob’s response to the prideful and adulterous among his people who hate the 
Lamanites for their filthiness and savagery.  In affirming that God will ultimately be 
merciful to the Lamanites Jacob asks rhetorically, 
Behold, their husbands love their wives, and their wives love their husbands; and their husbands 
and their wives love their children; and their unbelief and their hatred towards you is because of 
the iniquity of their fathers; wherefore, how much better are you than they, in the sight of your 
great Creator?25 
 
In other words, the Lamanites have not made the same mistake as the Nephites in 
failing to place family among the highest objects of their love.  Then, the strength of 
their family love and the apparent inescapability from the influence of their erroneous 
traditions, at least at this particular moment in the BoM narrative, soften God’s 
judgments for the hatred and unbelief which characterize their daily existence.  
 Still, in the case of most individuals, the human experience does not involve 
conditions which completely cause the removal of agency from their lives.26  Thus, 
with very few exceptions, God commands people to love both Him and their spiritual 
brothers and sisters because He holds them responsible and capable of such emotional 
manifestations and actions.  This is not to say that he expects such love to be as perfect 
as His or to be continuous and equally distributed.  Yet, within the limits of human 
abilities God desires an effort in the direction of love, which in turn He promises to 
sanctify and to intensify by the power of His Spirit.  In such a manner, love becomes an 
instrument that both facilitates and underlines the spiritual progression of the individual 
as I am about to explain in the following section. 
 
Developmental Instrumentality 
 As already hinted, it is a prominent message of LDS canonical texts that human 
abilities to experience and to extend love necessarily depend on divine love for fuelling 
and sustenance.  In other words, humans can love God and their neighbour only in the 
degree to which they are infused with the divine love which they have chosen to 
welcome and to receive as manifested by their willingness to be humble and to obey 
their God.  It is then a full cycle that originates in God’s loving kindness but whose 
continuation and intensification is closely interlinked with existing patterns of 
human/divine exchange.  What this means is that love functions as a general indicator 
                                                 
25 Jacob 3:7. 
26 The case of some mentally ill individuals is likely to represent an exception although it is probable that 
only the severest and most impairing illnesses should be included in this group. 
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of the condition of any particular human/divine relationship and, to be sure, of the 
condition of relationships among humans as well.  Furthermore, it acts as a sort of 
currency or asset in these same relationships which in turn motivates actions, sacrifices, 
and all sorts of giving and seeking behaviours.27  In short, love is a key motivator and 
teacher; as such, it is the primary instrument for the spiritual and emotional 
development of the individual.  
 To begin, the presence of love motivates individuals to act in a manner which 
may be contrary to the self-centred ‘fallen’ tendencies of the ‘natural man’.  These 
sacrifices, in turn, generally embody and indicate significant advances on the 
individual’s path of eternal development.  For example, in joyously contemplating the 
fruits of his missionary labours, Ammon writes about the previously murderous 
Lamanites who, following their conversion, would rather suffer death than kill another 
human being.  In this context, love is both a motivator of their actions and an indicator 
of the sincerity and fullness of their conversion. 
Now behold, we can look forth and see the fruits of our labors...and we can witness of their 
sincerity, because of their love towards their brethren and also towards us.  For behold, they had 
rather sacrifice their lives than even to take the life of their enemy...because of their love 
towards their brethren.  And now behold I say unto you, has there been so great love in all the 
land?  Behold, I say unto you, Nay, there has not...But behold how many of these have laid 
down their lives; and we know that they have gone to their God, because of their love and of 
their hatred of sin.28 
 
Their actions had shown the intensity of their love for both God and fellowmen, which 
in turn guaranteed their eternal salvation and progression. 
 While the sacrifice of one’s life to preserve another is an exceptional 
manifestation of love Mormon canonical texts also outline its more common 
expressions which are invariably associated with conditions of peace and righteousness.  
For example, following the demise of the wicked Sherem, Jacob notes that “peace and 
the love of God was restored again among the people; and they searched the 
scriptures.”  Similarly, in the ‘beautiful’ and ‘blessed’ days at the idyllic waters of 
Mormon, the people had followed their leader Alma when he had taught them to have 
“their hearts knit together in unity and love one towards another.”29  As a whole, the 
keeping of the commandments and the experience of love are so inextricably bound to 
each other that a first cause can hardly be identified.  In fact, on the one hand, 
obedience opens the door to being “filled with love towards God and all men”, as king 
                                                 
27 For an historical analysis of emotion as currency in a specific cultural milieu see Corrigan (2002). 
28 Alma 26:31-34. 
29 Jacob 7:23; Mosiah 18:21. 
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Benjamin teaches, while on the other hand, love logically precedes and motivates 
obedience in Jesus’ biblical statement which He directs at William Smith, “If ye love 
me keep my commandments.”30  
 Therefore, love and righteousness are mutually motivating, particularly in the 
context of the Holy Spirit’s influence which I address more closely in the next section.  
Still, although much in LDS scripture centres on the love and on the relationship 
between the human and the divine, the motivating power of love is also manifested in 
its inter-human expressions.  Perhaps, the most prominent example of this kind is found 
in the encounter of Ammon, accompanied by the newly converted Lamoni, with 
Lamoni’s father, namely the supreme king of the Lamanite people.  In the scuffle which 
ensues between them Ammon emerges victorious having the power to take or to spare 
the life of the Lamanite king.  Yet, in a situation where all kinds of self-aggrandizing 
requests would have been granted to Ammon by the powerless king Ammon only asks 
for that which will benefit his friend Lamoni and his fellow missionary brothers.  The 
king’s reaction to these requests is described in these terms, “And when he saw that 
Ammon had no desire to destroy him, and when he also saw the great love he had for 
his son Lamoni, he was astonished exceedingly.”  Thus, the door for the preaching of 
the Gospel to him was opened, the king asked Ammon to “come unto me, in my 
kingdom; for I shall greatly desire to see thee”, and he “was desirous to learn” more 
about the words he had heard Ammon speak.31 
  Love’s teaching capacity is also greatly significant in the LDS theological 
context.  In the first place, it provides individuals with an open window onto God’s 
character and nature like few other emotional experiences could do.  In fact, King 
Benjamin succinctly supports this conclusion when he equates “the knowledge of the 
glory of God” with knowing “of his goodness” and tasting “of his love.”  Similarly, 
Moroni recognizes God as the ultimate source of love by stating that “every thing 
which inviteth and enticeth to do good, and to love God, and to serve him, is inspired of 
God.”32  More sombrely, Mormon recalls his failed attempts to steer his people towards 
God in his sad recognition “I had loved them, according to the love of God which was 
in me.”33  In other words, since human love is of the same kind as divine love, although 
reduced in intensity and scope, feeling such love endows the individual with the ability 
                                                 
30 Mosiah 2:4; D&C 124:87. 
31 Alma 20.  Quotations from verses 26 and 27. 
32 Mosiah 4:11; Moro. 7:13. 
33Morm. 3:12. 
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to begin to understand how God must feel as a Father of eternal spiritual children.  
Indeed, as I examine shortly, empathy of this kind functions prominently at the 
foundation of all salvific work, whether in its exclusive divine manifestations or in its 
humanly assisted performances like, for example, Mormonism’s work in behalf of the 
dead. 
 Furthermore, given LDS scriptures’ necessary interdependence between love 
and righteousness the lack of the one generally indicates the absence of the other.  
Specifically, unrighteousness or iniquity informs the honest observer either about the 
mistaken focus of one’s love or ultimately about the deeper selfish motivations of one’s 
actions.  For example, some verses in the Mormon canon echo the New Testament in 
depicting the worrisome condition of a world in great need of repentance when, 
“because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold”.34  In this context, the 
individual who becomes aware of his own lack of love is given the alternative to turn to 
God and change or to continue in his path of dangerous spiritual decay.  At the same 
time, when such an absence of love is witnessed in the behaviour of others actions may 
be taken to facilitate personal protection or to warn the individual of the dangers 
inherent in such a path of disobedience. 
Yet, evil motivations are not always immediately exposed by the outward 
actions which accompany them, particularly when performed by others.  When failing 
to receive reinforcements and supplies during a time of war Captain Moroni accuses 
Pahoran to be governing for “the love of glory and the vain things of the world”.  
However, Pahoran is innocent and although Moroni is correct about the presence of 
iniquity within the government he is ultimately mistaken about Pahoran’s intentions.  In 
another example, Amalickiah, one of the greatest deceivers in the whole narrative, 
claims to share the people’s love for their king, whom he secretly had murdered, in 
order to achieve his selfish objectives.35  Therefore, since intentions could easily be 
misjudged in light of visible evidence the D&C warns Priesthood holders about the 
need to exercise their power with “love unfeigned”, and when called to reprove, to 
show “afterwards an increase of love” in order to remove the possible perception of an 
antecedent prideful motivation.36  In short, ‘apparent’ love and ‘apparent’ neglect do 
not necessarily open a window into one’s heart although they often do. 
                                                 
34 JS-M 1:10,30; D&C 45-27. 
35 Alma 60:32; 47:27-28. 
36 D&C 121:41,43. 
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In summary, although observable love is not a fault-proof indicator of one’s 
spiritual condition, the presence of sincere love towards God and neighbour points in 
the direction of a healthy spiritual relationship with the divine.  Its absence, on the other 
hand, teaches about the need for change and restructuring of priorities.  In turn, both the 
desire to experience such love and its reception from external human and divine 
sources can motivate this very process of change as embodied in individual desires to 
perform acts of obedience to divine commandments and service-oriented behaviour.  
This cycle, as I am about to explore, is only possible in association with the influence 
of the Holy Ghost, which is activated not only in circumstances of initial conversion 
but also in the context of maintenance of divine love in one’s heart.  In fact, it is now 
my goal to explore how Mormon theology suggests that love can be retained in one’s 
life given our ‘natural’ tendency to lose it in the process of self-driven objects and 
pursuits.  The short answer is again found in the Atonement. 
 
Love and the Atonement 
 In the LDS theological framework, as in other Christian expressions, the 
greatest example of love is undoubtedly Christ’s sacrifice for humankind.  In fact, the 
Atonement stands at the apex of all existing and even of all potential loving 
manifestations given its defining characteristics of empathic sorrow, sacrifice of one’s 
life, and self-limitation of divine power, a combination of attributes the BoM identifies 
as condescension.37  At the same time, since its specific context is unmatchable and 
unique it does not function as an exact model that humans can or need to experience in 
their lives.  Yet, the love as a principle which the Atonement manifests functions as the 
ideal example of what human beings who claim to walk in Jesus’ footsteps attempt to 
emulate.  Indeed, when speaking and teaching about the Atonement Mormons do not 
neglect to stress that the event was motivated, endured, and completed only because of 
Christ’s love.  Thus, the true disciples of a Christ-centred Mormonism also follow Jesus 
in similarly conducting a life of love to the degree that is humanly possible. 
 At the same time the Atonement is much more than a model for love; it is 
indeed its ultimate source.  As the process/event which allows the Spirit to influence 
and to change individuals the Atonement is the real source of all the divine love which 
flows in the direction of humanity.  In fact, love is probably the one word which is most 
                                                 
37 1 Ne. 11:16,26; 2 Ne. 4:26; 9:53. 
 209 
 
closely associated with the presence of the Holy Ghost in Mormon scripture.  For 
example, Mormon writes about the “visitation of the Holy Ghost, which Comforter 
filleth with hope and perfect love” and Alma adds that being “led by the Holy Spirit” a 
person becomes “humble, meek, submissive, patient, full of love and all long-
suffering.”38  In short, whether seen as the actual source of love or as the vehicle of the 
same (as when spoken of in terms synonymous with Spirit) Jesus’ love for the whole of 
humanity becomes individualized and personalized in the experience of the Holy 
Ghost. 
 Still, as previously mentioned, full spiritual manifestations of divine love are 
generally contingent on the individual’s prior expression of some love towards his 
maker.  In this context Mormon underlines the fact that one should “pray unto the 
Father with all the energy of heart, that ye may be filled with this love, which he hath 
bestowed upon all who are true followers of his Son.”  Then, in a poignant sentence 
which quickly moves from a very demanding to a more merciful and inclusive tone the 
D&C adds that all the gifts of the Spirit “are given for the benefit of those who love me 
and keep all my commandments, and him that seeketh so to do”. 39  In another section 
God stresses that He “bestows” the power of the Holy Spirit “on those who love him, 
and purify themselves before him” since “sanctification through the grace of our Lord 
and Savior Jesus Christ” is only available for “those who love and serve God with all 
their mights, minds, and strength.”40  Indeed, growing in the capacity to experience and 
to express love, namely to internalize, and embody it as a permanent attribute of one’s 
character, lies at the very heart of the LDS understanding of sanctification. 
 Therefore, Mormon texts often stress the need for sanctification in terms of 
maintenance and intensification of divine love in one’s heart.  For example, Alma 
describes the effects of being “led by the Holy Spirit” in the well-known threefold 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which involve “having the love of God 
always in your heart”.  In an earlier passage he again brings the reader’s attention to 
this need for continuity as he pointedly asks “if ye have experienced a change of heart, 
and if ye have felt to sing the song of redeeming love, I would ask, can ye feel so 
now?” 41  King Benjamin similarly places the accent on permanence when explaining 
that through humility and prayer “ye shall always rejoice, and be filled with the love of 
                                                 
38 Moro. 8:26; Alma 13:28. 
39 Moro. 7:48; D&C 46:9. 
40 D&C 76:116; 20:31. 
41 Alma 13:29; 5:26; 1 Cor. 13. 
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God, and always retain a remission of your sins”.  Significantly, in this verse are found 
all the most noteworthy effects of the presence of the Spirit which are described as joy, 
love, forgiveness of sins, and in its unquoted conclusion, growth in knowledge.42 
 Then, as already seen in the context of joy, it is apparent that Mormon 
scriptures do not distinguish between divine or human kinds of love.  Whenever 
individuals experience real love for each other the ultimate source of this emotion is 
attributed to the Spirit, i.e. to the divine.  This is particularly the case for human adults 
who, according to King Benjamin, live by default in a fallen condition characterized by 
the self-centred carnal pursuits of the ‘natural man’, which may be overcome only by 
the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit.  Yet, King Benjamin also implies that some of 
the effects of the fall are not immediately apparent at birth since children are described 
in terms which highlight their desirable characteristics.  In fact, “putting off the natural 
man” signifies for him, among other things, becoming “as a child, submissive, meek, 
humble, patient, full of love”.43  Hence, Benjamin suggests that humans at birth possess 
an inherent capacity for love, however embryonic and innocent, but that the subsequent 
acquisition of knowledge and the associated temptations of Satan can make real love in 
a sense unnatural.  In the most extreme cases of rebellion this loss can even culminate 
in a complete inability to love.44 
Therefore, humans naturally struggle to preserve deep love as their permanent 
attribute just as they find it difficult to make the influence of the Holy Spirit their 
constant intensive reality.  Still, Mormon scriptures affirm that it is possible to retain 
such love and several prophets outline the key spiritual ingredient which actualizes this 
objective.  As already mentioned, King Benjamin highlights humble prayer as central 
to this process and Mormon echoes him in stating that “love endureth by diligence unto 
prayer”.  Jacob puts it in more cognitive terms as he also underlines the need for 
prayers of faith in his words to the “pure in heart” among his people, 
Look unto God with firmness of mind, and pray unto him with exceeding faith, and he will 
console you in your afflictions, and he will plead your cause...O all ye that are pure in heart, lift 
up your heads and receive the pleasing word of God, and feast upon his love; for ye may, if your 
minds are firm, forever.45  
 
In this context, however “firmness of mind” is interpreted, no exegesis can neglect 
some reference to firmness of faith in God’s promises and in His love, as manifested by 
                                                 
42 Mosiah 4:12. 
43 Mosiah 3:19. 
44 See Moses 7:33; Moro. 9:5. 
45 Jacob 3:1-2. 
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the expression of heart-felt prayers addressed to Him.  To confirm this reading Jacob 
also associates firmness with truth, namely God’s truth, when he states that the 
righteous “love the truth and are not shaken.”46 
 In whole, the enabling role of the Atonement is such that the exchange of love 
between the human and the divine, while unequal, is fully efficacious and sanctifying 
for the individual.  At the same time, the other side of the coin paints a picture of 
rejection of the Atonement associated with the refrain of divine love and with the 
experience of loneliness and sorrow.  The D&C is particularly stern in its admonition as 
demonstrated by the following passages, which appear in the introductory revelation 
and in its appendix.  First, God affirms that “the rebellious shall be pierced with much 
sorrow” and later He confirms this promise by stating, “And this shall ye have of my 
hand – ye shall lie down in sorrow.”47  A more immediate and specific prophecy of 
doom is reserved for the early American persecutors of Mormonism and murderers of 
his Prophet.  Thus, as Brigham Young is leading the Saints to their new promised land 
God promises that “now cometh the day of their calamity, even the days of sorrow, like 
a woman that is taken in travail; and their sorrow shall be great unless they speedily 
repent, yea, very speedily.”48  The BoM adds other forebodings, and in this context it is 
important to note the adjective their as the indicator of responsibility in statements such 
as the following, “I will visit thy brethren according as I have said; and their 
transgressions will I bring down with sorrow upon their own heads.”49   
 What now remains to be examined is the relationship between love and the 
assessing emotions of joy and sorrow.  As already suggested in the previous chapter the 
Mormon theological picture involves more than a simple explanation which claims that 
love is necessarily accompanied by joy and that no love (or hate) invariably leads to 
sorrow.  Although these connections are both firm and frequent in LDS scriptures, both 
in their present and in their eschatological contexts, it is also possible to identify 
circumstances in the Mormon canon where a particular kind of sorrow, intense sorrow, 
accompanies love in both its divine and human manifestations.  This type of sorrow is 
associated with the righteousness rather than with the disobedience of its experiencer 
although it is also connected with the rebellion of some external agent to whom the 
                                                 
46 2 Ne. 9:40. 
47 D&C 1:3; 133:70. 
48 D&C 136:35. 
49 Enos 1:10. 
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suffering individual is bound by a feeling of love.  Hence, this is what I have called 
empathic sorrow. 
 In both present and previous chapters I have highlighted the fact that empathic 
sorrow stands at the foundation of the Mormon understanding of Christ’s Atonement 
and consequently of all conceptualizations of ideal or perfect love.  Furthermore, as I 
am about to outline, such a connection is not presented within the LDS canon as an 
exceptional phenomenon which is only relevant and necessary in the context of the 
Atonement; instead, it is an eternal principle from which neither God nor the human 
individual aspiring to love is able to escape.  To be sure, one of the ways in which the 
Atonement is indeed unique lies in its capacity to transform such empathic sorrow into 
salvific substitutory sorrow.  In fact, although humans, and specifically Mormons, can 
act as substitutes for the deceased in the physical performance of salvific ordinances 
like baptism they cannot extend their proxy endeavours to such realms as repentance.  
Still, empathic sorrow per se lies within the capacity of all those individuals, whether 
human or divine, whose great love is manifested in an existential context which is 
firmly rooted in the principle of agency.  Therefore, if such sorrow is a necessary by-
product of divine love, those who desire to follow Christ need to accept rather than 
reject this painful experience when it occurs. 
 Some examples from the Mormon canon will clarify this point beginning with  
Alma’s account of his labours among the people of Ammonihah.  In witnessing the 
wickedness of this people Alma suffers greatly and departs in much sorrow,  
While [Alma] was journeying thither, being weighed down with sorrow, wading through much 
tribulation and anguish of soul, because of the wickedness of the people who were in the city of 
Ammonihah, it came to pass while Alma was thus weighed down with sorrow, behold an angel 
of the Lord appeared unto him saying: Blessed art thou, Alma; therefore, lift up they head and 
rejoice for thou hast great cause to rejoice; for thou hast been faithful in keeping the 
commandments of God.50 
 
The irony of this passage captures like few others the LDS view on the suffering that 
often accompanies love.  Just as the angel gives comfort to the anguished Alma he also 
commands him to return to the source of his sufferings because through Alma’s 
preaching and through his work some unbelieving individuals may repent and turn to 
God.  True, Alma has been spiritually strengthened through this vision and is now able 
to return to his spiritual work with a renewed conviction of God’s love and support.  
Still, the suffering can only be removed through the repentance of the people of 
                                                 
50 Alma 8:14-15. 
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Ammonihah, on whom he has no direct control and for whom he is likely to feel great 
love and concern.  Perhaps, like his friends Ammon, Aaron, Himni, and Omner, he also 
“could not bear that any human soul should perish” the very thought causing him to 
“quake and tremble” when empathizing with them when anticipating their future 
sufferings.51 
In this context it must be recognized that LDS canonical texts are seldom 
explicit in relation to the source of the sorrow which a prophet experiences.  Therefore, 
especially in cases where great wickedness is manifested, it is usually unclear whether 
empathic sorrow emerges primarily from love of truth, of God, or of humanity.  In fact, 
it may even be supposed that sorrow could emerge from love of self given the personal 
loss and persecutions that the righteous often experience in such negative spiritual 
environments.  Yet, in the first place, since Mormon scriptures repeatedly stress the 
inherent unity and even equivalence between godly and neighbourly sorrow the exact 
source of the sorrow is not as important as the textual recognition of a righteous 
motivation, which is necessarily loving.  Furthermore, the presence of self-love does 
not appear as inherently incompatible with empathic sorrow when such love exists in a 
context of obedience and righteousness.  Indeed, in some instances, it is precisely the 
focus on this love for self, with the accompanying joy that one’s positive standing 
before God entails, which helps the individual to cope with the empathic sorrow that 
emerges from witnessing wickedness.  Of this Mormon is an example when he laments 
“My heart has been filled with sorrow because of their wickedness all my days.”  
However, he also adds, “nevertheless, I know that I shall be lifted up at the last day.”52 
Therefore, the presence or absence of empathic sorrow, among other things, is 
indicative of one’s spiritual connectedness with God and of the associated ability to 
love and to assist others.  In fact, King Benjamin warns his people about the necessary 
connection between loving God and lifting the burdens of others.  This he does by 
making use of a rhetorical role reversal which highlights the parallelisms between the 
believers’ relationship to God and their interaction with fellow humans in need, 
Ye will not suffer that the beggar putteth up his petition to you in vain, and turn him out to 
perish.  Perhaps thou shalt say: The man has brought upon himself his misery…for his 
punishments are just…O man, whosoever does this the same hath great cause to repent…For 
behold, are we not all beggars?  Do we not all depend upon the same Being, even God, for all 
the substance which we have…of every kind?53   
                                                 
51 Mosiah 28:3. 
52 Morm. 2:19. 
53 Mosiah 4:16-19. 
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Thus, empathic sorrow, which is constitutive of charity, will lead individuals to action 
and to sacrifices.  In another context Nephi puts it in these terms, “wherefore, if they 
should have charity they would not suffer the laborer in Zion to perish.”54  In short, acts 
of service and love usually begin with the ability to feel another’s sorrow in the dire 
circumstances which make them suffer, whether in the present, or as in Alma’s and in 
the sons of Mosiah’s case, in the eschatological future. 
Parenthetically, empathic sorrow is at times described in terms of anxiety, as 
Alma writes in one of his exhortations: “My brethren, I wish from the inmost part of 
my heart, yea, with great anxiety even unto pain, that ye would…cast off your sins.”55  
At the opposite end, instead, one finds indifference, lack of concern, or even rejoicing 
in the suffering of others.  Nephi’s account of his brothers’ joy in witnessing his 
suffering is in this sense indicative.  Upon their refusal to assist him in the building of 
the ship Nephi states that “I, Nephi, was exceedingly sorrowful because of the hardness 
of their hearts; and now when they saw that I began to be sorrowful they were glad in 
their hearts, insomuch that they did rejoice over me.”56  Thus, this is a clear example of 
joy, or more properly pleasure, which is connected to wickedness, jealousy, and 
rebellion.  On the other hand, as seen in various instances within the BoM narrative, 
Nephi’s love for God, truth, and family is accompanied by feelings of sorrow.  True, 
Nephi was “highly favored of the Lord”, but he himself cannot help but recognize that 
the path of discipleship often involves “many afflictions”. 57 
Undoubtedly, both LDS scriptures and the biblical record emphasize God’s 
promise that the faithful will rest from all their afflictions and pains in the glorious 
eschaton which will follow this mortal experience.  Yet, Mormon theology provides 
indications that, at least in its potentiality, empathic sorrow will not be annihilated.  The 
case of the three Nephite disciples, who desire to remain on the earth until Christ’s 
second coming, is in this respect highly illustrative.  When Jesus promises these three 
Nephites that they will not experience death or physical pain while continuing to live in 
the world until His return He makes the following exception, “save it be for the sins of 
the world.”  Mormon further explains in the same chapter that to fulfil this promise 
                                                 
54 2 Ne. 26:30. 
55 Alma 13:27. 
56 1 Ne 17:19. 
57 1 Ne. 1:1.  Other scriptural references of human empathic sorrow in the face of wickedness can be 
found in 2 Ne. 2:1; 26:7; Alma 19:28; 31:2; 35:15; Hel. 7:6-9,14; 3 Ne. 1:10,29; Morm. 5:9,11; 6:20. 
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“there was a change wrought upon their bodies, that they might not suffer pain nor 
sorrow save it were for the sins of the world.”58  Why was this kind of sorrow 
irremovable, even by the omnipotent God?  Because in the Mormon theological 
framework ‘sorrow’ as a consequence of external agents’ negative choices coexist with 
and indeed are necessary to a character rooted in altruistic love.  Thus, a removal of the 
potential for sorrow over the sin of others would ultimately remove the very foundation 
of these Nephites’ righteousness, namely love. 
In fact, as would be expected of a theology that highlights the imago Dei and 
the eternal nature of principles, God is not immune from such empathic sorrow.  
Indeed, in a distinct Mormon departure from the classical Christian doctrine of Deity 
the God of LDS scriptures is a ‘suffering’ God far beyond the earthly context of the 
Incarnation.  Specifically, in the Enochic pages of the book of Moses and at a time of 
great wickedness upon the earth, “the God of heaven looked upon the residue of the 
people, and he wept.”  The account continues as it tells of the surprise the prophet 
Enoch experienced in witnessing the weeping of the great God.  Through words 
describing Enoch’s knowledge of the majesty, perfection and grandeur of God, the 
prophet enquires with puzzlement about the unexpected revelation of God’s suffering, 
which he evidently had believed inconsistent with God’s perfect nature.  The divine 
response focuses on suffering as a response to the wickedness of His children, showing 
poignant and intense emotions underlying the price paid when love, indeed the most 
perfect love, is present.  It is a love that desires the most for the beloved and which is 
willing to accept the risks inherent in the exercise of agency and in the corollary 
omnipresent possibility that bad or undesirable choices will thus be actualised.59 
Therefore, if attempting to describe the perfect emotional make-up of the God 
that they worship Mormons would fully agree with the following statement by a 
modern theologian, “There is no love without openness to rejection, suffering, and loss.  
To believe in the triune God is to believe in a God who shares our suffering, a suffering 
that is not a sign of impotence but of strength and that leads to final victory.”60  This is 
the kind of love that Mormons aspire to and which underlies one of the core messages 
of LDS scriptures, namely that the experience of divine love is contingent on the 
personal embrace of the gift of Atonement and on the associated willingness to nurture 
                                                 
58 3 Ne 28:9, 38 
59 Moses 7:28-40.  Quotation from verse 28.  The BoM also describes the resurrected Christ weeping, 
although in an emotional context of joy rather than of empathic sorrow (See 3 Ne. 17:19-22). 
60 Pinnock and Paulsen (2007), 507. 
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love and to purify it in free emotional exchanges with both heaven and earth.  It is 
further a love which involves both great joy and possibly empathic sorrow, but nothing 
of the bitter remorseful sorrow which is a prerogative of those who love what they 
should not love and hate what they should not hate.   
 
Hate: the Negative Relating Experience 
 At least three terms appear in Mormon scripture which I consider to be close if 
not exact synonyms of hate, namely the noun hatred and the verbs to despise and to 
abhor.  These four words are present in at least 68 verses of the LDS canonical texts.  
Moreover, several other nouns and adjectives describe emotional manifestations which 
are consciously or unconsciously triggered by some underlying condition of hatred in 
its various degrees of intensity.  For example, the aggression intrinsic to anger is often 
associated with the hatred experienced towards particular individuals or groups; thus, 
anger and hatred may appear as two sides of the same emotional coin.  In this context 
anger functions as a physiological and behavioural manifestation of hate (probably its 
most typical manifestation, at least within our culture) whereas hate has reference to the 
internal cognitive/affective experience of the subject which is not as accessible to 
external observers.   
However, notwithstanding such close relationship, treating hate as a necessary 
precondition for the emergence of anger is questionable at best.  In fact, mere 
frustration of personal preferences in consequence of either impersonal dynamics or of 
social forces outside one’s control often give rise to the irritation that culminates in an 
angry emotional condition.  In many of these instances and even after careful 
introspection it can be difficult to pinpoint a human source or a clear object of one’s 
anger, also because anger has the capacity to acquire the generalized and enduring 
attributes which are typical of a mood.  Instead, in conditions which are not 
pathological, people know what they hate and in most instances they also know the 
reason for such hate.  Furthermore, while it is possible to speak of a hateful personality 
it is more difficult to conceptualize a hateful mood.  Therefore, these differences cast 
some doubt on the idea of a strict causal relationship between hate and anger, especially 
if such causal associations are drawn as necessary trajectories beginning with focused 
hate and culminating in generalized anger.    
 Yet, there is no question that in many instances anger does function as a 
manifestation of pre-existing hate as confirmed by even a cursory exploration of LDS 
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canonical texts.  Therefore, deciding whether to include or to exclude anger from the 
present exploration has been a difficult choice.  Ultimately I have opted to exclude it, 
both in light of the potential presence of anger when hate is absent and perhaps more 
significantly because anger is an emotion which deserves greater analysis than the 
limited space presently allows.  In fact, if one adds to the noun anger and to its 
adjective form angry the closely synonymous words fury, indignation, rage, and wrath, 
the combined sum of the canonical verses where at least one of these terms is present is 
no less than 260.  Therefore, judging by the mere number of its ‘textual appearances’, it 
is evident that the subject, which should be subdivided into divine and human 
manifestations of anger, is of some importance for the Mormon canon.  Still, our 
attention will now focus exclusively on the emotion of hate.  
 
Cognitive Necessity 
   Whenever LDS scriptures describe particular instances of hate they also 
identify both the reason at the root of the emotion and the specific object towards which 
hatred is directed.  In fact, I was unable to identify a single instance where the 
motivation for human hate is absent or where the object of one’s hatred is particularly 
unclear.  The impetus generally emerges from dynamics of human relationships which 
include motivations as varied as being “slow of speech” or claiming to have “seen a 
vision”, in the case of hated individuals, or being “poor”, having been “robbed” or 
“wronged”, having “despised the Holy One of Israel”, or having “many miracles” in 
one’s community in the case of particular groups.61  To be sure, the motivation claimed 
by the hater does not always match the one advanced by the hated.  In fact, the 
Lamanites justify their well-documented hatred towards the Nephites in terms of the 
supposed robbing and usurpation of legitimate power suffered at their hand.  On the 
other hand, it is clear that the Nephites do not accept such accounts as accurate 
historical descriptions since they choose to label these motivations as “incorrect 
traditions” or “iniquities of their fathers.”62  
 Indeed, such differences in perception of reality firmly root hatred to the realm 
of cognition, as observed with all other emotions examined so far.  Furthermore, 
hatred’s cognitive necessity is underlined by the fact that direct personal experience of 
a triggering ‘wrong’ is unnecessary, since in many instances the Lamanites hated the 
                                                 
61 See Moses 6:31; JS-H 1:25; Alma 32:5; 20:13; 3 Ne. 3:4; 1 Ne. 1:14; 22:5; 4 Ne. 1:29.  
62 Compare Mosiah 10:12-13 and Alma 54:17 with Mosiah 1:5 and Jacob 3:7. 
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Nephites simply because they had been taught to do so, even in the absence of direct 
interaction with them.  This is probably one of the reasons why the Nephites describe 
the Lamanites’ hatred as “extreme”, “fixed”, and “eternal”.63  Mormon indirectly refers 
to it as a disease since he describes the sons of Mosiah who are about to embark on a 
Lamanite mission as hoping “that perhaps they might cure them (the Lamanites) of 
their hatred towards the Nephites”.64  In short, the Lamanites’ hatred was so difficult to 
extirpate because it was grounded in a particular perceptive structure of reality which 
was passed on from generation to generation as a cognitive fixation. 
 In this light it logically follows that any reduction or elimination of hatred 
would necessarily include a cognitive restructuring of one’s perception of the reality to 
which hate is reacting.  In fact, those BoM accounts which describe the conversion of 
the Lamanites do not fail to emphasize that repentance is at least partially constituted 
by the acquisition of correct knowledge, which the humbled individual is now willing 
to welcome in replacement of the falsehoods previously held to be true.  This cognitive 
emphasis is particularly evident in Helaman’s brief account of Nephi and Lehi’s 
preaching among the Lamanites,  
“And...they did go forth...declaring throughout all the regions...all the things which they had 
heard and seen, insomuch that the more part of the Lamanites were convinced of them...and as 
many as were convinced did lay down their weapons of war, and also their hatred and the 
tradition of their fathers.”65 
 
To be sure, in most instances of Lamanite conversion the focus of the preached 
message does not appear to centre on the nature of ancestral traditions.  Instead, it is the 
acquisition of a global theistic worldview with all its accompanying effects over 
perception which leads the Lamanite converts to be “convinced” that the traditions at 
the root of their hatred should be abandoned. 
 It then becomes significant to explore whether hatred can ever be justified in 
those circumstances where it emerges in response to evil that was actually suffered.  To 
address this question one should examine what LDS scriptural texts outline about the 
‘hate’ references which pertain to the model of perfect emotional experience, i.e. to 
God.  I was able to identify only one instance, a quotation of Samuel the Lamanite, 
where the divine is described as hating a particular individual or group.  In reference to 
an earlier history and at a time where the Lamanites are depicted as more righteous than 
                                                 
63 Alma 43:11; Enos 1:20; Jacob 7:24. 
64 Mosiah 28:2. 
65 Hel. 5:50-51. 
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the Nephites the prophet declares that “the Lamanites hath he hated because their deeds 
have been evil continually”.66  In other words, Samuel claims that God’s hatred towards 
his people was justified because responsive to a true state of affairs which involved the 
Lamanites’ repeated rebellions.   
Yet, the many scriptural passages claiming to be quotation of God’s own words 
make no direct reference to God’s experienced hatred (the picture would be quite 
different if we were to examine anger).  At most, God appears to be involved in some 
measure at the causative level of human hatred when Jesus claims “I have caused my 
people...to become hated by them” in reference to the future state of the descendants of 
the Lamanites who would be conquered and killed by the Gentiles.  Still, the exact 
nature of such intervention remains unclear since other passages claim that the Lord 
will not “suffer that the Gentiles shall destroy the seed of thy brethren.” 67  In other 
words, at least in the specific context of hate aimed at particular individuals or groups, 
Mormon canonical texts are inconclusive on the question of divine hatred.  In all 
likelihood the commonly held conceptualization of hate as an enduring and intense 
emotion which centres in the rejection of individuals makes it incompatible with the 
perfect personality of a loving Father in Heaven.  Anger, on the other hand, seems to be 
more directly related to an individual’s behaviour rather than to his personal nature; 
therefore, anger can more easily be appeased through corrective actions.  Hence, anger 
is a better fit for a patient but tutoring God whose fundamental nature is love, the very 
opposite of hatred.   
In any case, what the canon makes explicit is that God does not directly 
encourage or fully justify human hatred towards another individual or group.  In fact, in 
echoing the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus addresses His believers on the American 
continent in these words, 
And behold it is written also, that thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy; But 
behold I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them than hate 
you, and pray for them who despitefully use you and persecute you.  That ye may be the 
children of your Father who is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the 
good.68 
 
Then, Jesus seems to affirm that although the perception which gives rise to a 
retaliatory hate is empirically correct, hatred should still be avoided.  Such perception 
should be enlarged beyond the immediate causes of pain and offense to include a view 
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67 3 Ne. 16:9;1 Ne.13:31. 
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of the offending individual as a member of God’s family who is also cared for by a 
loving Heavenly Father.  One need not deny that evil has occurred or that the other is 
acting as an enemy, but as I am about to examine, this is no justifiable reason for a 
hateful response by the true follower of Christ. 
 
Personal Responsibility 
 Although references to active divine commands to love are more common than 
God’s directives to avoid hate LDS scriptures provide evidence for both.  Interestingly, 
when God commands humans not to hate He either identifies a very specific human 
object or He describes a more general and impersonal focus.  In the first case, by the 
instrumentality of His Prophet, the divine voice warns that “no man (should) despise 
my servant Oliver Granger” or, in a later setting, “my servant George (Miller)”.69  On 
the other hand, the most common nonhuman object is God’s own word or His 
revelation.  Moroni puts it succinctly in these terms, “O then, despise not, and wonder 
not, but hearken unto the words of the Lord.”70  More frequent than these direct 
commands to avoid hate are several references where God infers condemnation for 
individuals who have manifested hate.  For example, Jacob specifically singles out the 
rich as he warns “wo unto the rich...for because they are rich they despise the poor” 
whereas in a later passage he speaks of the Jews in a condemning tone when he claims 
that “they despised the words of plainness”.  Other texts clearly associate hatred to 
wickedness, both when hate is directed at other individuals and when it is reserved for 
God’s message and His commandments.71 
 Therefore, God holds individuals accountable for their hatred.  Then, especially 
when He finds Himself to be the object of this hatred, His response involves in the least 
the abandonment of these beings to the natural consequences of their wicked actions.  
The D&C puts it straightforwardly in these terms: 
And the iniquity and transgression of my holy laws and commandments I will visit upon the 
heads of those who hindered my work, unto the third and fourth generation, so long as they 
repent not, and hate me, saith the Lord...And I will answer judgment...so long as they repent not, 
and hate me.72 
 
However one interprets the prolongation of condemnation to the third and fourth 
generation it is clear that this expression is no isolated rhetorical hyperbole.  In fact, the 
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warning appears in several other texts as it clearly pinpoints God’s displeasure for not 
receiving any love from the spiritual children He has created and blessed.73  As 
highlighted earlier, His response also involves sadness and suffering, particularly when 
He is portrayed to be contemplating those humans whose wickedness is so great that 
they are “without affection, and they hate their own blood.”74 
Furthermore, in those instances where hatred could be seen as understandable 
because emerging in response to the pre-existing hatred of the other individual or 
group, God still warns people that the human judgments which trigger hatred are 
limited at best and misguided at worst.  Thus, as already mentioned, Jacob chastises his 
people as he tells them that the hated Lamanites “are more righteous than you”.  
Similarly, Moroni calls his government to repentance in asking “can you suppose that 
the Lord will spare you and come out in judgment against the Lamanites when it is the 
tradition of their fathers that has caused their hatred?”75  In a separate context, and at 
the end of an account characterized by divine condemnation of the Jews of Jerusalem, 
both from Lehi’s time and from a time yet future, Nephi quotes the divine word 
directed at the Gentiles with the following admonition: “O ye Gentiles, have ye 
remembered the Jews, mine ancient covenant people?  Nay; but ye have cursed them 
and have hated them.”  The larger context clearly shows that such hatred is not pleasing 
to God so much that He adds the foreboding promise, “Behold, I will return all these 
things upon your own heads”.76 
In short, whatever condemnation God may utter and whatever curse or 
punishment may be seen to originate in His will is not a sufficient or justifiable reason 
to support hatred against the individual or group subjected to God’s judgment.  In fact, 
divine judgment is usually not permanent since both Jews and Lamanites, who in 
various parts of the BoM are explicitly condemned by God, ultimately find favour and 
mercy before His eyes.  Therefore, the finality and intensity typical of hatred, which 
implies a definite judgment of a group or individual, is incompatible with our limited 
knowledge and with other characteristics which make our discernments imperfect in the 
least.  Perhaps this picture is somewhat different in the case of temporary anger, but 
when it comes to hatred, Jesus’ higher standard of love for one’s enemy should at least 
begin with an avoidance of hatred towards the one who has caused us evil.  Indeed, 
                                                 
73 Other references are found in D&C 98:46;103:26;105:30; Mosiah 13:13. 
74 Moses 7:33. 
75 Jacob 3:5; Alma 60:32. 
76 2 Ne. 29:5. 
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Mormon theology highlights that it is always wicked parents who teach their children 
to hate.77 
Yet, there are some objects which God’s followers should hate and some 
realities which good parents should teach their children to hate.  These are not 
individual human beings but impersonal objects, which nevertheless exert influence 
over our lives, particularly when, although avoidable, they are allowed to exist or when 
they are actively pursued.  Specifically, Alma counsels his son Heleman to teach the 
people “an everlasting hatred against sin and iniquity”.  Similarly, Jacob describes the 
righteous as those who have despised the shame of the world and the D&C calls the 
repentant to symbolically “come forth out of the fire, hating even the garments spotted 
with the flesh” of those who have rebelled against the Lord.78  Clearly, since such 
wickedness is always perpetrated by individuals distinguishing between the sins that 
should be hated and the sinners who should be loved is not a necessarily simple 
endeavour.  Still, it is a message of the LDS canonical texts that, with God’s help, the 
full avoidance of the hate directed at individuals is fully compatible with the hatred of 
that which is false, corrupt, and sinful.  Therefore, humans are ultimately responsible 
for when and how the emotion of hatred is manifested within their hearts. 
 
Developmental Instrumentality 
 Since hatred towards other individuals is regularly condemned by LDS 
scriptures it is expectedly difficult to identify any statement which points at its 
developmental instrumentality.  On the contrary, hate blocks progress, locks the mind 
in cycles of revengeful rumination, and motivates acts of destruction which cause 
irreversible damage.  In fact, when stating that “the Lamanites began...to exercise their 
hatred upon them” Mormon underlines this connection between emotion and 
murderous behaviour.79  Moreover, it is not only the lasting damage on those who stand 
at its receiving end that makes hatred an instrument of regression but it is also the 
burden which it represents for the one who experiences it in the first place.  In fact, 
when reflecting upon the fruits of his missionary labours, Ammon declares: “For if we 
had not come up out of Zarahemla, these our dearly beloved brethren, who have so 
dearly beloved us, would still have been racked with hatred against us, yea, and they 
                                                 
77 Mosiah 10:17; 4 Ne. 1:39. 
78 Alma 37:29,32; 2 Ne. 9:18; D&C 36:6.   
79 Mosiah 11:17. 
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would also have been strangers to God.”  Therefore, hate ‘racks’ the individual since it 
is “sore” to the soul, i.e. it deepens the spiritual isolation and the misery of its subject.80 
 At the same time, Mormon scriptures recognize that human hatred may fulfil a 
function which, in some of its aspects, can be considered positive.  For example, the 
BoM indicates that those who share an object of hate often enjoy great unity in their 
single objective.  In describing one of the many unbelieving communities in its pages it 
pinpoints that “notwithstanding they were not a righteous people, yet they were united 
in the hatred of those who had entered into a covenant to destroy the government.”81  
Yet, although it may occasionally perform a politically positive function, the whole 
canonical text conveys a message of incompatibility between spiritual development and 
human hatred.  Of course, the picture is quite different if we shift our focus from human 
objects to the appropriate objects of hatred which God has commanded humans to 
despise, namely sin and iniquity.  Furthermore, it is also possible to identify some 
positive spiritual developmental aspects when considering textual evidence about the 
way in which received hatred can be transformed into a source of sanctification. 
 In the first place, hatred of sin can intensely motivate individuals to act in 
obedience to divine truth and to perform great sacrifices for the sake of righteousness.  
The most visible example of this kind involves the people of Anti-Nephi-Lehi many of 
whom, as Ammon describes, “have laid down their lives; and we know that they have 
gone to their God, because of their love and of their hatred to sin.”82  Furthermore, the 
sorrow which ensues from being the receptor of hatred can function as a humbling 
catalyst, which nudges the individual to turn to God in repentance.  In speaking to the 
poor Zoramites Alma makes this point very clearly, 
It is well that ye are cast out of your synagogues, that ye may be humble, and that ye may learn 
wisdom...for it is because that ye are cast out, that ye are despised of your brethren because of 
your exceeding poverty, that ye are brought to a lowliness of heart; for ye are necessarily 
brought to be humble.  And now, because ye are compelled to be humble blessed are ye; for a 
man sometimes, if he is compelled to be humble, seeketh repentance; and now surely, 
whosoever repenteth shall find mercy.83 
 
Therefore, although the perpetrator is by no means justified in his actions, being the 
receptor of hatred may at times facilitate the process of repentance and sanctification 
through the condition of humility which is likely to ensue. 
                                                 
80 Alma 26:9;24:2. 
81 3 Ne. 7:11. 
82 Alma 26:34. 
83 Alma 32:12-13. 
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 Moreover, scriptures often highlight the fact that the love of God exists in 
contraposition to the hate of the world.  To obey God’s commandments and to follow 
in His path of discipleship does not guarantee popularity; in fact, it often involves the 
exact opposite.  Thus, in a letter to the Church Joseph Smith laments, “For if I, who am 
a man, do lift up my voice and call upon you to repent, and ye hate me, what will ye 
say when the day cometh when the thunders shall utter their voices?”  Jacob similarly 
describes his people as “a lonesome and a solemn people, wanderers, cast out from 
Jerusalem...and hated of our brethren”.84  Therefore, although not to be sought because 
inherently painful, persecution driven by hatred often follows the individual who 
chooses God over Satan.  Indeed, the Lord says “I call upon the weak things of the 
world, those who are unlearned and despised, to thrash the nations by the power of my 
Spirit.”85  In these contexts the faithful will not be excessively surprised by the 
opposition and will humbly seek divine assistance to overcome it.  Then, as assistance 
is received, such occasions will function as further strengthening testimonies of one’s 
faith in a loving God, as witnessed by Zenos in the midst of his prayer: “Yea, and thou 
hast also heard me when I have been cast out and have been despised by mine enemies; 
yea, thou didst hear my cries”.86 
 Therefore, just as it may motivate individuals to either good or evil, depending 
on its object, hatred may also teach something to individuals, whether about themselves 
or about others.  On the one hand, the person who consistently manifests hatred 
towards another is not driven by the Holy Spirit and is therefore in great need of 
repentance.  To be sure, in light of previous warnings, such recognitions cannot justify 
retaliatory acts of hatred and can only be accepted as preliminary imperfect judgments 
which have no eternal finality.  On the other hand, hatred by itself does not warrant an 
evaluation of the person who receives it, and it does not teach by necessity that the one 
who is its object should modify his behaviour in order to appease such ‘hatred’.  In fact, 
the evaluation should be focused on the reason for such opposition and at most, the 
character of the individual may be assessed for how he chooses to respond.  Still, in 
some cases, hate may indeed teach both hater and hated that something is in need of 
change: to the former, the intensity of one’s personal opposition, and possibly to the 
latter, one’s immoral behaviour, which lies at the root of the reactive emotion. 
                                                 
84 D&C 43:21; Jacob 7:26. 
85 D&C 35:13. 
86 Alma 33:10. 
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 In this context a final and much needed consideration remains to be explored.  
In light of the previously mentioned principle of ‘opposition’, which is so basic to 
Mormon theology, one of the teachings of Jesus, also repeated in the BoM, acquires 
particular significance, “No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one 
and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other”.87  What is of 
interest in this passage is that love and hatred, while focused on quite separate objects, 
are shown to be coexisting.  In similar fashion, a previous reference on the people of 
Anti-Nephi-Lehi mentioned both their love for God and their hatred of sin as a 
necessary pair.  In other words, love and hatred appear as two sides of the same 
cognitive/affective manifestation in which the presence of the one seems to require the 
presence of its necessary opposite.88  In fact, the very foundation of morality is built on 
such necessary and recognized dichotomy.  Thus, Jesus states that if one truly loves 
God he must hate that which is its opposite, namely Satan.  Therefore, the strength of 
one’s positive emotion is measurable also in terms of its negative counterpart.  Should 
hate for Satan and evil be lukewarm or not very intense then, correspondingly, the 
individual’s love or devotion to the divine cannot have reached its highest peak.    
What this affirmation of emotional opposition should imply for a Mormon 
theology of hatred in its various historical, sociological, and psychological extensions I 
can only begin to allude at this point.  Indeed, it seems that every ideology and 
philosophy which has succeeded in motivating people and in making a difference in 
their lives has needed to identify some appropriate focus of hatred in order to avoid the 
indifference of its adepts.  In the case of Mormonism, and indeed of most other 
religions, sin, iniquity, and various impersonal negative forces generally fill this realm.  
Other secular or political ethical systems have identified different kinds of impersonal 
forces, such as particular ideologies or specific values, as the evils which should be 
hated (slavery, Nazism, Communism, etc.).  In both realms, whether secular or 
religious, moral systems have at times explicitly personalized their objects of hatred 
and in so doing have unfortunately justified crimes like murders and persecutions.  
Indeed, perhaps the greatest challenge of our world is to demarcate morality and 
freedom in such ways as to allow them to coexist. 
                                                 
87 3 Ne. 13:24. 
88 In this context a recent medical study on the shared neural pathways of love and hate is certainly of 
interest.  See Zeki and Romaya (2008), e3556. 
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Finally, returning to Mormonism, one of the things which distinguishes the 
tradition theologically is its belief in a corporeal personal God who embodies all 
possible goodness more literally than other Christians believe.   Then, this is perhaps 
one of the reasons why the personage of Satan continues to hold a place of significance 
in LDS theology at a time when most Christian theologies seem to make no mention of 
a spiritual devil which personifies evil.  In other words, although he is not believed to 
be the ultimate necessary source of evil, but only evil’s main facilitative instrument 
Lucifer is for Mormons a personage of spirit who embodies evil and hatred in clear 
‘opposition’ to the good and the love which is embodied in the Heavenly Father.  
Indeed, although both good and evil may be depersonalized in the Mormon theological 
context of eternal principles the ‘plan of salvation’ as presently taught would not have 
meaning without Satan’s hatred for God’s children.  Thus, if Christ’s love for humanity 
as manifested in His Atonement defines the positive centre of the plan of progression 
correspondingly Satan’s hatred delineates its negative core. 
 
Hatred vs. the Atonement 
 As the archetype of the greatest act of self-sacrificing love the Atonement 
clearly stands at the antithesis of hatred.  Indeed, if at all connected to hate, its effects 
are understood in terms which pertain to its elimination or reduction rather than to its 
inception or increase.  Moreover, even when considering sin and wickedness as 
hatred’s objects, Mormon scriptures do not directly associate the Atonement with the 
presence of such ‘righteous’ hate although the wider theological framework must 
certainly affirm the two to be compatible.  In fact, if only indirectly, and in light of the 
previous discussion on ‘opposites’, by facilitating and intensifying the flow of divine 
love the Atonement contemporaneously channels an emotional rejection of what stands 
as contrary to that love, namely sin.  Therefore, although a first impression would 
suggest that hate and the Atonement are completely unrelated, there is at least some 
less visible thread that connects what is usually considered to be the most unacceptable 
emotion and the ultimate expression of divine emotional perfection. 
   In this context the most explicit connection is perhaps found in the very nature 
of the act of Atonement.  In other words, the sacrifice which constitutes Christ’s offer 
of a perfect life is often conceptualized as involving His reception of human hatred.  
Thus, Jesus stands as the object of all hate, or, as stated in Abinadi’s quotation of 
Isaiah, “He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with 
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grief; and we hid as it were our faces from him; he was despised, and we esteemed him 
not.”89  While this description may extend to include a wider portion of Jesus’ life such 
hatred was particularly concentrated against Him at the time of the Passion.  Then, 
human hatred played a significant and needed role in the process of Atonement because 
it first set in motion the arrest and trial which culminated in Jesus’ willing death on the 
cross and secondly it contributed to give His death its unique meaning, i.e. that it was a 
loving sacrifice in behalf of a hateful humanity.90 
 Furthermore, the LDS theology of Atonement also frames Jesus’ experience in 
Gethsemane in the large context of divine sufferings which included the effects of 
human hatred.  Indeed, although no visible human hatred ‘caused’ Gethsemane in the 
same way as it ‘caused’ the crucifixion, Jesus’ substitutionary absorption of the all 
encompassing suffering of humanity must have included the painful effects of human 
hatred alongside such things as sin, disease, and afflictions.  In this manner Christ 
functioned as the object of all possible human hatred, whether in its past, present, or 
future manifestations, when He experienced its concentrated effects as part of His 
voluntary suffering in humanity’s behalf.  In turn, as previously outlined, this 
experience of ultimate sorrow endowed Jesus with a fuller ability to empathize with the 
human family which then enabled Him to more effectively come to the rescue of those 
individuals who turn to Him for assistance.  Among these are certainly some who suffer 
under the yoke of hatred, whether in the capacity of haters or as the objects of hate. 
 Therefore, in the various conversion experiences previously quoted, it is Jesus’ 
Atonement which ‘cures’ individuals of their existing hatred as the Holy Spirit fills 
them with the sanctifying ‘fruits’ of love and joy.  Examples are numerous and it is 
sufficient to mention the people of Ammon (or Anti-Nephi-Lehi), Alma the Younger, 
the sons of Mosiah, Zeezrom.  Furthermore, when subjected to hateful persecutions, 
others find comfort in the peace of the Spirit while also seeking to be delivered from 
their affliction.  Examples include Nephi son of Lehi, the people of Limhi, the people 
of Alma, the righteous church members in the book of Helaman, Joseph Smith, and 
many others.  In these instances, as already examined, the Atonement seems to function 
at both cognitive and affective levels of emotional experiences.  Indeed, ‘sanctified’ 
                                                 
89 Mosiah 14:3. 
90 Within the penal-substitutionary view of Atonement, as also present in LDS theology, Jesus is the 
receptor of God’s wrath or of eternal justice for the sins of the whole world.  Yet, since this particular 
conceptualization has more direct reference to anger than to hatred I do not find it to be of relevance in 
the present analysis. 
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individuals are described in terms which point both to their acquisition of an expanded 
and hopeful eternal perspective as well as to the strengthening of their affective state 
through feelings of peace, humility, and even joy.91 
 In these contexts the Atonement may enlighten the suffering person to discern 
between circumstances when it is appropriate to continually petition for deliverance 
from hateful individuals, when defensive violence is an acceptable means to obtain 
such deliverance, and when the humble disciple simply needs to endure with patience 
and long-suffering.  In fact, the power of the Spirit works its main transformative effect 
in those contexts where a willing heart seeks to receive its influence in humility.  In 
short, as previously highlighted, the Atonement generally functions in a context of 
respect for individual agency.  This means that if the hater chooses to nourish his 
negative emotion and fully refuses to reject hatred for love, God will usually respect 
this act of agency while endeavouring to strengthen and support the suffering object of 
such hate until deliverance is possible.  Clearly, in circumstances of murder such 
‘internal’ support does not prevent the taking of a life, thus creating one of those 
instances in which the ‘problem of evil’ visibly rears its head, even for people of great 
faith. 
A classic illustration of this pattern is found in the BoM narrative which depicts 
the believers’ martyrdom by fire before the eyes of Alma and Amulek.  As the scene 
unfolds Amulek is overcome with empathic sorrow for the many women and children 
being killed.  He then asks Alma: “How can we witness this awful scene?  Therefore let 
us stretch forth our hands, and exercise the power of God which is in us, and save them 
from the flames.”  Yet, Alma refuses to act and justifies his decision in these terms, 
The Spirit constraineth me that I must not stretch forth mine hand; for behold the Lord receiveth 
them up unto himself, in glory; and he doth suffer that they may do this thing, or that the people 
may do this thing unto them, according to the hardness of their hearts, that the judgments which 
he shall exercise upon them in his wrath may be just; and the blood of the innocent shall stand 
as a witness against them.92 
 
Thus, Alma knows by means of some implied revelation that God allows evil 
persecutors to perpetrate their hateful actions in order for their agency to be fully 
                                                 
91 For example, when Alma and his followers are in bondage of a newly formed coalition of Lamanites 
and Alma’s former priestly associates, persecutions become so unbearable that the believers repeatedly 
petition God for deliverance.  However, God does not immediately deliver this people although “the 
burdens which were laid upon Alma and his brethren were made light; yea, the Lord did strengthen them 
that they could bear up their burdens with ease, and they did submit cheerfully and with patience to all 
the will of the Lord.” (Mosiah 24:15)  Thus, although sorrow-causing hatred is not removed, an internal 
change is facilitated so much that the impact of the hateful circumstances is diminished. 
92 Alma 14:10-11. 
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expressed.  This conscious restructuring of the ‘meaning’ of suffering enables him to 
overcome his natural inclination to eliminate, resist, or impede hatred at all costs.  
Furthermore, it is significant to note that when the hate hits him more directly through 
physical pain and privations he abides by this same ‘revelation’.   
In fact, throughout the rest of this BoM chapter Alma and Amulek become the 
main victims of persecution as they are subjected to beating, binding, starving, 
mocking, and spitting for a prolonged period of time.  Then, only “after they had thus 
suffered for many days” Alma cries to God for power to be delivered from such hateful 
treatment and subsequently he and Amulek are able to break the chords that bind them 
and escape.93  The text does not explain how Alma knows that the time to say ‘enough’ 
has arrived, or why that particular moment should be the appropriate time of 
deliverance.  In any case, Alma’s faith is what emerges prominently from the account 
surpassing what may be viewed as his very natural and certainly acceptable desire to 
avoid suffering.  Thus, Alma recognizes God’s will as the greatest good for which to 
strive whereas faithless individuals always retain the avoidance of suffering as the 
highest priority to be pursued at all costs, even sin.   
 There is certainly no specification within Mormon theology that, in its details, 
Alma’s experience should be considered normative, although the general principle of 
attendance and obedience to the spirit of revelation remains of significance.  Indeed, 
LDS canonical texts do not allow a generalization in respect to a specific manner in 
which individuals are called to respond to hatred since accounts range from justified 
use of war or violent retaliation to pacifist, self-sacrificial responses, which may either 
be limited in time, as in Alma’s case, or which may culminate in the ultimate sacrifice 
of one’s life, as in the case of the people of Ammon.  Still, one point is quite explicit, 
namely that if the Atonement is to assist in the difficult experience of being the receptor 
of hatred the individual must endeavour to prevent what may otherwise function as the 
worst possible spiritual damage, i.e. emotional contagion.  In other words, LDS 
scriptures pinpoint that when viewed from an eternal perspective it is worse to hate than 
to receive hate, particularly when hatred endures, because human hatred closes the door 
to the presence of a Holy Spirit which conveys peace, joy, and love.  Then, perhaps the 
greatest succour of the Atonement comes from its endowment of strength, perception, 
humility, and patience which prevents hatred from ever taking root in one’s soul. 
                                                 
93 Alma 14:14-26. 
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 In conclusion, in this chapter I have analysed a few passages from the LDS 
canon, whose content pertains to the relating emotions as represented by love and hate.  
By highlighting the explicit and implicit textual evidence for the cognitive necessity, 
personal responsibility, and developmental instrumentality associated with these terms 
I have aimed to provide support for an implied ‘folk model’ of emotion, which brings 
these canonical authors to echo modern scholars and scientists in affirming the three 
basic characteristics which define emotions.  Furthermore, I have examined various 
interlinks and contingencies that associate the Mormon understanding of Atonement 
with both love and hatred and have highlighted the significance of such interactions 
within the wider theological framework of Mormonism.  Thus, having completed my 
analysis of the textual evidences that relate to the three selected categories of emotion I 
now summarize my main conclusions and briefly explore some potential questions and 
foci of exploration which may facilitate the advance of this area of research at a future 
time.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mormon Emotions: Knowledge, Character, Spirit 
 
 The first of the two primary objectives of this work has been to initiate a 
dialogue on emotion, if only by highlighting some points of correspondence, between a 
socio-scientific approach on the one hand and that of LDS theology on the other.  To be 
sure, Mormon theology has all but monopolized the stage in the present context since 
no attempt has been made to ensure equal time for the exposition of socio-scientific 
perspectives.  One of the reasons for such imbalance has been my desire to demonstrate 
at the outset of this dialogue that the conversation is both possible and worthwhile.  
Since in the present era the scientific perspective enjoys widespread acceptance while 
theology is increasingly viewed as an obscure field of discourse, which at best is 
meaningful to a selected few and at worse lacks legitimate epistemic value, this work 
has attempted to emphasize the common core that LDS theology and socio-scientific 
perspectives share on the subject of emotion.  Therefore, having established some 
general foundations in the two fields, it is my hope that the conversation may be 
considered sufficiently promising to be carried forward in a variety of possible 
directions. 
 Indeed, some researchers, especially Mormon scholars, have already engaged 
the conversation at a more focused level of enquiry in all likelihood having assumed 
that enough commonalities exist to make these pursuits of some value.  My approach 
has begun in the opposite direction but it ultimately confirms and attempts to articulate 
these very assumptions.  Furthermore, it has been my goal to explicitly assert that 
conversations of this nature are possible in relation to most subjects of scientific 
enquiry, although at various levels of depth, since Mormon theology is inherently 
incomplete, developing, and unapologetic about its willingness to borrow truth from 
whatever its legitimate source.  Therefore, inasmuch as a field’s epistemology does not 
inherently clash with the epistemic framework of the LDS worldview the possibilities 
for exchanges of this kind are virtually limitless.  Then, when the objectives and 
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methods of socio-scientific disciplines do not involve such necessary conflicts, 
Mormonism should and often has welcomed conversations and potential acquisitions of 
this nature.1 
 In fact, and to return to the present endeavour, I have demonstrated that some of 
the core concepts which underlie socio-scientific perspectives on emotion also appear 
prominently within the theological ‘scaffolding’ of the LDS view of existence.  This is 
certainly the case for such foundational ideas as responsibility, development, and 
perhaps, in a less explicit manner, for the monistic unity inferred by current 
cognitive/affective definitions of emotions.  Indeed, one cannot fail to note that there 
are at least some affinities between the significant emphasis on the role of cognition in 
the socio-scientific study of emotion and what I have termed the materialistic monism 
of Mormonism which involves both normative and descriptive unities of body and 
spirit, or of mind and brain.  Furthermore, I have repeatedly highlighted how one of the 
framing principles of LDS theology, namely Christ’s Atonement, also functions as the 
root metaphor which characterizes all of Mormonism’s emotion-related rhetoric.  In 
this context, and to stress only one area of its defining role, I have suggested that the 
Atonement operates as the theological parallel to what socio-scientific studies have 
identified as emotional regulation.  Yet, the Atonement may also be understood to 
include theologically many other ‘secular’ emotion-related processes such as emotional 
interpretation and therapeutic emotion intervention. 
 Then, with this introductory overview in place, the main body of this analysis 
has centred on a more focused examination of the specific emotion references which 
appear within the texts of unique LDS canonical scriptures.  To facilitate this 
exploration I have identified three categories of emotional phenomena, which I have 
labelled respectively the predicting, the assessing, and the relating type, each of which 
was further classified into a dichotomous distinction of its most typical manifestations.  
Consequently I have focused my attention on three pairs of emotions, each of which 
depicts both a positive and a negative manifestation of that particular kind of 
phenomenon.  In turn, I have explored all textual instances of these six emotions with 
the expressed purpose of addressing whether their specific usage and context supported 
an implied understanding of emotion which affirms its three core socio-scientific 
foundations, namely cognitive necessity, personal responsibility and developmental 
                                                 
1 An historical analysis of the relationship of Mormonism with science may be found in Paul (1992). 
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instrumentality.  Finally, for each emotion I have also analyzed its relationship with the 
LDS doctrine of Christ’s Atonement, specifically focusing on the way in which the 
Atonement shapes the evaluation, meaning, and management of each of these 
emotional phenomena. 
 The three emotion pairs with which I have been concerned are the following: 
hope-fear, joy-sorrow, and love-hate.  To each of these I have devoted a chapter within 
which I have aimed to outline at least some of the relevant scriptural verses that contain 
and describe these very emotions.  As a result, I was able to conclude that significant 
evidence exists for an LDS canonical theology of emotion, which firmly supports the 
three-fold view affirmed by socio-scientific perspectives.  Furthermore, in relation to 
the authors of these unique scriptural texts, the evidence points in the direction of a 
‘folk model’ of emotion which is similarly based on this distinct foundation.  In other 
words, the Mormon canon does not hold the old dualistic perspective which devalued 
emotion in viewing it as inherently irrational, beastly, and in opposition to the spiritual 
nature of humanity.  Instead, and in agreement with Christian theologians like Jonathan 
Edwards, Mormons affirm that the “religious man is not one who subjects passion to 
the rule of reason, but one whose reason is passionate and whose affection is 
intellectual.”2 
Indeed, in light of the uniquely theomorphic emphasis of LDS theological 
anthropology, not only the religious man but also his ultimate example of a distant 
perfection, namely God Himself, is emotional.  Thus, Elliot summarizes it well when 
he affirms: 
God is personal, God is emotional and God feels all the emotions that love can produce.  This is 
central to the character of God.  Our emotions are part of being made in the image of God; they 
are a good and integral part of human existence...As a man Jesus sets an example for the 
emotions of the Christian.  As God, Jesus shows us the emotions of the creator.  While the 
Gnostic Christ cures people of their passions, the Jesus of the Gospels is a man of 
passions…Jesus responds to the anguish of the world with compassion... Jesus Christ is 
portrayed as a man of deep emotion.  Jesus felt in passionate fullness (John 7:37-38).  Further, if 
Jesus was one with the Father this is also good evidence for the emotional nature of God himself 
(John 10:30, 14:9).3   
 
The God of Mormonism, both in the person of Jesus and of the Heavenly Father, is 
certainly such a Being.  In Him are found all the emotions in their perfect nature and in 
their perfect expression, including the appropriate time, intensity, and object.  By 
contrast, human capacity for emotion is more limited since the manner of its expression 
                                                 
2 Cherry (1990), 167. 
3 Elliott (2005), 247-49. 
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is often driven by the “natural man” who is “an enemy to God” when left to his own 
strength and to his own tendencies.  For this reason human emotions need to be 
properly directed and controlled. 
 The Holy Spirit is the primary instrument which enables this process of 
intervention and sanctification of the emotions.  In turn, it is Christ’s Atonement that 
bridges the gap between divinity and mortality by allowing the Spirit to function as an 
actual presence in the lives of those humans who remain open to its influence.  Thus, 
within the Mormon theological framework, the Spirit performs multiple functions in 
relation to the emotions.  Its facilitative and purifying role can then be felt in such 
diverse areas as the identification of emotion sources, the moral evaluation of both the 
internal and external dynamics which trigger them, the selection of the most 
appropriate object and environment for its expression, the use of negative emotions as 
an instrument for character-building experience, the ability to control the intensity of 
particular emotional expressions, the use of emotion as an epistemic instrument for 
both spiritual and secular information, and others.  In short, the functions of the Holy 
Spirit are as numerous as the functions of the living human being as Mormon Apostle 
Parley P. Pratt once explained, 
An intelligent being, in the image of God, possesses every organ, attribute, sense, sympathy, 
affection, of will, wisdom, love, power and gift, which is possessed by God Himself. But these 
are possessed by man in his rudimental state in a subordinate sense of the word...The gift of the 
Holy Spirit adapts itself to all these organs or attributes. It quickens all the intellectual faculties, 
increases, enlarges, expands, and purifies all the natural passions and affections, and adapts 
them by the gift of wisdom, to their lawful use. It inspires, develops, cultivates, and matures all 
the fine-toned sympathies, joys, tastes, kindred feelings, and affections of our nature. It inspires 
virtue, kindness, goodness, tenderness, gentleness, and charity… Love, joy, hope, ambition, 
faith, and all the virtuous principles of the human mind may here expand and grow, and 
flourish, unchecked by any painful emotions or gloomy fears4 
 
Therefore, the Spirit intervenes on all relevant aspects of emotion, including its 
cognitive necessity, personal responsibility, and developmental instrumentality. 
 In the first place, the Holy Ghost operates over the cognitive faculties of the 
individual in order to regulate emotions.  Indeed, my examination of the six selected 
emotions has regularly confirmed that a cognitive component is always intrinsic to 
emotions and that, at least in some instances, it is also causative of these very 
phenomena.  It is true that some types of emotions, the predicting ones for example, are 
more visibly cognitive than other emotions like the relating love and hate.  Still, all 
emotions have a reason or motivation which is not exclusively based on physiological 
                                                 
4 Pratt (1978), 96-97. 
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factors, but which is further and often mainly defined by a particular way of thinking.  
Therefore, in His roles as testifier, the Spirit often aids the individual to shift his focus 
on significant and often invisible aspects of a spiritual reality, thus facilitating the 
enlargement of perspective and consequently the reduction, or in some cases 
intensification, of particular emotional reactions. 
 Then, with this recognition of cognitive necessity and of some cognitive 
causality in the background, as well as in the context of the strong LDS emphasis on 
the principle of agency, I have shown that Mormon canonical texts underline personal 
responsibility for both experience and expression of emotions.  In fact, God’s children 
are commanded to experience particular forms of emotion, such as love for the divine, 
and not to have others, like joy in wickedness for example.  For these emotional 
choices individuals are held accountable and the Holy Spirit functions both to 
strengthen this accountability and to reduce its effects.  As needed, it may remind some 
of the moral significance attached to most of the emotions whilst it will also help those 
who have repented of emotional transgressions to feel the forgiveness that removes the 
negative effects of their mistakes.  Thus, in His role as comforter, the Spirit aids the 
individual to find peace in a context of imperfect and negative emotions, whether one 
has been the experiencer of emotion in sin or whether he is the innocent victim of 
somebody else’s sinful manifestation of these phenomena.  In this manner LDS 
canonical texts emphasize that since choices relative to emotions are often of great 
consequence they require divine guidance to function in their fullest positive potential. 
 Finally, my analysis has highlighted several scriptural passages in which the 
developmental instrumentality of emotions was visibly inferred.  To be sure, I also 
pinpointed those instances in which the ‘negative’ emotions, i.e. fear, sorrow, and hate, 
were presented as an obstacle rather than as a catalyst for progression.  Yet, it was not 
necessarily the type of emotion which created the impediment; instead, the obstacle 
was found in the specific object of the emotion or in its exclusivity.  Still, emotions can 
both teach and motivate and in so doing they move individuals forward in their path of 
human and spiritual development.  The Spirit facilitates these very processes by 
intensifying them, by directing them, and by exposing those aspects of both external 
reality and internal desires which often distort the epistemic and motivating value of 
particular emotions.  Thus, in His role as reminder, the Holy Ghost prompts the 
individual in the direction of the most fundamental principles of truth which should 
both inform and drive human processes of emotion evaluation and employment.  
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Furthermore, it assists in transforming moments of suffering from the negative effects 
of emotions into developmental opportunities built on an enlarging experience of 
empathy.  Therefore, as the individual is reminded of Christ’s empathic sorrow in his 
behalf, as his empathic baggage of emotional experiences is enlarged, and as his 
character is strengthened in the face of adversity, Christ-like love takes root, blossoms, 
and purifies one’s developing spirit. 
 In conclusion, and in addition to engaging in this early stage of dialogue on 
emotion between science and Mormonism, my main purpose in this work has been to 
develop an introductory Mormon theology of emotion.  In this context, I have only 
been able to highlight a few points of significance given the great number of 
theological tenets with which emotions intersect.  Still, it has been possible to lay some 
foundations, the first being that contemporary LDS theology of emotion parallels socio-
scientific enquiry in at least three of its core philosophical and experimental 
conclusions.  Then, emotions have been shown as inherently linked to the Mormon 
view of existence in which individuals, if they so desire, find themselves dynamically 
progressing in spiritual capacity and strength.  Therefore, emotions function as a key 
instrument which defines a developing person in relation to such characteristics as 
knowledge, character, and spiritual interaction (in the sense of experience of the Holy 
Spirit).  In other words, emotions describe what a person is and what he may become, 
what he knows and what he is; especially, they define what an individual thinks of 
Christ.  Indeed, according to Mormon theology, to achieve the highest potential in 
knowledge and character, which is to grow in one’s emotional life, people require the 
sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit.  Thus, while acting as testifier, comforter, and 
reminder the Spirit brings, by emotional means, light, strength, and divine grace to the 
emotional individual.  Ultimately, it brings the empathic and loving power of the 
Atonement of Christ to both spirit and body, or to both mind and heart. 
 
Directions for Further Research 
 There is no doubt that in the present analysis I have only scratched the surface 
of what may be identified as the LDS theology of emotion.  Furthermore, the 
theological-scientific dialogue I have employed in constructing such a theology has 
also been limited to its most basic level of engagement, namely the highlighting of 
areas of correspondence.  It follows that many avenues of potential exploration have 
remained untouched, but further research may begin to fill these gaps through focused 
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studies in a variety of possible directions.  In fact, although much more could be done 
theologically, both in the exclusive LDS setting and comparatively, many questions 
about the nature and role of emotional experiences in the Mormon context could be 
addressed psychologically and sociologically in informed interaction with the subject 
population’s theology.   Therefore, my final challenge in this endeavour is briefly to 
outline at least some of these potential explorative directions and particularly those that 
would build on and expand the present introductory examination. 
 Beginning with the theological focus it is evident that both the objects and the 
sources of the analysis just completed have involved some necessary limitations.  For 
example, and as already suggested, a canonical exploration of anger in the context of 
the negative relating emotions would significantly add to my present study.  
Furthermore, since my focus has been limited to six prototypical emotions any other 
emotion term that could be located on the spectra of the three selected emotional 
categories should receive some attention.  Specifically, in the predicting category I can 
think of ‘positive’ terms like courage, confidence, expectation, and even prophecy.  
Moreover, given its undeniable theological and emotional centrality faith should be 
carefully examined in its relationship to hope in order to ascertain both points of 
contact and of departure.  On the other hand, the ‘negative’ side of the spectrum could 
be more widely explored by placing terms like doubt, worry, and despair under the lens 
of analytic focus.  
 Similarly, in the assessing category the canonical use of terms like gladness, 
rest, blessedness, and of anguish, agony, grief, affliction, or mourn may contribute to 
broaden the theological picture presented in this work.  Finally, the relating spectrum 
could be enlarged to include longing, respect, devotion as well as enmity and a variety 
of synonyms of anger (fury, indignation, rage, wrath).  Whether the scriptural 
exploration of these terms were again to be used to address my question about the 
three-fold nature of emotion or to examine some other aspect of the theological use of 
emotion words in Mormonism it is likely that such a study could provide at least a 
nuanced contribution to the LDS theology of emotion.  For this purpose other emotions 
which may not be as easily classifiable, including jealousy, patience, or envy should 
receive their due attention as well as all those terms, which do not signify a specific 
emotion, but which are nevertheless significant in describing emotional experiences 
(mind, heart, thought, feeling, etc).  In turn, the meaning of all these emotion and 
emotion-related words could be examined in their nineteenth-century historical context 
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in order to attempt a canonical exegesis, which is as close as possible to the linguistic 
reality of the ‘voice’ which dictated these texts, namely Joseph Smith’s. 
 Indeed, within an expanded LDS theology of emotion greater attention should 
be paid to Mormonism’s founder.  In the first place, his non-canonical teachings should 
be explored to identify his beliefs on both the general subject of emotion and on more 
specific emotional manifestations.  In fact, although non-scriptural, Joseph Smith’s 
teachings seem to acquire an immediate quasi-canonical status among the Church’s 
membership given the unique status of the man as the Prophet of the Restoration.  
Thus, at least for those words which have survived in institutional transmission, 
Joseph’s written or even reported declarations on the subject have certainly played a 
role in building the structure of the LDS theology of emotion, however this is to be 
described.  Furthermore, since in the collective Church memory the Prophet still 
functions, at least to some extent, as the human embodiment of Mormonism the 
exploration of his emotional life could similarly bring to the surface some important 
elements which presently inform the emotional interpretation and regulation of many a 
Latter-day Saint.5 
 Another avenue of exploration which may lead to insights about Joseph Smith’s 
own perspectives on emotional phenomena would involve an examination of the 
Mormon canonical texts by him written or produced with the hermeneutical assumption 
that in such texts his nineteenth century voice is implicitly present.  This kind of 
approach would likely be resisted by many orthodox Mormons, although it is at least 
debatable, in an LDS theological context, whether prophetic ‘revelation’ must 
necessarily transcend the reality and the thought of its delivering instrument.  In other 
words, particularly in relation to the D&C but in some degree also in the BoM 
translation context, I know of no LDS theological tenet which may be paralleled to the 
common Muslim perspective on the ‘direct’ verbatim reception of the Koranic 
revelation by the prophet Muhammed.  It is therefore at least possible that Mormon 
theology could conceive of Joseph Smith’s revelations as involving divine origin and 
content as well as some degree of ‘filtered’ expression.  Yet, it is also understandable 
                                                 
5 There have been various attempts to present some kind of psycho-history of Joseph Smith, whose life is 
particularly inviting to such attempts given the many emotional upheavals which characterized it.  The 
most notable one is probably Brodie (1995) and most recently Bushman and Woodworth (2007) have 
also included some psychological considerations in their historical analysis.  Several other authors have 
widely speculated on Smith’s emotional make-up as well as on the purported psychological 
consequences of traumatic life events for the theology which he taught.  See Vogel (2004), Morain 
(1998), Anderson (1999), and Davies (2000), 86-90. 
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why most Mormons would resist embarking in a process of discernment between the 
one and the other. 
Less problematic for the purpose of extracting Joseph’s theology of emotion 
would be an analysis of the Joseph Smith Translation of the Bible, which does not 
claim to be ‘revealed’ but ‘inspired’ (an adjective with lesser mystic immediacy), and 
which, notwithstanding its title, recognizably originates in an interpretation rather than 
in a translation.  In fact, from a brief survey of the JST’s content it is evident that 
several of the biblical passages which the Prophet modified are concerned with 
emotions.  For example, he emphasized the need to avoid anger and strengthened the 
association of anger with sin by removing the clause “without a cause” from Matt. 5:22 
and by changing Eph. 4:26 from “Be ye angry and sin not” to “Can ye be angry and not 
sin?”  At the same time he did not remove references to God’s own anger and jealousy, 
thus suggesting that he viewed the biblical, especially the Old Testament, 
anthropomorphisms on the ‘emotional’ nature of God as sufficiently correct.6  Then, an 
important question to explore in this context would centre on the identification of those 
dynamics which distinguish godly from human experiences of anger, particularly in 
light of the unique LDS perspective on the imago Dei.  As already suggested, a focused 
study on the Mormon theology of anger would be highly beneficial for this objective 
and could shed some light on the relative significance of ‘correct thinking’ in relation to 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the emotion. 
 In any case, and more generally, the most visible theological link which is 
missing from the present work involves the vast body of prophetic statements, 
including Joseph Smith’s teachings, whose content has been focused on the subject of 
emotion.  Given the unique nature of Mormon theology with its emphasis on 
continuous prophetic revelation examining the words and writings of LDS Authorities 
on this subject should probably form the highest priority of any future theological study 
of this kind.  This is particularly relevant in the contemporary setting where the 
sermons of prophets and Apostles delivered twice a year in the World General 
Conference of the Church are first heard live by a large number of Church members to 
be then printed for repeated consultation and study in Sunday lessons, home visits, 
                                                 
6 In a separate context I have examined how these specific teachings on the emotional nature of God 
continued to be expressed by Brigham Young and by other Church leaders of the nineteenth century.  
See Properzi (2009).  In this context it would also be of particular interest to explore whether theological 
ideas about emotions have evolved or changed in association with the various historical transitions that 
have characterized the history of the Church. 
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personal instruction, and weekly family gatherings for worship and recreation (family 
home evenings).  In other words, and with the benefits of modern technology, there has 
never been a time, except in the earliest days of the movement, when the teachings of 
the Church’s highest hierarchy have been as available to the large body of the faithful 
as they are today.  Thus, examining the emotion content of the LDS canon is not 
sufficient if one aims to construct a comprehensive LDS theology of emotion.  Hence, 
the interpretations that the General Authorities apply to the canonical references on 
emotion and other teachings that they express on the subject, especially if frequent, 
ought to be included in any future examination of this nature. 
 Yet, it is one thing to outline the boundaries of canonical or prophetic 
statements about emotions and it is quite another to affirm that such view matches the 
perspective of the majority of church members.  Given the increasing cultural, 
intellectual, and social diversity of twenty-first century Mormons an exact 
correspondence of perspectives, particularly in a topic as elusive as emotion, should not 
be assumed.  Therefore, examining what the Church membership believes about 
emotions, both in relation to perceptions of theological orthodoxy and in the context of 
what is viewed as only ‘potentially’ doctrinal, could be useful and of great interest in its 
own right.  It would further be of significance to ascertain whether members of the LDS 
Church experience conflict between their theological interpretation of emotions and the 
socio-cultural classifications they have internalized.  This could lead to unique insights 
on what areas of emotional interpretation may need further authoritative clarification 
within the theological communicative content of the Church as well as providing 
information on the modalities through which members resolve perceived conflicts 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ messages of a psychological nature. 
By moving in this direction of exploration we would then encounter the social 
and psychological sciences, which could be engaged directly to examine a variety of 
aspects that pertain to the Mormon emotional life.  While allowing theology to inform 
our analysis many different questions could be addressed with the expressed purpose of 
identifying and defining the emotives of Mormonism.  Examinations of this kind could 
explore various areas of LDS material and non-material culture, oral traditions, 
folklore, and ritual practices, whether in the ecclesial or in the family setting.  
Sociologically, case studies of selected LDS wards could shed light on any underlying 
rules of emotional expression and on their relationship with social hierarchical roles 
within the community.  Similarly, the emotives of unique dimensions of the LDS life, 
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such as the mission experience, dating, or the ‘Especially for Youth’ programme, could 
bring to the surface interesting emotional patterns which would then need to be 
contextualized in the wider framework of the Mormon experience. 
Other studies could involve a more comparative or a more international 
emphasis.  Thus, the Mormon normative skeleton in relation to emotions could be 
juxtaposed to the accepted cultural standards of wider American society for parallel 
examination.  Whether the focus were to centre on specific emotional behaviours or on 
patterns of emotional regulation which Mormonism and larger society do not share it 
would be of interest to examine the consequences of such LDS distinctness.  For 
example, although many studies have addressed the physiological impact of the 
Mormon health code, the ‘Word of Wisdom’, more can be explored in relation to the 
emotional impact of the LDS prohibition of such substances as alcohol, tobacco, and 
coffee, which are often used by some in society as emotion or mood regulators.  On the 
other hand, Mormon emotional life could be juxtaposed to other traditions’ 
interpretation and management of emotion, both Christian and non-Christian, not only 
in relation to their orthodoxy but also to the wider realm of their orthopraxis.  In this 
context I suppose that an interesting area of enquiry for most religious traditions would 
involve the often problematic relationship between their emotional orthodoxy and their 
emotional orthopraxis. 
Furthermore, given Mormonism’s increasing international scope, studies may 
be focused to specifically address local emotional realities in cultural contexts which 
are distant from the United States’.  In fact, it would be of interest to assess the degree 
to which the emotional picture of Mormonism is homogeneous, especially in ritual and 
rhetoric, in the larger context of its international extension.  Then, studies that would 
focus on specific LDS populations could explore a variety of their psychological 
dynamics.  For example, the role emotions play in epistemology, especially in their 
association with divine revelation, seems to require more detailed exploration.  It would 
be of interest to identify patterns of epistemic classifications of emotional experience 
and potential models of discernment between emotions with epistemic value and those 
which have none.  These could be followed by further analyses that possibly could 
associate greater tendencies to ‘sacralise’ emotions with other relevant aspects of 
personality or of individual theology.  Similarly, the thought processes of the Saints 
may be dissected to examine the degree to which theological tenets determine their 
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decisions in relation to emotional regulation.  Then, in addition to exploring the nature 
of such thoughts, one could also examine their perceived efficacy. 
To be sure, any study which were to be concerned with specific aspects of the 
emotional life of a Mormon population would face the primary challenge of isolating 
the LDS ‘component’ of exploration within such realms as thoughts, words, and 
behaviours.  In some cases this task may turn out to be impossible or particularly 
problematic but bringing theology openly to the surface, particularly as it is perceived 
by the individual subjects of the study, may considerably facilitate the endeavour.  
Then, even those socio-scientific conclusions, which in the present work have only 
been engaged somewhat superficially, could be explored in greater detail in dialogue 
with Mormon theology.  For example, as already hinted, the cognitive necessity of 
emotions may emerge strengthened from an exploration of the theological appraisals 
associated with them.  Furthermore, the personal responsibility which they entail may 
be highlighted by specific theologically informed patterns of attentional deployment.  
In similar fashion, exploring the significance of emotions for purposes of theological 
learning may function to emphasize their developmental instrumentality. 
In conclusion, the intersection of the world of emotion with the world of 
Mormonism has produced a story that has only begun to be told.  Indeed, given its 
continuous development and extension, it is likely that the tale will never be explored 
or recounted in its totality.  Still, within this narrative there is much that can be 
understood and related; hence, this work, although only introductory, has represented 
an effort in this direction.  What has emerged is a picture where emotions are the very 
colours of the illustrations of our lives and of our souls.  In this, Mormons would echo 
Keats in exclaiming, “The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and 
superstitious is ‘a vale of tears’ from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary 
interposition of God and taken to Heaven – What a little circumscribe[d] straightened 
notion!  Call the world if you Please ‘The vale of Soul-making’.  Then you will find out 
the use of the world…How then are Souls to be made?  How then are these sparks 
which are God to have identity given them – so as ever to possess a bliss peculiar to 
each ones individual existence?  How, but by the medium of a world like this?”7  And 
this world is the world of emotions! 
                                                 
7 Gittings and Anstey (1995), 175. 
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